Competing justifications of basic income

Philippe Van Parijs


1. A radical reform

It is a beautifully, disarmingly simple idea. Under a variety of names - state bonus and social credit, social wage and social dividend, guaranteed income and citizen's wage, citizenship income and demogrant, existence income and universal grant - , it has been vindicated using the widest range of arguments. Liberty and equality, efficiency and community, common ownership of the Earth and equal sharing in the benefits of technical progress, the flexibility of the labour market and the dignity of the poor, the fight against unemployment and against inhumane working conditions, against the desertification of the countryside and against interregional inequalities, the viability of cooperatives and the promotion of adult education, autonomy from bosses, husbands and bureaucrats, have all been invoked in favour of what will here be called, in agreement with prevailing English usage, a basic income.

A basic income is an income unconditionally paid to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement. In other words, it is a form of minimum income guarantee that differs from those that now exist in

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1 This is, word by word, the definition adopted by the Basic Income European Network, an association founded in 1986 "to serve as a link between individuals and groups committed to, or interested in, basic income, and to foster informed discussion on this topic throughout Europe" (Secretariate: Bosduifstraat 21, B-2018 Antwerpen, Belgium)
Competing justifications of basic income

various European countries through its being paid
(1) to individuals rather than households;
(2) irrespective of any income from other sources; and
(3) without requiring any present or past work performance nor the
willingness to accept a job if offered.2
Thus, the expression "basic income" is here meant to convey both the
notion that it is granted by virtue of an unconditional entitlement, and the
idea that any income from other sources will come on top of the basis it
provides. But it is not meant to suggest a link with so-called basic needs. As
the expression will here be used, a basic income can in principle fall short of
as well as exceed whatever level of income is deemed sufficient to cover a
person's basic needs.3

Existing guaranteed minimum income systems - the U.K.'s social
security, The Netherlands' bijstand, Belgium's minimex, Germany's
Sozialhilfe, France's revenu minimum d'insertion, etc. - vary in the extent
to which the three features distinctive are actually absent. But both in
principle and in practice, they all remain strongly conditional, and hence
very far from a genuine basic income. Although basic income, by definition,
necessarily possesses all three features, nothing in its definition prevents it
from being introduced alongside other transfers the right to which, or the
level of which, would remain conditional upon household composition,
income from other sources, social insurance contributions, willingness to
work, etc. If a basic income were introduced, the current levels of pensions,
unemployment benefits, student grants, etc, would no doubt require
significant adjustments. But the introduction of a basic income, as such,
does not demand that they should be scrapped.

A basic income does not just differ from existing guaranteed minimum
income systems. It also differs, though to a lesser extent, from so-called
negative income tax proposals. While usually sharing the third feature with
basic income proposals - no work requirement is imposed -, negative
income tax proposals do not usually share the first one - they often operate
at the household level - and never possess the second one: by definition, a

2 The term "basic income" is sometimes used to refer to schemes which are not
unconditional in sense (2), being administered in the form of an (individual) tax credit or
(individual) negative income tax and hence taking the form of a cash payment only for those
with gross earnings below the break even point (see e.g. Stroeken 1986). This is also the
case in some of the contributions to this volume. As we shall see, however, the focus of the
ethical discussion in which they engage is on the justification of inconditionality in sense (3),
and this terminological variation is therfore of secondary importance.

3 This usage is therefore, strictly speaking, inconsistent with using the expression "partial
basic income" - as has often been done in the wane of the famous Dutch report on social
security (see WRR 1985 and e.g. Dekker & Nooteboom 1988, Atkinson & Sutherland 1988) -
to refer to an unconditional individual income pitched at a level that is recognized to be
insufficient to cover a person's basic needs.
negative income tax scheme can only determine the level of transfer a person or household is entitled to (if any) in the light of information about income from other sources. In this sense, the fundamental difference between a basic income and a negative income tax is that the former operates *ex ante*, whereas the latter operates *ex post*. This distinction is orthogonal to, though sometimes confused with, the distinction between those guaranteed minimum income schemes which create what is often called a poverty or unemployment trap, i.e. destroy pecuniary incentives to perform paid work at the bottom of the income scale, and those which do not. On paper, an individual negative income tax and a basic income can yield exactly the same distribution of post-tax-and-transfer incomes. In particular, in both cases, taxation can be, and usually is, designed in such a way that net income rises as gross income rises at all levels of income - i.e. in such a way that the poverty trap is in principle abolished. But in both cases, it could also be designed in such a way that net income would not rise as gross income increases below some threshold level - i.e. in such a way that the negative income tax rate or the "clawback rate" on the lowest earnings is 100 percent. (See Figure 1.)

This potential identity of the distributions of net income generated by basic income and negative income tax schemes only exists on paper, however, because in the real world it does make a tremendous difference whether the minimum income guarantee is given to all *ex ante*, no questions asked - as it is under a basic income scheme -, or whether it is given only to those who turn out to have had, or who provide adequate evidence they now have, an insufficient income. For this reason, a negative income tax is undoubtedly worse from the beneficiaries' standpoint than the "financially equivalent" basic income scheme. Yet it does not deserve the bad name it has on the left because of its association with right-wing economists such as Milton Friedman.4 Keeping the level of the minimum

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4  It is worth remembering, firstly, that the negative income tax scheme advocated by Friedman was not just pitched at a low level, but also meant to substitute most other social transfer schemes and conceived as a transitional measure in a gradual phasing out of the whole welfare state (see Friedman 1962, 1966 and esp. 1975); and secondly that, in 1968, it is a group of left-of-centre American economists (Galbraith, Tobin and Samuelson among them) that recruited 1200 of their colleagues into signing a call for the immediate introduction of a "national system of income guarantees and supplements" along N.I.T. lines, and that Friedman refused to sign it because he found the proposals too generous. Moynihan (1973) is still a fascinating account of how, in the late Sixties and early Seventies, the United States just missed a unique chance of making a significant step towards a genuine basic income.
Competing justifications of basic income

income unchanged, replacing existing European guaranteed minimum schemes by a negative income tax of the type proposed by Friedman (i.e. without a poverty trap, as in Fig.1B) would be, other things remaining equal, an unambiguous improvement for the beneficiaries.5

2. Why now?

The idea of a basic income is old enough. In Britain, for example, it can be traced back at least to the end of the First World War, when Bertrand Russell suggested it as a way of combining the appeal of both socialism and anarchism, while a Quaker and Labour Party member called Dennis Milner was working out in a small book the first elaborate proposal for a genuine basic income.6 But it is only in the nineteen eighties that it has begun to attract more than occasional attention and that, in several West European countries, a growing number of academics, but also of political and social organizations have made it the focus of an ever expanding discussion. Once dismissed as the idée fixe of a handful of cranks, it is now becoming an essential ingredient in any serious discussion of the future of advanced capitalist countries.7

The first part of this book ("Socioeconomic background") aims to answer this question. The two chapters it contains, one by a labour economist (Guy Standing) and one by a social theorist (Claus Offe), both of them among the main protagonists of the current European debate on basic income, show how the need to take the latter seriously has grown out of a number of powerful trends and the gradual realization of the inadequacy of conventional policies in the new context created as a result of these trends. I refer the reader to these two contributions for a detailed analysis, and shall restrict myself here to stressing two factors which I believe to be of

5 See e.g. Gerhardt & Weber (1984) and Mückenberger, Offe & Ostner (1989) for negative income tax proposals from the Left.
6 See Russell (1918: ch. IV) and Milner (1920). Note that Juliet Rhys-Williams' (1943) proposal of a "new social contract", often referred to as the starting point of the "social dividend" tradition in Britain, was not a basic income proposal as defined, because it made availability for work a necessary counterpart for the uniform grant. (Payment of the grant is suspended during strikes for example!) On the intellectual history of basic income in Britain, see esp. Van Trier (1989, 1990). The most comprehensive account of the intellectual history of guaranteed minimum schemes probably remains Morley-Fletcher (1981).
paramount importance in explaining the growing saliency of the basic income discussion.

One is that one can no longer assume that an overwhelming majority of households can cover their basic needs thanks to the wages they owe to the job one of their members currently holds or to the benefits they owe to the job one of their members used to hold. Under this assumption, central to the conception of the modern welfare state, the safety net of social assistance could be confined to a marginal - and hopefully shrinking - set of cases. For various reasons, this is now very far - and ever further - from being the case. Throughout Europe, an increasing number of households has had to rely on social assistance and has got caught in the net it provides. The joint impact of technical change and the internationalization of markets is making it increasingly difficult for the economies of advanced capitalist countries to generate a sufficient number of jobs that can be profitable while providing those who hold them with a living wage. The outcome of this process is, increasingly, a "dual economy", a "two-thirds society", in which the most significant divide, as far as material welfare is concerned, is no longer the one that separates capitalists from workers, but the one that separates those who hold proper jobs from the rest of the population. There is no easy way of fighting this tendency. But the replacement of the safety net, in which the weakest and the unlucky get trapped, by a firm unconditional floor, on which they can securely stand, in other words the replacement of a conditional minimum income scheme by a genuine basic income, is increasingly viewed as an indispensable ingredient in any such strategy.

