Income distribution and vertical comparative advantage. Theory and evidence

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In this paper, we provide a general model discussing the impact of non-homothetic preferences on the vertical comparative advantage of countries, i.e. the existence of demand-based determinants of the quality content of production and exports. We show that while average income positively impacts the quality mix of a country’s exports, the impact of inequality depends on the shape of the curve describing the evolution of the income share devoted to high-quality varieties. Along levels of income where this curve is increasing and convex, inequality increases aggregate demand for high quality varieties, more and more rapidly along income. Our empirical results on the quality content of bilateral export flows within the enlarged EU confirm our theoretical predictions. We show that a country’s income distribution has a significant impact on the quality of its exports. Moreover, the impact of inequality on the quality of exports is all the more positive that the exporter is rich. Our estimations are robust to instrumentation and inclusion of controls for supply-side determinants. In a quantification exercise, we show that the positive effect of inequality can be substantial and is magnified when coupled with an increase in average income. This suggests that a growing middle class is decisive for internal demand to drive quality upgrading of production and exports of a country.

**Keywords:** product quality, income distribution, trade, economies of scale, home market effect.

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\section{Introduction}

Climbing up the quality ladder is an objective for many developed and developing countries engaged in international trade.\footnote{Indeed, while in classical models of trade, welfare gains from openness do not depend on the specialization of countries, recent contributions show that what countries produce and export does matter. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) show for example that countries exporting more sophisticated products grow faster; producing high-quality varieties has also been emphasized as a way to increase differentiation and escape competition (see, for example Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005; Amiti and Khandelwal, 2011); finally, firms producing high-quality varieties might generate more technological spillovers and be less likely to delocate.} In this context, understanding the determinants of vertical specialization of countries is decisive. So far, the literature has mainly relied on supply-side mechanisms, i.e. differences across countries in technology and/or relative abundance of factors, to explain vertical comparative advantages of countries (see, among others, Flam and Helpman, 1987; Schott, 2004; Verhoogen, 2008; Fieler, 2011a,b). However, while recent papers show that emerging economies such as China or Eastern European countries do upgrade the quality of their exports (see Pula and Santabarbara, 2011; Chep-tea, Fontagné, and Zignago, 2010), we also observe in those countries the emergence of new middle and upper classes, more prone to consume high quality varieties. For sure, quality upgrading might affect income distribution (Verhoogen, 2008); however, in this paper, we focus on the other way round, i.e. the impact of income distribution on the vertical comparative advantage of countries.

Indeed, the economic geography literature has shown both theoretically (Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995) and empirically (Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Hanson and Xiang, 2004) that market size influences firms’ location decisions. In presence of increasing returns to scale and trade costs, production follows demand, so that due to a “home market effect”, big countries are net exporters of the increasing returns good. Those papers consider intra-industrial trade of horizontally differentiated varieties. In this work, we consider vertically differentiated varieties and non-homothetic preferences, and investigate how income distribution, by affecting the relative size of domestic demand for each quality, will impact on specialization of countries in terms of quality.

To the best of our knowledge, only one seminal paper, Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), deals with this issue. They provide a model where income distribution and the resulting aggregate demand translate into patterns of vertical specialization and trade. Heterogeneous consumers face a unit consumption choice over varieties of a vertically and horizontally differentiated good. In this framework, the fraction of consumers buying high-quality goods increases along income level. Through a home-market effect, an increase in average income, keeping the size of the country and the level of inequality unchanged, unambiguously shifts upwards the quality produced and exported. The role of inequality is less clear-cut. Inequality increases the quality content of production and exports when the share of consumers buying a high quality variety is increasing and convex along income.

Our paper is both theoretical and empirical. In the theory, we provide a general model
discussing the impact of non-homotheticity properties of the preference structure on aggregate demand and vertical specialization. Differently from Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), we assume that consumers buy several horizontally and vertically differentiated varieties of the same good: we indeed believe that this "joint purchase" feature of demand is relevant for an increasing number of goods, such as clothing, home furniture, but also cars or hi-fi equipments, of which households buy several units with potentially different quality (Gabszewicz and Waughy, 2003). These varieties enter their utility function as two CES bundles differing in quality; we however do not impose any functional form of their preferences over those two vertically-differentiated bundles beyond a property of strict non-homotheticity. This general specification provides a very tractable framework for studying the impact of income distribution on the vertical comparative advantage of countries. We find, as Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), that an increase in average income generates an increase in the average quality of production and exports through a vertical home-market effect. We also show that for income levels such that the income share devoted to high quality varieties of both poor and rich consumers is increasing and convex along income, more unequal countries have, all else equal, a comparative advantage in high-quality varieties. Finally, we moreover demonstrate that in this case, the impact of inequality on the quality mix produced and exported is all the more positive that average income is high.

We test empirically our predictions on trade flows within the enlarged EU for years 2005 to 2007. Indeed, EU25 is a free trade area whose member countries exhibit massive differences both in terms of average income and inequality. It is thus a perfect ground for an empirical investigation of the impact of income distribution on vertical comparative advantage. We use unit values of bilateral trade flows as a proxy for quality; indeed, the recent quality indices proposed by Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) rely on models with homothetic preferences, and thus hardly apply to our framework. We discuss carefully omitted variables and reverse causality issues. We propose an IV strategy to address the possible endogeneity of income distribution to the quality produced and exported. We find that unit values increase significantly with average income of the exporter. Inequality alone is not significantly related to export unit values. However, the interaction term between average income and inequality in the exporting country is positively and very significantly correlated with exports unit values: the impact of income inequality on the quality produced and exported is all the more positive that households in the exporting country are rich. These results are robust to the inclusion of several controls, in particular skills supply and wages in the exporting country, and to alternative subsamples of countries and products. The empirical analysis thus validates our theoretical predictions.

Our contribution is threefold. First, from a theoretical viewpoint, we confirm in a different framework the existence of the vertical home market effect highlighted by Fajgelbaum, 

2 More precisely, we translate the strict non-homotheticity property into predictions over the variations of both average and marginal propensities to consume along income.
Grossman, and Helpman (2011), the evolutions of the quality content of demand being linked in our model to intensive rather than extensive adjustments of the individuals’ consumption basket. We hence show that the equivalence between a framework featuring heterogeneous consumers with unit consumption and models with love for variety at the individual level, identified by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) in a horizontal framework only, holds in a vertical framework. Also, our general discussion based on the properties of non-homothetic preferences allows us to highlight a result that had not been emphasized before: when demand for high quality is increasing and convex with income, the impact of inequality on the quality content of exports is all the more positive that income is high. All in all, we believe that the theoretical framework we propose is general and tractable enough to guide different types of empirical exercises on individual and aggregate data. Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide an empirical test and confirmation of these demand-side determinants of vertical comparative advantage. In particular, we show that the heterogeneous relationship along income between inequality and quality of exports highlighted in the theoretical part is essential from an empirical point of view. Third, based on our empirical results, we provide a quantification of the relative impact of average income and inequality on the quality content of exports. We show that the positive effect of inequality can be substantial and is magnified when coupled with an increase in average income. This suggests that a growing middle class is decisive for internal demand to drive quality upgrading of production and exports of a country.

Beyond the literature on the determinants of vertical comparative advantage of countries, our work is related to several other papers. One strand of the literature has focused on demand-based determinants of the quality content of imports. Hallak (2006) shows that richer countries tend to import higher quality goods, while Choi, Hummels, and Xiang (2009) show that countries displaying similar income distributions tend to exhibit similar distribution of import prices. Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012) find that more unequal countries import lower quality varieties. Other papers investigate how income distribution determines the pool of trading partners of a country. Fieler (2011a,b) builds Ricardian models with non-homothetic preferences where countries differ both in technology and income distribution, and derives conditions under which rich countries trade more together. Hallak (2010) shows that the Linder hypothesis (countries with similar domestic demand structure trade more together) is verified at the sectoral level: countries with similar average income trade more intensively. At the firm-level, Crino and Epifani (2012) show that highly productive firms produce higher quality varieties and thus concentrate their exports on high-income countries.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes a discussion of the properties attached to non-homothetic preferences. We develop our model in a closed and open economy in section 3. Our data and empirical results are presented in sections 4 and 5. We then provide a quantification of the effects at play in section 6 while section 7
concludes.

2 Non-homothetic preferences - theoretical underpinnings

Most theories of international trade assume homotheticity of consumers’ preferences, precluding any impact of the income distribution on the aggregate demand structure and the resulting production and export patterns. Indeed, the homotheticity property guarantees that in the case of an increase in income under fixed prices, consumers will increase their consumption of each good so as to keep constant the fraction of overall expenditures devoted to it. Graphically, this property translates into the income expansion path (Engel curve) being a straight line starting from the origin: as income $I$ increases, the consumer will keep the share of its expenditures devoted to each available good constant (cf Figure 1(i)). Given the price $P_x$ charged for one unit of good $x$, it is then straightforward to see that both the average consumption $P_x I$ and the marginal propensity to consume $\frac{\partial P_x}{\partial I} = b(P_x)$ are positive and constant along income.

On the other hand, a utility function is said to be non-homothetic when it generates variations in the composition of the consumption bundle along the income expansion path, leading to an impact of the income distribution on the form of aggregate demand. In the case of a consumption bundle composed of vertically differentiated varieties of a given good, the said variations can be of two kinds: qualitative or quantitative.

The models featuring qualitative choices traditionally impose fixed, unit consumption of a vertically differentiated good available at different quality levels: consumers then carry out discrete consumption choices, and buy only the quality that, given its price, procures them the highest utility level. In the industrial organisation literature, the strategic pricing of firms in a situation of natural oligopoly then leads to a pure qualitative choice, with price being the adjustment variable within the consumption bundle along the income expansion path (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). In the international trade literature, strategic pricing of firms is often ignored, so that richer consumers either increase the chosen quality level of the single unit consumed (Flam and Helpman, 1987; Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman, 2011) or both the number of goods being consumed and their quality level (Foellmi, Hepenstrick, and Zweimuller, 2010; Fieler, 2011b). Hence, within this framework, variations of the consumption bundle along the income expansion path are systematically discrete, and carried out at the extensive margin.

Some models on the other hand feature quantitative variations within the consumption bundle of the vertically differentiated good along the income expansion path (Hallak, 2006; Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin, 2012). Several qualities of the same good are then simultaneously consumed, and it is the share of overall expenditures devoted to each quality that varies along income: variations of the consumption bundle take place along the intensive margin. This modeling strategy has so far been more scarcely used than its “unit consumption” counterpart, since choices pertaining to quality are often conjectured as being

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mutually exclusive. Along Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003), we however deem this “joint purchase” feature relevant for a majority of quality-differentiated markets.\(^3\) We will hence focus on the properties of this family of models in this paper.

In models with non-homothetic preferences featuring \textit{quantitative} variations within the consumption bundle, the shares of overall expenditures devoted to different qualities vary along income, with low- (resp. high-) quality varieties representing a decreasing (resp. increasing) fraction of the overall consumption bundle. In other words, the \textit{average} propensity to consume variety \(x\), i.e. \(\frac{E_x}{I}\) is increasing or decreasing along income, depending on the quality of the considered variety. This first property is shared by two classes of preference specifications: quasi-homothetic preferences \textit{a la} Stone-Geary and strictly non-homothetic preferences. Quasi-homothetic preferences are characterized by the income expansion path being still a straight line, but not starting from the origin (cf. Figure 1(ii)): the \textit{average} propensity to consume varies along income, but once the good is consumed (i.e. once the Engel curve is above the x-axis), the \textit{marginal} propensity to consume is positive and constant along income. For this class of utility functions and provided every consumer has a positive demand for every quality, the \textit{distribution} of income across the population does not impact the shape of the aggregate demand for a given quality: only average income does.

For preferences to be strictly non-homothetic, the \textit{marginal} propensity to consume needs to vary along income: \(\frac{\partial P_x}{\partial I} = g(P_x, I)\).\(^4\) Such a property graphically translates in a convex income expansion path of expenditures devoted to the high-quality varieties,\(^5\) tending asymptotically towards a straight line with a slope of 1 (on the other hand, the Engel curve for a low-quality variety will be concave, asymptotically tending towards an horizontal line\(^6\)). As represented in Figure 1(iii), the curve representing the evolution of the share of expenditures devoted to high-quality varieties is then convex up to a certain income threshold \(I_t\) and concave beyond, asymptotically tending towards the horizontal line \(y = 1\).\(^7\)

Analytically, those graphical properties translate in the following properties regarding the second derivatives of the overall expenditures \(P_j x_j\) and shares \(s_j\) of the consumption.

\(^3\)Indeed, they argue that “the mere improvement of living standards through the population allows many households to be equipped with several quality-differentiated variants of the same indivisible product. It is indeed far from seldom to observe households equipped with two or three different cars, or several TV-sets or P.C.’s” (Gabszewicz and Wauthy, 2003)

\(^4\)We restrict ourselves to preferences specifications in which high and low quality bundles behave as normal goods (positive income elasticity), the high-quality bundle behaving actually as a superior good (income elasticity bigger than 1). Hence, for a given price \(P_x\), \(g\) might be increasing (in the case of high-quality varieties) or decreasing (in the case of low-quality varieties) along income, but its value will always remain within the interval (0, 1).

