ON 7 MARCH 2001, Romano Prodi-President of the European Commission, Goeran Persson-(then) current Chairman of the European Council and Swedish Prime Minister, and Guy Verhofstadt-(then) future Chairman of the European Council and Belgian Prime Minister, met hundreds of pupils from the three Brussels-based European schools in the canteen of one of these schools. Many pupils from the eleven language sections (corresponding to the EU’s eleven official languages of the time) queued to ask a question, including a Greek girl, who asked President Prodi about the EU’s policy as regards languages. ‘From its very beginning,’ Prodi replied in substance, ‘equality between official languages has been a fundamental principle of the European institutions, and it must remain so.’ And they moved on to the next pupil in the queue. As the meeting was taking place in a school canteen, and hence without the interpreting boxes and other equipment that routinely facilitate multilingual exchanges in European institutions, you may wonder how hundreds of children from fifteen European countries and eleven distinct language sections managed to communicate with their distinguished guests. From the first to the last minute—except for a brief intervention in French by the French commissioner Michel Barnier, who had come along with Prodi-exclusively in English, including a speech forcefully asserting the principle of linguistic equality.

For reasons to be explained below, Prodi was right in both choice of medium and content of message. But the discrepancy between blatant inequality at the level of facts and fundamental equality at the level of declarations nevertheless raises a number of serious questions, at least four of which can be formulated as issues of fairness. In this article, I shall consider these in turn, and indicate what I believe to be the best way of handling each of them. But before doing so, I need to spell out the nature of the fundamental mechanism that explains what happened in the canteen and which underlies, far more broadly, the core of the dynamics of secondary language learning and multilingual interaction, not only in today’s Europe, but throughout history and throughout the world.
Most of the trends in linguistic competence that we can observe can be understood as the product of the (sometimes explosive) interaction of two micro-mechanisms.

Probability-sensitive Learning

What I shall call *probability-sensitive learning* simply captures the following two-dimensional fact. The extent to which people maintain and improve their linguistic competence in some particular language is strongly affected by the probability of expecting to have to function in that language. This is in the first place a matter of motivation: the more likely it is that competence in a particular language will be useful to communication, the greater the effort one will decide, individually or institutionally, to invest in learning it. But this differential learning is also in the second place a matter of opportunity: the more often one finds oneself in a context in which a particular language is actually being used, the smaller the effort required to learn it. Moreover, these two dimensions of the mechanism feed into each other: the motivation easily induces the creation of more opportunities than those that offer themselves spontaneously, and the actual enjoyment of the opportunities (over and above the expectation of further opportunities) may nurture the motivation to learn by enabling people to experience what difference it makes to possess the linguistic competence required to understand what is being said and to take an active part in the conversation.

I am of course not denying that other factors—for example, how aesthetically attractive one finds the language one considers learning, or how close it is to one’s native tongue, or how large a literary corpus it gives access to—may significantly affect either the motivation to learn a language or the ease with which one will learn it, or both. All I am asserting is that, through these two channels of motivation and opportunity to learn (and retain), the probability of having to interact in a particular language will be a massively important determinant of the extent to which average competence in a particular non-native language tends to expand or shrink in a particular population. A greater probability means both a larger expected benefit from any given level of linguistic proficiency in the language concerned and a lower cost of acquiring or preserving it. More sophisticated measures of the communicative value of a language have been offered, for example Abram de Swaan’s (2001) stimulating notion of Q-value. But none of them offers the promise of improving much, if at all, upon the simple probability of interaction in that language as a predictor of differential learning and retention.
Maximin Communication

What I shall call the maximin law of communication captures a distinct, somewhat less obvious but hardly less general mechanism, which can be sketched as follows. Suppose you have to address simultaneously a set of people who each know to various extents a number of languages and by all of whom you want to be understood. When deciding which language among those you know you should pick, the question you will spontaneously tend to ask yourself will not be which is your own best language, or which language is the best language of the majority, or which language is best known on average by your audience, but rather which language is best known by the member of your audience who knows it least. In other words, you will systematically tend to ask yourself whether there is any language that is known to some extent by all. If, to the best of your knowledge, there is one and only one, you will choose it. If there is none, you will tend to choose the language that is known to some extent by most. And if there is more than one, you will make a guess for each of them about the level of competence achieved by the person least competent in it, and you will choose the language for which this level of competence is highest.

This ‘maximin’ criterion amounts to maximising the minimum competence. It can also be described as a criterion of minimal exclusion. It has a number of direct corollaries, such as the systematic victory, in linguistically mixed marriages, of the language of the ‘worst linguist’, ie of the partner who knows least well the language of the other and systematically tends to be the speaker of the more widely spread of the two languages.

Again, I am not claiming that this maximin law operates without exception. To start with, deviation from it happens on a massive scale for pedagogical reasons. In foreign language classes, for example, teachers often know the mother tongue of their pupils (which may well be their own) far better that the pupils know the language they are learning, but the mutually accepted rules of the teaching game will frequently entail the partial or total banning of the maximin language. For analogous reasons, some people choose (as I did) to speak their mother tongue with their children, even though their children have been all along and they have themselves become significantly more fluent in at least one other shared language.

On a less massive scale but often in a highly sensitive way, deviation may also occur, even in informal contexts, for what could be called expressive reasons. This may happen in negative fashion, for example when post-1989 East Europeans struggle to communicate with one another in English, even when it would be (linguistically) far easier for them to do so in Russian. It may also happen in positive fashion. For example, on several occasions I have addressed a Brussels audience in Dutch rather than French, despite the fact that all would have understood me adequately in French, while some did not in Dutch, perhaps because the organisers felt that some fair
time sharing between French and Dutch needed to be kept. At least in part for an analogous reason, a *vade mecum* dispatched by the French foreign ministry insistently instructs France’s representatives in all European institutions that, even at informal meetings or after the interpreters have gone home, ‘les Français parlent leur langue’ *(Ministère des affaires étrangères, 2002).*

Provided the number of mother tongues involved does not exceed two or three, this sort of consideration may also lead one to operate, as often done at interpretation-free federal-level meetings in Belgium and Switzerland, according to the rule ‘Each speaks his/her own language’.

However, as soon as efficiency in communication prevails over pedagogical or expressive concerns, perceptible inequalities in the minimum knowledge of the various languages involved will generate a hardly resistible pressure for all to adopt the maximin language: What’s the point of uttering beautiful sentences with carefully chosen words if my audience would understand me far better were I to express myself more clumsily in a language far more familiar to them. Hence, although didactic effectiveness and symbolic impact may sometimes strongly constrain language choice, this will not prevent the maximin criterion from running the show whenever communication is the prime concern, ie in the bulk of spoken and written language use.

### An Explosive Interaction

Needless to say, these two mechanisms interact powerfully with each other. The more a particular language is being learned in some section of the world population, the more likely that language is to be the maximin language in contexts of interaction involving members of that section of the population. And the more often a particular language is picked as the language of interaction, the stronger the motivation for learning it and the more frequent the opportunity to learn it. It is worth noting that this positive feedback loop would also exist if the speech partners systematically tended to pick the language for which the average knowledge is greater (call it the maxi-mean language), or even the best language of the majority, but it would then operate at a considerably slower pace.

To illustrate this difference, take the situation that used to prevail before the Swedes and the Finns joined the EU. Both the maxi-mean and the maximin language in contexts of informal interaction between multilinguals within and around the European institutions then tended to be English and French in varying proportions (with German far more often maxi-mean than maximin). Given how small a percentage of the total population of speech partners they represented, the arrival of the Scandinavians did not change much in terms of maxi-mean. But it made a big difference in terms of maximin. For while the second best language for most British and Irish people
was and is French, the Scandinavians’ average competence in French was far poorer, and therefore tended to make English a clear winner in terms of maximin (though only marginally better than before in terms of maxi-mean) in any context in which they turned up. It is obviously far easier for newcomers to upset the prevailing choice of a language under maximin than under maxi-mean: it suffices for them to be almost completely ignorant of the prevailing language, while everyone else knows at least some more of at least one of the languages they know better. And once the switch is done, language learning is accordingly redirected for both incentive and opportunity reasons, leading further contexts to do the switch, and so on.

Undoubtedly, this analysis is very rough. Its basic assumptions need to be qualified and its implications should be modelled out in detail to provide precise answers to questions such as the following. Under what conditions does this twofold mechanism lead to a convergence to a single lingua franca? Under what conditions is it on the contrary consistent with the lasting coexistence of two or more linking languages? Under what conditions does it imply the decline of multilingualism (as opposed to bilingualism), and indeed of any bilingualism that does not consist in combining a mother tongue and the lingua franca? Under what conditions is it consistent with stable universal diglossia—competence of all members of a community in both their mother tongue and the lingua franca—or does it imply a long-term threat to the very survival of linguistic diversity? I do not know the answers to these questions (and would be interested in finding them out). But I have been, from the day of my birth, a participant observer in enough thousands of situations of multilingual interaction, and seen enough figures, tables and graphs depicting existing trends, to feel confident about the nature and power of the twofold mechanism outlined above.