A second factor, of a more ideological nature, is hardly less important, in particular on the Left. After the spectacular collapse of East European socialism, there are few people left, if any, with an unscathed conviction that socialism, or even a significant step towards it, is both desirable and possible in Western Europe within our lifetimes. Are those who have lost this conviction left with nothing to hope for but the survival of the existing welfare state or, at best, some marginal improvements in its structure or size? According to many of those on the Left who are arguing for a basic income, this need not be the case. For the introduction of a basic income is not just a feasible structural improvement in the functioning of the welfare state. It is a profound reform that belongs in the same league as the abolition of slavery or the introduction of universal suffrage. Indeed, it can arguably be viewed as a way of pursuing the radical ideal for which socialism was, or should have been, only a means, while unapologetically discarding a tool which has now proved, or at any rate is now widely believed to be, inadequate. It can be viewed, in other words, as a "capitalist
road to communism\(^8\). Furthermore, if in some country at some time, socialism were to become again a realistic possibility, basic income does not cease to be relevant. For among those who keep believing in a desirable and feasible form of socialism, basic income is becoming increasingly popular as a central ingredient of the blueprint they advocate.\(^9\) Both more modest and more radical than the notion of public ownership of the means of production, the idea of a totally unconditional income rekindles the hope that not all major steps towards the emancipation of mankind are behind us: another one is within reach.

3. What do we need foundations for?

There is, however, one formidable ideological obstacle to such a step. It is the feeling, widely spread from the far right to the far left of the electorate and often vigorously expressed by both politicians and academics, that introducing a basic income would be unfair, that it would amount to an institutionalization of free riding, to the exploitation of hard workers by those able-bodied people who would choose to live off their basic incomes.\(^10\)

To this challenge and its importance, the present volume owes its very existence. For if the advocates of basic income are to meet this challenge, they cannot content themselves with partial, limited arguments, say to the effect that a basic income would provide a more effective way of fighting poverty, long term unemployment or the dual society. They need to spell out a consistent and plausible conception of the just or good society which could provide firm foundations to the legitimacy of an unconditional income. As we shall shortly see, this is not a matter of simply applying to this particular issue some preconceived libertarian or egalitarian ideal. In the very process of relating basic income to such ideals, one is forced to question, clarify and reformulate some of the most central principles of

\(^8\) The 1986 special issue of *Theory and Society* (Vol. 15 n°5), which provides the most thorough theoretical discussion of basic income so far, looks at basic income from this angle. See also section 8 below.


\(^10\) Miller (1989: 329), for example, quotes empirical studies showing that, in both the U.S. and the U.K., there is widespread "concern that welfare should not go to the 'undeserving' - that is people who are capable of earning a living in the market place but choose not to do so". A typical expression of this view by politicians is contained in the majority resolution adopted by the Dutch Labour Party at the national conference it devoted, in part, to the discussion of basic income: "According to democratic socialists, every person who is able to perform labour must do so" (quoted by van Ojik 1983). A forceful expression of the same view by an academic appears in various writings by Jon Elster (see esp. 1986: 709, 719; 1989: 215-6).
Competing justifications of basic income

modern political philosophy. What is liberty? What is equality? What is efficiency? How can they be combined? How do the demands of justice relate to the concern with community? Is there any room today for a plausible radical political philosophy that does not turn out to be some version of left liberalism? These various questions, as we shall see, are central to the debate. This book, as a consequence, is not just a major substantive contribution to the discussion of an important policy issue. By going back and fro between abstract principles and concrete implications, by intertwining analytical distinctions and empirical claims, by trying to combine political relevance and intellectual rigour, by questioning the boundaries between pre-established positions - Marxist and liberal, for example -, and by displaying sharp disagreements as well as honest concessions, it also constitutes an exemplar of contemporary political philosophy at work.

In the remainder of this introduction, I shall not try to summarize the ethical arguments which make up the bulk of this volume, and even less to settle in advance the issues on which contributors disagree. What I will try to do is lay out the landscape, by presenting a sketchy critical survey of the main ethical arguments that have been offered in favour of a basic income. The survey makes no claim to being impartial, even though I have deliberately refrained from spelling out my own views on the subject.11 Nor does it make a claim to being exhaustive, although it does provide, I hope, sufficient historical and conceptual background to enable readers unfamiliar with contemporary theories of justice to make sense of the arguments of subsequent contributions by understanding how they fit into a wider theoretical discussion.

I. LIBERTY

4. Compensation for the infringement of common ownership rights

"It is not charity, but a right, not bounty but justice, that I am pleading for" (Paine 1796: 612, 617). As this statement by one of most outspoken forerunners of basic income strongly suggests, the very unconditional nature of such an income makes it quite natural to look for its foundations in a rights-based approach.12 So-called libertarian, or historical-entitlement

11 See, however, the end of section 10 of this introduction and the penultimate section of the final essay.
12 This search is consistent with Malthus' (1914: 190-1) famous warning that "there is one right which [...] I am confident [man] neither does nor can possess - a right to subsistence".
Competing justifications of basic income

Theories of justice, are therefore an obvious place to start our investigation. Rights, according to these theories, are logically prior to social institutions, which can only be just if they respect these rights. How could such a rights-based approach justify a basic income?

On a libertarian account, the just distribution is one that results from voluntary transactions. Clearly, such a criterion does not impose any particular pattern on the distribution of income, and it may therefore seem that any attempt to provide basic income with libertarian foundations is doomed from the start. Voluntary transactions only yield a just distribution, however, if they operate from a set of legitimate initial endowments. These endowments are often themselves the outcome of voluntary transactions. But their constituent parts must ultimately originate in (initially unowned) Nature. If there is a libertarian case for a basic income, it would seem, it must be rooted in the rules that govern the appropriation of natural resources or, as these rules are often called, in some principle of original appropriation. This principle itself is of course a non-starter if it boils down to proclaiming "First come, first served", i.e. if it states that every unappropriated natural resource is up for grabs, full stop. Prospects look brighter, however, if the principle imposes some constraint on this process, to reflect the notion that the Earth is for all to share.

This sort of argument can be traced as far back at Gerard Winstanley (1649) and the Levellers’ movement. It has been elaborated by a number of 19th century social reformers: by William Cobbett (1827), Samuel Read (1829) and Poulet Scrope (1833) in England, by Charles Fourier (1836: 490-2) and his disciple Jean-Baptiste Godin (1871: 212-3) in France.

A right to a basic income does not entail a right to subsistence, since nothing in the definition of a basic income requires it to be sufficient for subsistence.

13 An entitlement theory, in the sense that is here relevant, is therefore defined by a far stronger condition than the requirement that people be entitled to whatever they get as a result of voluntary transactions with their legitimate holdings. Entitlement theories - such as Rawls's or rule utilitarianism - in the sense defined by this weaker requirement need not postulate the existence of rights that pre-exist and constrain social institutions. The nature and significance of this distinction are spelled out in the first section of van der Veen & Van Parijs (1985).

14 This sort of view is defended, for example, by Kirzner (1978: 402-406) and Rothbard (1982: 48-50).

15 In the writings of these three authors, the argument often takes a contractarian turn. Had there been no provision for the support of the poor, no one would have agreed to a social contract that permits the private appropriation of land. As this social contract is the foundation of legitimacy, the poor are entitled, in the absence of poor relief, to take what they need from the rich (see Horne 1988: 125-9, for a useful survey). Contractarian arguments of this kind are still present today. Charles Reich (1990), for example, argues that "no rational person would make a social contract giving up the means to life", and hence that, in the context of a managed economy such as ours, "the Due Process clause must mean that no person can be denied the means of economic survival".
According to Fourier, for example, the violation of each person's natural right to hunt, fish, pick fruit and let her/his cattle graze on the commons, implies that "civilization" owes subsistence to everyone unable to meet her/his needs. Robert Nozick (1974: 178-9) explicitly refers to Fourier's argument and rephrases it more precisely, in support of the so-called "Lockean proviso", i.e. the stipulation that the private appropriation of natural resources should leave "enough and as good" for others (Locke 1690: section 25). According to Nozick's principle, the original appropriation of a natural object can only be legitimate if no one is made worse off as a result of no longer being able to use it. Hence, anyone whose welfare is lower than it would have been, had nothing been privately appropriated, is entitled to a compensation that brings up her/his level of welfare to whatever it would have been in that state of nature.

