Final Report

Regulation and Inequalities in European Education Systems

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Abstract

The object of the REGULEDUC research network is to understand and compare the evolution of modes of regulation of education systems in five countries and to grasp some of their effects on the processes producing the social inequalities encountered in (secondary) school within the relevant local school spaces. The countries concerned are Great Britain (England), Belgium (the Francophone Community of Belgium), France, Hungary and Portugal. Six school spaces have been observed within the urban agglomerations of Budapest, Charleroi, Lille, Lisbon, London and Creteil (Paris region). The modes of regulation of the education system are closely linked to the whole range of mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control and balancing of the system. Thus we are dealing with one activity of “governance” of the system (Dale, 1997). But regulation has many sources and does not derive solely from the controlling activity of political or institutional authorities of the system. Autonomous regulations exist as well. (Reynaud, 1989)

The goal of the project is to understand how different modes of regulation (political regulation, market regulation, autonomous regulations by local actors) evolve and combine in six local spaces, and how they affect the schools' logics of action. Indirectly we want to see how these changes can contribute to reconstructing local processes producing inequalities. The goal is to document the way local actors problematize and manage the question of inequalities. The research has been carried out on the macro, meso and micro levels, by combining quantitative and qualitative methodology. Some major results emerge from this analysis.

On a national level, partially convergent policies (the increasing autonomy of schools, the search for a balancing point between centralization/decentralization, the rise in external evaluation, the accent put on “free choice” of school, the will to diversify school offer, the erosion of teacher autonomy) construct, in varying degrees and with different temporal rhythms, variants of a “post-bureaucratic” regulation regime, which seek to go beyond the “bureaucratic-professional model” still dominant today, by accentuating either the traits of an “evaluative State”, or those of the “quasi-market” model.

This post-bureaucratic regime can also be seen on the level of the various “councils”, committees or authorities, located at the intermediate level, playing a regulation role in the local spaces analysed. Besides the fact that these various entities tend to develop and see their autonomy increase, we observe a tendency towards the “multi-regulation” of these spaces (multiplying the public or private organizations or networks participating in regulation) as well as the uneven but increasing use of various tools and forms of post-bureaucratic organization (“matricial” organization, “projects”, tools for evaluation, accompaniment, training, etc). Moreover, new professional figures are appearing, with partially common competencies, careers and attitudes: “proximate staff”, “politicized upper staff”, as well as the “rationalizing expert”.

On the meso level, the analysis of the spaces of interdependences among proximate schools has shown us the increasing impact of “market” in the regulation process of educational systems. Competitive interdependencies affect the logics of action of the schools in all these spaces (especially to capture the student public), whatever the institutional context. Nonetheless, the intensity of competition is variable, due to the setting as well as the demographic evolution, families’ strategies, in addition to the logics of the schools themselves. The logics of action (in the area of recruitment, school offer, the constitution of classes, etc.) appear rather analogous from one local space to another: “offensive/defensive”, “instrumental/expressive” logics, oriented towards the “specialization” or diversification of their offer or their publics. Yet they are differentiated according to the school’s position in the local space and also according to the regime of political regulation or internal dynamics. From the viewpoint of their effects in terms of inequalities, the logics of action observed tend to contribute to stabilizing the hierarchy existing between the schools and encourage a segmentation of publics depending on the school. Public action aimed at limiting inter-school segregation finds itself greatly handicapped by a multi-regulation that in each space provides certain schools or parents with opportunistic strategies.

A better coordination of various independent regulatory authorities, and controlling various more or less competitive “school providers” on an intermediate level is indispensable if public authorities hope to limit and overcome the increasing school segregation among schools.
1 Executive Summary

OBJECTIVES

Education systems across Europe are changing. These changes affect the way systems are being regulated and how responsibility is being shared, as well as those with responsibility over their management. Equality of opportunity remains an important aspect of education policy and changes in the way education systems operate are likely to impact on questions of inequality.

This project compares the development of public regulation of secondary education systems in five European countries (England, Francophone Belgium, France, Hungary and Portugal). It has analysed how these developments affect the local organization of schooling, including the way local actors may contribute to inequality and school segregation. It has also identified regulatory modes for the variable and complex ways that public authorities orient and co-ordinate policy and activities in response to state regulation, market forces and the demands of local communities. The project looks at how public regulations at central, intermediate and local levels interact with other “quasi-market” forms, like external and internal regulation of schools within local education areas.

MAIN RESULTS

Changes in the institutional regulation of school systems

1. In Europe, school systems are constrained by external economic, social and political pressures as well as by internal developments and these are leading to new ways of regulating schools and teaching practices.

2. Although the education systems under analysis are quite different (some are decentralized, others centralized systems, some have administrated enrolment, some have integrated, diversified curriculum…) in the last twenty years, there is evidence that some policy convergences have been emerging. Despite variance in significance between countries, the following convergences can be observed:

   • There is a rise in the autonomy local schools have. Simultaneously, this autonomy is increasingly framed or controlled by specific frameworks (evaluation and baseline models for practice and monitoring of local/school practices).
   • There is a tendency in each country to search for a balance between centralization and decentralization. This is expressed in the existence of trends towards centralization in decentralized countries (in England and Belgium) and trends towards decentralization in centralized countries (in France, Portugal and Hungary).
   In many cases, this goes along with an increase in power or in responsibilities devolving to “intermediate authorities” (public or private) in charge of various areas of responsibility and in the role of regulator within the system at regional or local levels (for ex. departments, municipalities, decentralized bodies of the central state, private associations of education providers, etc).
   • There is a varying rise in the use of external evaluation. Evaluation takes on various forms: evaluation of the system, of the intermediate education authorities, or of local schools (and this evaluation can be external or self-evaluation).
   • Parental choice is being increasingly promoted and legitimized to varying degrees. Usually, this means the promotion/advancement of a “quasi market” system or devices facilitating mechanisms for more open administrative enrolment.
   • There has also been an increase in the use of policies promoting the diversification of provision. At the same time, a common core curriculum is introduced (affecting specific basic subjects or skills, especially those aimed at 11 to 14 year olds).
   • For teachers, there is a loss of professional autonomy, individually and/or collectively.

3. The changes in the modes of regulation highlighted above are influenced by common political or economic developments.

   • A changing economic context (shaped by recent trends in globalization and by the new “postFordist” modes of production/consumption) has been pushing education systems to raise the
average level of competencies, to be more efficient and to adjust education to the "needs of the labour market".

- Political changes (such as the crisis of legitimacy of the Welfare State, the rise in profile of neoliberal ideologies) and the demands for more effectiveness and efficiency in educational expenditure are underway (in line with a relative reduction of financial resources in some countries).
- There is also a process of cultural change favouring an increase in individualism
- Status anxiety about children's professional and social future (especially amongst the middle classes) leads parents to take a more strategic attitude towards schools and schooling. Parents increasingly see themselves as "consumers of school goods". As a result there is social pressure in favour of choice, individualism and diversification of education provision and educational routes.
- The process of globalization and specific international comparisons of school systems are having an increasing influence on local and national policies; this is seen in the diffusion of transnational "modes of governance" (as well as managerial or pedagogical models).

In fact, national policies must be understood as being inspired by specific mixes of "quasi market" and "evaluative State" models of governance. As such, policies leave room either to let market forces regulate schools or to forms of an "evaluative State", which defines central goals and objectives to be followed by schools, gives them the autonomy to find the means of attaining those goals, and evaluates the results, the process, the procedures or practices needed to improve quality or equity in the system).

4. Furthermore, and beyond the above factors leading to convergence, the specificities of each national educational system may also account for the differences and existing divergences of policies. There is a significant "path dependency" effect in the processes of definition and implementation of education policies. For example, some national states put the emphasis on market forces as a form of regulation of schooling more than others (this is more the case in England and Belgium than in France or Portugal).

In terms of policy implementation, there is also a degree of policy "hybridization" taking place within the institutional, symbolic or material realities of the country. This means that there is a mixing of various logics or orientations within one policy, which, in some instances, reveals contradictions. For example, evaluation is very limited in Belgium because the authorities want to avoid reinforcing competition among providers or schools with the publication of results. But on the other hand, freedom of school choice by parents in Belgium is enshrined in the constitution and the logics of the market and competition are in fact already well developed. In France, some trends towards "evaluation by results" are intertwined with more traditional bureaucratic mechanisms and habits.

5. By looking at the local and regional levels (this is the "intermediate level" of our empirical investigation) we were able to determine that the process of school system regulation is being shaped by a growing trend to "multi-regulation". Such a trend is characterized by: -

- regulation which is produced by a growing number of sources (the national State, various regional or local public bodies, parental choice and market mechanisms).
- an increasing variety of tools and devices are being used ("post-bureaucratic" devices, such as evaluation, monitoring, sharing of practices and training, as well as more classic bureaucratic or "pre-bureaucratic" devices (such as a communitarian type of control and exchange).
- the growing strength of these varieties of regulation.

6. However, increasing (multi)regulation does not necessarily bring more order, adjustment or fine tuning. Taking into account contradictions and tensions is important. (Multi)regulation can lead to an increased fragmentation of the institutional environment of each school.