WHY WE NEED ONE LINGUA FRANCA

Whatever the power of the mechanism just described, one may want to pause to ask whether we really need the one lingua franca which it tends to bring about. Given the values to which I am committed, there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that we need a way of communicating directly and intensively across the borders drawn by the differences of our mother tongues, without the extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent interpreters. We need it in particular if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation. If we want all sorts of workers’, women’s, young people’s, old people’s, sick people’s, poor people’s associations to organise on the ever higher scale required for effective action, we must equip them with the means of talking to one another without interpreting boxes and highly skilled and paid professionals in them. One way
of putting this is to say that we need to meet the linguistic preconditions for turning Europe, and ultimately the world, into one demos, without this needing to mean that Europe, or the world, is thereby turned into a single ethnos: a forum can be shared thanks to a common language without the culture, including the language, becoming one. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that the linguistic preconditions for the existence of a single demos involve the adoption of one lingua franca.

Clever Softwares?

Firstly, one can try to imagine a situation in which technological development will have made informal communication possible between different language groups without requiring the learning of a single common language. It suffices to combine the best of voice recognition and translation softwares to convey instantaneously through earphones in any chosen language what is being said in any other. Both kinds of software, we are told, are making fast progress. But those who have experienced some of the oddities generated by translation software even when having to cope with only slightly casual style, and by voice recognition software even under favourable acoustic conditions, can imagine how stilted and contrived a spontaneous interchange would need to become in order for its participants to feel reasonably confident of being understood.5

Moreover, any interacting group soon develops a small culture of its own, with words being used between inverted commas, as it were, or proper names turned into nouns, or short-lived imports from another language. Even very imperfect mastery of a common language would provide for a far better medium than beautiful mastery of one’s own language constantly threatened by ridiculous stiffness on one side (if one bears the technology in mind) and the risk of ridiculous misunderstandings on the other (if one does not). Techno-freaks can keep dreaming about it. But there is no salvation to be gained from these quarters in my view.

Esperanto?

If technology does not enable us to dispense with a common language, why not opt for a neutral one? This second solution is less fanciful. It is vigorously defended on grounds of neutrality and simplicity. But these two advantages look far greater than they really are. And in addition, the spreading of Esperanto faces a prohibitive hurdle.

Take neutrality first. Esperanto is of course far from being neutral in the sense of equidistant from all existing languages. It belongs unambiguously to the Western group of Indo-European languages, with identifiable Latin,
Slavic and Germanic ingredients. Even within Europe with Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian, Basque and Maltese as part of the picture, it cannot make any claim to ‘neutrality’. Moreover, it does not stand a chance as a European lingua franca if in addition English needs to be learned as a worldwide lingua franca. But when offered on a world scale, it must lose all hope of being sold on grounds of fairness, especially to the millions in India, Nigeria, South Africa or even now Japan and China who have already invested massively in the learning of another Western language and will understandably show little patience for this new Eurocentric gimmick which they are enthusiastically invited to absorb.

It is true that, unlike English, Esperanto would be a learned language for everyone, and hence its adoption as a lingua franca would definitely be more egalitarian than that of English or French. This advantage, however, would only be transitional. Just assume that Esperanto successfully spreads and starts being used in a growing number of contexts, including by mixed couples in the upbringing of their children. Nothing would then prevent it, after some generations, from thickening from a lingua franca into the mother tongue of some—as happened to Swahili, for example—with the consequence that once again neutrality would be lost and the whole process of designing a neutral language, in the modest sense of being the mother tongue of no one, would need to be relaunched from scratch.

Secondly, consider the ease of learning. Syntactic and morphological rules are exceptionless in Esperanto, and therefore undoubtedly far simpler to learn from a grammar book than are those of natural languages. Moreover, compared to languages like English and French whose spelling was established long ago and very conservatively managed, Esperanto offers a sensible relationship between oral and written forms. However (usually shorter) irregular forms are rarely, if ever, sheer irrational nuisance. Natural languages operate complex trade offs between least effort in memorising and least effort in pronouncing, and the more intensively a language is used, the more the latter matters relative to the former. Esperanto turned into a real, living language would soon be subjected to such pressures. Moreover, Esperanto made relevant for all contexts would need to beef up its lexical stock massively through imports from other languages. Like all other languages today, it would import massively from English, and probably more than others because of its smaller initial stock. Hence, it would not take long for it to start looking like a bulky language, with a slim Esperanto component that can be learned in a couple of days and a huge English vocabulary with subtle nuances which could take years to master. Most fundamentally, however, the notion that Esperanto unambiguously has the upper hand over English in terms of learning rests on a very schoolish picture of language learning. As pointed out earlier, the learning of a language is essentially a matter of having the opportunity to play, whisper and quarrel, listen to music, watch TV and scan the web in that language, and a matter of being motivated to do all
these things, especially at an early stage in one's life. If this more realistic picture of large-scale language learning replaces that of enthusiastic but lonely xenophiles confined to grammar books and vocabulary lists, it is no longer so clear that Esperanto is, in the relevant sense, easier to learn.

With its claims to neutrality and simplicity thus drastically qualified, Esperanto is hardly in a strong position to face the formidable hurdle it faces, precisely as long as it is not the mother tongue of a significant group. Investing in the learning of such a language is definitely cheapened by the exceptional simplicity of its morphological and syntactic rules. But as long as speech partners, films, music and TV broadcasts in that language are not all over the place, it still comes at a significant cost for someone with average learning skills. In the case of widespread natural languages, there is a secure minimum return on the learning investment, thanks to the tens or even hundreds of millions of people with whom one can be sure one acquires the capacity to communicate. Even in the case of Esperanto, the most widespread among the artificial languages currently advocated, this minimum return is not guaranteed, as all depends on whether a sufficient number of people will be willing to make and keep making the deliberate effort of learning the language, which is itself dependent on which language learning choices they expect others to make (see Selten and Pool, 1991).

The size of this handicap, relative to English, keeps growing as English keeps expanding in terms of native speakers, mainly thanks to continued net migration into English-speaking countries, and, at a much faster rate, in terms of the total number of people competent in it: English is probably the only natural language today, and certainly the only major language, with (far) fewer native speakers than people who learned it as a second language. Given the twofold mechanism sketched at the start-probability-sensitive learning and maximin-dislodging it from this position will become an ever more impossible task. Esperanto is a wonderful way of linking up a fantastic bunch of generous and hospitable people around the world, but it is no more hopeful than clever software as an alternative Europe-wide or world-wide medium of communication.

**Lingua Franca Pluralism?**

Having granted that we need a natural language, perhaps we should not rush into asserting that we need only one. To avoid the drawbacks and dangers of the dominance of a single language, many (especially, but not exclusively, among those whose language stands a chance of being picked as one of the lingua francas in the event that the proposed formula is implemented) have proposed that there should be two or three lingua francas side by side, with identical status.
A first way of understanding this lingua franca pluralism consists in viewing the selected lingua francas as alternatives to one another: each person learns one of them and only one. But reflection on some very modest arithmetic exercises should suffice to make us quickly discard this version of the idea. In a population of six people with three distinct mother tongues, a balanced choice between two lingua francas provides a common medium to randomly grouped people far more frequently than a random choice of a second language, but with a decreasing frequency as the size of the grouping rises. And this frequency decreases sharply as the number of distinct mother tongues increases. By contrast, the learning by all of the same lingua franca provides a common medium in 100% of cases, whatever the size of the groupings and whatever the number of mother tongues. Moreover this can be achieved with a sizeable discount, as those whose mother tongue is being learned can be exempted from the learning of any second language (see Appendix).

There is, however, another interpretation of lingua franca pluralism which performs just as well as the single-lingua-franca option in ensuring inter-communication in all groupings. It consists in viewing the two or more languages granted lingua franca status not as alternatives but as complements. In other words, the rule is no longer that each individual is supposed to learn one of the lingua francas, but that he must know them all. At first sight this may seem to be wasteful overkill: two or three times more learning without any gain in inter-communication, as one lingua franca is sufficient. It is, however, reasonable to conjecture that the passive knowledge of a language is easier to acquire (and even easier to be believed to be acquired) than an active knowledge of it. Therefore, the cost reduction that flows from the fact that natives of a language promoted to lingua franca status no longer need to acquire an active knowledge of the original lingua franca must be matched against the cost increase flowing from the fact that others need to acquire a passive knowledge of that language. In Belgium or Canada, therefore, quite apart from being perceived as fairer (an issue to which I return shortly), an ‘each his own language’ regime may compete reasonably well, in terms of cost-effectiveness, with a single-lingua-franca regime.

The trouble comes again when the number of native languages increases. In the European context, French is keen to share lingua franca status with English. But this would mean that Germans, for example, still need to acquire an active knowledge of either French or English, while in addition having to acquire a passive knowledge of the other. As they form the largest native language group, they find this understandably hard to accept. If francophones are to have a chance of winning their case, they therefore realise that they need to broaden their alliance by proposing to further share this lingua franca status with German. But how will the Spanish, the Italians, and all the rest feel? Making life more comfortable for the Germans and the French by exempting them from acquiring an active knowledge of English
makes things considerably worse for all others, now forced to acquire a passive knowledge of two more languages without being exempted from acquiring an active knowledge of one of them.

What may make sense in the presence of two native tongues, possibly even three, does not make the slightest sense when there are many. Any attempt to press for the adoption of one’s native tongue as a second lingua franca in this supplementary sense will immediately be seen for what it is: trying to get greater comfort for oneself at the expense of increasing the burden on those who enjoy the privilege of having had their native tongue picked as the only lingua franca so far—which is defensible enough—but also on all other language groups who are not better situated than oneself—which is indefensible. Any attempt to assuage some of these by offering to extend the lingua franca status to them at the same time risks turning the net benefit to oneself into a net cost, unavoidably further increases the burden on any group still left out, and further boosts the global cost of the whole scheme.