Taking the premises for granted, does it follow that a basic income is justified? It must first be noted that the counterfactual exercise involved in this approach is of a particularly tricky nature. For when trying to figure out whether my fate would have been better in the state of nature, I quickly run into the question of how many people must be assumed, in that state, to share the natural resources with me. If I take population size to be what it now is, I arbitrarily abstract from the - no doubt - massive demographic impact of centuries of private land ownership. If instead I try to guess what the population would have been had the state of nature persisted up till now, I could not easily dismiss the suggestion that I would not have existed, and hence would hardly be in a position to claim any compensation at all. But there is even worse for our present purposes. Even if the counterfactual exercise could meaningfully be conducted, it would certainly not justify a basic income. True, the transfer that Fourier and Nozick justify does not rest on charity or solidarity, but on a right to compensation, and it can therefore be paid without any reference to work, whether current, past, or potential - i.e. it can be unconditional in our sense (3). Arguably, it also needs to be paid irrespective of people's actual income level - i.e. it must be unconditional in sense (2) -, even though people's earning power is no doubt an important component of their welfare position. But it would definitely not be given indiscriminately to all citizens. If some of these enjoy a very low level of welfare owing to some physical handicap, for example, the amount they will be entitled to will most probably be zero, as their welfare would be even lower in the state of nature. As pointed out above, the notion of a basic income does not rule out its existing alongside additional transfers to the handicapped. But it cannot possibly be consistent

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16 Could this difficulty be solved by comparing one's current welfare to the zero level one would have "enjoyed" had one not (as is probable) existed? Is the constraint then that no one should regret to be alive? Or should one rather say that people left to starve have no right to complain, since in the absence of private appropriation they would not have existed?
with some people being deprived of their right to it precisely because of their handicaps.

Does Nozick's criterion constitute the sole, or the most plausible, reading of Fourier's or his English predecessors' intuition? If someone steals all the apples in your garden and makes a lot of money out of selling the juice (s)he makes with them, it does not seem sufficient to demand that the thief should pay you part of the proceeds to offset your welfare loss, while being allowed to keep all the rest. Why should you not have a legitimate claim to a fair share in the profit (s)he made? If we really own the Earth in common, this is, according to Baruch Brody (1983), the proper analogy to use. And because our (unwaived) right to use common natural resources has been violated by private appropriators, we are entitled to far more than what is required to prevent us from being worse off than in the state of nature. We are entitled to a fair share in whatever has been produced with natural resources we could otherwise have used. Entitlement to this fair share is no doubt unconditional with respect to both income from other sources and willingness to work. 17 And it does not discriminate in terms of personal features in the way we have seen Fourier-Nozick compensations do. The fact that some people would have been unable to use the commons, for example owing to a physical handicap, by no means deprives them of their shares, just as the fact that you cannot pick your apples yourself does not mean that anyone can come along and steal them. But what is the criterion that should be used to determine fair shares? How is it possible to select a non-arbitrary point between a share that barely offsets the welfare loss and a share that absorbs the whole benefit from private appropriation?

17 Elsewhere, however, Brody (1981: 250-253) insists that welfare payments should be restricted to the destitute and subject to work requirements, in order to be able to give as much as possible to the least well off out of the legitimately collected funds. But this claim sits uncomfortably with Brody's central intuition (which is also Fourier's). If a thief steals your apples, you have a right to an adequate compensation, irrespective of whether it would be possible to give you less in order to give more to someone needier than you whose apples have also been stolen, and irrespective of whether you accept to do the work which some (the thieves and their associates) want to make your compensation contingent upon.
5. Equal right to the value of natural resources

This question cannot be satisfactorily resolved unless we shift from Charles Fourier's to Thomas Paine's earlier interpretation of the implications of our common ownership of the Earth. In his defence of what can plausibly be viewed as the first elaborate proposal of a genuine basic income, Paine starts with a variant of the argument considered above. Given that subsisting by hunting is no longer a feasible option for most,

"the first principle of civilization ought to have been, and ought still to be, that the condition of every person born into the world, after a state of civilization commences, ought not to be worse than if he had been born before that period" (Paine 1796: 610).

However, he soon shifts to a distinct argument, which warrants a different criterion.

"It is a position not to be controverted, he writes, that the earth, in its natural, uncultivated state was, and ever would have continued to be, the common property of the human race."

As the land gets cultivated,

"it is the value of the improvement, only, and not the earth itself, that is in individual property. Every proprietor, therefore, of cultivated lands, owes to the community a ground-rent (for I know of no better term to express the idea) for the land which he holds; and it is from this ground-rent that the fund proposed in this plan is to issue." (Paine 1796: 611).

Out of this fund,

"there shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty-one years, the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property. And also, the sum of ten pounds per annum, during life, to every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all others as they shall arrive at that age".

Payments, Paine insists, should be made "to every person, rich or poor",

"because it is in lieu of the natural inheritance, which, as a right, belongs to every man, over and above the property he may have created, or inherited from those who did" (Paine 1796: 612-613).

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18 Paine's proposal echoes that made slightly earlier, but far more sketchily and without much explicit argument, by his close friend Condorcet (1793: 273-4).
This idea of an equal right to the value of the Earth will later reappear in various forms. It appears, for example, in the early Herbert Spencer's (1851) writings on land reform, in Henry George's (1879) and the Georgist movement's advocacy of a "single tax", and in the normative writings of Léon Walras (1896), one of the founding fathers of mathematical economics. And it has been recently revived in a number of historical and analytical papers, by the left libertarian political philosopher Hillel Steiner (1977, 1982, 1987). In all these versions, we definitely end up with the justification of a genuine basic income as defined in section 1. Every living human being is unambiguously entitled to an equal share of the total value of natural resources.

There are, no doubt, some nagging difficulties, as soon as one attempts to work out detailed schemes. For example, should all receive the same total amount over their lifetime, or are those living longer entitled to more - or less? Should those belonging to a generation counting few members be entitled to more than those living in a crowded world and, if not, how can equality be implemented across generations? More fundamentally perhaps, how is the value of (unimproved) natural resources, to be assessed? Steiner advocates the use of competitive prices. Estimating these prices is no doubt difficult, owing to human improvements that cannot be detached from the raw land on which they have been performed. But it is in principle possible to ask about each chunk of Earth, abstracting from the improvements made on it, but not from those made on anything else, how much people would be willing to pay for it. This could provide a reasonable approximation of what the component parts of the Earth would go for in the counterfactual equal-endowments, perfectly competitive auction that provides the reference model. But what is it that justifies the choice of such competitive value as the "true" value of natural resources? Moreover, does the whole approach not rest, as radical environmentalists would argue, on an unacceptable reduction of the Earth and all non-human living beings to a bundle of economic resources to be meted out and ruthlessly exploited?

Suppose, however, that all these difficulties can be solved - as I believe they can. Even then, it looks certain that no more can be justified in this way than an extremely meagre grant, and one moreover that keeps shrinking relative to total income, as natural resources get depleted while capital, skills and people become more abundant. This shrinking could

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19 See for example, David Friedman's (1973: xiv-xv) estimate of 5% of world GNP, often referred to in the libertarian literature. Some argue, however, that such estimates based on actual prices grossly underrate the value of natural resources, due to the high power of capital and labour owners compared to relatively weak resource owners (see e.g. Daly 1977: 109-112). An alternative procedure, first proposed by Ise (1925), requires that non-renewable resources be valued at the price of their nearest renewable substitute and would lead to a far higher proportion of GNP.
Conceivably be blocked by stipulating that the depletion of natural resources should not diminish people’s entitlement, as each generation must make sure that it increases the capital stock so as to make up for its contribution to the unavoidable depletion of natural resources. The funds available, in other words, could be determined by the full "value" of the planet's resources before man started exploiting them. But this would not make that much of a difference, and the legitimate level of basic income would remain very low.

A far more significant increase would occur if instead of just this compensatory amount of capital, all the wealth produced by earlier generations could be viewed as a common inheritance. But this would involve a decisive departure from the libertarian perspective. For produced goods, according to the latter, have a status that radically differs from that of natural goods. They rightfully belong to those who created them. And the latter are therefore entitled to use them as they please, including to donate them to whomever they wish. But this is not the end of the story. In his contribution to the present volume, Hillel Steiner endeavours to circumvent this obstacle by using two ingenious strategies. One consists in arguing that bequests cannot count as voluntary transactions, because the persons who make them (at the moment they are actually made) are dead. What has been bequeathed, therefore, can be assimilated to natural resources, and its value too must be shared equally among all. Secondly, human genetic information is a gift from nature and its appropriation by its carriers therefore bears sufficient resemblance to the private appropriation of natural resources of the standard kind for more redistribution to become legitimate, consistently with libertarian premises.

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20 As required, for example, by Barry's (1983) principle of intergenerational justice. In a libertarian perspective, the compensation needs to take the form of physical rather than human capital (skills), as the latter cannot be detached from particular individuals and therefore could not be subjected to a lump-sum tax. An early formulation of this approach is to be found in Colins (1835), as interpreted by Cunliffe (1987).