\(^5\)See also Dalgin, Trindade, and Mitra (2008).

\(^6\)Graphs similar to those presented in the Figure 1 but for low-quality varieties can be found in Appendix E.

\(^7\)Such an inflection point and reversal of the convexity/concavity properties of the curves representing the shares is unavoidable, since shares are bounded from below by the x-axis and from above by the horizontal line \(y = 1\).
Figure 1: Indifference curves, Engel curves and expenditure shares for high-quality varieties
bundle devoted respectively to low- and high-quality varieties \((j = L, H)\):

\[
\frac{\partial^2 P_L x_L}{\partial I^2} < 0 \quad \forall I > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 P_H x_H}{\partial I^2} > 0 \quad \forall I > 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 s_H}{\partial I^2} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 s_L}{\partial I^2} < 0 \quad \forall I < I_t; \quad \frac{\partial^2 s_H}{\partial I^2} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 s_L}{\partial I^2} > 0 \quad \forall I > I_t
\]

However, note that a concave evolution of the share \(s_H\) along income reflects some kind of satiety of consumers as income increases further. Intuitively, this should only happen for very rich consumers. Hence, even if for the sake of generality we mentioned the behavior over the whole income array, in the following section we will place ourselves on the income segment where the properties of convexity (resp. concavity) will be respected for high- (resp. low-) quality goods.

Hence, in the case of strictly non-homothetic preferences, not only will the share of expenditures devoted to high-quality goods increase along income, but the increase will be stronger for higher levels of average income up to a certain income level \(I_t\). On the other hand, the reverse is true for low-quality goods: their share within the overall consumption bundle decreases, and all the more so at higher levels of average income, provided we are under \(I_t\). Those properties of the second derivatives guarantee that the distribution of income around its mean, and not only average income, will impact on the shape of aggregate demand. In other words, a mean-preserving spread of income will affect the quality content of overall demand of the population. This is due to the fact that rich and poor consumers allocate their income between vertically differentiated varieties differently, so that variations in inequality will translate into variations of the quality content of aggregate demand.

We now present a model of international trade with consumers having strictly non-homothetic preferences over vertically-differentiated varieties of a given good; we study the impact of within-country income distribution on the quality of the bundle consumed and exported by that country.

3 The model

3.1 The model in closed economy

We first consider an economy at autarky featuring one constant returns to scale industry \(A\) that produces an homogeneous good, and two increasing returns to scale industries \(L\) and \(H\) producing low-quality and high-quality varieties of the same good.

3.1.1 Preferences

We model an economy with a fixed number of consumers \(N\) assumed to differ in terms of their endowment in effective labor supply. More precisely, we consider a two-class so-
ciety with consumers belonging either to a poor (P) or a rich (R) class. The extent of inequality within the economy is exogenous. It is determined by the share of poor consumers within the population, denoted by $\beta$, as well as by the distribution of the aggregate amount of effective labor supply $L$ available in the economy between rich and poor consumers. $d \in (0, 1)$ is defined as the ratio of a poor consumer’s labor supply $l_P$ relative to the average per-capita labor supply $L/N$: $d = \frac{l_P}{L/N}$. As $d$ gets closer to 1, the level of inequality within the economy diminishes. Given $d$, it is possible to compute the labor supply of respectively a poor and a rich consumer as $l_P = d \frac{L}{N}$ and $l_R = \frac{1-\beta d}{1-\beta} \frac{L}{N}$. In this framework, a mean-preserving increase in the level of inequality corresponds to a decrease in $d$, while an increase in the average income, leaving the level of inequality unchanged, corresponds to an increase in $L$ or a decrease in $N$.

A consumer belonging to group $i$ ($i = R, P$) is assumed to have a utility of the general form:

$$U = (U[C_{iH}, C_{iL}])^\theta A_i^{1-\theta}$$

with $A_i$ being the consumed quantity of a homogenous good, and $U$ being a two-tier function of the consumed quantity of the differentiated good. Varieties of the differentiated good differ both horizontally and vertically, with consumers making quantitative consumption decisions along those two dimensions. Two qualities of the differentiated good exist: high (H) and low (L). We want to focus our analysis on the quantitative adjustments between these two qualities within the consumption bundle. We thus fix the allocation rule between horizontal varieties by imposing a standard CES specification for the subutility index $C_{ij}$ of overall consumption of varieties of quality $j$:

$$C_{ij} = \left[ \int_0^{n_j} c_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1}} c_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1}} (k) dk \right]^{\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1}}$$

with $c_{ij}(k)$ being the consumption of a variety $k$ of quality $j$ by a consumer of type $i$, and $\sigma_j$ being the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of quality $j$. We impose $\sigma_H < \sigma_L$, i.e. we assume that the elasticity of substitution is lower between high-quality varieties than between low-quality ones. We indeed conjecture that high-quality products display a richer set of product characteristics, and are therefore less substitutable. As it will be shown in the next subsection when modeling pricing decisions of firms facing free entry and fixed production costs, this further implies higher markups for high-quality varieties. Associated with the assumption of higher marginal production costs for high-quality varieties ($a_H > a_L$), this will lead to higher prices being charged for high-quality varieties.

Indeed, the production of high-quality varieties is often viewed as necessitating higher quality inputs (see, for example, Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012).
On the other hand, we do not impose any restriction concerning the functional form of the upper-tier utility $U$ beyond its strict non-homotheticity.

The budget constraint of a consumer belonging to group $i$ is:

$$A_i + P_H C_{iH} + P_L C_{iL} = l_i$$

(2)

with $P_L$ and $P_H$ being the price indices pertaining to the low- and high-quality varieties of the differentiated good, given by

$$P_j = \left[ \int_0^n p_j(k)^{(1-\sigma_j)} dk \right]^{1-\sigma_j}$$

(3)

where $p_j(k)$ is the price of a variety $k$ of quality $j$.

Consumers use three-stage budgeting. First, the Cobb-Douglas form of our overall utility specification guarantees that the income $l_i$ of a type $i$ consumer will be spread between consumption of the homogenous good and consumption of the differentiated good along constant shares $1 - \theta$ and $\theta$. Also, for a given allocation $C_{iH}, C_{iL}$ of consumption across the two available qualities, the CES-type sub-utility index guarantees the classic allocation across the existing horizontally-differentiated varieties of quality $j \in \{H, L\}$:

$$c_{ij}(k) = \left( \frac{p_j(k)}{P_j} \right)^{-\sigma_j} C_{ij}$$

(4)

Concerning the optimal allocation of the total expenditure $\theta l_i$ dedicated to the differentiated good between the two available qualities, i.e. the determination of $C_{iH}$ and $C_{iL}$, it is possible to translate our assumption of a strict non-homotheticity of the utility function $U_i$ in a series of properties. As already stated in the previous section, we choose to place ourselves on the income segment where the convexity (resp. concavity) of the evolution of the income share devoted to high- (resp. low-) quality varieties is preserved. Indeed, this case appears to us as the most probable one from an empirical point of view. Denoting the average propensity to consume varieties of quality $j$ of a consumer with income $l_i$ as $s_j(l_i) = \frac{P_j C_{ij}}{l_i}$, we then have the following local properties of the first and second derivatives along income:

**Property 1 (P1):** The average propensity to consume varieties of high- (resp. low-) quality increases (resp. decreases) along income: $\frac{\partial s_H(l_i)}{\partial l_i} > 0$, $\frac{\partial s_L(l_i)}{\partial l_i} < 0$.

**Property 2 (P2):** The marginal propensity to consume varieties of high- (resp. low-) quality increases (resp. decreases) along the income level: $\frac{\partial^2 P_j C_{ij}}{\partial l_i^2} > 0$, $\frac{\partial^2 P_j C_{ij}}{\partial l_i^2} < 0$.

**Property 3 (P3):** The average propensity to consume varieties of high- (resp. low-) quality is convex (resp. concave) along the income level: $\frac{\partial s_H(l_i)}{\partial l_i^2} > 0$, $\frac{\partial s_L(l_i)}{\partial l_i^2} < 0$. 

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(P1) corresponds to the weakest property displayed by non-homothetic preferences, verified by both quasi-homothetic and strictly non-homothetic utility specifications. As we have commented in the previous section, strict non-homotheticity guarantees further properties relative to the second derivatives of both the aggregate consumption $P_j C_j$ (P2) and the share $s_j(l_i)$ (P3), ensuring an impact of the distribution of income around its mean on aggregate demand.9

To sum up, high-quality varieties have two distinguishing features in our modeling framework:

(i) they are more expensive than low-quality varieties, due to higher marginal cost $a_H$ and lower elasticity of substitution $\sigma_H$ between them;

(ii) the budget share allocated to these varieties increases with income.

Characteristic (i) is consistent with the idea that the production of high-quality varieties necessitates higher quality inputs (see, for example Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012) and with the claim that higher quality varieties are more differentiated (see, for example Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman, 2011). Characteristic (ii) mirrors the definition of luxury goods in an inter-industrial framework. Intuitively, it derives from the fact that the marginal utility of high-quality varieties, all else equal, increases with income while the opposite is true for low-quality varieties. This latter property of the utility function ensures that the consumption of the differentiated good is distorted toward high-quality varieties when income increases.

Hence, in our framework, high-quality varieties are more expensive varieties of a given good, whose share in a given consumer’s consumption basket increases with individual income. This definition is in line with aggregate patterns obtained in unit consumption models, which also predict that the share of high-quality varieties in overall demand increases with average income in the population (see, for example Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman, 2011).

3.1.2 Firms

Firms compete monopolistically. In the quality segment $j$, producing a quantity $x_j(k)$ of variety $k$ requires $f_j + a_j x_j(k)$ units of labor, with $f_j$ and $a_j$ being respectively the fixed and marginal labor requirements for quality $j$. We assume free entry in each segment of the market. A firm $k$ producing a variety with quality $j$ chooses its price in order to maximize its profit $\pi_j(k) = (p_j(k) - a_j)d_j(k) - f_j$, with $d_j(k) = \left(\frac{p_j(k)}{P_j(k)}\right)^{-\sigma_j} D_j$ being the total demand (in real terms) for a variety $k$ of quality $j$, expressed a function of the total demand (in real terms) for all varieties of quality $j$ $D_j$.9

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9On income segments where the curve depicting the share of income devoted to high-quality varieties becomes concave, note that the sign of the second derivatives stated in (P3) is reversed.
As is common in models of monopolistic competition, the producers of different varieties of quality $j$ set prices to maximize profits, taking the aggregate price indices $P_j$ as given. The price maximizing the profits of a firm producing any variety $k$ with quality $j$ is then:

$$p_j = \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j - 1} a_j$$

(5)

Entry at each quality level proceeds until the next entrant fails to cover its fixed costs. Using expressions (5), the zero-profit condition yields the following equilibrium output for a firm $k$ operating in the quality segment $j$:

$$d_j = \frac{f_j(\sigma_j - 1)}{a_j}$$

(6)

Hence, within each quality segment, we obtain the classic result of fixed mark-up and fixed supply for each firm. However, we now have two kinds of firms, and the overall $n_H$ and $n_L$ will depend on the income distribution.

3.1.3 Equilibrium distribution of firms

Using (5) and (3), we obtain the following expression for the demand of any variety $k$ of quality $j$:

$$d_j = n_{1-\sigma_j} D_j$$

(7)

Using (7), it is then possible to determine that in our closed economy, the number of firms within each quality segment $k$ is a couple $(n_L, n_H)$ characterized by the two following zero-profit conditions:

$$\pi_L = a_L(\frac{\sigma_L}{\sigma_L - 1} - 1)n_L^{1-\sigma_L} D_L - f_L \leq 0, \quad n_L \pi_L(n_H, n_L) = 0$$

(8)

$$\pi_H = a_H(\frac{\sigma_H}{\sigma_H - 1} - 1)n_H^{1-\sigma_H} D_H - f_H \leq 0, \quad n_H \pi_H(n_H, n_L) = 0$$

(9)

A consequence of our assumption of strict non-homotheticity of the preference specification is that $D_L$ and $D_H$ depend on the income distribution within the economy. More precisely, overall demand $D_j$ devoted within the economy to varieties of quality $j$ is of the form:

$$D_j = \beta NC P_j + (1 - \beta) NC R_j$$

with $C_{ij}$ being the overall demand of varieties of quality $j$ by a consumer belonging to group $i$. As a consequence, (8) and (9) can be reformulated as a classic ‘supply equals
demand” equilibrium for each quality segment \( j \):

\[
\frac{f_j(\sigma_j - 1)}{a_j} = n_j^{-\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j - 1}} P_j^{-1}(\beta N P_j C_{Pj} + (1 - \beta)N P_j C_{Rj})
\]

\[
= n_j^{-\frac{\sigma_j - 1}{\sigma_j a_j}} (\beta N s_j(l_P)\theta l_P + (1 - \beta)N s_j(l_R)\theta l_R)
\]

Substituting for the expressions of \( l_P \) and \( l_R \), we finally get the following two equilibrium conditions:

\[
\frac{f_L \sigma_L}{\theta} = \frac{\beta d L s_L(l_P) + (1 - \beta) L s_L(l_R)}{n_L}
\]

\[
\frac{f_H \sigma_H}{\theta} = \frac{\beta d L s_H(l_P) + (1 - \beta) L s_H(l_R)}{n_H}
\]

with \( s_j(l_i) \) designing the share of overall expenditures \( \theta l_i \) devoted to the consumption of varieties of quality \( j \).

**Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium):** For given income distribution parameters \( \beta, d, L \) and \( N \) and under the assumption of strict non-homotheticity of preferences for the vertically differentiated good, there exists a unique and positive solution to the system of two equations defined by (8)-(9), defining the number of active firms in the high- and low-quality segments of the markets, \( n_H \) and \( n_L \).

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

Having stated the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution of firms \( (n_H, n_L) \) within our economy, we now move to studying the impact of variations in the income distribution on the quality bundle being produced.

We hence provide comparative statics of \( n_H \) and \( n_L \) along \( N \) and \( d \), and then interpret the latter in terms of variations in the quality of the production bundle. Indeed, adding the two conditions (10) and (11) together, we obtain the following equality that has to be met at equilibrium:

\[
f_H \sigma_H n_H + f_L \sigma_L n_L = \theta L
\]

Hence, for a given overall supply of effective labor \( L \), an increase in the number \( n_H \) of producers of high quality varieties can only happen at the expense of a decrease in the number \( n_L \) of producers of low quality varieties, leading to an increase in the quality content of overall production.

**Proposition 2 (Impact of the average income and the level of inequality on the quality of the production bundle):**

For given income distribution parameters \( \beta \) and \( L \) and under the assumption of strict non-
homotheticity of preferences for the vertically differentiated good, we have the following comparative statics along $N$ and $d$:

(i) An increase in $N$ (i.e. a decrease in average income) generates a decrease in the quality of the production bundle:
\[
\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial N} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial n_L}{\partial N} > 0
\]

(ii) An increase in $d$ (i.e. a decrease in the level of inequality) generates a decrease in the quality of the production bundle:
\[
\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial d} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial n_L}{\partial d} > 0
\]

(iii) The impact of variations in the level of inequality on the quality mix is more important for higher levels of income.

Proof. See Appendix A.

Part (i) of Proposition 2 states that in a closed economy, the average quality of the production bundle increases along the average income of consumers. This result can be simply interpreted: since the share of overall consumption devoted to high-quality goods increases along income in the case of non-homothetic preferences, an increase of average income leads to an increase in the size of the market for high quality varieties. Such a demand shift toward higher quality raises the relative profitability of high-quality varieties, leaving the possibility for a higher number of firms to enter the market: $n_H$ increases, driving the produced quality mix upwards. Since this result only relies on Property (P1), it is valid for preference specifications both of the quasi-homothetic and the strictly non-homothetic kind. Also, it remains true at income levels where Property (P3) is reversed, i.e. at income levels above which the evolution of the share of income devoted to high-(resp. low-) quality varieties become concave (resp. convex).

Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2 state that inequality has a positive and increasing impact on the quality mix being produced along the average income dimension if both $l_P$ and $l_R$ are below the income threshold $I_t$, i.e. if the evolution of the income share devoted to high-quality varieties is convex for both rich and poor consumers. This result is intuitively less straightforward, since mean-preserving variations in the spread of income impact in opposite ways the consumption of high quality varieties of the poor and the rich income group: \[ \frac{\partial s_H(l_P)}{\partial d} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial s_H(l_P)}{\partial d} < 0. \] However, when the income share devoted to high-quality varieties augments in a convex way, following an increase in inequality (i.e. a decrease in $d$), the marginal increase of rich consumers’ demand for high quality varieties is more important than the marginal decrease of poor consumers’ demand. Moreover, an increase in inequality gives more weight to rich consumers in total income. This leads overall to an increase in aggregate demand for high quality varieties. Furthermore, since the amplitude of the variations in the consumption bundle increases along income, a shock on the level of inequality will be magnified for high levels of average income (Proposition 2 (iii)).

Our results on the effect of income and inequality are quite similar to those obtained by Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), but the nature of the adjustment of aggregate demand for high and low quality varieties is different. In our model, it derives from changes
Figure 2: Heterogenous impact of inequality along the average income dimension

in the quantity of each quality consumed at the individual level while in their model, it stems from changes in the number of people devoting their unit consumption towards high and low quality varieties. This equivalence between a framework featuring heterogeneous consumers and unit consumption and models with love for variety at the individual level had already been pointed at by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) in an horizontal framework. We provide evidence for this equivalence in a vertical framework.

Moreover, we highlight a result overlooked so far, namely the heterogeneous impact of inequality on the quality content of production along average income.

We will now move to a two-country set-up, briefly showing how the properties of the produced quality bundle in a closed economy translate into properties of the exported quality bundle once we move to a trade equilibrium.

3.2 The general model in open economy

The introduction of international trade in our model is done in a fashion similar to the one presented in the seminal paper of Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011). We will hence only present our main hypotheses and predictions, while the details of our computations and proofs can be found in Appendices B and C.

We model international trade between two countries, D and F, totally similar in terms of production technology and structure of preferences. The only differences we allow for between the two countries are in terms of income distribution, i.e. while D and F display a similar amount of efficient labor supply $L$, they may differ in their distribution of $L$ among workers ($d_D \neq d_F$ and $N_D \neq N_F$). We assume “iceberg” trade costs: in order to export to
country $r$ ($r \in \{ D, F \}$) one unit of quality $j$’s output manufactured in country $s$, a firm must ship $\tau_j \geq 1$ units. We further assume that the homogenous good is freely traded, i.e. that $\tau_A = 1$, which will ensure that the wage of a unit of effective labor is the same for the two countries.\(^{10}\) On the other hand, we impose strictly positive and similar transport costs for low and high quality varieties of the differentiated good, i.e. $\tau_H = \tau_L = \tau > 1$.\(^{11}\)

Firms fully pass on their shipping costs to their foreign costumers: one unit of variety $k$ of quality $j$ manufactured in country $s$ is sold to consumers of country $r$ at price $p_{kj}(k) = \tau p_{kj}$ where $p_{kj}$ is the mill price. Along Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), it is then convenient to introduce the notion of “effective competitors” of quality $j$ present on the domestic market $r$: $\tilde{n}_j^r = n_j^r + \tau^{1-\sigma_j} n_s^s$. The intuition behind the concept is straightforward: while love for variety guarantees that for each quality $j$, each consumer in each country will devote a non-null part of its overall expenses to every available variety (both domestic and foreign), the demand devoted to foreign varieties is discounted by a factor $\tau^{1-\sigma_j}$, capturing the fact that the price charged for foreign varieties bears the burden of shipping costs.

As demonstrated in Appendix B, the four conditions defining an equilibrium with trade can then again be formulated in terms of “supply equals demand” conditions:

\[
\frac{f_L \sigma_L \tilde{n}_j^D}{\theta} = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_L})(\beta d_D L_D s_L (l_{PD}) + (1 - \beta d_D)L_D s_L (l_{RD})) \tag{13}
\]

\[
\frac{f_H \sigma_H \tilde{n}_j^H}{\theta} = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_H})(\beta d_D L_D s_H (l_{PD}) + (1 - \beta d_D)L_D s_H (l_{RD})) \tag{14}
\]

\[
\frac{f_L \sigma_L \tilde{n}_j^F}{\theta} = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_L})(\beta d_F L_F s_L (l_{PF}) + (1 - \beta d_F)L_F s_L (l_{RF})) \tag{15}
\]

\[
\frac{f_H \sigma_H \tilde{n}_j^F}{\theta} = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_H})(\beta d_F L_F s_H (l_{PF}) + (1 - \beta d_F)L_F s_H (l_{RF})) \tag{16}
\]

The set of equilibrium conditions (13)-(16) can be seen as two independent systems of two equations: (13)-(14) jointly determining $\tilde{n}_j^D$ and $\tilde{n}_j^D$, i.e. the number of effective competitors within each quality segment in country $D$, and (15)-(16) similarly determining $\tilde{n}_j^F$ and $\tilde{n}_j^F$. Each one of those systems is exactly similar to the equilibrium conditions (10)-(11) that defined the distribution of firms across qualities in a closed economy, except that the number of producers of a given quality $n_j$ has been replaced by $\tilde{n}_j^r$, i.e. the number of effective competitors within country $r$ on the quality segment $j$. Using Proposition 1, we then argue that there exists a unique positive solution $(\tilde{n}_j^D, \tilde{n}_j^D, \tilde{n}_j^F, \tilde{n}_j^F)$ to the system of four equations defined by (13)-(16).

This result concerning the number of effective firms within each country does however not guarantee that we will observe trade of the differentiated good at the equilibrium. Indeed, we have the following expression for $n_j^r$, i.e. the number of local firms producing

\(^{10}\)We assume that labor supply in both countries is sufficient with respect to the equilibrium labor demand of the producers of differentiated varieties, so that at equilibrium some labor is devoted to the production of the homogeneous good in both countries.

\(^{11}\)This assumption is made for the sake of notational simplicity. Our predictions would be qualitatively the same for transport costs specific to each quality.
varieties of quality $j$ within country $r$:

$$n_j^r = \frac{\tilde{n}_j^r - \tau^{1-\sigma_j} \tilde{n}_s^j}{1 - \tau^{2(1-\sigma_j)}}, \quad r \neq s, \ j = H, L, \ r, s = D, F$$

(17)

which entails the following condition for $n_j^r$ to be positive, i.e. to have partial specialization of both countries:

$$\tau^{1-\sigma_j} \tilde{n}_j^r < \frac{\tilde{n}_s^j}{\tilde{n}_j^s} < \frac{1}{\tau^{1-\sigma_j}}, \quad r \neq s, \ j = H, L, \ r, s = D, F$$

(18)

Condition (18) is scarcely respected for low levels of transport costs, i.e. $\tau$ very close to 1, but always met for high enough values of $\tau$.$^{12}$ From now on, we then assume the transport costs $\tau$ to be sufficiently high so as to guarantee that both countries produce and export the two qualities, i.e. so that $n_j^r > 0$ for $j = H, L$ and $r = D, F$.$^{13}$ We hence focus on the properties of the quality bundle in a partial specialization trade equilibrium. We have the following propositions:

**Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with trade):** For given income distribution parameters $\beta$, $L_r$ and $d_r$ ($r = D, F$), and sufficiently high transport costs $\tau$, there exists a unique positive solution to the system of four equations defined by (13)-(16), defining the distribution of firms across country and sectors $(n_D^H, n_D^L, n_F^H, n_F^L)$.

Proof. See Appendix C.

**Proposition 4 (Impact of the average income and the level of inequality on the quality bundle of exports):**

For given income distribution parameters $d_r$, $N_r$, $N_s$, and $d_s$ ($r, s = D, F$, $r \neq s$), for high enough transport costs $\tau$ and under the assumptions (P1)-(P3), we have the following comparative statics along $N_r$ and $d_r$:

(i) An increase in $N_r$ (i.e. a decrease in average income within country $r$) generates a decrease in the quality of country $r$’s export bundle: $\frac{\partial n_H^r}{\partial N_r} < 0$, $\frac{\partial n_L^r}{\partial N_r} > 0$.

(ii) An increase in $d_r$ (i.e. a mean-preserving decrease of the spread of income within country $r$) generates a decrease in the quality of country $r$’s export bundle: $\frac{\partial n_H^r}{\partial d_r} < 0$, $\frac{\partial n_L^r}{\partial d_r} > 0$.

(iii) The impact of variations in the level of inequality on the quality mix of exports is more

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$^{12}$For low values of $\tau$, condition (18) is respected when countries $D$ and $F$ are relatively similar in terms of average income $\frac{\bar{y}_r}{L_r}$ and efficient labor size $L_r$.

$^{13}$As demonstrated in Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), a single big country might produce and export the whole array of available varieties of both qualities, provided trade costs are sufficiently low. In the following analysis of the properties of the exported quality bundle, we however want to restrict ourselves to the parametric cases where both countries produce at least one of the two qualities, i.e. to the cases where trade occurs with multiple exporters of the same good. Such a requirement stems from the empirical strategy implemented when testing the theoretical predictions of our model: indeed, we compare across EU25 countries the unit value of their exports to other EU25 members for a given product. In our two-country model, this amounts to comparing the quality mix of the exports of the two trading partners for a given good, which is not possible if one of the trading partners captures the total production of both qualities ($n_D^H = n_L^H = 0$).
important for higher levels of income.

**Proof.** See Appendix C.

The results featured in Proposition 4 in the case of an equilibrium with partial trade specialization are strongly reminiscent of the results presented in Proposition 2 in the case of a closed economy and the same intuitions apply, except that now, income distribution in the domestic country impacts both on the quality bundle being consumed locally and the quality mix being exported. As commented by Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), this result is the vertical translation of the classic horizontal “home-market effect” identified by Krugman (1980): in the country with the biggest market for varieties of a given quality \( j \), the ability to serve more consumers with sales that do not bear shipping costs guarantees the entry of a greater number of producers of quality \( j \).