7. Such fragmentation can, in turn, lead to problems related to inequality but it can also produce incoherence, bureaucratic overload, a loss of direction in their intervention and mistrust and resistance from local schools against any kind of regulation concerning their practices.

8. In all five countries, at an intermediate level, regulation is carried out by a wide variety of agents who have different roles and whose statuses range from civil servant to private consultant. These agents tend to interpret their mission independently from the others.
9. Such autonomy or independence does make it easier for agents to adapt to the specificity of the context; this can, indeed, generate incoherence between the different agents who are working at different levels. With the exception of Hungary, there is some evidence of a process of rationalization of the agencies’ work. This is observed in the creation of specific tools, the promotion of reflexivity about their work and competition with other types of agents – which is hoped will lead to greater effectiveness or efficiency, but which does not reach these agencies in all cases.

Local spaces of schooling, regulation and competition.

10. The core of our empirical research focuses on local spaces of schooling within different urban contexts in Budapest, Charleroi, Paris, Lille, Lisbon and London. We specifically investigated the competitive and cooperative relations amongst schools, local authorities’ regulation and core strategies or logics of action of some of the schools located within those spaces.

11. These are all local urban spaces with some residential and socio-economic segregation.

12. The schools we studied are institutionally diverse (we researched public, private, and “mixed” schools).

13. We observed the existence or a significant trend towards the creation of social hierarchies and segregation among the schools relating both to tested academic abilities of the students and to the socio-cultural or socio-economic background of their families in all areas. These two kinds of hierarchies are highly correlated (slightly less in Lisbon). Moreover, the public schools are mostly located in the lower positions of the hierarchical rankings, especially in London, Lille and Charleroi.

14. In each national space, both the formal regulation of some key issues such as the assignment of students among local schools and the actual practices of regulation of each local authority are significantly different. For example, Charleroi (Belgium) is the most liberal context, where a clear choice of schools by parents co-exists with a choice of students by the school. No intermediate or local authority is required to make decisions on assignment. On the other hand, in Paris and Lille, the assignment of students to schools is done by a regional authority and at the same time, (public) schools have to follow strict rules regulating student enrolment. The other local spaces find themselves in intermediate positions: parents can express their preferences for specific schools but it is up to the local authority to accept them or not. In these spaces, schools have strict rules to follow in cases where there is an excess of demand (this is the case in Portugal which is stricter than England or Hungary).

15. However, market forces are present in the various institutional spaces to a lesser extent (Lisbon) or to a greater extent (especially Charleroi and Budapest). Wyeham (London), Paris and Lille find themselves in an intermediate position. “Market forces” in this context refer to a process of interdependence between schools produced by competition, even though these schools are not in direct contact with one another.

16. Not all schools compete with all the other schools; there may be several “clusters of schools in competition” in the same space, but clusters are more or less independent. Institutional or spatial factors can account for this situation.

17. The competition among schools is competition for students (in terms of numbers or quality). Students condition a number of other aspects in schools: funding and teachers, for example. Student characteristics also affect teacher work and teaching conditions, teacher prestige as well as school image. To varying degrees, schools are increasingly taking into account enrolment issues as well as decisions that can influence their intake, such as offer, marketing the school, its external presentation, internal organization and discipline, etc.

18. Competition is more or less intense in the areas investigated (less intense in Lisbon; more intense in Charleroi and Budapest). What is the reason for this? Several factors influence competition between schools:

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1 “Mixed” schools are state funded but governed by private bodies. They have specific rules and a contract to follow, both partly controlled by the State.
• a demographic decline (with a surplus of places);
• “few” “quality” “students” (these are students perceived as without academic or social problems) and on the other hand, the perception of the importance of “problematic students”. These perceptions are related to the actual socio-demographic characteristics of the area but may also be affected by the competition itself;
• the type of strategies of the population (which is more oriented to “quality” issues): In this case parents do not only choose according to criteria of “proximity” or convenience, but as well take into account the existing variety in school offer, the “school mix”, reputation and the school's position in the local hierarchy;
• the “offensive” character of the school's logics of action;
• the inability of local authorities to avoid or reduce competition among schools (in case they wanted to do this and were allowed to do so);
• the stakes for schools relating to students' numbers/characteristics (this is less important in Lisbon because the number of students does not condition funding or the number of teachers).

**Competition, local regulation and schools' logics of action**

19. The strategies and logics of action of individual schools are affected and oriented by their position in the hierarchy and by the competition in the local “market” as well as by the constraints of national regulations or by the pressure exercised by local authorities.

20. Headteachers, in particular, have to find a balance between “external constraints and demands” (deriving from local authorities, parental pressure, and other schools) and “internal” ones (teachers, students, parents and other demands). All these demands are filtered by the ethos, preferences and by consensus or lack of consensus within schools.

21. We identified some types of logics of action following various and partially independent dimensions.

- offensive schools where entrepreneurs try to conquer new market shares vs defensive schools where rentiers want to maintain their positions. This is even clearly observed in schools occupying intermediate and high positions in the local space.
- expressive vs. instrumental schools:
  - *Instrumental schools* are characterized by:
    - greater selection of intake
    - teacher-student relationships which are based on students’ academic identity and teacher authority
    - parents being viewed as “strategic assets”
    - esoteric programs of preparation for higher education and “high ability” students,
    - the marginalization of equity programs
    - extensive use of ability differentiation
    - the principal being seen as a manager
    - This logic of action is more widespread among schools occupying a high position in the local hierarchy.
  - *Expressive schools* are characterized by:
    - the existence of open intake and by programmes aimed at students with special needs
    - teacher-student relationships based on familiar roles and principles of care
    - schools which are seen by some parents as being part of the local community
    - a discourse of equity being central to the school’s philosophy and practice
    - special programmes for educational and behavioural needs
    - minimal use of ability differentiation
    - the principal is seen more as a leading professional
    - This logic of action is more widespread amongst schools occupying lower and intermediate positions in the hierarchy.
- specialization vs diversification: some schools tend to specialize their offer in order to keep their intake or to attract a new public. This may refer to “special needs students for schools in the lower positions or “high ability” students in higher positions in the hierarchy. Diversification relates to schools who try to attract from all sections of the public by offering a greater variety of different
programs and routes. This process may coexist with the creation of internal hierarchies of courses and segregation. This logic is more frequent in intermediate positions.

Some schools fit the types better than do others and there are of course some “hybrid” schools combining different logics.

22. These logics of action are mainly geared to preserving specific interests, to balancing specific situations within the school or to improving its specific position in the local hierarchy. On a more collective level, and taking “the common good” into account, if they can address their constraints and problems, their logics of action may at the same time contribute to the production of some unexpected or undesired results.

23. In general – and there are exceptions – these logics of action tend to favour or reinforce school hierarchies. This is the case with the logic of specialization either in “high abilities” students or “special needs” students. Moreover, offensive strategies tend to reinforce the logic of competition.

24. Principal and staff alike view some school policies and actions as being primarily or at least partly related to questions of attractiveness and positions in the hierarchy, whether they are related to the process of establishing a reputation for academic excellence, to working with students with ‘special educational needs’ or to keeping an internal variety within the school. In the two latter types of schools, issues of equity are clearly at the forefront of school actors’ concerns. But this is not the case with the former type of school, habitually resulting in a systematic neglect of issues of inequality. This means that inequality issues are increasingly only “concentrated” in certain kinds of schools.

25. Schools accommodate to, and engage with, their ‘market’ either as ‘local’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ institutions. This means having a primary relationship to a local community and its ‘needs’ or trying to attract and select a particular kind of parent and student from a wider geographical area.

26. Particularly those schools that are ‘attractive’ to middle class parents practice ‘market complicity’ with support given to and influence used to support internal policies that are ‘class friendly’. Concomitantly, in ‘schools of choice’ – cosmopolitan schools – parents also have more internal influence and ‘contribute’ more to the schools.

27. In these ways, there is a clear and apparent relationship between market dynamics and social inequality characterized by: 1. Maintaining or developing social segregation. 2. reinforcing institutional differences in student experience and opportunity. 3. the resources available for student activities and student support.

Role and limits of local authorities’ intervention concerning market effects on segregation and inequalities

28. The action and the political will of local authorities to regulate school strategies or parental strategies (in order to avoid the unexpected or undesired consequences of a trend toward increasing segregation of students among area schools) are quite different for the following, diverse reasons

- national regulations are either in favour or not in favour of choice and of markets and allow or do not allow local authorities to control schools or parents
- political choices and professional ethics of public agents who either accept or do not accept the “market” as being a “normal” development and school choice as being legitimate or not being legitimate
- difficulties in being efficient in their purpose.