21 In a book in which he tries to reconcile socialism and christianity, François Huet (1853: 263-75) proposes an elegant solution which seems to reconcile a large social inheritance and this creator-keeper principle. People can freely dispose of all those goods they have acquired through their own labour. But whatever they have been given as a gift or a bequest must go to a common fund which gives each young person a uniform "social endowment". This clever compromise was later worked out by Rignano (1911, 1919) and Wedgwood (1929: chap.11). In his most recent book, it is also sketched (independently) by Robert Nozick (1989: 30-33), but precisely in order to illustrate how much he drifted away from the libertarian stance of Anarchy, State and Utopia. Such a proposal does not fit into a libertarian framework, because it interferes with people's voluntary transactions: if I am the legitimate owner of some object (for example because I have made it myself with natural resources for which I have paid the just price), I must be able to give it to some other person with the proviso that s/he can do whatever s/he likes with it, including bequeath it further.
As the reader will find out from reading Alan Carling's comment, Steiner's intriguing suggestions have not persuaded everyone. Let me just add one question to the discussion. Suppose one grants both Steiner's premises and his argument. Is it not most unlikely that a significant increase in the legitimate level of basic income would thereby be justified? For is it not the case, firstly, that the turning of bequests (once these are banned) into gifts (still unobjectionable from Steiner's standpoint), is bound to erode away most of what was hoped would swell the available funds? And secondly, would not the assimilation of genes to natural resources justify (at best) a system of lump-sum taxes on the gifted and lump-sum subsidies to the poorly endowed, but not an increase in the uniform grant warranted, on Steiner's account, by the common ownership of the Earth?

6. Equal right to the contribution of social assets

Instead of thus trying to increase the stock of goods whose value is available for distribution, we may want to contemplate a third, quite distinct approach, which curiously consists in turning Locke against himself. Libertarians are committed to giving people the right to the product of their contribution. But then, surely, if men own the Earth in common, the part of the total product that can be attributed to natural resources should be shared equally among all. How is this part to be determined? When arguing that labour's contribution accounts for most of the product, Locke (1690) implicitly offers an answer to this question. Try to imagine, he says, what the Earth would produce without man's labour. If you deduct this hypothetical product from the actual product, you get the part of the total product that can rightfully be ascribed to labour. Let us now turn things around. It is easy enough to imagine what man would produce without natural resources to work with: nothing. The difference between this and the total product is what can be rightfully ascribed to the Earth and therefore shared equally by all. The whole product, in other words, is up for distribution. And even if, for incentive reasons, one would not be well advised to distribute everything equally, it would nonetheless be legitimate to do so from a libertarian point of view, since one would thereby do neither more nor less than pay the owner of a factor of production what would not have been produced without the latter's contribution.

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22 Huet (1853: 259) considers an ancestor of Steiner's proposal, but rejects it for a related, though distinct, reason: as a consequence of the 100% taxation of bequests, agonies would be plagued with unbearable pressing requests for the dying to donate whatever they still possess to those around them, before it joins - with their last breath - the common pool.

Competing justifications of basic income

It may legitimately be objected that Locke's criterion is inconsistent, since applying it to each factor of production in turn will in general lead to distributing far more than 100% of the product. But what is the alternative? Using marginal products (instead of aggregate differential products, as I did) would generate similar inconsistencies outside the special case of constant returns and is anyway altogether implausible as an account of each factor's total contribution to the product. Using competitive values - thus returning to the previous approach - is no more plausible as a way of interpreting how much each factor contributes to production, since it would imply, for example, that labour's relative contribution to the product is less, other things remaining equal, if people are keen to work (and therefore willing to accept a lower wage) than if they are not. And other allocation principles for a joint product may perhaps be defensible as indices of bargaining power and hence as predictors of actual shares, but not as normative criteria reflecting the notion that each contributor is entitled to his/her own product.

The same difficulty besets any other attempt to justify a substantial basic income by identifying the part of the product that can be ascribed to something owned by the community as a whole and arguing that it must be distributed equally among all. For example, it is plausible enough to claim, as James Buchanan does, that a very large part of the total product can be ascribed to the "legal-governmental framework", for

"in a setting where there is no enforced and protected difference between 'mine' and 'thine', individuals will exert relatively little effort, and a large share of that which is exerted will be devoted to predation and defence".

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24 With fixed coefficients of production, the marginal product of, say, labour is zero, but this cannot mean that labour contributes nothing to the total product.

25 This implication makes sense, if what is at stake is the contribution of each factor to the value of the product. For the fact that people are keener to work means that the work that enters production has a smaller opportunity cost, that workers have had to give up less of what they care for in order to perform their contribution, and therefore it makes sense if what we are talking about (as we are here, if the present argument is not to collapse immediately into the argument of the previous section) is the "physical" contribution of each factor to the product.

26 As pointed out to me by John Roemer, a good illustration is arguably the so-called Shapley value, construed as recommending the allocation of the product in proportion to each factor's average marginal product, in all conceivable factor combinations in which it appears.

27 Buchanan (1985: 6-7). See also Kearl (1977) for an argument to the effect that this massive contribution of the State to the product (or the value of assets) provides a powerful rebuttal of the claim that taxation is theft. An early statement of a similar idea can be found in Hobson's (1901) claim that society's participation in the making of property values legitimates a "natural claim to property", and that "the greatest single source of error in
Similarly, one can most plausibly assert, as John Rawls has recently done, that a very significant part of the social product can be traced to the diversity of talents, both qualitative (as in an orchestra) and quantitative (as in Ricardian comparative advantage), and hence to a specifically social factor irreducible to the talents held by society's individual members.\textsuperscript{28} But in either case, the attempt to turn the recognition of a massive specifically social contribution into a rights-based argument for basic income is bound to be blocked by the impossibility of finding a consistent criterion for assessing this contribution. Furthermore, even if such a criterion could be found, it is not obvious at all that each citizen would have a "natural right" to an equal share of this contribution, just as each has a "natural right" to an equal share of natural resources.

Thus, though emphasizing the productive contribution of natural resources, of the legal framework, or of talent diversity is no doubt effective for the purpose of undermining the Lockean-libertarian (and Ricardian-socialist) thesis of a right to the full product of one's labour, it seems unlikely to provide a consistent argument for a basic income that would exceed the pretty low per capita value of natural resources. The most a libertarian approach can justify, it seems, is an admittedly strong right to a pathetically small grant. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that no appeal to freedom could legitmate a significant basic income. The whole libertarian perspective rests, after all, on a very peculiar interpretation of a free society, defined as one whose institutions respect and protect a consistent set of (somehow pre-existing) natural rights. If instead a free society is conceived as one whose members enjoy maximum equal (or maximin) real freedom, i.e. not just the right but also the material means to conduct their lives as they wish, then the justification of a substantial basic income is no longer out of sight.\textsuperscript{29} I return below to this real-libertarian approach, as a particular brand of egalitarianism.

\textsuperscript{28} This is the way in which Rawls (1990: section 21) spells out, contra Nozick, his earlier claim (Rawls 1971: 101) that the \textit{distribution} of talents can be regarded as a common asset. According to this interpretation, only the part of the social product that can be ascribed to talent diversity is governed by the Difference Principle.

\textsuperscript{29} Some authors who view themselves as libertarians of some sort, such as Samuel Brittan (1973: chapter 3) or James Sterba (1980: chapter 5) do end up justifying a substantial basic income. But they can only do so because they appeal to some notion of "real freedom" in the sense just indicated. This is not the case with Friedrich Hayek (1944, 1960), who emphatically rejects this interpretation of freedom, yet recommends some form of guaranteed minimum income. But even leaving aside the fact that this proposal sits uneasily with much else in Hayek's work and is only justified in a pretty ad hoc way, it does not amount to recommending the introduction of a genuine, unconditional basic income - and could not, precisely because of Hayek's rejection of a real-libertarian account of freedom.
II. EQUALITY

7. Equal share in the social surplus

What does the egalitarian ideal require? If it simply required the equality of all incomes, whatever features people possess and whatever they do, the egalitarian justification of basic income - indeed of a basic income that would exhaust the entire net product - would be straightforward. But this is an untenable interpretation of the egalitarian ideal. Firstly, different people have different needs. And secondly, they produce different amounts of effort - at least in a society that is not so oppressive as to prevent people from choosing how hard and how long they work. Any sensible version of egalitarianism must take such differences into account and accordingly deviate from strict income equality in order to cater for needs and reward effort. But it does not follow that no basic income could be justified on sensible egalitarian grounds. It is precisely such a justification that is offered in the elaborate argument presented by John Baker in his contribution to this volume. The egalitarian ideal, in his view, requires differentiated transfers in order to cover everyone's basic needs, the definition of which can be settled by social agreement. It also requires that due compensation should be given to those who perform work, as a function of the length of this work and of the effort involved, assessed again using socially agreed standards. But in a reasonably affluent society, a surplus remains, which can and must be distributed equally among all. Thus, egalitarianism does justify a basic income. In their comments on Baker's contribution, Richard Norman agrees, while Brian Barry disagrees.