Hence, keeping characteristics of country F constant, an increase in average income or in the level of inequality within country D will distort the quality mix of production and exports from D to F towards high quality. Once again, the impact of inequality is not linear along income, but will be magnified for higher levels of income because of the concavity/convexity of the expenditure share devoted to high quality varieties along income.

**Quality content and unit value of exports**

The empirical part of this paper will aim at testing our predictions on the impact of income distribution on the quality content of exports. However, we do not have firm-level data; we have exports data at the exporter-importer-product level. Consequently, we will not be able to measure directly the impact of income distribution on quantities of high- and low-quality varieties being exported. We will have to rely on an index of average quality of exports. We choose (and discuss this choice extensively in the next section) unit value as a proxy for quality content of exports. We thus need to check how our predictions about the impact of income distribution on \( n_H \) and \( n_L \) translate into predictions on unit values of exports in our model.

Unit value at the product-exporter level can be computed as \( q^e = \frac{n_H d_p^H n_L + n_L d_p^L}{n_L d_L + n_H d_H} \).

In our model, using equation (12) to substitute for \( n_L \), we obtain:

\[
q^e = \frac{\theta L a_L a_H}{\theta L a_H (\sigma_L^{-1})} + n_H f_H \left( (\sigma_H - 1)a_L - \frac{\sigma_H (\sigma_L^{-1})a_H}{\sigma_L} \right)
\]

(19)

It is then straightforward to see that \( \frac{\partial q^e}{\partial n_H} > 0 \) under the condition that \((\sigma_H - 1)a_L < \frac{\sigma_H (\sigma_L^{-1})a_H}{\sigma_L}\), which is equivalent to \( p_L < p_H \). Hence, an increase in \( n_H \) at fixed \( L \) can unambiguously be interpreted as a shift of the production mix towards high quality at equilibrium, which translates into higher average price of exports. Moreover, \( q^e \) being a convex function of \( n_H \), we can easily show that our results on the non-linear relationship...
along income between inequality and $n_H$ also hold for unit values.\textsuperscript{14}

We now turn to the empirical test of our theoretical predictions.

4 Data and empirical strategy

In this section, we present the data we use and the empirical strategy we follow to test the main predictions of our model on income distribution and vertical comparative advantage of countries. We focus on EU25 countries for the period 2005-2007.\textsuperscript{15} Three main reasons motivate this choice. First, trade policy and the quality content of production and exports have been conjectured to be closely related (Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky, 2002; Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 2001). Since May 2004, the EU25 is an integrated market where goods can circulate freely, without any trade restrictions: focusing on trade flows within such an area allows us to ignore interferences between trade policy and quality. Second, to conduct our empirical analysis, we need reliable data on both average income and inequality within countries. However, information on inequality (Gini index or interquintile ratio) is rather scarce.\textsuperscript{16} The World Income Inequality Database, collected by the United Nations, provides some data, but information is missing for many years and countries. On the opposite, Eurostat provides harmonized and reliable information on income distribution within EU countries. Finally, since the enlargement to Eastern European countries in 2004, the EU displays important variations across countries in terms of both average income and inequality. Therefore, the enlarged EU looks like a perfect ground to test empirically the impact of income distribution on the vertical comparative advantage of countries.

4.1 Data

For trade data, we use the BACI database. BACI has been developed by CEPII, based on COMTRADE data.\textsuperscript{17} It records all bilateral trade flows at the HS6-product level, in value (dollars) and in volume (tons).

We conserve in the sample bilateral export flows involving EU25 countries only, both as exporters and importers. As commonly done in the literature (see for example Choi, Hummels, and Xiang, 2009), we clean the data and consider trade flows for which the quantity shipped is at least equal to one kilogram. We drop the flows whose unit value

\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial^2 q^e}{\partial n_H \partial d} &= \frac{\partial n_H}{\partial d} + \frac{\partial^2 q^e}{\partial n_H^2} + \frac{\partial^2 n_H}{\partial N \partial d} + \frac{\partial q^e}{\partial n_H} > 0. \quad \text{Since in our framework, an increase in } d \text{ reflects a decrease in inequality and an increase in } N \text{ reflects a decrease in average income, a positive cross-derivative means that the negative impact of a decrease in inequality on unit value is weaker for low levels of income. It hence means that the impact of a higher level of inequality on unit values is all the more positive that average income is high.}
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{14}Indeed, when the expenditure share of high quality varieties is increasing and convex along income, we have $\frac{\partial^2 q^e}{\partial n_H \partial d} \frac{\partial n_H}{\partial d} + \frac{\partial^2 n_H}{\partial N \partial d} \frac{\partial q^e}{\partial n_H} > 0$. Since in our framework, an increase in $d$ reflects a decrease in inequality and an increase in $N$ reflects a decrease in average income, a positive cross-derivative means that the negative impact of a decrease in inequality on unit value is weaker for low levels of income. It hence means that the impact of a higher level of inequality on unit values is all the more positive that average income is high.

\textsuperscript{15}Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{16}See Fieler (2011a).

\textsuperscript{17}See Gaulier and Zignago (2010).
is lower than 0.1 time and higher than 10 times the median unit-value observed for that commodity within EU25. This amounts to dropping 5-6% of non-missing observations per year. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing industries\(^ {18}\).

For each year, we also need information on exporters characteristics. Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, provides data for all EU25 members from 2005 to 2007. Average income, in purchasing power parity (PPP) and in current value, Gini index of income inequality and total population are directly available. Income is defined as “the total disposable income of a household, calculated by adding together the personal income received by all of household members plus income received at household level”. It encompasses earnings from work, but also private income from investment and property, transfers between households and all social transfers received in cash including old-age pensions. Therefore, our measure of income and income inequality goes beyond wage and wage inequality.

In BACI, Belgium and Luxembourg are a single entity. We calculate the population of Belgium-Luxembourg as the sum of the population of both countries. Income and Gini index of Belgium-Luxembourg are calculated as the weighted average of income and income inequality in each country, using population shares of each country as weights (around 96% for Belgium and 4% for Luxembourg).

Finally, data on distance between countries are taken from the CEPII database dist_cepii.\(^ {19}\)

\[\text{4.2 Measuring quality}\]

In this paper, we decide to use the unit values, measured by fob prices, as a proxy for the quality of the varieties of product \(p\) exported by country \(x\) to country \(m\). Within a given product category (defined at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity System), more expensive varieties are thus assumed to be higher quality varieties. Country \(x\) might export both low and high quality varieties of product \(p\) to country \(m\): the higher the unit value of the export flow \(uv_{x,m,p,t}\), the higher the share of high quality varieties. As shown in section 3.1.3, a relative increase in the number of high quality producers translates into a higher average price of the production bundle as soon as the price of high quality varieties is higher than the price of low quality varieties.

The 6-digit level is the most disaggregated nomenclature level to be harmonized across countries. For some products, hs6 is the finest entry,\(^ {20}\) while some other product lines can be further disaggregated in varieties for which codification is country-specific. Sometimes, these varieties are clearly vertically differentiated.\(^ {21}\) Variations in unit values at the hs6 level will thus mirror both variations in prices and differences in the composition of exports 

\(^{18}\)They correspond in our dataset to industries HS28 to HS97. 
\(^{19}\)Available online at \url{http://www.cepii.fr/francais/BD/bdd/distances.htm}. 
\(^{20}\)“Footwear with outer soles of leather, and uppers which consist of leather straps across the instep and around the big toe” for example, coded as product 640320. 
\(^{21}\)“Watch straps, watch bands and watch bracelets, and parts thereof of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal”, coded as product 911310, which can be decomposed into finer 8-digit varieties such as “Watch straps, watch bands and watch bracelets, and parts thereof of precious metal” and “Watch straps, watch bands and watch bracelets, and parts thereof of metal clad with precious metal”.
in terms of 8 or 10-digit vertically differentiated varieties, nested within the considered hs6 product line.

The recent empirical trade literature has discussed the relevance of unit values as a proxy for quality. In particular, Hallak and Schott (2011) and Khandelwal (2010) point at the fact that differences in unit values might capture other elements than quality. For example, exogenous differences in factor prices or exchange rates misalignments might impact on unit values of exports, without being directly linked to the quality of exported products. They develop alternative measures of quality, using information on both the value and the volume of exports. The intuition in both papers is the same: countries that sell more for a given price export higher quality products. Hallak and Schott (2011) infer quality of US imports from prices and trade balances of source countries. For a given export price, a country with a higher trade balance vis a vis the world produces and exports a higher quality. Khandelwal (2010) estimates a nested logit demand system on US imports that embeds preferences for both horizontal and vertical attributes. For a given product, controlling for export price, countries that sell more to US consumers are said to produce a higher quality.

However, both indices are derived from models that feature homothetic preferences. They are consequently not suited to investigate the role of income distribution, which necessitates non-homothetic preferences. We thus prefer to rely on unit values, as other papers like Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006), Fontagné, Gaulier, and Zignago (2008), Fieler (2011b) or Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012). Note that Amiti and Khandelwal (2011) show that their results on quality upgrading and import competition are qualitatively unchanged when they use unit values as a proxy for quality, instead of the Khandelwal (2010) index.

In our empirical analysis, we will propose different robustness checks to ensure that prices actually proxy for unit values. First, Khandelwal (2010) shows that prices are a correct approximation for quality when products are characterized by a long quality ladder. We will show that all our results hold, and more, are magnified, when we restrict the sample to the most vertically differentiated products. Second, in a robustness check, we will also directly control for the level of wages in the exporting country.

4.3 Estimated equation

The two main predictions of our model we want to test can be stated as follows:

Prediction 1: Within a given product category, richer countries specialize in high quality varieties, and thus exhibit higher unit values of exports than their partners.

Prediction 2: Within a given product category, income inequality has a heterogeneous impact on vertical specialization. Income inequality increases specialization in high-quality varieties if preferences for high quality varieties are convex along income. In that case, inequality increases quality most for richer countries.

22Those are the products which unit values exhibit a higher coefficient of variation within EU25.
To test empirically these predictions, we thus want to relate the unit value of exports to income distribution in the exporting country. This focus is different from papers that relate unit values to importers characteristics (see, among others Choi, Hummels, and Xiang, 2009; Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin, 2012; Simonovska, 2011). We estimate the following baseline equation:

$$uv_{xm} = \alpha \text{avg\_inc}_{xt} + \beta \text{ineq}_{xt} + \delta \text{avg\_inc}_{xt} \times \text{ineq}_{xt} + \gamma \text{bal}_{xpt} + \mu_{mpt} + \epsilon_{xm}$$ \hspace{1cm} (20)

where, after log-linearization, $uv_{xm}$ is the unit value of exports of product $p$ by country $x$ to country $m$ at time $t$, $\text{avg\_inc}_{xt}$ is the average PPP income of country $x$, $\text{ineq}_{xt}$ is the Gini index of income inequality in country $x$ and $\text{bal}_{xpt}$ is the Balassa index for country $x$ and product $p$ at time $t$, taking EU25 countries as partners and reference. We finally control for importer/product/year fixed effects $\mu_{mpt}$: doing so, all importer-side determinants of unit values are absorbed by the fixed effect. $\delta$ is our coefficient of interest, measuring potential heterogeneous impact of inequality along average income. Due to the presence of importer-product-year fixed effects, the impact of explanatory variables is measured by exploiting, for a given importer-product-year, cross-sectoral variations in unit values and characteristics of the source countries.

Several remarks are in order. We use PPP income rather than current income. The reason for this is that the cost of living varies a lot across European countries, being higher in Western European countries. This is particularly true for necessity products, meaning that controlling for average income, the share a consumer can allocate to luxury products/varieties might depend on the average cost of necessity goods/varieties. We thus prefer using PPP income, but we show that our results remain qualitatively unchanged when using current income. Also, we use the Gini index as a measure for income inequality, while other measures of inequality exist; we show that our results hold when using the interquintile ratio.

In the theoretical part, we have assumed away any differences between countries in terms of technology. This is of course a simplifying assumption, hardly verified in the context of the enlarged EU. Controlling for comparative advantage is important since specific ability of country $x$ for product $p$ might translate into lower prices. In particular, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) develop a model featuring firms with heterogeneous productivities, countries with different relative factor abundance and industries with different factor intensity. In this framework, they show that trade liberalization induces tougher selection in the comparative advantage industry, and consequently magnifies \textit{ex ante} comparative advantage. Since, for a given level of quality, higher productivity firms charge lower prices, we should observe a negative relationship between unit value and comparative advantage. We do not have direct information on product-level comparative advantages of countries. This is why we introduce, for each exporter $x$ and product $p$, a Balassa index of revealed
comparative advantage, defined as follows:

\[ B_{xpt} = \frac{X_{xpt}/X_{xt}}{X_{EU25pt}/X_{EU25t}} \]

(21)

where X denotes exports in volume. This index measures the share of product p in exports of country x, as compared to the share of product p in total exports of EU25 countries. The higher is \( B_{xpt} \), the higher the comparative advantage of country x for product p, as compared to its EU25 competitors. We compute the Balassa index using the BACI database and focusing on trade flows among EU25 members. We expect \( \gamma \), the coefficient on the Balassa index, to be negative.