29. The difficulty (or inability) of public (regional or local) authorities in regulating the “market” can be due to two main general factors:

- the institutional borders of the regulation authority do not fit the actual flows and mobility of students among schools (for ex. some students go to school in another borough or municipality, etc; or some students are moving between public and private schools)
- in these spaces regulations come from different authorities who do not act in coordination (between the authorities in charge of private and public schools, state schools, department schools, municipal schools, etc). As a result, the various regulators are unable to avoid competition among the schools run by the different institutional providers.
30. Consequently, some regulators (public local authorities or private authorities) may be led to defend “their schools” against schools of another district or provider. This is reinforcing competition. For example, some co-operation may be encouraged by local authorities, in order to promote their schools: through common advertising of Catholic schools in Charleroi to collectively promoting their sector ; through collaboration between public schools in Paris/Lille in order to improve their relative attractiveness in relation to private schools ; through collaboration between all community schools of Wyeham (London) to diminish the number of students leaving for other boroughs, etc.

31. Co-operation amongst schools may thus be indirectly related to the competitive situation

32. On the other hand, where all schools in one local space are regulated by one authority, regulatory actions seem to be more effective (as is the case in Lisbon).

33. There are also schools able to avoid the control of local or regional authorities, particularly when the latter are pro-active against the creation of social hierarchization of schools. For example, in France, since 1995, the State and the intermediate regulatory bodies (with some exceptions) have been working to promote stronger control over school curriculum and recruitment, in order to limit social and academic segregation. Nevertheless, regional authorities may have some difficulty in applying their will. In France, State schools which are market active are so by using ‘illegitimate autonomies’ which sometimes bring them into conflict with intermediate authorities. This is particularly the case of schools seeking to attract the middle class. They are to a great extent able to assert these ‘illegitimate autonomies’ by virtue of the influence or status of their ‘clients’. Schools and their middle class parents act together to subvert the constraints of regulation.

34. In fact, the local (or intermediate) level of public action and regulation in each country not only involves “technical”, “administrative” or “managerial” decisions. Their actions and decisions are also political in essence. This level of regulation has to be considered as being increasingly strategic, particularly when dealing with inequality issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is important to carefully consider the local context when considering these recommendations, as solutions adopted in different countries do not necessarily have the same effect.

2. The fact that “market forces” and competition are present in any area investigated should not lead us to any “sociological fatalism” concerning the issue of market regulation, insofar as market forces tend to maintain or develop the dynamics of social segregation of students among schools, beyond favouring individual inequalities.

3. If we accept (and this is a political decision) that one of the main political roles of the “intermediate bodies” is to prevent spontaneous “market dynamics” leading to more social segregation and inequalities (as is the case in France, but less in other countries), we should empower local and intermediate authorities in order to give them the real means for their potential role.

4. This mostly means generalizing and harmonizing the rules and regulations applying to all schools in an area, concerning key issues such as “recruitment”, “school offer” and “exclusion”.
   - Currently, the presence of schools with practices which are different from these points of view are partly favoured by the presence of autonomous school providers with different rules (public and private, as well as various public providers).
   - In the present situation, those variations are indeed used by families, especially middle class families, to ensure their children have access to some good (or less bad) schooling conditions, but this induces “undesired group consequences” such as more competition amongst schools, and especially a trend to segregation amongst them.
   - At the same time, fragmentation and “multi” regulation are one of the most important limits to the effectiveness of one single public regulation authority. It is therefore strategically important not to get rid of all institutional variety amongst schools and school provision (the old goal of a “unified comprehensive school” seems to us not to be politically feasible and maybe undesirable), but instead to promote strong co-ordination and harmonization of the rules between the various school providers and regulators. This could lower “opportunistic” behaviours by certain individual
schools who dispose of undesirable students (for academic or behavioural reasons) and who transfer their education load to other schools or to other providers.

- Such strategy can only be conceived while taking into account national and regional specificities. The forms this harmonization and standardization are to take should be left to national or regional policy makers. They may range from the way the State regulates to the way consensus amongst the principal group actors concerned is achieved. This may perhaps require important legislative changes.
- This, first of all, requires that a consensus exist about the following goal: less segregation and more equality. (However, this does not mean that effectiveness should be abandoned as a complementary goal). We are well aware that this may be the central issue which may be evaluated in very different ways from one country to another.

5. Empowering intermediate bodies means maintaining/developing “intermediate bodies” with a large enough scope to enable them to “cover” for the actual flows of students among schools.

6. Among others things, this also means developing (or maintaining) regional observatories of market effects and the consequences markets have on schools and families. The activity of these observatories can then become a tool for regional or local authorities, as well as for national authorities, which can help them redefine academic sectors when they judge it useful. This can also supply objective data useful for the co-operation or negotiation processes amongst different school providers.

7. In short, present policies, mostly oriented towards devolution of more autonomy to individual schools should be counterbalanced in a compulsory way by policy empowering local and/or regional authorities who can regulate all the schools they are responsible for. Along with this, a harmonization of the rules of all providers or regulators in an area is needed.

8. There is thus need for greater dialogue, communication and coherence between political actors on all levels and, particularly, need to support the participation of intermediate agents. They play a vital role in the information flow between policy makers and practitioners as well as in legitimizing political decisions and actions.

9. On the level of schools and their teaching teams, an effort should be made to educate and accompany them, with a view to making them aware of the wider repercussions of what they do. This is particularly true for the “privileged” schools which are often characterized by:

- A weak knowledge of teaching conditions in the schools less well situated in the school hierarchy
- A tendency to gloss over inequalities. By their actions they tend to externalize part of the problems of schooling more difficult youths, which seems perfectly normal to them whereas it presupposes that other schools take charge of them.
- A tendency to absolve themselves of responsibility vis-à-vis inequality problems met with at school: usually responsibilities are referred back to families or attributed to a lack of means.

10. Training and accompanying educational teams should moreover be oriented towards the struggle against their school’s “internal segregation”.

11. Financial incentives to the social diversity of the populations of schools can also be set up. Experiences in this sense are ongoing in Belgium or Hungary. Thus in the FCB, financing the functioning of schools in the years to come is going to be partially determined in terms of the students’ socio-economic characteristics, according to a principle called “positive differentiation”.

12. However, it is also important to remember that school systems are embedded in societies. The current trends observed at the root of the process of increasing segregation and inequalities in schools are also related to general developments in our societies, especially in the labour market or the residential market. Therefore, action against inequalities should not be limited to the school system alone. Social policies against socio-economic inequalities and urban policies against excessive residential segregation should be conducted complementarily ..
2 Background and objectives of the project

The object of the REGULEDUC research network is to understand and compare evolutions in modes of regulation of educational systems in five countries and grasp some of their effects on the process of producing the social inequalities encountered in schools within relevant local spaces. The countries concerned are Great Britain (England), Belgium (the Francophone Community of Belgium), France, Hungary and Portugal. Six school spaces were observed within the urban agglomerations of Budapest, Charleroi, Lille, Lisbon, London and Paris.

The education system's modes of regulation are closely linked to the whole range of mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control and balancing of the system. Thus we are dealing with one of the activities involved in the governance of a system (Dale, 1997). But in a wider sense the notion can also be understood as all the processes, actions and institutional forms contributing to guiding the conduct of actors and defining the “rules of the game” within a sphere of social activity. In this sense, regulation has many sources and does not just derive from the institutional activity of controlling political or institutional authorities in the system.

Hence the goal of the project is to understand how different modes of regulation combine with one another in the local spaces observed, how they evolve under the influence of national education policy as well as in relation to local or global social evolutions, and how these changes affect the functioning and logics of action of schools situated in these spaces. Indirectly, it is a matter too of seeing how these changes can also contribute to recombining the local processes of production and reproduction of inequalities. The aim here is less one of proffering a definitive diagnosis on the objective effects of these new processes of regulation on quantitative indices measuring the inequality of opportunities or inter-school segregation than of documenting how they contribute to redefining the way in which local actors (in schools, in local regulatory organizations) problematize, construct and manage the question of inequalities.

1- Objectives and hypotheses at the outset

For some fifteen years now we have observed that the older modes of regulation in many national systems have been undergoing pressure for change. Thus, we can put forth the hypothesis of a relatively convergent evolution of some of the education policies in these countries, insofar as they tend to affect the expression of modes of regulation of the systems concerned. This convergent evolution is related to the decentralization/deconcentration of decision making in the area of pedagogical orientation and/or financial and human resource management. It reveals itself in two complementary ways:

- Accentuation of the autonomy of local actors/entities in management, coordination and steering regarding certain responsibilities (educational or managerial). The entities or actors who benefit from this increasing autonomy may be situated on the school level but this is not always so: one might cite the case of the academies in France. The “local” then appears in various configurations depending on societal contexts;
- The introduction of new methods and tools for control and supervision of local units or territories who thus see their power and autonomy reinforced. Many means exist: (a) the development of statistical tools, the practice of evaluations aimed at school performance, the development of a normative context seeking “obligatory results” (Neave, 1988; Broadfoot, 1996); (b) the development of “incentive contracts” as a type of relationship between schools and their guardianships (Demailly et alii, 1998); (c) the introduction (or maintenance) of user choice mechanisms and setting up competition between schools in relation to users (Vandenberge, 1999; Woods, Bagley, Glatter R.1997) (d) the development of the supervision of schools (counselling, formative evaluation, sponsoring, ad hoc continuing education, etc.) (Delvaux et alii, 1997; Demailly L. 2001); (e) accentuating user control of schools (for example, by setting up participatory bodies for the various actors making up the school).