Again, I shall not attempt to preempt this important dispute, and shall instead put it in perspective by exploring two other tracks along which an egalitarian justification of basic income has been or could be constructed. Each has its point of departure in one interpretation of the core of Marxist political philosophy and its point of arrival in the vicinity of the real-libertarian position alluded to at the end of the previous section.30

8. A capitalist road to communism

30 I am not claiming that these are the two only possible interpretations of Marxist political philosophy, but only that they are the only ones that can be clarified, developed or reconstructed in such a way that they hold some serious promise for the justification of a basic income.
According to one interpretation, Marxist political philosophy essentially consists in a critique of *alienation*, narrowly defined as the property of those activities which are not performed for their own sake. It only warrants an instrumental, empirically contingent justification of socialism, the public ownership of the means of production. What justifies the struggle for socialism, in this perspective, is not that a socialist society is a just or juster society, but rather that, having got rid of the capitalist fetters on its productive forces, it can move faster towards full communism. As suggested in Marx's (1875) elliptic passage on the subject, full communism refers to a regime in which people will no longer be rewarded according to their contributions, but entirely according to their needs, and in which, therefore, they will only perform (sufficiently productive) unalienated activities, activities that are rewarding enough in themselves. It refers, in other words, to a state of affairs in which the "realm of freedom" will have been fully realized. The most straightforward way of implementing communism thus defined, once its material preconditions have been realized, is in the form of an unconditional basic income, supplemented by some specific transfers to those with special needs and pitched at such a level that nothing is left to reward contributions to production.

Whether under capitalist or socialist property relations, any attempt to realize communism in this sense would unavoidably, at the present stage of development of the productive forces, lead to disaster. For incentives to work and save (under both systems) and to invest (under capitalist conditions) would be dramatically curtailed. One might be tempted to conclude that what matters, for the present, is to accumulate and innovate to the utmost, in order to boost labour productivity to such an extent that soon no material incentive will be required to elicit an adequate amount of labour. The optimal level of basic income is then most likely to be zero. However, if the communist ideal is to take a shape that is at all defensible, it cannot be given this teleological interpretation. For it would then legitimize the sacrifice of an indeterminate number of generations for the sake of bringing about some (hypothetical) future state whose benefits they will not enjoy. If communism, as defined, is desirable, one must rather try to realize it as much as possible for the present generation, subject to not worsening the potential for its future realization, for the present generation.

The most straightforward interpretation of such partial realization consists in introducing an initially low basic income and determining its level in such a way that the *proportion* of total income taking the form of a basic income is maximized, subject to everyone's needs being covered. As the

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31 There are two other ways in which one can conceive of a gradual realization of communism - which can equivalently be characterized as a regime under which everyone has free access to all goods required to fulfill her/his needs. One is by making all these goods freely available to some of the people - which is (in general) grossly unfair. The other
productive forces develop, the amount of effort required to produce a given output decreases. Hence, less material incentives are needed to satisfy the subsistence constraint, and the proportion of total income that needs to be distributed according to contributions is reduced, up to the (notional) point where it falls to zero and full communism can be achieved. Whether this process should take place in a capitalist or socialist framework is, in this perspective, a purely instrumental question. It all depends on which mode of production enables society to move closer to full communism.\(^{32}\)

Thus, the "Marxian" criterion for determining the proper level of the basic income consists in maximizing basic income as a proportion of average income, subject to guaranteeing subsistence to all and to maintaining the productive potential (at least) undiminished for the next generation. However, this criterion is indefensible.\(^{33}\) In order to conveniently explain why, I shall define abundance in the weak sense, or weak abundance, as a situation in which it is possible to sustainably provide an (unconditional) basic income that exceeds the subsistence level. As long as weak abundance in this sense has not been achieved, the "Marxian" criterion can be interpreted both in terms of the maximum realization of communism - distribution according to needs - and in terms of the maximum expansion of the "realm of freedom" - the free choice of activities by all. For under such circumstances, the criterion demands that one should guarantee everyone's subsistence through some sort of conditional income guarantee, while introducing a low or "partial" basic income at the highest level compatible with guaranteeing subsistence to all (by means of the conditional system) and preserving the productive potential. The smaller the gap between the basic income and the subsistence level - in other words, the larger the part of people's needs that is covered in unconditional fashion -, the larger their real freedom to choose activities that are intrinsically rewarding, and the more they will do so.

As soon as weak abundance obtains, however, a tension arises between the pursuit of communism and the concern with freedom. When the highest sustainable basic income exceeds the subsistence level, maximizing basic income in relative terms subject to the subsistence
constraint and maximizing it in *absolute* terms subject to the same constraint no longer coincide. Suppose one has organized transfers in such a way that the (sustainable) absolute level of basic income is maximized. Any further taxation would reduce this level, owing (mainly) to adverse incentive effects. But such further taxation is required by the "Marxian" criterion. For what the latter demands is that the relative level of basic income (the proportion of total income that gets distributed unconditionally) be maximized, as long as it does not threaten the subsistence guarantee. Since the highest sustainable basic income has been assumed to exceed the subsistence level - this is what weak abundance means - , there is room for increased taxation of other income (or lower net pay) without this constraint being violated. And the "Marxian" criterion, therefore, requires that taxation be increased, beyond the top of the "Laffer curve", to a point where the (absolute) level of basic income is lower than it could sustainably be.34

Such "prohibitive" taxation, i.e. taxation beyond the point at which the absolute level of basic income is maximized, would worsen the situation of both net contributors (because of higher tax rates) and net beneficiaries (because of a lower basic income).35 The claim, however, is not that application of the "Marxian" criterion will maximize welfare, but that it will expand the realm of freedom as much as is currently possible, given the level of development of the productive forces. Precisely because of the disincentive effect of higher taxation (or lower net pay), the amount of paid work that gets done under the Marxian criterion is smaller than if the absolute level of basic income were maximized. And it might therefore be argued that more people spend more of their time on unalienated, intrinsically rewarding activities, and hence that the realm of freedom is more fully realized than it would be with a higher basic income.

9. From the realm of freedom to the Difference Principle

This argument, however, does not hold water. First of all, it can be objected that the net effect on the volume of unalienated, non-intrinsically rewarding activities is uncertain, for one cannot simply identify activities that are unpaid or undeclared and activities that are performed for their own sake. The main effect of higher taxation may just be a substitution of poorly productive and no more attractive informal toil for more productive

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34 This corresponds to a move from R towards E' on Figure 2 of chapter 13 below.
35 This makes a utilitarian justification hard, but not inconceivable. For reducing everyone’s income is consistent with increasing average welfare (e.g. owing to the positive net impact of reducing envy), indeed even with increasing everyone’s welfare (e.g. owing to the removal of significant environmental externalities).
formal employment, with an overall increase in alienated labour.\footnote{See Carens (1986: 686) and van der Veen & Van Parijs's (1986b: 743-4) reply.} 
Secondly, the amount of free time one enjoys is only one dimension of freedom; the amount of income one has available for use in one's free time is another. Hence, even if (genuine) free time increases as the "Marxian" criterion takes us beyond the maximum absolute level of basic income, this need not mean an overall increase in freedom, since at the same time everyone's income goes down.\footnote{See van der Veen & Van Parijs (1986a: 651-2)} Thirdly and most decisively, even in the leisure dimension itself, there is no freedom-based rationale for the "Marxian" criterion. For even if further taxation increases the volume of unalienated activities, it decreases the freedom to engage in such activities. With a higher basic income at a lower level of taxation, all have, ceteris paribus, broader opportunities to do whatever they want to do, including such activities. If they do more of them when the "Marxian" criterion is fulfilled, it is not because their freedom to engage in them has been enhanced, but because their freedom to do other things - namely engage in more lucrative activities - has been curtailed.

What this shows is not yet that there is no Marxian argument for a basic income to be found along this track, but that, if there is such an argument, it needs to be of a perfectionistic nature, i.e. i.e. appeal to a conception of the good society that rests on some particular view about the nature of the good life. For if the "Marxian criterion" is to be justified, it cannot be by reference to a concern with people's freedom, but rather as a restriction of people's freedom in order to foster a particular type of life which consists in unalienated activities. One may have serious qualms about the substantive acceptability of a perfectionistic justification in a pluralist society, in which people disagree about many things, including whether alienation, as defined, makes an activity, on balance, any less worthwhile. But even leaving such qualms aside, there are strong reasons to doubt the very possibility of a perfectionistic justification of basic income. For a basic income is bound to be an extremely gross tool for anyone concerned to foster a particular conception of the good life. If one believes that paid work, however freely accepted, must be discouraged, and unpaid activities encouraged, one will surely also have a view about what these unpaid activities should consist in - say, "self-realization" or "the practice of virtue", as distinct, for example, from watching TV, playing marbles or bickering. A completely unconditional income to which people are entitled no matter how they conduct their life, seems a particularly ineffective instrument in the service of a perfectionistic ideal.