We will introduce two additional controls to our baseline equation. First, we add distance between the exporting and the importing country; indeed, several recent papers show on aggregate or on firm-level data that bilateral distance is positively correlated with exports unit value, either due to strategic pricing-to-market or to spatial sorting of exported qualities along distance (see Martin, 2012; Bastos and Silva, 2010; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). Second, we also introduce population in the exporting country: Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) show that an increase in population increases disproportionately the number of varieties that are more horizontally differentiated. In our model, we assume the same elasticity of substitution between low and high quality varieties, and thus do not expect population to play a role. However, even with identical elasticity of substitution, if fixed production costs are higher for high-quality varieties, the incentive to agglomerate in bigger countries might be more important for high quality varieties, leading to higher prices in bigger countries. On the other hand, Desmet and Parente (2010) show that bigger markets exhibit lower markups and consequently bigger firms, which favors process innovation. This could lead, all else equal, to lower prices in bigger countries. Given these conflicting theoretical insights, we have no prior on the empirical correlation between unit values and population.

Finally, our dependent variable is exporter-product-year specific, while our variables of interest are exporter-year specific. According to Moulton (1990), standard-errors of the coefficients on exporter-year characteristics might consequently be downward-biased. To correct for this, we cluster all regressions at the exporter-year level.

### 4.4 Supply-side determinants and reverse causality

**Supply-side determinants** We focus in this paper on demand-side determinants of vertical comparative advantage. We control in the baseline equation for revealed comparative advantage of a country at the product level. However, the Balassa index does not control for specific ability in a given quality range. Schott (2004) for example interprets the positive correlation between unit values and GDP per capita as reflecting better endow-

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23From a computational point of view, the dimension of the fixed effect being different from the dimension of the cluster, we first calculate demeaned variables in the importer-product-year dimension, and we then run the regressions using OLS estimations and clustering standard-errors at the exporter-year level.
ments in terms of capital to labour ratio or in terms of skills. Also, recent papers show that not only the average level of skills available within the population, but also the diversity of those skills might have an impact on the country-level comparative advantage. More specifically, Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato (2012) show that observed and unobserved skills dispersion might confer countries a comparative advantage in industries where complementarity between tasks is low. Those industries are industries where individual talent is more important. The same kind of reasoning could apply to vertical specialization within sectors; we can imagine that producing high quality varieties requires more ingeniousness, so that countries with more diverse skills tend to specialize in high quality products. Consequently, if income inequality reflects skills dispersion, one might worry that average income and Gini index do not only capture demand-side, but also supply-side determinants of vertical comparative advantage. In robustness checks, we control for population skills and skills dispersion, and results remain the same. Moreover, none of those supply side stories account for the heterogeneous impact of inequality along average income we highlight in this paper.

Reverse causality Another issue relates to the endogeneity of income distribution with respect to the quality produced. Trade openness *per se* has distributional effects. A recent survey of the literature (focused on developing countries) by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) shows that the impact of globalization on income distribution is highly heterogeneous across countries and periods. This diversity of cases mirrors the theoretically ambiguous links between globalization and inequality, much more complex than the basic Stolper-Samuelson effect (see Grossman and Maggi, 2000; Costinot and Vogel, 2010). More directly connected to the issue of trade in quality and income distribution, Verhoogen (2008) shows that in Mexico, during the nineties, quality upgrading in manufacturing industries has generated an increase in wage inequality within sectors. Indeed, following the peso devaluation, more productive firms increased their quality so as to export to the US market; since high productivity/high quality firms pay higher wages, this increased wage inequality. In our empirical analysis, it could thus be the case that income and inequality are explained by the pattern of trade of vertically differentiated varieties, rather than the opposite.

There are two main reasons why we anticipate this issue to be limited in our context. Previous theoretical and empirical works relate globalization and quality upgrading to wage inequality, while our measure of average income encompasses other sources of revenue than wages (transfers, income from investment and property etc.). Moreover, these studies are generally focused on the short or medium run; in the long run, educational choices, and thus skills supply, should, at least partly, compensate the movement in inequality generated by globalization and/or quality upgrading. Since our empirical analysis is based on cross-sectional variations between EU25 countries, we capture long run relationship between income distribution and quality content of exports, rather than short run movements.

However, we propose an instrumentation strategy to address this endogeneity issue. To instrument average income, we use GDP per capita in 1992 and geographic centrality within EU25, as measured by distance to Germany. In the period between 1992 and 2005,
some countries have experienced a dramatic increase in their national wealth, due to the transition to a market economy for Eastern countries, or to the accession to EU membership for countries like Spain and Portugal. Some other countries like Ireland have implemented policies in order to attract foreign companies. We thus expect GDP per capita in 1992 to be positively correlated, but not collinear, with average PPP income in the middle of the years 2000. This is all the more true that GDP per capita and households’ average income can substantially differ, depending on the share of GDP attributable to multinational firms, on the level of taxes etc. We do not expect, on the other hand, GDP per capita in 1992 to affect itself the quality content of exports in the mid-2000’s, if not through an internal demand effect. We also use geographic centrality within EU25 as an instrument for households’ average income. The economic geography literature has emphasized the role of proximity to other markets to explain economic development, when production exhibits increasing returns to scale and when trade is costly. Proximity to demand is partly explained by geographic centrality. Head and Mayer (2011) for example investigate the impact of market access on GDP per capita, and instrument market access by geographic centrality. We thus expect geographic centrality to positively influence household PPP income due to the positive correlation between geographic centrality and market access, while geographic centrality is not expected to influence directly the quality content of production.

To instrument the Gini index of income inequality, we use income inequality in the 1990’s and the number of years with a left-wing government from 1991 to 2000. We use the World Income Inequality Database to obtain the Gini index in the 1990’s: since information is missing for some years and countries, we use the most ancient reliable figure for each country. The intuition for such an instrument is similar to the one presented in the case of GDP per capita: again, some European countries have experienced tremendous changes in their level of income inequality, in particular Eastern European countries, due to the end of Communism. We expect the level of Gini index in the 1990’s to be positively related to income inequality in the mid 2000’s because of some hysteresis in income distribution; however, past inequality should not impact subsequent quality content of exports through a mechanism other than the size of the internal demand for high-quality products. On the other hand, we anticipate the number of years during which the country was run by a left-wing government from 1991 to 2000 to negatively influence the level of inequality in 2005-2007, left-wing governments being more inclined to implementing redistributive policies. However, it seems rather implausible that left-wing governments have different preferences from right-wing governments regarding technology or quality choices. We obtain information on the political color of governments in European countries from maps available on the Guardian website.

We use interactions between the lag of GDP per capita and the lag of inequality on the one hand, and geographic centrality and the number of years with left-wing govern-

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24 They instrument market access for a reverse causality issue: GDP per capita of a country potentially influences GDP per capita of its neighbors, through a market access mechanism too.
26 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jul/28/europe-politics-interactive-map-left-right
ment on the other, to instrument the interaction between average income and inequality. Our preferred specification will thus be an instrumental variables regression with importer-product-year fixed effects, income and inequality being considered as endogenous regressors.\footnote{Due to computational reasons, we run this regression as an instrumental variables regression on dependent and independent variables demeaned in the importer-product-year dimension.}

5 Results

In this section, we first present some descriptive statistics on income and inequality within EU25 countries, and discuss the relevance of our instruments to explain income distribution. We then detail our baseline results and provide several additional robustness checks.

5.1 Descriptive statistics

We distinguish “rich” and “poor” countries, rich countries having an average income higher than 16,000 euros over the period. This threshold splits countries of the enlarged EU into two equal-sized samples.\footnote{Rich countries are Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great-Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden. Poor countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.}

Table 1 show that rich countries are almost twice as rich as poor countries in terms of average PPP income, whatever the income quintile we consider. In 2005, rich countries seem also to be less unequal than poor countries: the Gini index is equal to 28 on average in rich countries, vs 31.3 in poor countries. Rich countries are more homogeneous along all the dimensions described in the table, the standard-deviation of the different variables being lower for rich than for poor countries. However, Graph 3 shows that both average income and inequality vary strongly across countries of the enlarged EU, whatever the sample of countries we consider. We observe rich and unequal countries (Great-Britain, Germany), rich and equal countries (Sweden, Denmark), but also poor and unequal countries (Latvia, Lithuania) and poor and equal countries (Hungary, Slovakia). No significant correlation exists between average income and inequality in the different samples of countries. This confirms that the enlarged EU is very well suited to investigate the role of income distribution on the specialization of countries in terms of quality.

Table 2 shows that our instruments are good predictors of income and income inequality within EU25. Lag GDP per capita and geographic centrality (as measured by the inverse of distance between a given country and Germany) are positively correlated with PPP income between 2005 and 2007. Lag Gini index and the number of years with a left-wing government are respectively positively and negatively correlated with income inequality within countries between 2005 and 2007. All correlations have thus the expected sign and are significant at least at the 5% level. We are thus confident in the reliability of our
Table 1: Average income and inequality in the enlarged EU in 2005 - PPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>14435</td>
<td>5348</td>
<td>6182</td>
<td>21966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st quintile Average income</td>
<td>6197</td>
<td>2507</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>9479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th quintile Average income</td>
<td>27119</td>
<td>10053</td>
<td>10695</td>
<td>44372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>9900</td>
<td>3376</td>
<td>6182</td>
<td>14880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st quintile Average income</td>
<td>4084</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>7064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th quintile Average income</td>
<td>19005</td>
<td>6489</td>
<td>10695</td>
<td>28718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rich countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>18970</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>16544</td>
<td>21966</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st quintile Average income</td>
<td>8311</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>5956</td>
<td>9479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th quintile Average income</td>
<td>35233</td>
<td>5059</td>
<td>28445</td>
<td>44372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Average income and inequalities in 2005
instruments to explain endogenous variables. We will provide formal tests on the relevance and the validity of our instruments when presenting regression results.

Table 2: Predictors of average income and inequality EU25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ln Average PPP income</th>
<th>Gini</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln GDP per cap. 1992</td>
<td>0.760$^a$ (0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic centrality</td>
<td>0.312$^a$ (0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini 1990's</td>
<td>0.705$^a$ (0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># years with left-wing gvt 1991-2000</td>
<td>-0.171$^b$ (0.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses $^a$, $^b$ and $^c$ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered by year. Geographic centrality is the inverse of distance to Germany.

5.2 Bilateral export prices and income distribution within the exporting country

Table 3 displays our baseline results. We first provide evidence based on OLS regressions with importer-product-year fixed effects. As expected, in all regressions, the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage is affected by a negative and significant coefficient: countries that are relatively more specialized in a given product exhibit lower export unit values for that product; countries specialized in a given product have a cost advantage for that product. Moreover, as predicted by our model, column (1) shows that when we compare countries that export a given product to a given importing country, exporters with higher PPP average income exhibit higher unit values. On the opposite, income inequality has no significant impact. In column (2), we check that these results are not driven by omitted variables such as distance and population. In line with results obtained, among others, by Bastos and Silva (2010), Martin (2012) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), we find a positive correlation between unit values and distance: for a given product, the most expensive varieties imported by a country are those coming from further away. This is coherent with both Alchian-Allen selection effects and/or strategic pricing based on bilateral distance. Also, big countries seem to export, all else equal, cheaper varieties than smaller ones, pointing at scale effects or innovation mechanisms such as the one developed in Desmet and Parente (2010). When distance and population are taken into account, the Gini index attracts a negative and significant coefficient; this coefficient is however very close to zero. In column (3), we turn to the test of the main prediction of our model; in line with our theoretical predictions, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between income and inequality (the sign of the coefficient on both variables cannot be interpreted directly anymore due to the presence of the interaction term). The effect of income inequality on the quality content of countries’ exports is heterogeneous: it
is all the more positive that the country is rich.

Table 3: Bilateral export prices and exporter characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Ln uv\text{__x_{\text{empl}}}</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.242$^a$</td>
<td>0.225$^a$</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td>0.269$^a$</td>
<td>-0.325$^a$</td>
<td>-0.485$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0204)</td>
<td>(0.0249)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.0244)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00163</td>
<td>-0.00471$^b$</td>
<td>-0.127$^a$</td>
<td>0.00395</td>
<td>-0.187$^a$</td>
<td>-0.251$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00172)</td>
<td>(0.00203)</td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
<td>(0.00317)</td>
<td>(0.0547)</td>
<td>(0.0557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Balassa ind. vol.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0790$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0841$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0852$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0833$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0854$^a$</td>
<td>-0.104$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00289)</td>
<td>(0.00298)</td>
<td>(0.00294)</td>
<td>(0.00285)</td>
<td>(0.00264)</td>
<td>(0.00291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Pop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0135$^c$</td>
<td>-0.0173$^b$</td>
<td>-0.0246$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0295$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0370$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00737)</td>
<td>(0.00755)</td>
<td>(0.00729)</td>
<td>(0.00728)</td>
<td>(0.00936)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.126$^a$</td>
<td>0.125$^a$</td>
<td>0.117$^a$</td>
<td>0.117$^a$</td>
<td>0.135$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00754)</td>
<td>(0.00759)</td>
<td>(0.00800)</td>
<td>(0.00836)</td>
<td>(0.00891)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0130$^c$</td>
<td>0.0201$^a$</td>
<td>0.0268$^a$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00384)</td>
<td>(0.00384)</td>
<td>(0.00505)</td>
<td>(0.00609)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2421908</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1039233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importer-Product-Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinbergen-Paap test (p-value)</td>
<td>30.50$^a$</td>
<td>14.97$^a$</td>
<td>15.99$^a$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses $^a$, $^b$ and $^c$ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the exporter-year level.