These tools and methods, all rather broadly analysed on the level of discussion, in reality develop in various ways depending on the country, and combine differently according to societal contexts. Hence the
central goal of the research has been to grasp how these modifications or changes in regulatory modes are, or are not, bearers of transformations in the practice of local actors (teachers, school directors and front line management) and contribute to renewing and rearranging the processes that reproduce inequalities. We submit the hypothesis that the transformations of modes of control or regulation of local entities affect the relationships between schools, the nature of functioning of schools, the characteristics and conduct of actors within schools - notably the professionalites, the practices and ethics of various professional groups (notably, directors and teachers), and their relationships with parents. We became convinced that these modifications affect the way these actors locally problematize and manage the question of inequalities. Thus, the introduction of an educational quasi-market or supervising the functioning of an existent quasi-market may considerably affect how the actors position themselves within a school, in relation to the inequality question, for example as soon as we take up questions of recruitment or option availability. The problem posed by these evolutions is in fact that the decentralization/deconcentration processes mentioned risk precipitating an accentuation of differentiation, which can very rapidly end up increasing hierarchization between the schools.

The general goal of the comparative research then has been to grasp how the evolutions mentioned (devolution of increasing responsibilities toward local entities and a concomitant evolution of modes of regulation and control) contribute to rearranging the local processes producing and reproducing inequalities.

2- Project stages and components

Hence the project has opened up numerous research objectives situated on three levels of analysis.

A. the macro level: an analysis of the global tendencies of systems and their modes of regulation.

Here the goal has been to compare the evolutions of institutional arrangements which contribute to orienting, coordinating and controlling action in every educational system. This work has sought to show the national specificities and convergent tendencies that have been at work over the two last decades in school systems that were initially sharply contrastive (WP 2 and 3). On the statistical level, the work has also seen to establishing a comparative inventory of academic inequalities and hierarchies between the various countries or regions studied, on the basis of the PISA international survey (WP 4)

B. the meso level: an analysis of the implementation of new modes of regulation in “relevant local spaces”.

The work then consists in comparatively analysing the setting up and ongoing effects of these modes of regulation within the local spaces pertinent to each national entity. The study has first dealt with local spaces composed of schools in interdependence and close interaction. (WP 5 and 6). It has also studied the regulatory authorities situated on an intermediate level (as for ex. territorial public authorities or consultative bodies situated between the Central State and schools) whose role is to contribute to regulating the local dynamics of actors (within or between schools). (WP 7 and 8). These authorities are competent to intervene in the schools so far studied. Two complementary entry points are explained here:

- Statistical and qualitative analysis, within each country, of a local space in competition and interaction among neighbouring schools: analysis of their structure and the positions of schools in that space; impacts on the logics of action of school heads as well as the effects on differentiation, hierarchization and segregation among schools (WP 5, 6).
- Qualitative analysis of authorities and intermediate regulatory initiatives explicitly intended to regulate schools or their actors on various objects (school offer, student assignments, internal functioning, teachers’ pedagogical work). We have proceeded to a comparison of the authorities involved (juridical nature, competencies, means of action) and to an observation of their logics of action and their tendential effects. This analysis has also involved the study of their agents, notably those in charge of the evolution of teacher professionality and group work within those schools (pedagogical companions or interveners, inspectors/auditors of schools, …). (WP 7, 8)

C. the micro level: case studies of schools within the same local spaces

Finally we analysed the internal logics of some schools in the local spaces mentioned (those that are “attractive” and well-positioned in the local hierarchy vs. “unattractive” ones). The analysis deals with the effects of new modes of regulation on the practice and professional ethos of teachers, on the logics of
action of the school, especially when relating to issues of equity and equality (WP 9, 10). These components of the project are summarized in the following graph (graph 1):
Graph 1: project components « Changes in the regulation modes of European education systems and production of school inequalities: an international comparison ».

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro Level</th>
<th>Micro Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP2- Analysis of the institutional contexts and autonomy of local actors: analysis by country.</td>
<td>WP9- Actor logics and modes of group action in schools facing inequalities: approach by country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP3- Comparative analysis of national monographs.</td>
<td>WP10- schools: transversal approach.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP4- Degree of differentiation of student achievement by school: an international statistical approach.</td>
<td>WP12- Synthesis: final report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP5- Interdependent local spaces between schools: a statistical and qualitative approach by country.</td>
<td>WP7- Intermediate regulatory authorities and supervisory agents: analysis by country.</td>
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<td>WP6- Interdependent local spaces: transversal analysis.</td>
<td>WP8- Intermediate regulatory entities and supervisory agents: transversal analysis.</td>
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3 Theoretical framework and main concepts

Our central problem and empirical research strategy is anchored in a theoretical framework based on many key notions, which are specified throughout the project. Thus we shall successively present notions of regulation and modes of regulation, central, intermediate and local regulations, interdependent spaces and logics of actions of schools. We shall also pinpoint the meanings we give to the notions of inequality, hierarchy and school segregation, all of which constitute the social stakes giving the research meaning. These concepts form the central conceptual reference points of our research.

1- Notions of regulation and modes of regulation

In all social fields, regulation is a complex process of producing “game rules” and guiding the conduct of actors who come from many intermingled sources (Maroy and Dupriez, 2000).

Regulation is first political or institutional in the restricted sense of the term. Regulation in the educational system refers then to “modes of orientation, coordination, and control of educational systems” (Dutercq and van Zanten, 2001). Various institutional arrangements, inherited from history, defined, promoted or authorized by the State (such as the rules and laws enacted by different levels of public authority, the discretionary power devolving to local authorities or to the hierarchies of schools, measures for consultation, coordination or control, such as the (quasi-) market, evaluation, etc) contribute to coordinating and guiding action in the educational system through the distribution of resources and constraints affecting local actors’ contexts of action. The institutional aspect aimed at here then is understood in the narrow sense of formal and statutory measures, in general promoted by the State.

These institutional arrangements form an important dimension of school regulation, but of course other sources and regulatory processes coexist with them. The game rules are built simultaneously from “the bottom up” in the very construction of the organized action. They are constructed ‘in situ’ by the actors to solve problems of coordination and orientation in those systems of organized action. Thus they derive as much from “autonomous regulations” as from “control regulation”, meaning that emanating from political or organizational authorities (Reynaud, 1989). In fact, “those to whom these rules should be applied, even though they are not the authors, may more or less goodheartedly follow them. But it may also happen that they endeavour to do so if only to protect themselves from having to make their own rules.” (Reynaud, 1993, p XVIII). This is what Reynaud calls autonomous regulation, the regulatory activity of “executants” in organizations. This may range from simple “resistance” to the autonomous definition of working rules, which will be that much stronger in that the actors (often salaried workers) may have a high degree of competence and professional autonomy at their disposal. The various sources of regulation do not necessarily meet in a system of organized action ; it may in fact simply share the same field, a compromise of coexistence or, on the contrary, conflict and negotiation to define the rules of the game. Regulation thus becomes “joint” if this procedure is institutionalized. Thus the regulation process puts in play local processes of negotiation and definition of game rules which have been developed in courses of action, beyond institutional arrangements set up by public or organizational authorities to supervise local practice.

To these institutional and organizational regulations we should add “normative” regulation (Demailly, 2001). In fact, local actions are also oriented by cognitive and normative models, historically situated and constructed, produced and diffused by various channels (universities, study centres, administrations, etc) and crystallized into the political rhetoric of the education field. These models amount to resources and constraints on actors’ action, whether they be basic deciders or executants. Thus for example, depending on the model of governance favoured, the basic values and norms promoted vary: whereas bureaucratic models are founded on the valorization of law, rules and reason, post-bureaucratic models privilege instrumental rationality, valorizing efficacy and efficiency.

3 Thus the term is not intended in the large sense, derived from Durkheimian sociology, where an institution refers to all forms of norm, formal or not, liable to exercise constraint on individuals, a norm capable of being more or less interiorized. We limit ourselves here to one of the three dimensions of institutions identified by R. Scott: institutions can be understood both as formal norms and rules, cognitive schemes, and normative orientations. (Scott, 1995). We take up these last two dimensions in discussing normative regulation.
Thus regulation is a multiple process by its sources, its mechanisms, its objects, as well as by the multiplicity of actors constructing it (on transnational, national and local levels). In fact, regulation is always multi-regulation (Barroso, 2004), complex, sometimes conflictual, and potentially contradictory. So our approach to regulation is not functionalist; regulations do not necessarily produce order and adjustment in facing problems and dysfunctions in a system. Multi-regulation can also generate disorder and contradictions. To successfully grasp the specificity of our approach we need to situate it briefly in relation to various approaches and classical meanings generally associated with notions of regulation.

2 Approaches and acceptations of the notion of regulation

Many meanings are connoted by the term regulation, depending on the contexts and theoretical approaches it is used in. Here we distinguish the approaches as they give the term a functionalist or institutional sense. For our part, we shall try and align ourselves with a “post-functionalist” and constructivist approach to regulation.