The alternative is to reinterpret the "realm of freedom" approach in a way that remains precise enough, but is no longer tied to the "Marxian"
Competing justifications of basic income

criterion, i.e. to the maximization of the ratio of basic income to average income, or of the proportion of the total product that gets distributed according to needs rather than according to contribution. The most obvious choice, suggested by the previous discussion, consists in switching over to a straightforward maximization of basic income in absolute terms - subject again, presumably, to guaranteeing everyone’s subsistence and to preserving the productive potential. For this position coincides with the "Marxian" criterion as long as weak abundance is not achieved. And once it is achieved, it is precisely the position against which we were at a loss to vindicate that criterion on grounds of freedom.

Thus modified, the "Marxian" criterion converges with the one associated with the justification of basic income that can arguably be constructed on the basis of the Difference Principle, at least in John Rawls's (1971) initial formulation. For if one pays attention, as Rawls invites us to do, not just to income, but also to wealth, powers and the social bases of self respect, there is a strong presumption that the guaranteed minimum income he explicitly advocates (Rawls 1971: 275) should take the form of an unconditional basic income pitched - in order to expand as much as possible the set of "all-purpose means" available to the least disadvantaged - at the highest sustainable level. Whether fair or not to Rawls himself, this real-libertarian approach to basic income undoubtedly echoes many pleas for basic income of a more casual nature. Clearly, it cannot be viewed as a strictly egalitarian position, not even in the qualified sense in which Baker's position could. But by focusing on the least advantaged, it still has strong egalitarian credentials, and it is bound to justify a more generous basic income than any other approach could - including Baker's or the one suggested by the second Marxist track - to which I now turn.

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38 For Warren Johnson (1971: 184), for example, "what the guaranteed income would do would be to let people live the way they wanted to. For those who prefer the fast-paced, competitive, high-style life, this opportunity would be largely undiminished. [...] For those who find this way of life unsatisfying, whatever the reason, the guaranteed income would provide the minimum resources to strike out in other directions". For Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (1979: 61), the worker "will [under such a system] never need to subject himself to the constraint which the Marxist model of exploitation presupposes. In case the conditions of the purchaser of labour power are not acceptable, the individual worker has the full freedom not to accept them." And for Bill Jordan (1984:7), "the essential feature of a Social Dividend approach would be that it removed from the worker the obligation to sell his labour power for his subsistence. [...] The Social Dividend approach [...] would give the wage workers the same rights as those with property incomes: the right not to work."

39 The main problem with the "Rawlsian" approach, as stated, is that it still involves an unwarranted bias, an unjustified privilege given to the real freedom to spend one's time as one wishes, as against the real freedom to consume. This problem, I believe (and argue elsewhere: see Van Parijs 1991a: sections I-IV), can only be satisfactorily resolved by reformulating it in the "resourcist" direction suggested by the second track. Rawls's (1974, 1988) own attempt to suppress the unwelcome bias by rephrasing his Difference principle ends up with a bias in the other direction.
10. Exploitation reduced, resources equalized

This other egalitarian track takes its departure from Marxist political philosophy, now understood as basically consisting in a critique of capitalist exploitation. It entails a direct, non-instrumental justification of socialism, defined as the joint ownership of all means of production by the working class. As far as basic income is concerned, this brand of Marxist political philosophy looks all but promising. For exploiting someone must consist, on any intuitively plausible account, in extracting some benefit from someone else's labour (or in doing so under some specific circumstances or in some specific way). And it is hard to see how a principle that would indict exploitation so conceived, could also justify a basic income. Indeed, there is every reason to fear that the opposite will the case: that this very principle will condemn the introduction of a basic income as the beginning of a new form of exploitation, the exploitation of the net contributors to the basic income by its net beneficiaries. This fear, I believe, is fully justified for the standard concept of exploitation, defined as the extraction of surplus labour. But the remarks made earlier (sections 5-6) about the massive contribution of "social assets" (natural resources, the legal framework, talent diversity) should have shed serious doubts on the right-to-the-full-product principle and hence on the normative relevance of exploitation conceived as the violation of this principle.

Recent Marxist thought, however, has produced an alternative interpretation of exploitation which is at the same time immune to these doubts and far more congenial to the justification of a basic income, John Roemer's "property-relations" or "game-theoretical" construal of capitalist exploitation as an inequality in material welfare deriving from an inequality in alienable assets. This definition may not be defensible as an explication of the intuitive notion of exploitation. (It implies, for example, that someone who chooses not to work and to live off her/his fellows' labour, thanks to modest interest payments on a below-average share of assets, may be exploited.) But the equal-endowments principle to which it points undoubtedly provides a promising normative basis for the justification of basic income. Clearly, one straightforward way of abolishing capitalist exploitation as defined, would consist in giving everyone an equal share of

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40 See Roemer (1982: part III). In Van Parijs (1987a), I justify this particular formulation of Roemer's notion and spell out the latter's relation with standard concepts.

41 See e.g. Roemer (1985b: 44): "The most consistent Marxian ethical position is against inequality in the initial distribution of productive assets" and Roemer (1988: 89): "Differential initial wealth [...] may well be the central injustice of a capitalist system, by virtue of the unequal opportunities that it creates."
society’s alienable assets. Unless one arbitrarily restricts the demands of justice to production assets (workshops and shares, not mansions and cash), this prompts the suggestion that whatever is being inherited or donated in the society considered should be taxed away and distributed equally to all as a uniform basic income.

This suggestion converges with what follows from Ronald Dworkin's (1981, 1987) conception of equality of external resources. As long as one abstracts from inequalities in internal resources or talents, the egalitarian ideal requires, according to Dworkin, that people should be given nothing but equal cash grants with which they can then acquire real resources at prices that should reflect the latter's true opportunity costs, i.e. how precious they are to other potential acquirers. In a way, this only provides a sophisticated reformulation of the old idea that what must be distributed equally among all is not just - as in the Paine-George-Steiner tradition - what we have received from Nature, but everything we have received from previous generations.

The alternative is of course to collectivize assets. But as Roemer (1989) recognizes, the various reasons that can be given for preferring this alternative have nothing to do with the concern with abolishing capitalist exploitation.

An early version of this type of justification too can be found, not altogether consistently with his main rationale considered above (§4), in Thomas Paine (1796: 620): "Land, as before said, is the free gift of the Creator in common to the human race. Personal property is the effect of society [Paine's emphasis]; and it is as impossible for an individual to acquire personal property without the aid of society, as it is for him to make land originally. [...] All accumulation, therefore, of personal property, beyond what a man's hands produce, is derived to him by living in society; and he owes on every principle of justice, of gratitude, and of civilization, a part of that accumulation back again to society from whence the whole came." A similar idea is developed more extensively by François Huet (esp. 1853: 262, 271-3), who proposes that young people should all be given an endowment financed out of the taxation of land and other property which the bequeather has himself received, as well as by "mutualist-socialist" César De Paepe, who argues that the rent attributable to the labour of past generations (as opposed to the improved value stemming the present generation’s labour) can be used for all "necessary public services", including redistribution among producer communes (see Cunliffe 1987: 56-57). It is further echoed in authoritarian socialist Edward Bellamy’s (1888, 1897) argument for a uniform social income (coupled to a twenty-year service in the "industrial army"): "How did you come to be possessors of this knowledge and this machinery, which represents nine parts to one contributed by yourself in the value of your product? You inherited it, did you not? And were not these others, these unfortunate and crippled brothers whom you cast out, joint inheritors, co-heirs with you?" (Bellamy 1888: 82-3). It an academically more respectable vein, the same sort of rationale crops up in several writings of George D.H. Cole, who advocates that incomes "be distributed partly as rewards for work, and partly as direct payments from the State to every citizen as "social dividends" - a recognition of each citizen's claim as a consumer to share the common heritage of productive power" (Cole 1935: 235). "Current productive power, he argues, is, in effect, a joint result of current effort and of the social heritage of inventiveness and skill incorporated in the stage of advancement and education reached in the arts of production; and it has always appeared to me only right that all the citizens should share in the yield of this common heritage, and that only the balance of the product after this allocation should be distributed in the form of rewards for, and incentives to, current service in production."
There are, however, two major objections which this Roemer-Dworkin approach needs to answer if it is to be usable for the justification of a significant basic income. One is that it stops half way. Once egalitarian concerns are extended from alienable assets to inalienable assets, from external resources to internal resources, as both Roemer and Dworkin claim they must, it becomes hard to see how a uniform basic income could be justified, rather than a far more differentiated system of taxes on talents and compensations for handicaps. The second major objection is that a tax on bequests and gifts cannot be expected to finance anything like a substantial basic income. Even if the tax rate were 100% and if there were no effect on the tax base, one could only finance a basic income at 10 to 15% of GNP per capita. I believe these two objections can be satisfactorily met, but it is of crucial importance that they should be addressed if this Roemer-Dworkin approach is to yield what it promises.44