In columns (4) and (5), we replicate columns (2) and (3), instrumenting average income, inequality and their interaction. We use the instruments described in section 4.4. When the interaction between average income and inequality is ignored, average income in the exporting country is still positively and very significantly related to unit values of exports; on the opposite, the coefficient on inequality is very close to zero and insignificant. However, in column (5), the interaction between average income and inequality in the exporting country is introduced and again, it is positively and very significantly related to export unit value. More, the coefficient increases by 50% as compared to the non instrumented regression. In column (6), we run the same regression, but we focus on the products that are more vertically differentiated. We rank products according to the coefficient of variation of their export unit values within EU25, and conserve the top 50% of products in terms of observed dispersion of unit values. This is an important test; indeed, Khandelwal (2010) shows that the correlation between unit value and the quality index he develops is very high for products with long quality ladders. Results show that our results hold and are reinforced: the coefficient increases by one third as compared to the results obtained on the whole sample of manufacturing products. Finally, we can note that for all the IV regressions, instruments seem to explain correctly the potentially endogenous regressors (Kleinbergen-Paap statistic very significant and well above 10), while we cannot reject the validity of our instruments based on the Sargan-Hansen test.

Overall, we can conclude that our baseline results validate our theoretical predictions: richer countries specialize in higher quality varieties of a given product, and the effect of inequality on the quality content of exports is all the more positive that average income
is high. Given our model, this tends to show that demand of EU25 consumers for high-quality varieties is convex on the range of values taken by average income in the enlarged EU. The fact that income inequality impacts on the quality of exports also points at the importance of non-homotheticity of demand to explain vertical specialization of countries.

5.3 Robustness checks: Additional controls

In this section, we provide several robustness checks, introducing additional controls to our baseline regression (column (6) of Table 3).

First, even though descriptive statistics were rather reassuring in this respect (see section 5.1), one might fear that some correlation exists between average income and inequality; in that case, our interaction term between average PPP income and the Gini index would in reality capture non-linearities in the relationship between the quality content of exports and income or inequality. In column (1) of Table 4, we thus introduce the square of log PPP average income, and we add the square of log GDP per capita in 1992 as an instrument. The coefficient on the square of average PPP income is positive and significant, and consistently with our theoretical framework, the interaction between average income and inequality also remains positive and significant. In column (2), we do the same with income inequality. We do not find such a non-linear relationship between export unit values and income inequality; moreover, the introduction of the square of the Gini index does not affect our baseline results.

All the additional controls we use from column (3) to column (9) are taken from Eurostat. In column (3), we control for the level of wages in the exporting country. Indeed, unit values are often criticized on the ground that they would capture other elements than quality, in particular the level of production costs (see Khandelwal, 2010; Hallak and Schott, 2011). Of course, the level of wages and average income are highly correlated. However, even though reduced, the coefficient on the interaction term between PPP average income and inequality is still positive and significant once the level of wages is controlled for.

Columns (4) and (9) control for supply-side determinants of the quality content of exports that would not be controlled for by our IV strategy. Differences in skills supply across countries, or in the diversity of skills, might explain differences in the quality content of production and exports. If average income and inequality are correlated to the level and the dispersion of skills available in a country, the interpretation of our results in terms of demand-side determinants would be spurious. In column (4), we first introduce in the regression the number of graduates in maths, sciences and technologies per thousand inhabitants and in column (5), we add the interaction of this variable with average income. The latter interaction controls for potential heterogeneity in the quality of diplomas across countries and for heterogeneous impact of skills along income. These controls do not alter the heterogeneous impact of inequality on the quality content of exports we measure.
Table 4: Bilateral export prices and exporter characteristics - Additional controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>-8.711a</td>
<td>-0.359a</td>
<td>-0.151a</td>
<td>-0.485a</td>
<td>-0.779a</td>
<td>-0.404a</td>
<td>-1.747a</td>
<td>-2.176a</td>
<td>-4.767a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-0.287a</td>
<td>-0.0458c</td>
<td>-0.191a</td>
<td>-0.246a</td>
<td>-0.161a</td>
<td>-0.249a</td>
<td>-0.457a</td>
<td>-0.562a</td>
<td>-0.547a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.0302a</td>
<td>0.0219b</td>
<td>0.0202c</td>
<td>0.0261a</td>
<td>0.0168a</td>
<td>0.0279a</td>
<td>0.0482a</td>
<td>0.0599a</td>
<td>0.0577a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Balassa ind. vol.</td>
<td>-0.102a</td>
<td>-0.105a</td>
<td>-0.104a</td>
<td>-0.103a</td>
<td>-0.103a</td>
<td>-0.106a</td>
<td>-0.106a</td>
<td>-0.106a</td>
<td>-0.106a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Pop</td>
<td>-0.0361a</td>
<td>-0.0472a</td>
<td>-0.0322b</td>
<td>-0.0385a</td>
<td>-0.0329a</td>
<td>-0.364a</td>
<td>-0.345a</td>
<td>-0.352a</td>
<td>-0.454a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Distance</td>
<td>0.156a</td>
<td>0.141a</td>
<td>0.137a</td>
<td>0.135a</td>
<td>0.140a</td>
<td>0.157a</td>
<td>0.157a</td>
<td>0.157a</td>
<td>0.156a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln ² Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.436a</td>
<td>-0.00270</td>
<td>(0.00942)</td>
<td>0.0805b</td>
<td>-2.050a</td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td>0.223a</td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Wage</td>
<td>-0.835 (0.101)</td>
<td>0.0805b</td>
<td>-2.050a</td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td>0.223a</td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Grad. in math, sc. &amp; tech. per 1 000 of pop.</td>
<td>0.436a</td>
<td>-0.00270</td>
<td>(0.00942)</td>
<td>0.0805b</td>
<td>-2.050a</td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td>0.223a</td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Nb of people with post sec. non tert. educ. × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.260a</td>
<td>(0.0352)</td>
<td>(1.007)</td>
<td>(1.183)</td>
<td>(2.900)</td>
<td>0.415a</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnNb of people with post sec. non tert. educ. × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.260a</td>
<td>(0.0352)</td>
<td>(1.007)</td>
<td>(1.183)</td>
<td>(2.900)</td>
<td>0.415a</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Nb of people with ter. educ. × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.0559c</td>
<td>2.830b</td>
<td>3.807a</td>
<td>-0.284b</td>
<td>-0.388a</td>
<td>-1.022a</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Nb of people with ter. educ. × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.0559c</td>
<td>2.830b</td>
<td>3.807a</td>
<td>-0.284b</td>
<td>-0.388a</td>
<td>-1.022a</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills diversity</td>
<td>0.111a</td>
<td>-13.64a</td>
<td>(0.0821)</td>
<td>(4.935)</td>
<td>1.439a</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>0.111a</td>
<td>-13.64a</td>
<td>(0.0821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills diversity Ln× Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.111a</td>
<td>-13.64a</td>
<td>(0.0821)</td>
<td>(4.935)</td>
<td>1.439a</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>0.111a</td>
<td>-13.64a</td>
<td>(0.0821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
<td>1039233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importer-Product-Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinbergen-Paap test</td>
<td>16.43a</td>
<td>10.66a</td>
<td>24.64a</td>
<td>17.41a</td>
<td>18.76a</td>
<td>29.93b</td>
<td>16.52b</td>
<td>20.67a</td>
<td>14.76b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses "a", "b" and "c" respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.

Standard errors are clustered at the exporter-year level.
In column (6), we use a different proxy for skills supply in the population. We control for the share of population with post-secondary (but non tertiary) education, and for the share of population with tertiary education. As for the previous regression, we also interact these variables with average income in column (7). Again, the heterogeneous impact of income inequality on unit values of exports holds. Note that from column (5), interaction terms between skills and income are instrumented by interactions between skills and geographic centrality and skills and GDP per capita in 1992, to address the potential endogeneity generated by the presence of current income in the interaction.

Finally, we control in columns (8) for the diversity of skills, using the inverse of a Herfindahl index, calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Skills diversity} = \ln\left[\left(\text{share}_{\text{sec educ}}^2 + \text{share}_{\text{post sec educ}}^2 + \text{share}_{\text{tert educ}}^2\right)^{-1}\right]
\]

It accounts for the dispersion of skills in the population, as measured by the share of population with up to secondary education, the share of population with post secondary education and the share of population with tertiary education. The higher the index, the more dispersed the skills. In column (9), we authorize the effect of skills diversity to vary along income.

Results in column (8) show that skills diversity is affected by a positive coefficient. In the framework developed by Grossman and Maggi (2000), this would tend to show that producing higher quality varieties requires more individual talents; countries with higher skills dispersion would thus have a comparative advantage for high quality varieties. Column (9) would indicate that this is all the more the case that the country is rich (positive coefficient on the interaction between skills diversity and income). Regarding our results on the role of income distribution on the quality content of exports, our conclusions remain unchanged. If anything, the coefficient on the interaction between average PPP income and the Gini index is boosted by direct controls for supply-side determinants of the quality of exports.

Note that the Kleinbergen-Paap test and the Sargan-Hansen test show that in most regressions, our instruments explain correctly income distribution and are valid instruments (except, regarding the Sargan-Hansen statistic, in regressions with controls for secondary and post-secondary education). Overall, these results consequently confirm that our demand-side explanation of vertical comparative advantage is at play in the data for the enlarged EU, and resists to controls for alternative supply-side stories. Note that the fact that the introduction of proxies for skills and skill dispersion does not affect much our results on income and inequality is not entirely surprising in the specific context of the enlarged EU. Indeed, Eastern European countries have a high share of their population holding a tertiary degree, as a result of strong education policies in these countries under the Communist era. Consequently, differences in terms of income and inequality across EU25 countries are much bigger than differences in terms of skills and quality of the
workforce.

5.4 Robustness checks: Alternative samples

In this section, we provide additional checks, and run our benchmark regression (column (6) of Table 3) on alternative subsamples.

We first limit the sample to final products. Antras, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) develop an index of industries upstreamness, based on I-O tables. Their method gives a measure of the number of production stages between a given industry and final consumers. We use a conversion of their index, available for US industries, into the HS6 product classification. Final products are defined as products for which the index is equal to 1.41 (first quartile of the value of the index, final products having an index equal to 1). Results obtained in column (1) of Table 5 are very much the same as those obtained on the whole sample. The role of income distribution as a determinant of the quality content of exports is consequently not limited to final products. This is not so surprising, since high quality inputs are generally needed to produce high quality final products (see Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012, for example).

In column (2), we get rid of small trade flows, for which the measure of unit value could be spurious. We drop trade flows smaller than 10,000 euros, and again, results are pretty much the same.

In columns (3) to (5), we drop respectively the smallest countries, i.e. the islands Cyprus and Malta, the poorest countries, i.e. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and the richest ones, i.e. Denmark, Great-Britain and Ireland. In all cases, results remain qualitatively unchanged, showing that our results are not driven by some outlier countries.

Finally, Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix show that our results hold when we consider absolute average income and not PPP income, and when we use the interquintile ratio as a measure of inequality instead of the Gini index. Results also remain the same if we use average unit value of exports of product $p$ by country $x$ at time $t$ as a dependent variable, instead of bilateral prices (using shares of flows $x_{mpt}$ in the total volume of exports of product $p$ by country $x$ at time $t$ as weights).\footnote{30}

6 Quantitative assessment of the effects

Now that we have shown that average income positively impacts on the quality content of exports, and that inequality has a heterogeneous impact along average income, we provide a quantitative assessment of the effects at play.