**Regulation in a functionalist and cybernetic sense**

In this approach, regulation refers to retroaction mechanisms, to control and exchange processes by which a system (biological, social or mechanical) tends to remain in dynamic equilibrium, guided by a baseline objective (for ex. survival of the species). In sociology (Luhmann 1984; Parsons, 1951), in economy or in education sciences, these exact senses of notions of system and regulation have often been employed, as well as criticized for various reasons (see Canguilhem, 1990; Chazel, 1974, Habermas, 1987). As concerns regulating the educational system, we can therefore only talk about a “system” in the current sense of the term (a totality of interdependent elements). Such an understanding of the notion of system does not imply the existence of a general regulatory mechanism assuring the system's equilibrium in taking its environment into account. Quite the contrary, based on the results of the sociology of organizations, we can advance the hypothesis that the school system forms a “composite arrangement” (Friedberg, 1993; Derouet, 2000; Maroy and Dupriez, 2000) which requires the “combination” of numerous actors and actions, on different levels, like a number of other social entities or organizations. More fundamentally, the conflictual aspects, the contradictions, the “dysfunctions” form an integral part of this system's functioning, whose goals in fact also involve potentially conflictual social choices. Briefly, the “cybernetic” use of the concept participates in a “consensualist” and functionalist sociology which poses a double problem: 1# a tendency to evacuate conflict and contradiction, 2# a systemic approach, which tends to finesse the role and problematical aspect of social action.

Yet this approach does underline a dimension of the notion of regulation often taken up by other approaches: regulation participates in a process of adjustment and correction of imbalances one seeks to reduce or correct, with more or less success.

**Institutional regulation**

In this sense, regulation refers to institutional arrangements and mechanisms of control and supervision of actions promoted by a politically recognized authority. This regulation has classically been exercised by the law (and other statutes) or hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations set up. Yet, more recently, new institutional forms of coordination and control have been used by political authorities, such as, for example, incitement to consultation and partnership, encouraging “good practice”, contractualization and evaluation.

The sociological or politological analysis of institutional regulation is, for that matter, first centred on formal regulations of a juridical and bureaucratic type being implemented by the State or major bureaucratic organizations. Yet the sociology of organizations (Crozier, 1963) and professional relations (Reynaud, 1989; 1999) have rather rapidly shown that far from being self-sufficient, such formal regulations are counterbalanced by an autonomous regulation. Formal arrangements of a juridical and statutory type simultaneously make appeal to many informal and official accords, usually necessary for the very efficiency of the formal plan and notably for their adaptation to local particularities. Hence regulation is seen to be produced by many sources; control regulation makes appeal to autonomous regulation, and throughout the entire process is intrinsically “conflictual” and unstable.
Institutional regulation has also been the object of further contemporary study carried out by economists as well political scientists in questioning transformations in modes of State intervention and public action in the last twenty years (Commaille and Jobert, 1998; Duran, 1999). A ‘politistic’ reflection has developed on the theme of “governance”. Although this literature (at once descriptive and normative) is already rather vast and diverse, the hardcore of this theory is that, under the impact of various factors (globalization and individualization of the society), “welfare” States are undergoing crises of rationality and legitimacy. The mode or style of classical “government” is said to be in the process (or should be) of making room for new mechanisms of “governance”. This last privileges “governmental mechanisms with no need of the authority and sanctioning of public power for functioning.” (Stoker, 1998). In fact, “the concept of governance refers to the creation of a structure or order which cannot be imposed from outside, but results from the interaction of a great number of governors who influence one another reciprocally” Kooiman and Van Vliet, 1993, p 64, cited by Stoker, 1998

Five aspects characterizing governance according to Stoker:

- Governance causes the intervention of a set of institutions and actors who do not all belong to the government sphere
- In governance situations, the boundaries and responsibilities are less clear in the domain of social and economic action
- Governance reveals an interdependence between the powers of institutions associated with the collective action
- Governance causes the intervention of networks of autonomous actors
- Governance begins with the principle that it is possible to act without calling on the power or authority of the State. The State’s role is to use new techniques and tools for orienting and guiding collective action (Stoker, 1998, p 20-21)

In a logic of governance, the State should hence become a “regulator” (Majone, 1996), and make more room for other actors than public authorities and other forms of coordination than the law or hierarchy for ensuring collective functions. According to this theory, as Merrien describes it, “good governance is where the State retreats, loses its power, becomes modest and works in networks with private interests and groups, in the capacity of partner no better than others. […] In some ways we move from a governmental process “from top to bottom” to an interactionist process” (Merrien, 1998:62-63).

In the context of this passage from a logic of government to a logic of governance (a context of real as well as theoretical and ideological evolution), some forms of coordination and regulation efficiently promoted by the State have had a tendency to evolve: development of recourse to “citizen forums” for debate and consultation, promotion of new institutional arrangements appealing to notions of “network”, “partnership” and horizontal “consultation”, as well as contractualization, evaluation, and market privatization.

Alongside the politological approach, in the economics line, numerous works (attached to various currents, such as institutional economy, the economy of organizations, the “new public management”; for a presentation in French, see Le Galès, 1998) have studied the comparative merits of these various forms of coordination and “governance” (market, semi-market, hierarchy/bureaucracy, State, as well as networks or “heterarchy”) out of concern to determine their respective efficiencies for contributing to carrying out collective functions. This line has also been pursued along a less normative route in the context of the current of the New Political Economy in terms of history and comparing institutions coordinating capitalism (Campbell, Hollingsworth and Linberg 1991; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).

Towards nonfunctionalist theories of regulation

Two types of theories, which have developed in the francophone universe in the two last decades, go beyond the functionalist conception of regulation in their endeavour to express the notions of regulation and conflict. These two theories are nonetheless quite distinct due to their global conception of the systemic and social integration of the society, and by the different places they allot to action and actors.

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4 If in Anglo-Saxon literature, the term governance has long been (and sometimes still is) used interchangeably with that of government, it is less and less the case since the early 90s. The term has a more specific sense in francophone literature on governance, see notably: Le Galès, 1998 ; Stoker, 1998 ; Jessop, 2003 ; Merrien, 1998.
the theory of regulation has essentially been developed by economists (Boyer, 1986; Boyer and Saillard, 1995). Of Marxist inspiration, this approach has sought to understand the dynamics of accumulation and crisis in capitalism by showing how social struggle and social relationships may pave the way to the construction of various institutions which will give a particular and historically situated form to the salariable relationship in capitalist society (for ex. the Fordist relationship). These institutional forms will contribute to regulating the dynamics of capitalistic accumulation and the structural contradictions characterizing it. In this approach, regulation is envisaged above all from a systemic and macro-social angle with an insistence on the regulatory role of labour market institutions. The analysis bears more on systemic integration than on social integration, to employ the distinction proposed by Dubet and Martucelli (Dubet and Martucelli, 1996). Thus the theory makes room for group actors (for ex. unions/employers/State) and their conflicts but run up against limits in taking micro-social action into account.

the theory of Social Regulation has been developed by sociologists (Reynaud, 1989; 1999; de Terssac, 2003) based on the advancements of the sociology of organizations, labour and professional relations. The approach taken here begins with the actors and dynamics permanently constructing “the rules of the game”, on all levels of social action: local, intermediate, national and transnational. The integration of all these “regulations” is not supposed a priori, but is in fact the object of negotiations, tensions and sometimes the development of “super rules”. The combination of all this is not thought in terms of the macro-social systemic dynamics of capitalism (the viewpoint of the Marxist theory of regulation, centred on the dialectic between the accumulation regime and the forms of regulation by various social institutions), nor in terms of normative regulation by a central corpus of values and institutions (the functionalist viewpoint). Integration of this whole is always dynamic, incomplete and conflictual. Hence regulation is an unfinished, plural process, essentially resulting from negotiating work between actors (situated on different levels). For that matter, these actors can construct themselves in the very process of regulation. Regulation here is then first an action and not a property of a system.

Despite their differences, these regulation theories share their opposition to a relatively “voluntarist” and “institutional” conception of regulation, exclusively centred on the institutional actions of an actor or central leader, like the State. Unlike the functionalist approach, they also seek to assimilate contradictions and social conflicts, the dynamics of social action and actors (although to very different degrees) in the theorization of processes constructing an integration and stabilization of the social order.

Our approach to regulation follows this third path, placing the accent on a constructivist perspective. Thus we are greatly influenced by J. D. Reynaud's social regulation theory (for example, in accepting the notions of control, autonomous and joint regulation). But finally this theory provides little conceptualization of the new roles and new modes of State intervention and, in this regard, we think that some of the descriptive tools of a governance theory deriving from the New Political economy may be useful. Following Jessop (1995), Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), we can thus distinguish in a typical, ideal way four (or five) key forms of regulation and coordination: State, hierarchy, market, community and network (Dupriez and Maroy, 2003). Along similar lines, Barroso also opposes bureaucratic regulation, regulation by the market and community regulation (Barroso, 2000).