Hence, for quite a different reason, lingua franca pluralism is no more promising in the supplementary sense than in the alternative sense. Whatever the language historical fate happens to have picked, we definitely need convergence to a single lingua franca. Those saddened by the fact that it is not the one they learned as infants will have to come to terms with it. Their narcissism should not jeopardise the satisfaction of our urgent communicative needs, in Europe and in the world.

UNFAIRNESS AS UNEQUAL ACCESS TO LINGUISTIC ADVANTAGE

The twofold mechanism sketched above and the feedback loop between its two components enable us to understand what is now leading to the dominance of English. No hidden conspiracy by the Brits, let alone the Americans, but the spontaneous outcome of a huge set of decentralised decisions, mainly by non-anglophones, about which language to learn and which language to use. Our exploration of imaginable alternatives then led to the conclusion that the increasing dominance of one natural language as the single lingua franca simply makes a lot of sense: to communicate with one another, we need one and only one idiom, and it will need to be a natural language. Both unavoidable and wise then? Undoubtedly. Fair too? Certainly not. I now turn to four possible characterisations of the nature of the unfairness involved and briefly indicate in each case how I believe it is best to respond to the problem, as characterised.

Undeserved Linguistic Rents

First, convergence towards a lingua franca that is the mother tongue of a subset of the population concerned unavoidably provides the members
of this subset with undeserved advantages over the rest. They can express themselves with more ease and therefore tend to be more active and more persuasive in discussions conducted in the lingua franca, whether of a business, political or social nature. In addition, some jobs restricted to native speakers of the lingua franca—such as a far more than proportionate number of language teachers and language editors paid for by non-natives, a more than proportionate number of translators and interpreters into that language paid for by international organisations—would not exist without the privileged status enjoyed by that language. Moreover, a large number of jobs that are not specifically linguistic in content are explicitly or implicitly restricted, or far more easily accessible, to native speakers of that language, because of the central importance of being able to communicate in that language. This booming demand for people proficient in the lingua franca unavoidably tends to boost the relative pay of people with native competence in that language, whether, for example, through being able to ask for high fees for private language tuition or through faster promotion in inter- or supra-national organisations.

The undeserved inequalities thus created are by no means restricted to inequalities between natives and non-natives of the lingua franca. Among non-natives, there are also huge and increasingly consequential social inequalities in terms of the extent to which the family environment provides children and adolescents with both the opportunity and the motivation to learn the lingua franca. There is a big difference between children whose parents have both a rich set of foreign connections with people who commonly speak the lingua franca and a purse large enough to fund Summer courses in Oxford, and those who have never taken part in any English conversation and whose parents would not know how to start to give them the chance of however modest an immersion.

Stepping Back

Thus, growing unfairness there appears to be. Before considering what can and must be done about it, it is worth pausing briefly to get a sense of perspective.

First, the problem thus characterised is far from being unprecedented. In most nation states, the majority of the population had a mother tongue, usually labelled a ‘dialect’, that differed notably from the national language, as used in the media and the educational system, in high culture and political life, and in business transactions beyond the local level. Indeed, in many places, there is still a big discrepancy between the home language of many families, especially rural ones, and the nationally imposed lingua franca. In most cases, linguistic distance was not as great as between most European languages and English, but in some cases it was, and in all cases it involved
forms of disadvantage in economic and political life, often even forms of blatant discrimination, closely parallel to those now encountered as English becomes just as much of a trans-national must as the dialect of the capital was a national must.

In the national context, the task of drastically reducing the resulting inequality of opportunities was (regarded as) accomplished through compulsory schooling in the national language. In the case of a trans-national lingua franca that no one would dare to try to impose as the main language of the various national populations concerned (and rightly so, as I shall argue later), the job looks far trickier. But let us bear in mind that the average number of years spent at school and the resources devoted to education in today’s European context are enormous from both a historical and a comparative perspective. For example, when we are demanding that a country like the Congo, whose educational system is in shambles and whose formal political life is entirely conducted in an alien language mastered by no more than an estimated 7% of the population, should operate democratically, and hence at the very least enable a majority of its citizens to more or less follow what is going on, we are demanding something incomparably more utopian, in terms of its linguistic preconditions, than universal competence in English throughout Europe.

Moreover, as reflected in recent surveys, the process is well underway. In Belgium, for example, where there are two national languages on the same footing, average competence in English for the younger cohorts of adults is considerably higher than average competence in the second national language has ever been in the history of the country.9 It is true, however, that even in these younger cohorts it remains a minority feature, and on average still a very long distance from the competence of native speakers. But there is one simple and cheap measure which, if taken vigorously throughout Europe, can be expected to have a dramatic impact both in reducing this distance and in spreading competence in English at all layers of the population.

Ban Dubbing!

To see what this could be, just reflect for a while on the distribution of competence in English across European countries, as revealed by Eurobarometer (see Table 1). If we leave out the UK and Ireland because they are essentially anglophone, and Belgium and Luxembourg because they are multilingual, we are left with eleven countries, five with a Germanic language, four with a Latin language and two others. To no one’s surprise, the five Germanic countries score better in terms of self-assessed knowledge of English (with an unweighted average of 65%), than the four Latin countries (with an unweighted average of 38%). This seems to provide strong support for the common wisdom that this sizeable inequality is rooted in the fact that
Europe’s Linguistic Challenge

English is an (admittedly quite latinised) Germanic language, and hence intrinsically easier to learn for the average citizen of the former set of countries than for the average citizen of the latter.

There is however, a second conjecture that turns out to be far more consistent with the data as soon as some attention is paid to the two remaining countries. Greek and more so Finnish are uncontroversially far more remote from English than either the Latin or the Germanic languages. As one moves from Finnish to Greek and next to the Latin and the Germanic group, one would therefore expect competence in English to rise monotonically. Yet for the population as a whole, the profile yielded by the data is 61% for Finland, 47% for Greece, 38% for the average Latin country and 65% for the average Germanic country. Even worse, for the younger generation (under 40), we find 87% for Finland, 71% for Greece, 61.5% for the average Latin country and 79.5% for the average Germanic country. On closer inspection, therefore, linguistic distance looks like a very bad—and worsening—predictor of competence in English.

To find a better predictor, let us partition our eleven countries according to the number of native speakers of their official language worldwide: fewer than 10 million (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), between 10 and 50 million (Greece, the Netherlands), between 50 and 100 million (Italy, France, Germany, Austria) and over 100 million (Portugal, Spain). The average proportion of people who say they know English now drops quite sharply and consistently from one category to the next: 72%, 58.5%, 45% and 35.5%, respectively, for all age groups together; 88%, 75.5%, 66.5% and 60%, respectively, for those under 40. Why?

My conjecture is that the key intermediate variable is the relative frequency of dubbing versus subtitling in the broadcasting of English-language

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series, films and other programmes. It is estimated that the average cost of one hour of dubbing is about fifteen times the cost of one hour of subtitling (Luyken et al., 1991). Hence, the threshold, in terms of number of viewers, at which it starts making sense to incur the cost of translation is far lower in the case of subtitling than it is in the case of dubbing, which a majority of viewers seem to prefer. Consequently, the extent to which English-language productions are dubbed, rather than subtitled, can safely be expected to rise steadily as one moves from countries whose language is spoken by comparatively few people, such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands, to countries populated by the members of larger linguistic groups. As revealed by incipient research, the watching of undubbed foreign programmes provides, under appropriate conditions, a powerful way for children to learn foreign languages. No wonder, therefore, that we should find a strong negative correlation between size of the language group and competence in English.

In order to motivate the proposal I am about to make, I do not need to assert that no other factor plays a significant role. It is sufficient for me to be able to assume, as the available evidence strongly suggests I can, that the learning mechanism in question is a powerful one. We cannot do much about linguistic distance between languages, or about the numbers of native speakers of the various languages, or therefore about the relative profitability of subtitling and dubbing. But we can outlaw dubbing. And if we do so, while providing supportive language teaching and letting MTV music, web chats and other less virtual trans-national contacts do the rest of the job, competence in English will become, in the space of one generation, even less of a problem than it now is in the most English-literate parts of the European continent.

Refusing to ban dubbing in those countries in which it is currently common practice amounts to unnecessarily inflicting a linguistic handicap on the most disadvantaged layers of the populations concerned and therefore strengthening the privilege enjoyed by the elite whose access to competence in English is far easier through quality schooling and foreign contacts. It also amounts to perpetuating an increasingly costly disadvantage for many members of their populations who are at all likely to be involved in the global economy, in supra-national organisations or in the trans-national civil society. If we want to be serious about fighting linguistic injustice in the sense of unequal access to linguistic advantage, therefore, my recipe is simple and inexpensive: Ban dubbing!

Three Objections

One possible objection is that such a ban would violate the fundamental freedom of expression. Note, however, that it applies indiscriminately to all languages, that it involves no restriction whatsoever on the content of that
which is being subtitled or dubbed, and that it does not prevent anyone from addressing directly through the media an audience with whom it has no language in common. This objection is therefore bound to be regarded as ludicrously formalistic, especially if the ban it incriminates can persuasively be shown, along the lines sketched above, to better equip a large proportion of the population to express themselves in a language in which it will be increasingly crucial for them to be able to express themselves in order to be heard by those who they will need to be heard by.