We first consider a country with an average income and a Gini index equal to the average within EU25, i.e. 14,435 euros and 29.7 (see Table 1). Given the results obtained in column (6) of Table 3, a one standard deviation increase in the average income of that country (i.e. an increase by 5,348 euros) will generate an average increase of its export unit

\footnote{29}We thank Julien Martin for providing us the data.
\footnote{30}Tables are not presented to save space but are available upon request.
Table 5: Bilateral export prices and exporter characteristics - Alternative samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: $\ln uv_{xmp}$</th>
<th>Final goods w/o flows w/o CYP and MLT LTU and POL</th>
<th>w/o LVA GBR and IRL</th>
<th>w/o DNK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>-0.394$^a$ -0.429$^b$ -0.509$^a$ -0.681$^a$</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222) (0.207) (0.179) (0.251)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-0.214$^a$ -0.243$^a$ -0.259$^a$ -0.327$^a$</td>
<td>-0.189$^b$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0661) (0.0630) (0.0554) (0.0860)</td>
<td>(0.0801)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Balassa ind. vol.</td>
<td>-0.0782$^a$ -0.120$^a$ -0.106$^a$ -0.103$^a$</td>
<td>-0.104$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00358) (0.00326) (0.00295) (0.00315)</td>
<td>(0.00267)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Pop</td>
<td>-0.0427$^a$ -0.0412$^a$ -0.0366$^a$ -0.0412$^a$</td>
<td>-0.0254$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00886) (0.0111) (0.00973) (0.0118)</td>
<td>(0.00985)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Distance</td>
<td>0.116$^a$ 0.139$^a$ 0.134$^a$ 0.131$^a$</td>
<td>0.133$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0121) (0.00956) (0.00928) (0.00954)</td>
<td>(0.0104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini $\times$ Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.0229$^a$ 0.0261$^a$ 0.0277$^a$ 0.0347$^a$</td>
<td>0.0197$^b$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00721) (0.00687) (0.00594) (0.00910)</td>
<td>(0.00889)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>233641 782921 994165 968718 886347</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importer-Product-Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinbergen-Paap test</td>
<td>16.09$^a$ 16.15$^a$ 16.15$^a$ 23.08$^a$ 21.80$^a$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)</td>
<td>0.23 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses $^a$, $^b$ and $^c$ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the exporter-year level.

On the other hand, an increase in income inequality by one standard deviation (i.e. by 4.5), keeping average PPP income constant, would increase exports unit values by 2.6%. This is not negligible, but far less important than the effect of average income. Finally, an increase in both average income and inequality would raise unit values by 16.2%.

Assume now that we want to match the income distribution of a poor and egalitarian Eastern European country in 2005, Czech Republic, with the income distribution of a rich and more unequal Western European country, France. In the long run, increasing Czech average PPP income (equal to 10,023.3 euros) to the level of French average PPP income (equal to 16,937.6 euros) would raise unit values of Czech exports by 11.1%. Doing the same for inequality (i.e. increasing the Gini index from 26 to 28) would decrease Czech export unit values by 0.8%. Finally, matching both average PPP income and income inequality would raise the unit value of Czech exports by 13.1%.

These simple thought experiments show that inequality does impact on the quality of exports by 9.8%. On the other hand, an increase in income inequality by one standard deviation (i.e. by 4.5), keeping average PPP income constant, would increase exports unit values by 2.6%. This is not negligible, but far less important than the effect of average income. Finally, an increase in both average income and inequality would raise unit values by 16.2%.

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The slightly negative effect is due to the negative sign affecting inequality in the regression with the interaction term. Theoretically, a negative impact of inequality on the quality content of exports is not possible when demand for high quality varieties is increasing and convex along income. Still, according to the coefficients obtained in our benchmark regression (column (6) of Table 3), an increase in the Gini index by one point has a positive impact for countries with a PPP average income above $\exp(0.251/0.0268) \approx 11680$ euros, i.e. all countries but Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Baltic countries. However, we would not interpret too much this negative coefficient; indeed, it is calculated so as to fit best the data given the presence of the interaction term, and has no economic significance per se.

---

31 The figure is obtained thanks to the following calculation: $-0.485 \times \ln(14435+5348)-\ln(14435)|+0.0268 \times [\ln(14435+5348)-\ln(14435)] \times 29.7 \approx 9.8\%$
32 The figure is obtained thanks to the following calculation: $-0.251 \times 4.5+0.0268 \times [\ln(14435)] \times 4.5 \approx 2.6\%$
33 The figure is obtained thanks to the following calculation: $-0.485 \times [\ln(14435+5348)-\ln(14435)]-0.251 \times 4.5+0.0268 \times [\ln(14435+5348)-\ln(14435)] \times 4.5 \approx 16.2\%$
34 This slightly negative effect is due to the negative sign affecting inequality in the regression with the interaction term. Theoretically, a negative impact of inequality on the quality content of exports is not possible when demand for high quality varieties is increasing and convex along income. Still, according to the coefficients obtained in our benchmark regression (column (6) of Table 3), an increase in the Gini index by one point has a positive impact for countries with a PPP average income above $\exp(0.251/0.0268) \approx 11680$ euros, i.e. all countries but Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Baltic countries. However, we would not interpret too much this negative coefficient; indeed, it is calculated so as to fit best the data given the presence of the interaction term, and has no economic significance per se.
content of exports, but that it has alone a second-order effect as compared to average income. However, due to the convexity of demand for high quality varieties highlighted in the theoretical part, the impact of inequality on average income is magnified when it is coupled with an increase in average income.

7 Conclusion

We have provided a general and tractable theoretical framework to discuss the role of income distribution on the vertical comparative advantage of countries. Our empirical results on EU25 countries confirm our predictions on the positive impact of average income and the heterogeneous impact of inequality on export unit values. The quantification of effects at play suggests that a poor country seeking to climb the quality ladder should not immediately favor the formation of a rich class through an increase in inequality. The intuition for this is that for low levels of average income, demand for high quality varieties increase very slowly with income; a small and relatively wealthy group of consumers does not represent a sufficient market for high quality firms to produce in the country, since a vast, poor majority of consumers still cannot afford high quality goods. An increase in inequality then has no significant impact on the quality mix being produced and exported.

The influence of the demand structure on vertical specialization clearly points in the direction of a sequential development path: a poor country should first implement policies increasing the income of the whole population, so that average income reaches a high enough level for a sizable domestic market for high qualities to develop. Only once average income has increased to a certain point does an increase in inequality start having a positive effect on the quality mix being produced.

We furthermore believe that our results have several interesting implications. Showing that the income distribution of a country is a significant determinant of its export specialization patterns suggests that there might be an impact of redistributive policies on export performance of a country. In a more dynamic view, we can also conjecture that high quality varieties are more likely to generate externalities or to induce technology adoption. Some interesting new results could thus certainly be obtained on the link between income distribution and growth through this quality channel. These could be interesting avenues for future research.
References


Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 1

Using (4), it is possible to see that we have \( P_j C_{ij} = n_j a_j \frac{\sigma}{\rho} c_{ij} \) with \( i = L, P \) and \( j = H, L \), which yields \( s_j(l_i) = n_j a_j n_i \frac{\beta d}{\rho} c_{ij} \). \( c_{ij} \) captures the impact of the level of income \( l_i \) on the consumption of a given variety of quality \( j \) by a consumer of type \( i \); it depends on \( l_i \) but not on \( n_j \) anymore. The equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) can then be reformulated as:

\[
\frac{f_l}{\sigma} = \beta d L \frac{a_L c_{PL}}{n_L a_L c_{PL} + n_H a_H c_{PH}} + (1 - \beta d) L \frac{a_L c_{RL}}{n_L a_L c_{RL} + n_H a_H c_{RH}} \quad (22)
\]

\[
\frac{f_H}{\sigma} = \beta d L \frac{a_H c_{PH}}{n_L a_L c_{PL} + n_H a_H c_{PH}} + (1 - \beta d) L \frac{a_H c_{RH}}{n_L a_L c_{RL} + n_H a_H c_{RH}} \quad (23)
\]

(22) and (23) represent the possible combinations for numbers of low- and high-quality producers consistent with market clearing and zero profits in the two market segments. Both equations yield downward-sloping curves in the \((n_H, n_L)\) plane, since an increase in the number of competitors in one quality segment necessitates a decrease in the number of competitors in the other segment in order to preserve profitability. More precisely, we have \( n_L \to \frac{L \phi}{d L} \) as \( n_H \to 0 \) and \( n_L \to 0 \) as \( n_H \to \infty \) in (22), while we have \( n_H \to \frac{f_H}{\sigma} \) as \( n_L \to 0 \) and \( n_H \to 0 \) as \( n_L \to \infty \) in (23). The two curves must hence intersect in the positive quadrant, i.e. there exists a unique equilibrium with \( n_H > 0 \) and \( n_L > 0 \). This ends the proof. □

Proof of Proposition 2

(22) and (23) yield two implicit functions \( n_H = \phi^L(n_L) \) and \( n_H = \phi^H(n_L) \). \( \phi^L \) and \( \phi^H \) are implicitly defined by writing (22) and (23) respectively as \( L(n_H, n_L) = 0 \) and \( H(n_H, n_L) = 0 \) with:

\[
L(\cdot) = \frac{f_L}{\sigma} - \beta d L \frac{s_L(l_P)}{n_L} - (1 - \beta d) L \frac{s_L(l_R)}{n_L}
\]

\[
H(\cdot) = \frac{f_H}{\sigma} - \beta d H \frac{s_H(l_P)}{n_H} - (1 - \beta d) H \frac{s_H(l_R)}{n_H}
\]

As already stated in the demonstration of Proposition 1, the two implicit functions \( \phi^L \) and \( \phi^H \) can be represented as downward-sloping curves in the \((n_H, n_L)\) plane. Indeed, considering (22) and (23) it is straightforward that \( \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} < 0 \), \( \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} < 0 \), \( \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} < 0 \). Using the implicit function theorem, we then have \( \frac{\partial \phi^L}{\partial n_L} = -\frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial \phi^H}{\partial n_L} = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} < 0 \), confirming the fact that \( \phi^L \) and \( \phi^H \) are decreasing in the plane \((n_H, n_L)\). Furthermore, considering that \( \phi^L \to \infty \) as \( n_L \to 0 \) and that \( \phi^H \to \frac{f_H}{\sigma} \) as \( n_L \to 0 \), \( \phi^L \) is necessarily steeper than \( \phi^H \) (cf Figure A-1), which entails \( -\frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} < -\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} \). Rearranging the terms, we obtain the inequality \( \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} < \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} \) (*).

Using the implicit function theorem, the comparative statics of \( n_H \) and \( n_L \) with respect to a parameter \( \eta \) (\( \eta = N, d \)) can be obtained with the formula:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial \eta} \\
\frac{\partial n_L}{\partial \eta}
\end{pmatrix}
= -
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} & \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} \\
\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} & \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L}
\end{pmatrix}
-1
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial H}{\partial \eta} \\
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \eta}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

39
Figure A-1: $\phi^H$ and $\phi^L$ in the $(n_H, n_L)$ plane

which yields:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial \eta} \\
\frac{\partial n_L}{\partial \eta}
\end{pmatrix} = -\frac{1}{\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} - \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H}} \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} - \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} \\
-\frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} + \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L}
\end{pmatrix}
$$

The sign of the fraction is straightforward: considering the inequality (*), we have $-\frac{1}{\frac{\partial H}{\partial n_H} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_L} - \frac{\partial H}{\partial n_L} \frac{\partial L}{\partial n_H}} > 0$. We are left to determine the signs of the derivatives of $H$ and $L$ with respect to $d$ and $N$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial L}{\partial N} &= -\frac{\beta dL \partial s_l(l_P)}{n_L} \frac{\partial l_P}{\partial N} - \frac{(1 - \beta d) L \partial s_l(l_R)}{n_L} \frac{\partial l_R}{\partial N} \\
\frac{\partial H}{\partial N} &= -\frac{\beta dL \partial s_H(l_P)}{n_H} \frac{\partial l_P}{\partial N} - \frac{(1 - \beta d) L \partial s_H(l_R)}{n_H} \frac{\partial l_R}{\partial N} \\
\frac{\partial L}{\partial d} &= \frac{\beta L}{n_L} (s_l(l_R) - s_l(l_P)) + \frac{\beta}{n_L} \left( \frac{L^2}{N} \left[ \frac{1 - \beta d \partial s_l(l_R)}{1 - \beta \partial l_R} - d \partial s_l(l_P) \right] + \frac{L^2}{N} \right) \\
\frac{\partial H}{\partial d} &= \frac{\beta L}{n_H} (s_H(l_R) - s_H(l_P)) + \frac{\beta}{n_H} \left( \frac{L^2}{N} \left[ \frac{1 - \beta d \partial s_H(l_R)}{1 - \beta \partial l_R} - d \partial s_H(l_P) \right] + \frac{L^2}{N} \right)
\end{align*}
$$

(i) We have $\frac{\partial l_P}{\partial N} = -d \frac{L}{N^2} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial l_R}{\partial N} = \frac{1 - \beta d}{1 - \beta} \frac{L}{N^2} < 0$. Along P1, we are further able to state that $\frac{\partial s_H(l_R)}{\partial l_R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial s_l(l_P)}{\partial l_P} < 0$. We hence obtain unambiguously that $\frac{\partial L}{\partial N} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial H}{\partial N} > 0$. The implicit function theorem then entails that $\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial N} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial n_L}{\partial N} > 0$.