In short, we shall endeavour to combine many approaches, without claiming to propose a synthesis transcending them. It seems methodologically fruitful to us to proceed using a plural and crossed approach to the regulation process (Maroy and Dupriez, 2000). A theoretical and methodological distinction should thus be made between a descriptive and morphological approach to institutional arrangements set up by the State and public powers (using the ideal-typical conceptual distinctions of institutionalist economists such as market regulation, hierarchical regulation, etc.) and a “strategic”, “active” approach to regulations in action (inspired by Reynaud's theory of social regulation). The first underlines the fact that, depending on the country, regions and periods, the forms mobilized to supervise contexts of action and conduct may be very different. The second insists on the fact that highlighting these forms in no way exhausts the intelligibility of the active processes of regulation and that, in each of these forms, or their inter-relationships, it is a question of making sense out of the construction processes situated in the game rules in force, at play in the interstices or joints between these different forms of regulation.

In particular, concerning State developed institutional regulation (by juridical rule or hierarchical coordination), we hasten to agree with Reynaud that control regulations are always counterbalanced by
autonomous regulations originating in various actors. Concerning coordination by network or the market, it is also evident that the strategies and logics of action of actors should be taken into account to explain and understand the resultants of these co-ordinations in terms of individual behaviours or group results. In other words, we ought not think a priori that these forms of coordination tend towards collective optimums, which would dispense us from analysing the “real market” (lived market; Lauder et alii, 1999) beyond ideal types. In fact, in concrete contexts of action, we may find multiple sources, limits and contradictions (“failures”) in these forms of coordination (Jessop, 1995).

The concrete actors, individual or group, who are the sources and actors in these ongoing regulations, may be varied: agents of the Central State, agents of subordinated public powers, users (parents), school heads, varied teaching professionals, various “stakeholders” representing one another, or other sectors of the society.

For that matter, an approach to regulations “in action” is what has justified our attention to local school spaces and transcending an exclusively institutional and morphological approach to transformations of school system regulations.

3- Complementary precision and conceptual tools

Beyond the general approach to regulation proposed, our common research also relies on many key constitutive notions of the conceptual culture shared by the Reguleduc network. This is the case of some notions already used, such as “intermediate regulations”, “local spaces of interdependencies”, “logics of action”, or, further, notions of educational inequalities, hierarchization or segregation of schools. We shall explain in more detail.

**Central, intermediate and local regulations**

Political or autonomous regulation can develop on different grades and levels of analysis. Without concentrating on transnational regulation here (see Barroso, 2004, van Zanten, 2004) we can already distinguish central, intermediate and local regulation. The first has already been broadly mentioned relating to institutional regulations. This has to do with the way “public authorities (i.e., the State and its administration) exercise coordination, control and influence on the educational system, guiding the context of action of social actors and their results by norms, injunctions and constraints” (Barroso, 2004, p 92).

Intermediate regulations develop between central public authorities and schools. They emanate from public steering authorities and/or networks of actors (public and/or private) who want to influence the conduct of actors in schools (directors or teachers). Their regulatory actions may bear on various objects: school offer, assignment of students or professors among schools in the same territory, the functioning of each school or, further, teachers’ work. These actions can be understood as control regulations carrying out interpretations and transfers between central regulations and schools. They can also be considered as autonomous regulations and hence, occasionally, as interfaces of “joint” regulations with professional organizations, for example. Intermediate regulations are often profoundly affected by the political modifications of modes of the institutional regulation already mentioned; hence they more and more form a “fragmented multi-regulation”, which sociologists of public action today describe in terms of coordination, governance, mediation, partnership, community action and networks. These intermediate regulations variously correspond to intermediate “territories” between national space and the school’s space. Just the same, the mediation of central regulation does not always or exclusively imply this territorial base. Private educational authorities or networks can also participate in intermediate regulation in certain national contexts. The description ‘intermediate’ should not then be exclusively understood in the “spatial” or territorial sense of the term.

Finally local regulations develop inside schools or other organizations constitutive of educational systems, regardless of the level their action takes place on. These are internal processes by which the organization’s internal game rules are defined. The rules of the game may vary considerably from one school to another and even more so when the local becomes more strategic in the systems; the local’s

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5 This central regulation was taken up in wp 2 and 3 (see Ch 3 section 2 of that report).
6 Regulatory actions organized on the intermediate level were analysed in the context of WP 7 and 8 (see Ch 3 sect.2)
game rules may be influenced by (substantial or procedural) control regulations emanating from central or intermediate authorities. They can be further influenced by the immediate (social, political, school) environment or by market regulations and competitive relations and interdependencies between schools, but they are also produced locally. The game rules on this level refer to standard ways problems of co-operation between actors and, more broadly speaking, the problems the school organizations face, are resolved. They refer to the stakes and problems entailed in collective action, described as such by the actors, and to “types of collective action” introduced to deal with those problems. (Dupriez and Maroy, 1999)

Local spaces of interdependencies

An important part of our work (WP5 and WP 6) deals with local interdependent spaces between schools situated in geographically proximate spaces. The empirical contours of these spaces have varied from one national context to another, but they were chosen and demarcated in such a way that the schools composing them maintain relations of interdependence between one another.

What do we mean by interdependence? This concept refers to the fact that the functioning of a school is dependent (to a greater or lesser extent) on what the neighbouring schools do and amount to (it being understood that distance is not an objective variable but depends on perceptions and practice in the space depending on local and national contexts). In other words, diverse phenomena (notably in terms of regulatory systems) act in such a way that a school is affected in its internal functioning by the other schools and that in return its internal functioning affects the other schools. By internal functioning, we also designate as much class organization, remedial programmes, disciplinary policy and even pedagogy, as well as still other elements all pertaining to the field of the school's autonomy.

The sources of these interdependencies between schools are of two types:

- on the one hand, phenomena of “competition” between schools which are established regarding processes distributing various elements that are important resources for the survival, functioning or development of these schools (students, teachers, financial means, teaching offer or reputation). We may refer to interdependencies of competition or to competitive interdependencies. These interdependencies may come into being independently of any effective interaction between them.
- on the other hand, exchange phenomena (formal or informal) linked to various forms of co-operation between those schools (ranging from exchange of information and services to development of joint projects). In those cases, the interdependencies are associated with effective interactions, with networks and individuals linking members of various schools by which perceptions, opinions and practices are diffused from one school to another.

The interdependent spaces analysed may thus be variously structured by competition or co-operation, and this happens regardless of the institutional context (the regulatory system) or socio-demographical contexts they fit into. For that matter, and we shall return to this, these two types of interdependencies can interact (for example, when a collaboration pact unites two schools in different positions in a space). “Cooperative interdependencies” can for that matter arise from their autonomous initiative, like injunctions or instigations declared by guardianship authorities. Finally, all schools are not necessarily in interdependent relationships between one another in the same space. They may moreover be interdependent with other spaces and other schools.

Schools’ logics of action

The logics of action of schools and their actors were analysed in WPs 5 and 9. The scientific challenge is to grasp how the logics of schools are influenced by present regulatory systems in each local space studied (market regulation, institutional regulation done by local, intermediate and central authorities, as well as internal, school self-regulation). We also need to grasp the differences and similarities of these logics of action depending on various factors and different local spaces.

7 These local regulations were studied in the context of wp 9 and 10 (see Ch 3 section 4).
8 These local spaces of interdependence will be taken up in chapter 3, section 3.
Hence the notion of logics of action should be specified, notably to distinguish it from that of strategy. In a generic way, an actor’s logic of action (an individual or group) designates the dominant orientations which emerge ex post facto from observation of the practice of this actor in a given domain of action (for ex. work, sociability, or emotional relations, etc), as they have been understood either by observation or by various accounts of his actions rendered (by the actor himself or other informers). The term of logic does “not refer here to an explicit reasoning structuring speech, but rather to an implicit coherence in a series of practices contributing to carrying out a certain orientation” (Remy, Voyé and Servais, 1978, p 93).

Many presuppositions and details can be offered:

- This notion presupposes that the actions present a form of meaning (orientation and significance) which the observer is able to reconstruct after the fact (ex post facto) in distancing himself from the meaning lent to the action by the actor and in relating the actions to a context and properties characterizing the actor (resources, capacities, ethos, explicit goals, etc) as well as to their effects.
- This also assumes that there is relative coherence in the actor's orientations, even if all his actions cannot be subsumed on the basis of his logic of action.
- It might be useful to distinguish, with Jean Remy, what, on the one hand, arises from intentional logic and, on the other hand, what arises from objective logic. Intentional logic designates “everything that contributes to organizing the lived sense that motivates the actor and based on which certain practices are possible” whereas objective logic designates “the effects flowing from the practice independently of the consciousness one has of them” (Remy, Voyé and Servais, 1978, p 93). The logic of action is constructed by the observer in relying more on objective logic. Intentional logic and objective logic are interrelated in complex ways it is not possible to develop here.
- The notion of the logic of action is to be distinguished from that of strategy in the sense that the latter implies that the actor necessarily has at least a partial consciousness of the orientations he privileges and for which he signals a relative preference. In other words, to varying degrees, the notion of strategy always implies a form of “conscious calculation”, of “planification and anticipation” whereby the actor chooses a possibility of action, taking into account a situation, its constraints and its resources, and his consciousness of objective effects presupposed by his action.
- The logic of action may result in such strategic behaviour but that is not always the case. The logic of action can in fact also derive from interiorized cognitive and normative schemes and/or constraints and situational opportunities in the absence of conscious deliberation of choices of action.