A second objection is that the ban would directly harm the interests of professional actors, who use dubbing as a way of securing more regular income than film or theatre contracts can provide. There will undoubtedly be an effect of this kind, but it will be buffered, if not offset, by a significant increase in the demand for local production if it remains the case, beyond the transition period, that a majority of people prefer dubbing to subtitling. A residual net negative effect on professional actors taken as a whole cannot be ruled out. But the vested interest of a tiny minority cannot legitimately block a move that would massively benefit a large, comparatively disadvantaged majority.

Finally, there is the risk that the ban would be bypassed as a result of people going to the cinema or watching videos and DVDs not subjected to the same ban. While the ban seems easy enough to extend to cinemas, it seems more difficult for videos and DVDs. But the fall in demand from TV channels and cinema distribution may in itself be sufficient to make quality dubbing unprofitable for videos and DVDs alone, even if some boosting of the demand for dubbed videos is triggered by the ban. Needless to say, if the effect of the ban were that people would shift entirely to programmes in the native language, or to cartoons with a sound track in the native language, or to dubbed videos, or to a combination of these, the intended effect would not be achieved. But although some shift in each of these three directions can be expected, it is most doubtful that it would inhibit a lasting and expanding impact, especially as tolerance for subtitling develops through practice and as teletext technology makes it possible to offer a wide range of individual choices for subtitle languages and to optionally get rid of subtitling altogether as competence in English (or any other non-native language) makes it superfluous for a growing number of non-native people for an ever wider range of programmes.

UNFAIRNESS AS THE UNEQUAL SHARING OF THE BURDEN OF LANGUAGE LEARNING

Free Riding

To phrase as sharply as possible our second problem of linguistic injustice, let us next assume that competence in English has spread massively to the
non-native speakers, and pretty equally among them, so that the adoption of English as a lingua franca no longer gives a great advantage in discussion or competition to English natives or to non-natives with a privileged access to English. Language-related injustice has not disappeared. For unlike the community of natives, the non-natives have had to devote a considerable amount of time and resources to the learning of a foreign language.\textsuperscript{17} It is estimated that the average time required to master a foreign language is 10,000 hours—compared to a standard school year totalling less than 1,000 hours in the classroom.\textsuperscript{18} However speculative such estimates, it is clear that the cost in time and resources of acquiring proficiency in a foreign language is huge. This heavy effort obviously benefits the community that performs it—otherwise it would not bother—but also, in some cases possibly to an even larger extent, the community whose language is being learned.

In other words, there is a public good—the creation of a lingua franca—being enjoyed by all linguistic groups throughout the world involved in global communication, but produced only by those groups whose language has not been picked as the lingua franca, with the lucky ones whose native language happens to have been picked enjoying a free ride. This is the second sense in which ‘linguistic injustice’ can be said to be involved. What can be done about it?

\textbf{Cost Sharing}

Scandinavians, who speak some of the least widely spread of the EU’s official languages, have tended to be pretty blunt in admitting the dominance of English, whilst being quite imaginative in suggesting how the induced fairness could be reduced. Thus, the first Danish delegation to the European Parliament is said to have made the following proposal. They conceded upfront that they could not expect others to understand Danish and agreed to speak English, but only on condition that the others, including the French, did the same with the sole exception of the British, who would have to speak French. The British were no doubt quick to point out that this would be grossly unfair to them as they would be forced to express themselves in a language that only a minority would grasp, while everyone else could be understood by all. As they were still allowed to speak in English at that stage, the others must have understood that they had a point, and the idea was dropped.\textsuperscript{19}

More recently, the Swedish Prime Minister, somewhat scared at the prospect of a near doubling of the number of official EU languages, made a distinct proposal. Instead of having all countries paying jointly (roughly according to their wealth) for the translating of everything into every language, why not have a system in which the cost of language services would be systematically shared equally between the countries whose language is
being used and the countries into whose language the translation is being made. As an ever greater majority of texts is being produced in English and as the Swedes are competent enough in English not to need a translation for most documents, the rule would end up practically exempting the Swedes from any contribution. Fairly, it might be said, as this counts as a compensation for their investment in the learning of English. Efficiently too, it may be added, as this would provide other countries with an incentive to follow suit, thereby facilitating massive savings in translation costs. At the limit, all translation costs would be eliminated as a result of all countries conforming to the Swedish pattern. However, while translation costs may then be down to zero, unfairness would not, as one linguistic community would still get away with not learning a foreign language.

Proportionality between Cost and Benefit

As argued persuasively by Jonathan Pool (1991), the only real solution to this problem, the only real way of reconciling communicative efficiency and linguistic fairness in this second sense, consists of introducing a subsidy from the linguistic group whose language is being learned to those who do the learning. How high should this subsidy be? Various criteria are worth discussing. For example, Pool (1991) proposes that each language group should contribute to the cost of the learning of the lingua franca according to its numerical size, while David Gauthier’s (1986) general conception of co-operative justice as maximin relative benefit would amount, in this case, to requiring equality among the per capita benefits derived from the existence of the lingua franca by the various language groups.20

I argue elsewhere (Van Parijs, 2002) that neither of these prima facie attractive criteria is defensible and that a distinct one is to be preferred: the equalisation of cost-benefit ratios across language groups or, put differently, proportionality between (total or per capita) contribution of each group to the cost of the existence of the lingua franca and (total or per capita) benefit derived from it. Suppose we measure roughly the benefit to a language group of the existence of the lingua franca by the number of people with whom the latter enables members of the group to communicate. And suppose we measure the contribution of a language group by the amount (in money and time) its members spent acquiring the lingua franca, if any, plus the taxes paid in this connection to other language groups, if any, minus the subsidies received in this connection from other language groups, if any. What the proposed criterion requires is that, across all language groups involved, the total cost (taking taxes and subsidies into account) be proportionate to the number of people the language group can communicate with thanks to the lingua franca.

In all circumstances, this criterion will require a net transfer from the linguistic group whose language is being learned to the groups who do the learning, and the per capita size of this language tax will grow, other
things being equal, as more and more people learn the language. The size of the transfer will never exceed the benefit to lingua franca natives, as the criterion requires the ratio of cost to benefit to be the same for all, and the learning only makes sense if the benefit exceeds the cost. Yet, it is clear that the criterion justifies massive transfers from those countries in which the bulk of the English natives live—in particular the United States, home to 70% of them—towards the rest of the world.

Four Qualifications

This conclusion needs to be qualified in four ways. Firstly, as the biggest language groups in the world—the mandarinophones and the hispanophones—fully join the global game, the English natives will not be the only ones from whom fairness will require a contribution. For as one moves from a larger to a smaller language group that learns the lingua franca, it is not just that the total amount of the subsidy justified by our criterion shrinks, but also its per capita level, because smaller groups unavoidably gain more speech partners than large ones thanks to the lingua franca. So much so that for small language groups learning the lingua franca alongside far bigger ones, this subsidy may be negative. Thus, overall equality of cost-benefit ratios may require small learners such as the Danes, the Dutch and even the French, to pay, along with the Americans and the Brits, for part of the learning of English by such potential big learners as native speakers of Mandarin, Castillian, Hindi and Bengali.21

Secondly, as English spreads as a world lingua franca, the quantity of learning may be rising, but its per-unit cost is bound to fall at some point, for two reasons. One is that there are more and more opportunities to speak English as the number of (non-native) English speech partners expands, and the expansion of costless opportunities to speak is the surest way of cheapening language learning. The second reason is that the local spread of competence in English makes it possible to provide prospective learners with the competent teachers they need at much less cost—it is no longer necessary to import natives at high cost or to send children on immersion courses in native territory. For this reason the swelling of the global cost of lingua franca learning is bound to be far less than proportional to the swelling of its quantity. At the limit, if it ever became as easy and natural to learn the lingua franca as it is to learn one’s mother tongue, i.e. if our first problem of linguistic unfairness had become solvable at no cost, our second problem of linguistic unfairness would vanish altogether.22

Thirdly, one has to draw the full implications of the fact that talking to some willing native speakers of a language in a context in which it is natural to speak that language is one of the most widespread and most effective ways of improving one’s knowledge of a language—this is precisely the opportunity
side of the probability-sensitive learning mechanism at the core of the language dynamics sketched towards the beginning of this paper. But it is its reverse side that I now want to draw attention to. As competence in English spreads worldwide, there are ever fewer circumstances, because of the maximin dynamics sketched earlier, in which English natives will have a natural opportunity to speak another language and improve their knowledge of it. The advantage of being able to use one’s own language in an ever growing number of contexts therefore has the side effect of making it increasingly difficult to learn other languages. Even though the importance of knowing other languages for communication purposes decreases accordingly, this is a genuine disadvantage. One way of putting it is that language learning is to a large extent made up of free-riding on patient speech partners. As English spreads, interaction between English natives and others occurs more and more—soon nearly exclusively—in English. Consequently, this type of free-riding of English natives on others will reduce to very little, relative to the symmetric free-riding of these others on English natives (even though an ever growing majority of the people to whom non-English natives will be talking English will be other non-English natives).23 This growing asymmetry in learning assistance may be far from offsetting the growing asymmetry in exemption from learning, but it does qualify the assessment of the size of the unfairness involved.