III. COMMUNITY

11. Full citizenship for all

Whether the emphasis is on liberty or on equality - a close look reveals that both are involved in each of the justifications surveyed so far -, it can rightfully be observed that we have been sticking since the beginning to a purely individualistic perspective. The question we have been considering all along is whether some defensible conception of the fair distribution of burdens and benefits among individual members of a society would justify the granting of a basic income and, if so, at what level and under what conditions. This individualistic outlook, shared by every one of the (Cole 1944: 144). As evidenced by Van Trier (1989), this is the source of market socialist Oskar Lange’s (1936: 61-65, 1937:143) use of the term "social dividend" to refer to each citizen's contribution-independent share or in society's net profits on the use of collectively owned means of production. Another variant of the same rationale is very much present in some recent East European thinking. It is, for example, at the core of Hungarian economist Tibor Liska's (1990) proposal that every citizen upon her/his birth should be given her/his share of the "social inheritance", only the interest on which s/he can use in his/her lifetime: "All the historically accumulated material, spiritual, etc. wealth, belongs to each and every citizen; hence, it should be publicly and proportionally divided - under mutually acceptable rules and conditions - among all members of our society.".

44 I try to tackle these two objections in Van Parijs (1990b) and Van Parijs (1991a), respectively (as well as, more fully, in a forthcoming book provisionally entitled Real Freedom for All). A conception of equality of internal resources as "undominated diversity" provides the core of my answer to the first one. The view that jobs have now become an extremely significant category of assets is at the core of my answer to the second one. The relationship between Baker's equal-share-in-the-surplus approach, the capitalist-road-to-communism approach and Dworkin's equality-of-resources approach are set out in Van Parijs (1990a).
conceptions of justice presented above, from the far right to the far left, from the least to the most redistributive, has been sharply criticized as part of the so-called communitarian critique of liberalism. Is there no way of arguing for basic income, not as the object of just individual claims, but as an essential instrument for the achievement of a society's common good?

One can think of the following sort of argument. Whether a society is a good society depends above all on the density and quality of the network of human relations in which it consists. A society which excludes from full participation in its life a significant proportion of its members cannot possibly be a good society, both because of the impoverished life it imposes on the excluded and because of the climate of tension and insecurity that tends to permeate all layers of society as a consequence of the "anti-social" behaviour fostered by exclusion.45 If one is to be a full citizen, a full participant in the community, it does not only matter that one should have access to adequate means of subsistence. It is also crucial that this access should be secured in a way that does not stigmatize or humiliate, in a way that does not prevent or discourage attempts to escape poverty by taking a job or acquiring further training, or in a way that makes any planning nearly impossible because of permanent uncertainty. This is the sort of considerations that may lead a communitarian, someone with a paramount concern for a society's common good, to favour an income unconditionally paid to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement, i.e. a basic income.

45 This "criminological" argument for basic income too was anticipated by Thomas Paine (1796: 620-1): "The superstitious awe, the enslaving reverence, that formerly surrounded affluence, is passing away in all countries, and leaving the possessor of property to the convulsion of accidents. [...] To remove the danger, it is necessary to remove the antipathies, and this can only be done by making property productive of a national blessing, extending to every individual. When the riches of one man above another shall increase the national fund in the same proportion; [...] it is then that antipathies will cease, and property be placed on the permanent basis of national interest and protection." As persuasively argued by Andrew Schotter (1984), however, a simple individualistic rational-choice model would favour wage subsidies - or, what tends to amount to the same thing in the present context, transfers contingent upon actual work, past work or willingness to work - over a basic income. The choice between legal and criminal activities is there assumed to depend on the comparison between their expected marginal returns. And this comparison is bound to be less favourable to criminal activities if the transfer can only be cashed when (legal) work is being performed (or has been performed or would be performed if offered) that if it is offered in all cases, no questions asked. The "criminological" argument for basic income must therefore be that it gives a more effective recognition as full citizens, and hence better facilitates an identification with the community as a whole, than would a grant conditional upon (potential) work performance - not just that it weakens self-interested motives for criminal behaviour.
Arguments along these lines are presented in Bill Jordan's contribution to this volume. In their comments, Michael Freeden agrees with the substance of this position, while André Gorz forcefully disagrees. Following an old lineage of social thinkers - from Edward Bellamy (1888, 1897) and Joseph Popper-Lynkeus (1912) to the "distributistes" (J. Duboin 1932, M.L. Duboin 1985), the fédéralistes (Marc 1972, Marc-Lipianski 1984) and Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (1979), André Gorz has been arguing in several writings for a social income linked to the performance of a social service of considerable length (20,000 hours). Like Jordan's, his argument can easily be phrased in communitarian terms. Full membership in the community means enjoying common rights but also fulfilling common duties. A successful fight against exclusion is therefore inconsistent with lifting the compulsion to work. Doubts about the possibility of efficiently allocating such a large amount of labour (and the means of production it requires) without relying on the market, have now become so strong and so widespread that the proposal of a massive social service is now likely to sound wildly utopian. But even a watered down version of Gorz's proposal remains a challenge for Jordan's position. In the fight against exclusion, are wage and training subsidies not a better tool than an indiscriminate basic income? It may be the case that a subsidized, "unreal" job does not provide the social recognition and social power people are after (in addition to money) when wanting a job. But if things are kept sufficiently opaque (so that few people are able to work out which jobs are subsidized for their own sake), is it not plausible that massive wage subsidies will outperform basic income from a communitarian standpoint?

IV. EFFICIENCY

12. Target efficiency and economic efficiency

Alongside (libertarian and egalitarian) justice arguments and (communitarian) common-good arguments, scores of efficiency-based arguments have also been made in favour of basic income. Efficiency claims, however, form a highly heterogeneous set. In one sense, efficiency just refers to the extent to which a value is realized, or a general principle met, as a consequence of the proposed measure. In this sense,

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46 And in his most recent theoretical book (Jordan 1989). His earlier pleas for basic income (e.g. Jordan 1973: ch.3; 1982; 1985: ch.15-16) did not rest on an explicitly communitarian stance. For another, far sketchier, communitarian case for basic income, see Mouffe (1988).
one can claim, for example, that basic income is more efficient than actual or potential alternatives, as a strategy for equalizing resources or for turning the excluded into full citizens. Efficiency arguments of this type are of course just reformulations of the arguments we have been considering so far.

In other cases, efficiency refers to the extent to which some particular partial objective is achieved by the measure that is being proposed. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that basic income provides, relative to existing institutions or rival proposals, an efficient way of removing poverty, fighting long-term unemployment, stabilizing the small farmers' incomes, reducing economic inequalities between men and women, or of improving working conditions. Indeed, most pleas for basic income take the form of such an argument or of a concatenation of such arguments. But arguments of this type are plagued by the following difficulty. Taking for granted that basic income actually enables one to better achieve the stated objective and that this objective is agreed to be valuable, it generally involves an additional cost, and therefore a reduced ability to pursue other objectives left unmentioned, but nonetheless valuable. However important in the public debate - in particular to refute efficiency-based defences of the status quo -, these arguments leave open the question of the overall effect and can therefore always be countered by asking "So what?". This riposte is particularly effective when, as is usually the case, different social categories are interested to very different extents in a more effective pursuit of the stated objective - say the reduction of long-term unemployment or the promotion of cooperatives. Why should others be made to pay the cost of pursuing more efficiently an objective in which only some are interested? It is precisely from the insufficiency of such partial arguments that arguments based on an explicit conception of a just or good society, such as those discussed in previous sections, derive their importance.

However, two categories of efficiency arguments of the partial type play such a special role in the debate on basic income, and on social policy generally, that they deserve a special discussion in the present context. One of them interprets efficiency as target efficiency, i.e. the extent to which a social policy programme provides help to those who need it, with a given budget. It is at first sight very difficult to see how a basic income could beat on this score highly differentiated welfare programmes involving a battery of means tests and work conditions. Yet, in the penultimate chapter, Robert Goodin argues that under plausible factual conditions, it is not unreasonable to believe that basic income would outperform conditional schemes even in terms of this criterion, their advocates' favourite standard.