In short, orientations of action are not then (solely and necessarily) derived from the sense the actor attributes to his action (what we call, with Jean Remy, intentional logic), but they are reconstructed by the researcher on the basis of an analysis of coherencies of the action and its tendential effects in situations (objective logic). In other words, the logic of action should neither be confused with a strategy, nor with the lived sense of action.

Logics of action can be referred either to a collective actor (an organization like a school as a whole or a group having a logic of common action, like “teachers” ), or to an individual actor (the director, the coordinator, the prefect, etc). The unit of analysis and choices of the actor to which we refer the logic of action is a methodological operation carried on by the researcher. This signifies that we can methodologically centre our attention either on the school as a whole, seeking to illustrate a global coherence emerging from the actions of its members, or centre on one or the other of its components.

The question of knowing if the school vehicules one or many logics of action is an empirical question. The logics of action of an organization are in fact the coherencies which emerge (ex post facto) from the observation of practice and decisions in the organization relative to the functioning of its totality or to its orientations in more specific areas. Thus for ex. in the case of schools, the logic of action may concern the practice (formal or informal decisions) of enrolment/expulsion of students, forming classes and the assignment of students to classes, the construction of offer (options), discipline and order, pedagogical practice, managerial practice and personnel "mobilization", practices promoting the school vis-à-vis parents, practices of partnership/alliance or co-operation with external organizations (others schools, associations or enterprises, etc.). Based on the observation of practice in these different areas, we can
ask questions about correspondences, forms of coherence, affinities or, on the contrary, about the incoherence between logics of action originating in different areas or components of the school.

**Inequalities, segregations and school hierarchies**

All the comparative analysis of regulations present in the national or local spaces investigated, and their interrelations with the logics of actions of schools within these last spaces, takes on meaning due to what is at stake in equality of opportunities, the struggle against the hierarchization of schools, and the segregation of student populations - notably in terms of their economic and cultural resources. Hence it is worthwhile spelling out how we understand these notions.

We first point out that the units of analysis these notions refer to are different. We understand by this notions of differentiation, hierarchization and segregation on the level of schools within local spaces. The notion of educational inequality applies more to individuals or social groups.

Thus traditionally the literature has had a tendency to distinguish between inequalities of treatment, inequalities of opportunities and finally inequalities in results (see for ex. Crahay, 2000; Duru-Bellat, 2002). The notion of equity also deserves to be distinguished from that of equality. These notions, used throughout the research (notably WP 4 and 5), deserve to be specified in referring to a table: Draelants et alii (2003, p. 46)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equality of access</th>
<th>Equality of access corresponds to everyone’s right to instruction. This revendication is at the origin of the fight for free instruction and, to a large extent, mandatory schooling.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality of treatment</td>
<td>This involves giving the same thing to all students and doing the same thing with all, even if at the outset and on arrival inequalities exist and subsist. Thus equality of treatment supposes the same school for all children, the longest time possible. In Europe, in the 1960s, this revendication was at the origin of the combination of various school tracks into more unified structures (the ‘collège unique’ in France, ‘enseignement rénové’ in Belgium, the comprehensive school in the United Kingdom). In the name of equality of treatment, some also revendicate the most standardized definition possible of objectives, resources and pedagogical orientations in order that each student enjoy similar learning conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of results/ Equality of attainments</td>
<td>Strictly speaking, equality of results corresponds to a situation where all students perform equally at the end of a learning period. This notion is above all useful in measuring the width of the gap separating us from achieving that ambition. Many authors also speak of equality of attainments, that is to say equal access to a common basic level. We note that equality of attainments tolerates sizeable differences between students because gaps between them may be considerable in the results obtained beyond a common basic level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equality of opportunities has sometimes covered the notions of equality of access and equality of treatment. In a more precise acceptation, equality of opportunities does not refer to the organization of the school system (an equal organization), but to student results at the end of school (equal results). Hence it is a matter of aiming at an equal probability of members of different groups acceding to diplomas. In this perspective, differences may exist between individuals, but globally girls should obtain the same results as boys, children of blue collar the same as white collar workers, students of foreign origin the same as those of national origin, etc. It is essentially a question here of aiming at upward mobility for students coming from working classes.

Equity
Reference to equity presupposes that we have renounced attaining equality *stricto sensu*. Here we are no longer involved in providing or aiming at the same thing for every category taken into consideration. Equity is based on the idea that it is fair to distribute resources in an unequal way in the face of unequal situations. The policy of positive discrimination is an example of the policy of equity: the point is according more resources to schools welcoming greater numbers of students from underprivileged areas.

(adapted from Draelants et alii, 2003)

Notions of segregation, hierarchy or differentiation make sense on the level of schools or wider spaces.

Segregation can be descriptively defined as an allotment of students from various points of view (sex, socio-economic status, country of origin) that differs significantly from the distribution of the same characteristics in a reference population (for ex. the total population of students from 11 to 18 years of age in an administrative entity in relation to that of a particular school). At the same time, these situations of separation and concentration of social and ethnic groups (on the level of urban spaces or school spaces) “allow other social categories to take over these spaces and control access, leading to a social, cultural and economic marginalization (... groups mentioned) which contradicts the fundamental ideals of democratic societies”. (van Zanten, 2001, p 8). In other words, the notion of segregation adds a gap to a mean statistical distribution attesting to a separation and concentration of a given population and the social relationship of domination and inequality such separation favours.

The hierarchization of schools is linked to their classification according to criteria and/or social values. Thus they can be commonsensically hierarchized according to their “academic quality”, the social and ethnic characteristics of their public, or various other traits amounting to social constructions. Depending on the context, hierarchization can be uni- or multi-dimensional (principally constructed as a function of academic characteristics or also based on social or ethnic characteristics, etc.). This hierarchy can be more or less formalized or official. Thus the “league table” in England is an “official” social hierarchization of schools according to their academic results. Hierarchization can also be linked to a group perception in a local population, which informally “hierarchizes” them according to their “quality” or “reputation”, etc. Thus B. Delvaux introduces the notion of “instituted hierarchy” (Delvaux, 2001).

Differentiation (or diversity) of schools: differentiation is in fact a notion coming from the world of “marketing”: a firm (or school) tries to differentiate its “product” from those proposed by the competition. (see Glatter et alii, 1997). Differentiation may have to do with the “options offered”, extracurricular activities (sports, arts, etc) or further with the “pedagogical project”, the school’s culture or its norms of internal functioning, etc. This differentiation is rarely neutral from the viewpoint of the school’s social valorization and hierarchical positioning, notably because it has direct or indirect effects on the students.
3 Scientific Description of the Project: Results and Methodology

SECTION 1 GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The aim of our research is to examine changes in modes of regulation in a number of national and European contexts. From the moment the project was announced, we have insisted on the necessity of observing institutional and regulatory staff and operations in action in localized settings, as opposed to limiting ourselves to describing this apparatus. This is why our analysis focuses on several levels in each society or educational system studied (see Ch. 2, section 2).

Macro level: analysis of the development of education policy in the last 20 years (on the basis of a synthesis of national and international literature) and statistical analysis of the results of the PISA survey, conducted by the OECD in 2000 to examine the main indices of inequality and segregation; Median level: analysis “of local cases in competition and interdependencies between schools” and analysis of intermediate regulation; Micro level: case studies of schools.

In other words, the analysis of modes of regulation and their changes in each country is carried out, on the one hand, on the level of national institutional regulations and, on the other hand, beginning from the analysis of local educational spaces within which three approaches have been combined: 1) an analysis of relations of interdependencies between a set of some twenty schools (primary or secondary, but having to do with the 11-14 year old age group) 2) an analysis of logics of action developed by them at the local level; 3) examination of one or more institutional bodies with an intermediate regulatory role, and the agents who carry out this function, whose responsibilities include the schools examined, as mentioned above.9

In order to carry out these empirical studies, we have employed both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques. The type of data used, the particular methods of collection and analysis of the data used at each stage of the research – this will be explained as our results are presented. We would like to give an overview here of the general methodological choices made at the outset, for example, the use of comparative international analysis or, on another hand, “multi-level” analysis seeking to express the meaning of national contexts while still giving important weight to the detailed analysis of local contexts. We will discuss the various advantages and limitations which come with these choices. We will also set out in general the criteria involved in choosing spaces to observe and the empirical techniques of investigation employed at each stage of the research.

1 International comparative analysis of a “multi-level” type

International comparison has a double function in our research. On the one hand, we are able to test the hypothesis of a convergence relative to educational policies, and evaluate the eventual existence of a process of ‘Europeanization’ of education policies. On another hand, such comparisons make the specific characteristics of each system stand out in clear relief, and we are able to ‘de-naturalize’, within each separate context, that which for national observers tends to go without saying. For this reason, we expect the specific characteristics of the configuration of modes of regulation at work in each system or local space to stand out even more clearly. Still, the benefits expected from the use of international comparative analysis should not be allowed to conceal certain difficulties.