Poach the Web!

Finally, one must be aware of the fact that both the incentive and opportunity to learn any foreign language but English will decrease as English increasingly suffices to get by wherever one is. As a consequence, English will become more and more a globally public language, while other languages will remain or increasingly become globally private languages. Having no private language means being far more liable to give away information to any outsider who cares to listen or read. This may take some minor forms: whatever your mother tongue, you may benefit from overhearing two American tourists telling each other, in the queue to the museum, that the door to the toilet is locked. Had they been Finnish, you would have lost your position in the queue. Trivial asymmetric benefiting of this sort may seem hardly worth mentioning. But as more and more information gets loaded onto the web, easy to access, copy and use worldwide, this asymmetry is assuming gigantic proportions. Whatever is being made available in this way to the 350 million English natives is being made available simultaneously to the 700 million or so non-natives who bothered to learn English (and are massively over-represented among web users from their respective countries). By contrast, practically none of the information that these 700 million put on the web in their native languages can be ‘overheard’ by English natives, because so few of these know
other languages. Of course, more and more of the material put on the web by non-English natives will be in English (far from exclusively, or even mainly, to communicate with English natives). But as long as a significant proportion is produced and made available in other languages, a deep asymmetry remains, which, again, partly cancels the advantage derived from one’s language having become the lingua franca. Indeed, it provides the only realistic chance of ever cancelling that advantage to a significant extent. Let me explain.

My point of departure was that English natives derive a massive advantage as a result of their language having been picked as the lingua franca and that this unfairness needs to be corrected through a fair sharing of the burden of producing the public good, ie of the learning of the lingua franca by those with a different mother tongue. But it is hard to imagine the US and the UK gathering huge amounts of cash to compensate countries whose populations spontaneously crave to learn English anyway, and do so. But it is not exactly crazy to believe that the web can be poached, ie taken advantage of without a compensatory payment. The difficulty of protecting property rights effectively on the web means that poaching, tolerated or not, will assume ever growing proportions. In actual practice, by far the most effective (though selective) lock may well be language-for those who do not understand it. But as English spreads, all English material gets unlocked for the world, and poaching becomes increasingly asymmetric. No vigorous efforts should be made to repress it, to enforce intellectual property rights over English-language content accessible in this way - or indeed in (increasingly obsolete) printed form. No collaboration can be legitimately expected for the sake of redressing the massive resulting (net) free riding by non-English natives. For this is nothing but compensatory free riding. My slogan-like response to linguistic unfairness in the second sense is therefore as simple as was my response to unfairness in the first sense: Poach the web!

UNFAIRNESS AS UNEQUAL INFLUENCE

Americanisation

Suppose ‘Ban dubbing!’ works as a way of equalising language-based inequalities, and suppose ‘Poach the web!’ works as a way of offsetting the unequal distribution of language-learning burdens. The outcome will undoubtedly be an acceleration of the very process to which these two strategies are meant to respond: as the consumption of undubbed TV programmes and the use of English-language websites expand, competence in English keeps increasing, but, as a by-product, so does the absorption of intellectual products conceived and produced in English-speaking countries, above all the United States.
This is the case not only directly because ever more is heard or read
directly in English by non-English natives relative to what is heard or read by
English natives in languages other than English. This primary bias is further
amplified by a derived bias in the flow of translations. This can be seen in
two ways: firstly, far more is being translated from English into other lan-
guages than from other languages into English; and secondly, for any given
language, an ever greater proportion of what is produced in English is trans-
lated into that language than is translated from any other language. This
must hardly come as a surprise: the very spread of competence in English
among those who have to make decisions about what to adapt or translate
gives a far greater chance of discovery and translation, for a given quality
and interest, to anything that is available in English. And once the process
is underway, marketing strategies focusing on known names will further
amplify the process (see Melitz, 1999). Might this not lead to unfairness in
a third sense, as unfair inequality in the ability to spread one's ideas and,
tightly linked to this, to a worrying worldwide ideological domination by
the United States? (See eg Wilmet, 2003.)

Let us first clarify a confusion. Whatever you may hear said in English,
there is of course nothing intrinsically ‘pro-capitalist’, or ‘anti-poor’, or
‘market-imperialist’ about the English language, just as it is not because
Marx wrote in German that there is something intrinsically ‘anti-capitalist’
or ‘pro-proletarian’ or ‘state-fetishist’ about the German language. Like
all other languages in the world, English and German have the means of
expressing negation, so that whatever Marx wrote in German you can also
deny in German and whatever Bush said in English you can also deny in
English. Similarly, contrary to what is occasionally asserted, there is nothing
intrinsic to English that makes it more suitable for expressing things rigor-
ously and succinctly. (Mathematical economics, let us remember, was born
in French, and analytic philosophy in German.) Which is not to say that
there are no distinct national intellectual traditions, shaped by educational
practices and cultural fashions, nor therefore significant statistical differ-
ences between average levels of rigour or long-windedness in speeches and
writings in the various languages.

Seize the Loudspeaker!

Hence, the real problem is not the use of English as such, but rather the
fact that the political content of English-language discourse, as reflected for
example in academic textbooks, newspaper articles, TV series and web con-
tent, tends to differ in ways which many regard as undesirable from what
the discourse would be in non-anglophone countries if these were sheltered
from anglophone influence. What ‘makes sense’ in terms of public policy
in the United States is strongly shaped by the heavy dependence of political
candidates at the highest levels on the collection of private contributions to the funding of their electoral campaigns. As a result of the worldwide spread of competence in English and hence of English-language publications (in the original or in translation), this situation unnecessarily skews the realm of the politically thinkable and feasible worldwide. For this contingent reason, not because of any intrinsic feature of the English language, there is a real danger of ‘Americanisation’ that the ban on dubbing and the poaching of the web, as such, would admittedly rather reinforce than contain.

The solution, however, cannot be defensive retreat. It consists in appropriating that medium in order to spread through it whatever content we see fit. Not shrill whispering in provincial dialects, but the uninhibited grabbing of the global loudspeaker provides the way forward. Throughout the world we must become able to say:

English is our language, even when it is, as for many of us, only one of our languages. And we will use it to say what we want to say in it, and not what the government of the country that houses 70% of its native speakers would like us to say.

But to make this strategy effective, the worst would be to hold back and obstruct in all sorts of ways the learning of English by our people, our students, our children, especially the less advantaged among them. They should rather acquire as soon as possible the competence needed to talk and write in English, indeed to feed the web with English material and produce English-language works. If people from all over the world want to be read or heard all over the world, they must not proudly or shyly withdraw into their tiny linguistic world but use the language that will enable them to reach as far as possible, albeit with distinctive accents and in distinctive styles. If ideological domination is to be avoided and, by the same token, if the distribution of worldwide influence is to be made less unfair, one must not resist, but accelerate the competent appropriation of the lingua franca. All the better, therefore, if the ban on dubbing and the poaching of the web takes us in that direction more quickly.

UNFAIRNESS AS UNEQUAL RESPECT

There is, however, a distinct objection that is sometimes confused with the risk of ideological domination. Conceding, indeed accelerating, the de facto prevalence of one language over all others can be perceived as showing a lack of respect towards these other languages and the people whose identities are closely tied to them. Even if second-language competence is widely and thoroughly spread, even if the burden of learning the lingua franca as a second language is fairly shared by the people who have the lingua franca as their mother tongue, there remains the fact that the language of one subset is being given a privileged status above all the others. The most fundamental
injustice, the form of injustice that is hardest to fix, may well turn out to be the associated inequality of respect, of honour, of pride. What can be done about it?

Demystification

There need not be anything obnoxious, or ridiculous, or insulting for others, in taking pride in one’s mother tongue having been picked as a world’s lingua franca—not more, at any rate, than in being proud about the fact that a boy from one’s village has been picked as a page to the King. It may nonetheless be wise to reassert now and then that the choice was not based on any intrinsic quality. English is just the dialect of some Germanic Barbarians who settled across the Channel, messily bastardised as a result of subsequent French colonisation and gradually enriched, through the centuries, from the top down by sophisticated scholars shamelessly plundering Latin and Greek lexicons and from the bottom up through the reluctant incorporation into grammar books and dictionaries of the unspeakable slang of defiant youth. It may also be of some use to reiterate, whenever an opportunity arises, that the choice is not rooted either in any ethnic superiority of its native population—by now anyway a pretty mixed bunch of people which owes its large size far (and ever) less to the reproductive drive of the Angles than to the assimilating power of the US educational machine.

Ritual Affirmation

All this may be worth rehearsing whenever arrogance shows up, but equal respect can hardly be expected to be achieved as a result. More significant is the ritual, sometimes ceremonial, affirmation of the equality of all recognised languages. For example, the authors of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) were right in stating, in its article 22, that ‘the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. And so was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing when he opened the European Convention in February 2002 by saying ‘Mesdames et Messieurs’ in the EU’s eleven official languages of the time, just as it has great significance for the language groups concerned that the Pope should mumble publicly a brief Happy New Year in their own language, however modest the latter’s range. However, the lip service thus ceremoniously paid to linguistic equality has obvious limits, not only because of its growing awkwardness as the number of official languages increases from the initial four (in the first two decades of the ‘European community’) to twenty after the 2004 enlargement and twenty-one from January 2007 with the inclusion of Irish. The number of cases in which oral and written communication will be allowed to transgress the equality rule will
keep increasing. More fundamentally, if equality of respect boils down to ceremony, it is hard to dispel the suspicion of hypocrisy.