An alternative and more intuitive demonstration of part (i) of Proposition 2 can be obtained by considering a slightly modified version of the equilibrium condition (11):

$$
\frac{f_H \sigma n_H}{\theta} = \beta dLs_H(l_P) + (1 - \beta d)Ls_H(l_R)
$$

As already said, an increase in $N$ decreases both $l_P$ and $l_R$, and hence generates a decrease of both $s_H(l_P)$ and $s_H(l_R)$ (cf property P1). The RHS of condition (11) hence unambiguously decreases. Considering the concavity of $s_H(l_i)$ along $n_H$ ($\frac{\partial^2 s_H(l_i)}{\partial n_H^2} < 0$, cf demonstration of Proposition 1) and the fact that the LHS is linear in $n_H$, such a decrease of the RHS cannot be compensated by an increase in $n_H$. The LHS necessarily needs to decrease for the equality to be respected again, leading to a decrease in $n_H$ following a
decrease in $N$.

(ii)-(iii) We first place ourselves in the case where both $l_R$ and $l_P$ are under the income threshold $l_I'$. Along P1 and since $l_R > l_P$, we have that $s_H(l_R) - s_H(l_P) > 0$ and $s_L(l_R) - s_L(l_P) < 0$. Along P3, we have that $\frac{\partial s_H(l_R)}{\partial l_R} > \frac{\partial s_H(l_P)}{\partial l_P}$ and $\frac{\partial s_L(l_R)}{\partial l_R} < \frac{\partial s_L(l_P)}{\partial l_P}$. Using those properties, we can deduce $\frac{\partial L}{\partial d} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial H}{\partial d} > 0$. Considering the formula obtained with the implicit function theorem, we then obtain unambiguously that $\frac{\partial n_H}{\partial d} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial n_L}{\partial d} > 0$.

Alternatively, considering (24) and under P1 and P3, the RHS decreases following an increase in $d$. The LHS hence needs to decrease for the equality to be respected again: $n_H$ decreases. Demonstration of (iii) then folds out naturally: for higher levels of $N$ (i.e. lower levels of average income) and because of the convexity of $s_H$ along income levels under the income threshold $I'_r$ (Property P3), the sign of $\frac{\partial \text{RHS}}{\partial d}$ is left unchanged, but the amplitude of the variation is smaller. Hence, the smaller the income, the smaller is the decrease in $n_H$ following an increase in $d$. In other words, the impact of variations in levels of inequality on the quality mix is more important for higher levels of income.

This ends the proof. □

Appendix B

Firms fully pass on their shipping costs to their foreign customers: one unit of variety $k$ of quality $j$ manufactured in country $s$ is sold to consumers of country $r$ at price $p_{sj}(k) = \tau rj_{s}$ where $p_{sj}$ is the mill price. The price index in country $r$ for quality $j$ can then be computed as:

$$P_{rj} = \left[ \int_0^{n_r^j} p_{rj}(k)(1-\sigma_j) dk + \tau^{1-\sigma_j} \int_0^{n_s^j} p_{sj}(k)(1-\sigma_j) dk \right]^{1-\sigma_j}$$

(25)

where $n_r^j$ and $n_s^j$ are the number of firms producing varieties of quality $j$ in country $r$ and country $s$ respectively.

Consumers have the same structure of preferences in each country, and have access to domestically- and foreign-produced varieties. $D_{rj}$ being the total demand in country $r$ for all varieties of quality $j$ (both domestically- and foreign produced), total demand for a variety $k$ of quality $j$ produced in country $r$ is of the form:

$$d_{rj}^j(k) = p_{rj}^{-\sigma_j}(P_{rj}^{\sigma_j} D_{rj} + \tau^{1-\sigma_j} P_{sj}^{\sigma_j} D_{sj})$$

(26)

As one can see from equation (26), a producer located in country $r$ now sells to both domestic and foreign consumers. However, such a producer is a less effective competitor on the foreign market $s$, because of transport costs being fully passed on the price charged to the foreign consumers. Hence, within each country, demand for a foreign variety of quality $j$ is discounted by $\tau^{-\sigma_j} < 1$.

The profit function of a firm $k$ producing quality $j$ in country $r$ is:

$$\pi_{rj}^j(k) = (p_{rj}(k) - a_j)d_{rj}^j(k) - f_j$$

(27)

Profit maximisation yields the following optimal price:
Entry at each quality level proceeds until the next entrant fails to cover its fixed costs. Using expressions (27) and (28), the zero-profit condition yields the following equilibrium output for a firm $k$ operating in the quality segment $j$ in country $r$:

$$d'_j = \frac{f_j(\sigma_j - 1)}{a_j}$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)$$

From equations (28) and (25), the price index in country $r$ for quality $j$ can then be re-expressed as:

$$P_{rj} = (n^j_r + \tau^{1-\sigma_j}n^s_j)^{1-\sigma_j} \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1} a_j$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)$$

This expression can be compared to the form taken by the price index $P_j$ for quality $j$ in a closed economy when expressing it in terms of the number of active competitors $n_j$, i.e. $P_j = n^j_s \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1} a_j$. Here, the price index $P_{rj}$ is similarly function of $n^j_r$ and $n^s_j$, i.e. the number of both local and foreign producers of quality $j$ varieties. The number of foreign competitors $n^s_j$ is however discounted by a factor $\tau^{1-\sigma_j}$, expressing the fact that those foreign producers are less competitive on the local market because of the existence of transport costs fully impacting the price charged to the consumers. We then define the number of “effective competitors” of quality $j$ present on the domestic market $r$ as $	ilde{n}^j_r = n^j_r + \tau^{1-\sigma_j}n^s_j$. Substituting (28) and (30) into (26), we then get the following expression for $d'_j$:

$$d'_j = (\tilde{n}^j_r)^{1-\sigma_j} D_{rj} + \tau^{1-\sigma_j} (\tilde{n}^s_j)^{1-\sigma_j} D_{sj}$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)$$

with the overall demand $D_{rj}$ devoted to consumption of varieties of quality $j$ in country $r$ depending on the income distribution within the considered country in the following way:

$$D_{rj} = \beta NC_{Prj} + (1 - \beta) NC_{Rrj}$$

with $C_{irj}$ designating the overall consumption of varieties of quality $j$ by a consumer of country $r$ belonging to group $i$.

**Equilibrium distribution of firms**

The equilibrium distribution of firms across countries and quality segments $(n^D_L, n^D_H, n^F_L, n^F_H)$ is determined by the following zero-profit conditions:

$$\pi^r_j \leq 0, \quad \tilde{n}^r_j \pi^r_j = 0, \quad j = H, L ; \quad r = D, F$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)$$

Proceeding the same way than in the closed economy case and using equations (29) and (31), the four equilibrium conditions can be reformulated as classic “demand equals supply” conditions $(r, s = D, F, r \neq s, j = L, H)$:

$$\frac{f_j(\sigma_j - 1)}{a_j} = (\tilde{n}^j_r)^{-1} \frac{\sigma_j - 1}{\sigma_j a_j} (\beta N_r s_j(l_{Pr}) \theta l_{Pr} + (1 - \beta) N_r s_j(l_{Rr}) \theta l_{Rr})$$  \hspace{1cm} \underbrace{= A(j)}_{(33)}$$

$$+ \tau^{1-\sigma_j} (\tilde{n}^s_j)^{-1} \frac{\sigma_j - 1}{\sigma_j a_j} (\beta N_s s_j(l_{Ps}) \theta l_{Ps} + (1 - \beta) N_s s_j(l_{Rs}) \theta l_{Rs})$$  \hspace{1cm} \underbrace{= B(j)}_{(33)}$$

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For (33) to hold for both \( r = D, F \) we necessarily have that \( A_j = B_j \), i.e. the domestic demand faced by a producer of a quality \( j \) variety is the same in both countries. This property of our model directly stems from the fact that we have imposed for the two countries to be strictly similar in terms of production technology. Entry at each quality level and within each country proceeds until the next entrant fails to cover its fixed costs, which leads to a similar equilibrium output across countries, \( d_j^r = d_j^s = f_j(\sigma_j - 1) \).

The four equilibrium conditions can then finally be reformulated as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{f_L \sigma \tilde{n}_L}{\theta} &= (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_L}) (\beta d_D L_D s_L (l_{PD}) + (1 - \beta d_D) L_D s_L (l_{RD})) \\
\frac{f_H \sigma \tilde{n}_H}{\theta} &= (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_H}) (\beta d_D L_D s_H (l_{PD}) + (1 - \beta d_D) L_D s_H (l_{RD})) \\
\frac{f_L \sigma \tilde{n}_H}{\theta} &= (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_L}) (\beta d_F L_F s_L (l_{PF}) + (1 - \beta d_F) L_F s_L (l_{RF})) \\
\frac{f_H \sigma \tilde{n}_H}{\theta} &= (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_H}) (\beta d_F L_F s_H (l_{PF}) + (1 - \beta d_F) L_F s_H (l_{RF}))
\end{align*}
\]

Appendix C

Proof of Proposition 3

Using the same demonstration than in Appendix A for Proposition 1, we have that for given income distribution parameters \( \beta, L_r \) and \( d_r \) \((r = D, F)\), there exists a unique positive solution to the system of four equations defined by (13)-(16), defining a unique distribution \((\tilde{n}_L^D, \tilde{n}_H^D, \tilde{n}_L^F, \tilde{n}_H^F)\). Under high enough transport costs \( \tau \), this unique and positive number of effective producers for each quality in each country guarantee the existence of a unique and positive number of domestic producers of each quality within each country (partial trade equilibrium). This ends the proof. \( \square \)

Proof of Proposition 4

As in closed economy, adding up equations (13) and (14) as well as equations (13) and (14) yields the following condition that needs to be met at the equilibrium in both countries \((r = D, F)\):

\[
\frac{f_L \sigma \tilde{n}_L^r}{1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_L}} + \frac{f_H \sigma \tilde{n}_H^r}{1 + \tau^{1-\sigma_H}} = \theta L_r
\]

(34)

Hence, at fixed overall labor supply \( L_r \), condition (34) guarantees that an increase in \( \tilde{n}_H^r \) is only possible through a decrease in \( \tilde{n}_L^r \). Furthermore, we have that:

\[
\frac{\partial n_j^r}{\partial \tilde{n}_j^r} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial n_j^s}{\partial \tilde{n}_j^s} < 0, \quad r \neq s, \quad j = H, L, \quad r = D, F
\]

(35)

Those comparative statics imply that, provided that we are in an equilibrium with partial trade specialization (i.e. for high enough values of \( \tau \)), an increase in the number \( \tilde{n}_j^r \) of “effective” producers of a given quality \( j \) in country \( r \) increases the number \( n_j^r \) of domestic producers of this quality. We can hence directly interpret an increase in \( \tilde{n}_H^r \) as an increase in \( n_H^r \), and a decrease in \( \tilde{n}_L^r \) as a decrease in \( n_L^r \). In other words, an increase in \( \tilde{n}_H^r \) leads
to a shift of the production- and export-mix of country $r$ towards high quality at the equilibrium.

It is then possible to use exactly the same demonstration than in the case of Proposition 2 so as to obtain predictions on the movements of $\tilde{n}_H^r$ (and hence of $n_H^r$) following an increase in $d_r$ or $N_r$. This ends the proof. □

Appendix D

Figure A-2: Engel curves and expenditure shares for low-quality varieties
### Appendix E

Table A-1: Bilateral export prices and exporter characteristics - Non PPP income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Ln $u_{x,y}$</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Avg Income</td>
<td>0.159*</td>
<td>0.145*</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0116)</td>
<td>(0.0140)</td>
<td>(0.0597)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-0.000845</td>
<td>-0.00417*</td>
<td>-0.0845*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00169)</td>
<td>(0.00209)</td>
<td>(0.0184)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ln Balassa ind. vol.</td>
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<td>-0.0832*</td>
<td>-0.0848*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00207)</td>
<td>(0.00291)</td>
<td>(0.00290)</td>
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<td>Ln Pop</td>
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<td>-0.0162*</td>
<td>-0.0209*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00703)</td>
<td>(0.00723)</td>
<td>(0.00730)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ln Distance</td>
<td>0.124*</td>
<td>0.123*</td>
<td>0.115*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00739)</td>
<td>(0.00739)</td>
<td>(0.00783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GiniLn × Avg Income</td>
<td>0.00865*</td>
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<td>(0.00298)</td>
<td>(0.00325)</td>
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<td>Kleinbergen-Paap test</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses *, *, and ** respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the exporter-year level.
Table A-2: Bilateral export prices and exporter characteristics - Interquintile ratio

<table>
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<th>Dependent Variable: Ln uv&lt;sub&gt;exp&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
<td>0.243&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.224&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0736&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0205)</td>
<td>(0.0258)</td>
<td>(0.0823)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP Interquintile ratio</td>
<td>-0.00495</td>
<td>-0.0178&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.311&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.00626)</td>
<td>(0.00757)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Balassa ind. vol.</td>
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<td>-0.0840&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.0848&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.00292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Pop</td>
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<td>-0.0168&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.0249&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>(0.00732)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ln Distance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00750)</td>
<td>(0.00751)</td>
<td>(0.00792)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP Interquintile ratio × Ln Avg PPP Income</td>
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<td>2421908</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importer-Product-Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinbergen-Paap test</td>
<td>32.78&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.39&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup> and <sup>c</sup> respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the exporter-year level.
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