48 As usefully emphasized, for example, by Le Grand (1990).
A second partial sense of efficiency which deserves special attention is economic efficiency, understood as the extent to which economic growth is being fostered. Ever since the first (remembered) book-length plea for basic income (Milner 1920), efficiency arguments of this type have played a major role in the debate. Many of these arguments, in particular those stressing the contribution a basic income would make to boosting or stabilizing effective demand, are too general to justify a preference for basic income over the more conditional types of redistribution embodied in existing welfare states. But others, illustrated by Guy Standing in his contribution to this volume and briefly surveyed in the last chapter, do attempt to show how the very unconditional nature of basic income can make a specific contribution to economic growth. In that chapter, I present the conjecture that there is a close connection between the availability of efficiency arguments of this particular sort and the political feasibility of major social reforms such as the introduction of a basic income. The conjecture is not that for basic income to be feasible, it must be shown optimal for growth, but that a plausible case must be made for its having a positive impact, relative to the status quo, on both the situation of the worst off ("justice") and the national product ("efficiency"). If something like this conjecture is correct, we are led to a strange paradox, on which I want to briefly reflect before drawing this introductory essay to a close.

13. A green case for basic income?

Among all political forces in Europe today, Green parties have undoubtedly been keenest to embrace the idea of a basic income and make it part of their political platforms. One potential explanation is that there is a strong ecological case for such a proposal, along the following lines. What is best for the sake of output growth need not be best for welfare growth, because GNP accounting neglects both the environmental component in the present generation's welfare and the welfare of future generations. As soon as these two factors are taken into account - so the argument goes -, it becomes plain that what we should go for, for the sake of economic growth, is something different from the "social credit" and "distributiste" traditions. Various early Keynesians, such as Robinson (1937), Meade (1938), Lerner (1944) and Cole (1944), explicitly discuss the idea of a social dividend in this connection. See again Van Trier (1989) for a useful survey of this literature.

49 This sort of argument keeps cropping up both in the "social credit" tradition of Major Douglas (1920) and in the "distributiste" tradition of Jacques Duboin (1932). Various early Keynesians, such as Robinson (1937), Meade (1938), Lerner (1944) and Cole (1944), explicitly discuss the idea of a social dividend in this connection. See again Van Trier (1989) for a useful survey of this literature.

50 This efficiency condition is, strictly speaking, distinct from, but, at least in a capitalist context, closely related to Sam Bowles's (1990) profitability condition (no negative effect on the rate of profit), which he takes as the key feasibility condition in his interesting formal model of basic income in a capitalist country, and to Susan Strange's (1990) competitiveness condition (no negative effect on the country's share of the world market) which she sees as increasingly constraining government choices in both capitalist and socialist countries. See Van Parijs (1991c) for a more careful discussion.
of efficiency in this expanded sense, is not maximum growth, but some way of braking the growth process that avoids the suffering involved in massive involuntary unemployment. And this is exactly what a basic income seems to provide. For what it effects is a partial uncoupling between contributing to the GNP and sharing in its benefits. The higher it is, the lower the individual incentive to work and save, and the lower, therefore, the GNP’s propensity to grow. An optimal level of basic income can thus be determined, which slows growth down sufficiently to protect our own interest in a healthy environment and our offspring’s interest in adequate natural resources, while not slowing it down to such an extent that the net overall effect on welfare would be negative, because of the resulting drop in the current generation’s material standard of living.52

To this argument, it can first be objected that, if the economic arguments alluded to in the previous section are correct, it is all but obvious that the substitution of a basic income for the conditional guaranteed minimum income schemes that now exist would actually slow growth down - up to a certain level at any rate. Secondly, and in my view decisively, even beyond this point, a basic income would constitute an extremely crude, unsophisticated way of braking the growth process for ecological purposes. It is not difficult to conceive of a scheme that would tax specifically those productions and consumptions which are particularly damaging for the environment or particularly costly in terms of natural resources, while using the proceeds to encourage activities with a positive effect in either of these respects. I cannot see how such a system could fail to achieve the same objectives in terms of environmental protection or resource preservation at a substantially lesser cost in terms of growth, than a basic income system that would tax output indiscriminately (as is the case in most schemes) and distribute the proceeds in an ecologically insensitive way. To rescue the argument, one would need to show that it is paid work as such that needs to be discouraged, because of some externality intrinsically associated to it, say the impoverishment of neighbourhood life resulting from everyone going out to his/her job. But any precise suggestion of this kind would be vulnerable to the objection that a more closely targeted measure would deal better with the externality at hand, than the far cruder basic income.

Why then is there a privileged association between the Green movement and support for basic income? My guess is that the most

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51 From the British Ecology Party and the Dutch Radical Party PPR (now integrated into “Groenlinks”) around 1980 to various initiatives more recently taken on behalf of the Green group in the European Parliament.

fundamental explanation lies in some "cognitive dissonance" mechanism. It is, I think, a valid generalization, that on average those joining Green movements attach comparatively little importance to income and the acquisition of goods, and comparatively great importance to the disposal of free time and the intrinsic value of their work. But why is this the case? Why is there a correlation between having this kind of preferences (roughly, a high ranking of leisure relative to income) and advocating limits to growth? We have just seen that this can hardly be because environmental concerns mandate a shift to more free time, which basic income would make possible. The causal link, I conjecture, rather runs in the opposite direction. People to whom getting a higher income is comparatively unimportant are far more likely to put up with - and a fortiori to greet with glee - the prospect of a slowdown or even a standstill of our aggregate income, than people for whom the ability to buy ever growing amounts of material goods and services is of paramount importance. At the same time, given the comparatively high value they attach to being able to use their time as they wish, they obviously have an interest in a basic income, indeed in as high a level of basic income as is economically feasible. In other words, being "green" and supporting basic income have a common cause: a free-time-oriented preference structure. Self-interest is enough to explain why people with such a preference structure become basic income supporters, and the (non-Greens') tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance explains why people with this preference structure are overrepresented in the Green movement.

This is then the paradox. The reason why the green movement (which reaches far beyond official green parties) both tends to be well disposed towards a basic income and can afford to be hostile to growth lies in the "post-industrial" orientation of its members. But what the previous section and, more fully, the final essay suggest is that a crucial, if not the crucial, argument for basic income must be that (up to some level at any rate) basic income is growth-friendly. Does this not generate a painful contradiction which, once exposed, risks depriving basic income of the firmest components of its political basis? It need not.

For what is objectionable, for most greens, is not output growth as such, which is after all a major precondition for satisfying the basic needs of a growing number of people and for expanding the life options of all, including those who attach comparatively little importance to consumption. What is objectionable is output growth pursued for its own sake and engineered at the prohibitive cost of massive environmental destruction and rapid resource exhaustion. Ever tighter measures will have to be taken, with

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53 See the sociological literature on postmaterialist values and new social movements, from Inglehart's (1977) onward.
54 I spell this out in Van Parijs (1991b).
an sizable negative impact on output growth, to discipline the latter in such a way as to keep these costs under check. In this context, a measure - such as, arguably, the introduction of a basic income - which improves the working of the economy, for example by allowing the labour market to function in a way that is better suited to contemporary technological conditions, can only be welcome. And its being growth-friendly cannot make it objectionable to greens any more than to anyone else. They should therefore have no compunction in promoting it on this ground, alongside other measures whose predictable effect is instead to curb growth. Up to some level at any rate (providing the productivist argument for basic income is correct), they can and should defend basic income not because its introduction would dampen growth, but because it would dampen the negative impact of indispensable measures for channelling growth in an environment-friendly way. Beyond that point, they can still advocate basic income on other grounds - whether of justice, community or self interest -, but they will do so although, not because, growth is thereby hampered.

14. To conclude

Let us sum up. When arguing for basic income, its advocates often mention particular objectives, whose value is taken for granted, and claim that basic income provides an efficient means for achieving it. But because there are many valuable objectives, and because they often conflict, such arguments, even when they are fully persuasive, can always be countered by asking "So what?". This is why the debate on basic income keeps prompting arguments of a more ambitious kind, attempts to derive basic income from an explicit formulation of the ideal of a free, equal or good society. It is arguments of this type which the bulk of this book aims to present, defend and discuss, and which this introductory chapter has attempted to survey. The importance of such arguments does not make more limited efficiency arguments irrelevant, partly because many of these fit, as partial components, into arguments of the more ambitious sort, and partly because some of them - in particular economic efficiency arguments - may point to crucial conditions for the feasibility of the proposed reform.

Thus we need to pay to these many more limited dimensions of the debate on basic income all the attention they deserve. In the end, however, we shall only find the strength to fight for the introduction of a significant basic income - and the breath that will undoubtedly be needed if this fight is ever to be successful - if we feel confident that the proposal can be backed by a defensible conception of a less unjust or a better society. It is our job, as political philosophers, to articulate such conceptions in a consistent, informed, critical way, and to sort out carefully what follows from them and what does not, in this case as regards the introduction of an unconditional income. This job, clearly, is not finished as this book goes to press. But the
latter should provide to anyone who wishes to go further a rich and stimulating starting point.


Competing justifications of basic income

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