Grab a Territory!

In addition to demystification and ceremonial affirmation, however, there is a third, and in my view far more significant way of expressing equality of respect for the various languages concerned. It consists in allowing each of them to be ‘the King’ in some part, large or small, of the EU’s territory, thereby making its own survival secure and bestowing a privilege, within the limits of that territory, on the people who have as a mother tongue the language to which that territory has been ascribed. The message from the EU to its citizens is then simply:

Free movement within the European Union is one of our great achievements. But if you move for more than a short time to any part of the EU’s territory whose official language happens to be different from your mother tongue, you must have the courage and the humility to learn that language if you do not know it already.

The symmetry involved in this linguistic territoriality principle, as I shall call it, is the only really significant way in which equality of respect can be shown to be meant seriously, consistent with the full acceptance of systematic asymmetric bilingualism at EU level.

In concrete terms, what the linguistic territoriality principle amounts to is a set of enforceable rules about the public use of language that will systematically frustrate the powerful pro-dominant-language bias incorporated in the interaction between probability-sensitive learning and maximin communication. The territoriality principle will typically impose public education in the local language even on those who would prefer to have their children taught straight in the lingua franca. It will impose administrative or judicial procedures in the local language even in cases where the local public officers master the foreign language better than the foreign person they have to deal with masters the local language. And it will impose the use of the local language in the political realm, even if more residents could be enabled to participate to some extent if another language were used. As a result, more people will learn the local language, or will learn it more thoroughly, than if probability-sensitive learning had been left unconstrained. More interactions will also occur in the local language than if maximin were given free rein, thereby creating both a stronger incentive and a wider opportunity to learn the local language.

If the local language is a powerful language, which most immigrants spontaneously have a strong incentive to learn, the territoriality principle will hardly be felt, as only a very light constraint may be enough for the
spontaneous interaction of differential learning and maximin communication to take over and keep that language firmly in place. But when this is not the case, when the ‘natural’ incentive to learn is weak, the enforcement of the territoriarity principle will not only be felt, but more often than not bitterly resented by non-native speakers of the official language, unless it is credibly framed as a fair way of showing equal respect. After ‘Ban dubbing!’, ‘Poach the web!’ and ‘Seize the loudspeaker!’, this is, then, my fourth recipe for linguistic justice in Europe and in the world: *Grab a territory!*

**Arbitrary Borders**

Which are the languages that should be given a territory, and how should their borders be determined? There is no neat answer to this question. I propose two (fuzzy) conditions as necessary and sufficient. One is that there must be a sufficiently vigorous movement asking for it—otherwise, the energy needed to bear the cost of forgo large economies of scale and other expenses related to the setting up of institutions in one’s own language will not be forthcoming. The second condition is that the presence of the linguistic group must not be the product of recent immigration, whether from inside or outside the country. Fairness is respected to the extent that it can credibly be said: ‘You need to learn our local language here just as we would need to learn yours if we settled in your own place.’ Your place may be small, and the probability of my ever settling there close to zero, but the symmetry needed for equal respect does not require equal sizes or equal probabilities. For those allophone immigrants who do not have a protected linguistic homeland—the Kurds, the Arameans, the Baluba—the solution cannot consist in allowing them to grab a territory wherever they decide to migrate, but where they are traditionally settled.

Thus, if and only if the two conditions mentioned are satisfied-vigorous movement, ancient roots—with no doubt some grey area in each case, a territory can be associated with the language. The borders are bound to be contentious, and some compromise will need to be made between geographical neatness and linguistic homogeneity. People stuck on the wrong side of the border will need to have their vested rights protected through special measures that will be phased out with their generation. And of course languages other than the official one can thrive and even get official support, provided the protective measures are powerful enough to keep promoting the official language into maximin position in a sufficient number of contexts for all permanent residents to have both the desire and the opportunity to learn the official language properly.

**Strengthening the ‘Natural’ Grip**

A second difficulty is precisely that for three distinct reasons—one general, two more restricted in scope, though of special importance for the European
Union—the mechanisms of linguistic integration, essential for facilitating the implementation of the territoriality principle, are losing their grip. The first reason is the spread of satellite and cable TV, which considerably reduces the exposure of immigrants of all ages and their children, grandchildren, etc, even born in the new country, to the local language. Quickly reinforced by all types of sorting mechanisms (if the café’s TV broadcasts nothing but Turkish programmes, what are the chances of it attracting or retaining non-Turkish customers?), this makes it considerably more difficult for linguistic competence in the local language to spread through the immigrant population, including through the school system, as children are far more likely to keep speaking the immigrant language to each other than used to be the case.

A second reason applies more specifically to those cases where immigrants, in addition to their mother tongue, have some knowledge of English and soon find that they can get away with hardly any knowledge of the local language, as most local people also have some knowledge of English. Especially when the local language is not widely spread and when the immigrants are not sure how long they will stay, probability-sensitive learning will never be sufficient for the local language to take over from English in most everyday circumstances. Worries about this new phenomenon are now commonly aired in such countries as Sweden and the Netherlands.

The third reason applies more specifically to those countries with a developed welfare state that makes it possible for a significant proportion of the immigrant population of working age to live for long periods without entering a work community. The fact that many of the less skilled jobs in the service sector are quite demanding linguistically makes it particularly difficult for immigrants to find jobs, even in the absence of discrimination. And the outcome is that the work sphere is less effective than earlier and elsewhere in providing immigrants with both the opportunity and the motivation to learn the local language. Effective language learning for all therefore arguably requires tougher measures, such as compulsory language courses, sanctioned by proficiency tests, for new immigrants, the prohibition of the immigrant language in class and in the playground, and/or the constrained mixing of children of various origins in schools which are in danger of becoming ethnically homogeneous.

Stabilising Diglossia

The third difficulty concerns the possibility of stable diglossia. Suppose the process has gone so far that practically everyone in a particular country knows the lingua franca in addition to the country’s main mother tongue. Will there then not be a growing number of contexts in which the local language will no longer unambiguously be the maximin language even among natives? Think of the spread of English-language courses in continental
European universities (see Ammon, 2001a; Maiworm and Wächter, 2002). As this trend extends downward from postgraduate to undergraduate levels, there will be a number of domains in which natives of a particular language will find it easier to communicate with one another in English than in their own common mother tongue, or in a variant of their mother tongue perforated by strings of lexical borrowings and occasional full sentences in English. Can some territorial community’s universal bilingualism really be more than a transient stage between universal competence in the local language only and the withering away of that language? (see Salverda, 2001; Willems, 2002) Here too, the only safeguard is a toughening of the territoriality principle. But is this sustainable when it is not only the newcomers or some local linguistic minority, but the whole of the native population that is made to feel its pinch so keenly?

**Ground Floor Attraction**

The final and potentially most formidable difficulty stems from the asymmetric migration of highly skilled people that the implementation of the territoriality principle will tend to generate.\(^{31}\) Once the highly skilled of a particular country and their families are about as competent in English as in their mother tongue, the obstacle to moving to the English-language part of the world will shrink to about the same size as the cost of moving to a place where their native language is being spoken, and become far less prohibitive than the obstacle to moving to a country whose language they would need to learn from scratch in order to fully participate in social life, or even sometimes to manage barely comfortable survival. This transforms the part of the world in which the lingua franca is being spoken—what I call ‘the ground floor of the world’ (Van Parijs, 2000)—into a powerful attractor of high skills, which other countries will have the greatest difficulty counteracting.

Of course, the loss of a number of highly skilled people trained at great expense at home may be partly offset by remittances sent home, through the creation of networks from which the home country will benefit and above all through the return, after a number of years, of better trained and better connected highly skilled workers. Indeed, one might wish to argue that this process is not fundamentally different from the sort of systematically asymmetric migration of high skills that has always existed between cities and their rural hinterland. There is a similarity, but there is also a deep difference. It is not just that remittances are not quite of the same relative magnitude as the daily pay which commuting workers take to their villages when returning home every evening. The solidarity relationship between a city and its hinterland is also far tighter, as a result of all sorts of explicit and implicit transfers organised by a state that encompasses them both. The concentrated use of high skills in cities can therefore be routinely
regarded as serving everyone’s interest far more easily than asymmetric trans-national migration.

Because of these differences, the global brain drain cannot be observed with the same equanimity as the exodus of the rural intelligentsia. Countries which inflict on prospective settlers the cost of learning a lesser used language put themselves at a competitive disadvantage relative to ground floor countries. They can only compensate for it, at first sight at any rate, by making conditions more attractive for the people they need to attract back or retain. And this must mean, one way or another, that they must shrink the degree of solidarity expected from the more talented, the more skilled, the more mobile, towards the less qualified, the less able, the less mobile.

What can be done about this final problem short of giving up the territoriality principle? The cost to be paid in terms of prosperity and/or solidarity would no doubt be considerably decreased if all countries were linked by a solidarity system that would automatically spread across borders whatever the ground floor produces thanks to the fruitful collaboration of brains drained from all over the planet. As this is still far off on any significant scale, inventiveness is in order. What about a combination of poaching-again-and ground floor enclaves?

As a growing part of what is being produced, especially with a large high-skill input, consists of knowledge, maximal worldwide leakage of the knowledge produced on the ground floor is part of what is needed to offset the free riding of the ground floor on the education, training and (self-)selection of the human capital it attracts. It is the very accessibility of whatever is done in English and the very fact that the spread of English makes the ground floor a receptacle of bright brains from all over the world that also makes it particularly vulnerable to the poaching of whatever (informational) wealth is thereby produced.

Over and above this poaching, other countries might also think of organising carefully circumscribed ‘linguistically free zones’, ie small areas in which the linguistic territoriality principle is relaxed. The highly skilled and their families who settle in these zones, selected because of their high-tech vocation, would be relieved of the heavy ‘tax’ of having to learn the local language. As a consequence, the lingua franca would gradually rule within these enclaves about as imperially as it does on the real ground floor.

After having quickly gone through these four difficulties, my answer to the fourth interpretation of linguistic injustice—unequal respect—remains: Grab a territory! But there will be many cases in which this grabbing will need to be done in a very sensitive way (first difficulty), require more strenuous effort than used to be the case (second and third difficulties), and come at a cost that will not be easily offset (fourth difficulty).
CONCLUSION

To conclude: Yes, there is unfairness involved in the fact that one of the native languages is being picked, through countless unco-ordinated choices, as the sole lingua franca. But this unfairness can, to a large extent, be compensated. Firstly, inequalities in competence in the lingua franca can be massively reduced through an effective ban on dubbing and other ways of facilitating early learning. Secondly, inequalities in the shouldering of the burden of learning the lingua franca can be compensated by poaching the web and free riding in other ways on the intellectual production of the natives of the lingua franca. Thirdly, language-based inequalities in influence, and the associated ideological dominance of the United States, can and must be reduced through appropriating the common medium and using it as a loudspeaker. Fourthly and finally, inequality in the respect expressed towards the various languages can be alleviated to some extent through demystification and ceremonial recognition, but above all through allowing each recognised community to effectively give top status to its language within some home territory.

Provided fairness is vigorously pursued along each of these four dimensions, we can accept without rancour or resentment the increasing reliance on English as a lingua franca. We need one, and only one, if we are to be able to work out and implement efficient and fair solutions to our common problems on both European and world scales, and indeed if we are to be able to discuss, characterise and achieve, again Europe- and world-wide, linguistic justice.

APPENDIX: WHY LEAVING THE CHOICE BETWEEN TWO LINGUA FRANCAS WILL NOT DO

To start with, imagine six people with three mother tongues—two Brits, two French and two Germans—and consider the following three regimes:

(1) No lingua franca: Let them choose their second language at random (each language is chosen with equal frequency).
(2) Double lingua franca: Constrain the choice of a second language by demanding that it is English in half the cases, and French in the other half.
(3) Single lingua franca: Impose English on all non-anglophones, while the Brits learn nothing.

As regards the communicative efficiency of these various regimes, the key question is how frequently the six people will have at least one language in common when gathering at random in groups of various sizes (from 2 to 6). The outcomes, under some simplifying assumptions, are given in Table I.
Philippe Van Parijs

Table I: Percentage of groupings with at least one language in common (6 people, 3 mother tongues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of the groupings</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of possible combinations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) No lingua franca</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Double lingua franca</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Single lingua franca</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the No-LF regime (1), the 6 people will always have a common language when 2 of them meet; in 60% of the cases when 3 meet; in 25% of the cases when 4 meet; and never when more than 4 meet. Under the double-LF regime (2), the percentage of cases in which they have a common language rises, thanks to the constraint on their choice, from 60 to 80% when 3 of them meet; from 25 to 66% when 4 of them meet; and from 0 to 33% when 5 of them meet. It remains 0 when all of them meet. Under the single-LF regime (3), the percentage of cases in which there is a common language rises to 100% whatever the size of the grouping. Moreover, this is achieved with a one-third global discount on the learning involved, since the Brits need to do none of it.

In this simple three-language case, the cost-benefit advantage of opting for a single lingua franca is strong enough. But it becomes overwhelming as the number of mother tongues increases. Take the same example, but with six mother tongues instead of three and re-interpret the three regimes accordingly (Table II). The no-LF, as interpreted, leads to less than half of the two-by-two groupings and to no larger grouping having a common language, while the double-LF regime now performs worse than the random option did in the three-language case. The single-LF, by contrast, still scores 100% for all sizes of groupings and does so at a discount, now reduced from 1/3 to 1/6 of the learning cost.

Table II: Percentage of groupings with at least one language in common (6 people, 6 mother tongues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of the groupings</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of possible combinations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) No lingua franca</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Double lingua franca</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Single lingua franca</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1  This essay is based on talks given at the University of British Columbia (11 September 2001), at the Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne (16 March 2002), at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (24 April 2003), at Oxford University (1 May 2003), at the Università degli Studi di Siena (6 July 2003), at the Australian National University in Canberra (15 July 2003), at the Cursos de Verano of the Universidad Complutense in San Lorenzo del Escorial (18 July 2003) and at the Law School of New York University (6 November 2003). It also benefited greatly from three workshops respectively held at the European University Institute (Linguistic Diversity and European Law, Florence, 12-13 November 2001), the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (‘The Public Discourse of Law and Politics in Multilingual Societies’, Oñati, 5-8 June 2002), and the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics (‘Language Dynamics and Linguistic Justice’, Louvain-la-Neuve, 27 June 2002). A somewhat different version of this chapter appears in Archives européennes de sociologies (Paris) XLV (1), 2004. I am particularly grateful to Miriam Aziz, Dario Castiglione, Abram de Swaan, Bruno de Witte, Ronald Dworkin, Gilles Gantelet, François Grin, Victor Ginsburgh, Christian List, Tom Nagel, Adam Swift, and Michel Van den Abeele for useful comments and insights.

2  Based on a witness account by two of my children, and later checked in broad outline with the main actor in the scene.

3  ‘At least in part’, because another reason may be the correct anticipation of the dynamics of maximin and differential learning to be sketched shortly: to prevent French from being ever less often the maximin language (chosen even when no one French is around), one must voluntaristically preserve the incentive and opportunity to learn it by using French even when it is not the maximin choice. Not exactly appreciated by those (non-French) who are thereby forced to listen to a language they do not understand, nor indeed by those (French) who are thereby forced to speak French at the risk of being ignored.

4  The unwritten rule may even sometimes be (for example for a time, I am told, at the regular meetings of the European Commissioners’ chiefs of cabinet) ‘Each speaks one of the others’ languages’, as a supreme expression of respect for the other languages, or perhaps as a proud display of one’s linguistic competence, or both.

5  David Crystal (1997: 22) describes what is going on in this respect as a race between global English and the ear insert for oral translation in Douglas Adams’s (1979: 52) Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy—with the spread of the former and the development of the latter each inhibiting investment in the other. English will win effortlessly in the case of all small languages, as the competence in English already achieved further shrinks the market for the very expensive fine-tuning of the sophisticated software required (see Maurais, 2003: 19). But even in the case of language combinations that provide for large Babel Fish markets, English in the brain is far more promising than technology in the ear as a reliable and cost-efficient way of securing understanding (and much besides) in a wide variety of contexts.

6  Hebrew may provide a second case, but to a fast decreasing extent, whereas for English the gap keeps increasing.

See for example the recent English-French-German proposal by the French national deputy Michel Herbillon, reported by Kovacs (2003), and the even more demanding four-language variant (Spanish included) proposed by the Belgian linguist Marc Wilmet (2003). In these proposals, the natives of the three privileged languages are allowed to speak their own language. In other variants, out of fairness, they are not: see eg Chaudenson (2001: 152), Ammon (2001b: 73), and the proposal by the Flemish deputy Danny Pieters, also reported by Kovacs (2003). I return to the fairness issue below. As long as the only concern is communicative efficiency, a scheme that prevents a native from speaking his own language even when understood by all others is obviously absurd.

8  Esperantists are particularly active in documenting discrimination in favour of English native speakers in and around the EU’s institutions by collecting hundreds of job offers of the following type (www.lingvo.org): ‘The Union of Independent Retail Traders in Europe is currently in search of a Jurist. You are English native speaker and fluent in French. Knowledge of the German language is an asset’ (The Bulletin 8/03/01). ‘European Association of Co-operative Banks is looking for an English mother tongue Junior Adviser’ (The European Voice 1/03/01). ‘Delegation of the European Commission in Russia. Press and Information Section
Philippe Van Parijs seeks: A Stagiaire. The candidate must have excellent drafting skills in English (preferably of English mother tongue)' (internet, 30/03/03).

9 The percentage of people who regard themselves as speaking ‘completely correctly’ or ‘more or less correctly’ the second national language versus English is 17% versus 11% for Belgian residents who attended school in Belgium aged 55 or more, 23% versus 25% for those aged 35 to 54, and 21% versus 36% for those aged 15 to 34 (source: survey by INRA Marketing unit conducted in February 1999 on behalf of TIBEM. For a more detailed analysis of these data and what they reveal, see Van Parijs (1999).

10 Source: Eurobarometer 54. Table 1 uses the data of the Eurobarometer Report prepared at the request of the Directorate Education and Culture of the European Commission, on the occasion of the European Year of Languages (INRA, 2001). It has been computed on the basis of tables 2 and 2a in Ginsburgh and Weber (2003), who had access to the data set, and not just to the (rather clumsy) published report. Table 1 indicates the proportion of residents who either have English as their mother tongue or mention English among the first two languages they ‘know’ in addition to their mother tongue (if any), first in the whole of the country’s population aged 15 or over, and next in the fraction of that population under the age of 40.

11 According to INRA (2001, Summary §6), 29.8% of the European population say they prefer subtitled, and 59.6% that they do not. (Had the question been phrased the other way round, the difference would no doubt have looked less striking.) As pointed out by Koolstra and Beentjes (1999), however, these preferences correlate strongly and positively with prevailing practices in the country, which suggests that preferences tend to adjust.

12 It has been estimated that Dutch children spend about half their TV time watching programmes with English-language sound (Koolstra and Beentjes, 1999: 16).

13 See, especially, van de Poel and d’Ydewalle (1996) and Koolstra and Beentjes (1999) for some experimental evidence on learning English through watching subtitled programmes. Chaudenson (2001: 145, 155–6) also mentions the competence in Italian acquired by Tunisian and Albanian children with no exposure to it other than the watching of Italian TV channels. (A TV once exploded in Tunis, I am told, and the kids rushed out screaming ‘Aiuto!’.)

14 I am clearly not the only one to have realised the handicapping effects of dubbing. At European level, the EU’s Council of Ministers, in 1990, decided to promote indiscriminately dubbing, subtitling and multilingual broadcasting as ways of overcoming the ‘language barrier’ (Luyken et al, 1991: 208), but a more recent document, drafted by the European Commission’s DG Education and Culture in connection with a consultation on linguistic diversity, contains the following passage: ‘In some member states, TV programmes and films in foreign languages seldom get onto our screens, or if they do they are often dubbed rather than subtitled because the local market prefers dubbing; yet research shows that films and TV can encourage and facilitate language learning if they are made available in their original language, with subtitles instead of dubbing; subtitling provides an economical and effective way of making our environment more language-friendly.’ (European Commission, 2002: 16). Similarly, in the debate about the learning of languages in the Parliament of Belgium’s Francophone Community, one deputy briefly suggested: ‘I shall content myself with one proposal, simple but far more important than one might think at first sight: abolishing the dubbing of spoken texts on the radio, on TV and in cinemas’ (Henry, 2003: section 2).

15 At the end of the process, it may be argued that the advantage of the anglophones has not only been removed, but inverted: it may be more valuable to be fluent in English than in any other language, but it is more valuable to be fluent in two languages, including English, than in English alone. One cannot simply object to this argument that anglophones are no less well equipped to acquire another language than natives of other languages are, and hence that the unfair advantage has not been turned into an unequal advantage. For the ability to learn a language is a matter not only of mental capacity but also of socio-linguistic opportunity, and as the maxim rule drives languages other than English out of ‘natural’ interaction, the cost of learning other languages for anglophones (and everyone else) keeps increasing. One consequence of the universal spread of the lingua franca would then be that anglophones would face competition in their home labour markets from everyone else in the world, while having no real access to those labour markets in which another language remains a requirement. I return to this issue below.

16 The prohibition of subtitling might have been more problematic in this last respect, as dubbing does not offer the same potential as subtitling for checking that the words of a person are not being distorted.
In the United States, over half of secondary school pupils no longer study any foreign language and the cost of foreign language learning per capita can be estimated to be about forty times less than in Switzerland (Maurais, 2003: 24, 32). See Grin (2004) for more useful estimates of the costs involved.

Admittedly, this sort of estimate is pretty arbitrary. In the first place, the notion of ‘mastering’ a foreign language is extremely fuzzy, and once the basic syntax and morphology are learned, hundreds of hours may be needed for tiny improvements in pronunciation, fluency, use of idiomatic expressions and respect for grammatical exceptions, as well as for expanding one’s lexical repertoire. Secondly, the number of hours required through a classroom method for any given level of competence is highly dependent on linguistic distance between the mother tongue (and other languages previously learned) and the language to be learned. Thirdly and most importantly, as emphasised above, what happens inside the classroom cannot be dissociated from the motivation and opportunity dimensions of what is going on outside. The ‘average’ time needed is therefore crucially dependent on the way in which the various combinations of native language background, language to be learned and context are weighted—a rather tricky matter, both conceptually and empirically.

As I have heard this story in several versions, I would not bet on its accuracy. See eg Ammon (2001b: 73). In the same vein, see the multiple-lingua-franca proposals mentioned above, which, in both ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ versions, all face the same decisive difficulty.

In other words, the difference between the average benefit derived from the existence of the lingua franca by the members of a language group and their average contribution to the cost of its learning must be the same for all language groups, whether or not they do the learning themselves.

Moreover, the native lingua franca countries may plausibly argue that the cost they can be expected to share is not the actual cost of learning, but the cost of using the cheapest effective method. If some countries deliberately fail to use such inexpensive and powerful tools as the ban on dubbing advocated earlier, they cannot reasonably expect other countries to foot a portion of the resulting extra bill.

How many times does it happen that some nice Americans or Brits (not of the ‘If English was good enough for Jesus Christ, it is good enough for them’ type), after managing some painstaking but much appreciated sentences in the local language, are rewarded with a ‘Now, let’s get down to business’ in an English so competent that carrying on in the local language would be felt to be pointless masochism?

The myth of the three working languages (French, German, English) will gradually be recognised as such (fundamentally for the reasons explained above). But it makes plenty of sense, in the many circumstances in which even a mere symbolic use of all official languages will prove far too much, to express the recognition of and respect for linguistic pluralism by using only French and German in addition to English. German and French are the two main languages with the majority of their native speakers inside the EU, and the EU would never have existed had France and Germany not found the strength to take the original initiative and to keep supporting it ever since. It is of course important that this symbolic use of less widely known languages should not alienate European citizens. For reasons spelt out elsewhere (Aziz and Van Parijs, 2002), it seems a particularly bad idea, for example, to maintain the prevalence of French in the European Court of Justice.

Not an advice unanimously given to European authorities, least of all by those who care about nothing but business: ‘It is worthwhile to consider whether the EU should answer the call for uniformity on the issue of language business transactions and further protect itself against the potential onslaught of language regulation by each individual Member State. One potential action the EU might take would be to declare a common language in the EU market’ (Feld, 1998: 199, quoted by Phillipson, 2001: 113-14). As rightly pointed out for example by Phillipson (2003: 193–8), there is an inherent tension between the EU’s ritual assertion that it wants both to encourage contact and mobility in all sorts of ways, and hence multilingualism, on the one hand, and on the other hand the preservation (if not the promotion) of linguistic diversity.
The common distinction, in the area of language rights, between the territorial principle and the personality principle, is often misleadingly formulated (see Réaume, 2003 and Patten, 2003 for some useful discussion). Which language(s) one is allowed to learn at public expense, to speak and write while expecting to be heard, or to receive information and services in, is obviously dependent on the legislation of the territorially circumscribed political entity in which one might wish to do these various things. In this sense, all language rights regimes instantiate a territoriality principle, just as they instantiate a personality principle in the sense that the rights are ascribed to individual persons. The relevant distinction should rather be phrased in terms of how accommodating the regime is to the linguistic wishes of the people who happen or settle within given borders. This is obviously a matter of degree, with at one extreme even public schools, public services and public life adjusting swiftly to people’s desires under the sole constraint of a cost-conscious use of resources (threshold levels, etc), and at the other extreme even private language use and acquisition coercively constrained. Once it is understood that, in a high-mobility, high-communication context, the unconstrained dynamics of differential learning and maximin puts weaker languages under permanent pressure, a serious concern for linguistic diversity and equal respect requires this dynamic to be constrained, though in a way that cannot be rejected as unacceptably coercive. This entails a restriction of the constraints on particular contexts, all in the ‘public’ sphere. But once the contexts are defined, the linguistic constraint needed to protect the weaker language can be linked either to where one is (what is the local official language) or to who one is (what is one’s native language). The first option— which corresponds to the territoriality principle—has the decisive advantage of being both less coercive (one can change one’s residence, not one’s mother tongue) and cheaper to implement (because of the locally-bound nature of many of the services concerned). Whether it offers a stronger guarantee of survival to a threatened language depends on the relative probabilities of the homeland running empty on the one hand and the race no longer procreating (or intermarrying heavily or spreading thinly) on the other.

The much earlier firm application of the territoriality principle is the secret of Switzerland’s relative linguistic peace, compared to Belgium and Canada. There has never been a Germanisation of Geneva analogous to the Frenchisation of Brussels or the Englishisation of Montreal. The solution here advocated for Europe can therefore be said to have had an early formulation by the European Commission’s first President: ‘The fact that the Europeans do not speak the same language cannot disturb us. Switzerland provides us with the classical example showing that linguistic variety does not constrain, but rather enriches, and we wish for our Belgian friends that they can soon be cited as another example’ (Hallstein, 1973: 112, quoted by Kraus, 2004).

In the Region of Brussels, for example, the rate of employment in the working-age population is 64% among Belgian citizens (including naturalised immigrants), but only 33% among non-EU citizens (Decker et al, 2000: 15).

Table 1 above suggests that English is known by 94% of Sweden’s young adults, for example.

This paragraph summarises the argument developed in Van Parijs (2000).

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Europe's Linguistic Challenge