The first of these appears as a dilemma linked to all forms of comparative analysis: whether particularities or likenesses are to be emphasized. The difficulty has to do with the choice of the scale of the analysis. If we look at things from the greatest macro angle possible (wide angle), it’s easy to accentuate similarities which disappear as soon as the analysis makes a closer approach (Whitty et. al., 1998). In order to correct for this, the ‘multi-leveled’ aspect of our research strategy functions as a sort of antidote. In fact, one of the dangers of an excessively ‘macro’ analysis is sometimes to ‘smooth out’ changes or realities which appear more distinctly at the local level. Thus certain ‘convergences’ (relative, for example, to the development of external evaluation, or to intensified regulation due to ‘the market’) have been described and weighed by taking account of their content and actual meaning on the local level. A local analysis of the

9 The investigation here deals with the institutional and organizational forms these authorities assume, and the various agents (profile, work, ethos, tools) of regulation they use, as well as with “operations” carried out by these agents.
implementation of institutional regulations or market regulations has in this sense helped to avoid producing contradictions, and to avoid mistaking nominal changes for real ones, superficial convergence from deeper.

Comparative analysis also carries the risk of skimming over historical contexts or societal particularities which give meaning to what is observed, ending with a superficial product. This difficulty may actually be increased if a ‘deductive’ stance is adopted for purposes of constructing comparisons and interpretations. The use of universal a priori categories risks forcing meanings to emerge, while yet we misunderstand the specific meaning of an institution or practice. A symmetrical risk exists, however. We may also exaggerate idiosyncrasies or shy away too easily from identifying tendencies or common logics. Methodologically, no magic spell can extricate us from these difficulties.

We have used two research strategies in the hopes of avoiding abstract universalism on one side, while guarding against an attention to detail which makes us blind to common tendencies on the other. The deployment of teams of national specialists from each of the national education systems has permitted us to avoid over-simplistic or reductionist interpretations of each national reality. On the other hand, our mode of organization and internal division of labour is aimed at limiting any ‘universalizing’ or ‘particularizing’ biases as regards interpretations at all stages of the research.

- For each main focus of the research, our ‘leadpartners’ have designed, in advance of the empirical research, certain conceptual tools (questions for empirical research, baseline concepts, etc.). But they have also designed tools for cooperative investigation (interview guides, indicators) whose operational value and pertinence within the various national contexts have been the subject of prior discussion and verification at meetings of the research network. These theoretical or empirical tools have in all cases been subject to review by all the network members in the interest of the realities of the countries or localities studied.
- Next, the collection of data and its analysis for each section of the research was performed by a national team, which produced a ‘national report.’ The comparison of national reports was then entrusted to two leadpartners (from different countries) and then opened up for discussion at working group meetings or by e-mail (discussion of the particular comparison carried out, followed by changes made in the ‘transnational’ report)
- This method of operation has allowed the development of comparisons which would not have been produced through the simple application of conceptual tools defined deductively or a priori. Our research protocol may be described as semi-inductive (Maroy, 1995), in the sense that the analytic tools which structure the various interpretations are partially derived from theoretical tools built into beginning assumptions, but which are subsequently reworked, expanded, or redefined in the light of the observation process on the ground, and the national analyses made by each team.

2 Multiplicity of contexts and priority given to local observation

The importance accorded to the observation of local spaces in our research can be justified by the following argument: the regulations which are in force in the educational system are not constructed according to, and are not equivalent to, politico-institutional regulations which follow on national education policies enunciated by states, or administrative actions initiated by states. They are also constructed ‘from the bottom up’ in actual interactions that make up the daily functioning of educational organizations. That’s why we have given a great deal of importance to the study of intermediate level regulatory bodies and agents (which can inflect the implementation of national regulations at a local level, or in some cases develop autonomous regulations). We wanted to analyse the actual relations between schools in individual localities, which may be symptomatic of a ‘market forces’ type of regulation. This close-up investigation of localities has been indispensable for the exposition of the whole set of transformations of existing regulations.

Nonetheless, these local observations do not take on meaning in the light of micro-social processes alone. On the contrary, they may reveal certain structural tendencies in our societies, whose major indices or effects can only be grasped with the aid of analytic instruments which are sufficiently delicate. Hence our research has attempted to place in operation an investigative process which constantly varies its focus. One the one hand, it is necessary to work out fine-grained local, empirical knowledge; on the other, it is
important to contextualize this data in relation to one or another national regulatory apparatus and social processes whose origin and dynamics are not solely micro-social.

In short, our analysis has been obliged continuously to interweave various comparisons, on the one hand in order to articulate the levels of analysis and the approaches to each national reality (we could call this the ‘vertical’ dimension of the analysis within each national reality) and, on the other, making ‘horizontal’ comparisons between different national realities (international comparative analysis properly so called).

This is obviously a very delicate exercise, and the results of research presented below do not pretend to have resolved all the problems associated with this interweaving of ‘vertical’ analyses within each system together with ‘horizontal’ ones between systems. It is particularly unwise to hope that the analyses constructed on each level should be in perfect continuity (Lahire, 1996), since the objects of study and their contexts are ineluctably differently reconstructed depending on the level of analysis. The analysed material collected at different levels will in what follows be commented for its own value, and articulated together with its counterparts on other levels, all at once.

3 Choice of national and local observed spaces

The specificities and differences between countries on the level of education systems (described in more detail in section 3) and institutional regulatory schemes are the basis of this choice. On the one hand, some systems were and remain rather decentralized (Belgium, England and Hungary), while others were and are relatively centralized (France and Portugal). On the other hand, the degree of ‘free choice’ given to parents of students as concerns the selection of a secondary school varies greatly. In some countries such a choice is more or less encouraged (Belgium, England and Hungary), while in others that choice is much more ‘regulated’ or ‘fixed’ (France and Portugal).

As concerns the criteria of choice of local spaces, the choice favoured spaces of interdependence between schools as opposed to the choice of one or more institutions with an intermediate level regulatory control whose territorial boundaries covered several schools. Local spaces of interdependence within each system were chosen on the basis of the following criteria: 1) an integrated space within an important urban space; 2) a space which presented a certain educational or social heterogeneity. The schools concerned include, in each local space, years 6 to 9 (ie pupils from 12 to 14/15 year old). Following the school system, there are therefore either elementary schools (Hungary, Portugal) or secondary schools. Beyond this, criteria of feasibility and access to actual areas surveyed were taken into account. Yet some sites or jurisdictions of intermediate regulation present particularities which will be kept in mind in the analysis. Thus in England the intermediate level regulatory control exercised by the borough of Wyeham illustrates the ‘limited’ nature of such regulation as a result of certain changes in intermediate regulation (notably from the point of view of privatization), while the Lille site is an example of intermediate regulation which is particularly ‘innovative’.

4 Qualitative and quantitative methodologies

A number of methodological tools, both quantitative and qualitative, have been employed in the various ‘work packages’ used in this research project.

- At the macro level, WP 2 and 4 are based on a synthesis of existing research and publications on education policy. The others are based on a qualitative analysis of the international PISA data bank (Program for International Student Assessment) produced in 2000 by the OECD.
- In the analysis of local spaces of interdependence (WP 5) several techniques have been combined: 1) statistical examination of existing data bases, or use of questionnaires to collect data related to a characterization of the local context (socio-demographic characterization of the

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10 Hungary was much more centralized before the fall of the communist regime (see section 3).
11 Thus many teams had already worked the survey area, which facilitated their “entry” into the schools or local regulatory authorities and afforded them a preliminary knowledge of the site of investigation. The spaces to be investigated will be presented in chapter three and in the appendices.
12 For this reason, Wyeham cannot be considered to be “representative” of what happens in other LEAs but, on the other hand, may shed more light on tendencies developing in other LEAs, just as “critical incidents” are treated by anthropologists as revealing habitual social functioning.
space, indicators of school attractiveness and socio-academic characteristics of them; 2) interviews with local or regional regulatory staff; 3) interviews with their directors concerning their operation and types of external action (n= 15-40 per research team)

- Analysis of jurisdictions and agents at the intermediate regulatory level (WP 7): 1) quantitative analysis of the number and type of agents employed by the bodies studied; 2) interviews with senior staff, junior staff, and ‘support staff’ from among the employees of regulatory agencies (n= 20-60 per team); 3) monograph-style analysis of one or more ‘operations’ carried out by agents of intermediate regulation.

- Case studies covering two or three schools for each local space (WP 9): these case studies were carried out in classical fashion (Yin, 1994). Interviews (with regulatory agents, teachers, educators, parents and students) were combined and interwoven with observations made at meetings, informal and formal school activities, and documentary analysis (descriptive brochures giving the school’s mission statements, other prospectuses, Websites, etc.).

- At the level of the quantitative handling of data relative to WP 5, we should point out the limits of comparisons which have been made from a statistical point of view. Gaps in existing data, the period during which original data was gathered, the difficulties involved in constructing a comparative table showing relevant and comparable indicators (e.g., relative to the segregation or hierarchization of schools) have made this objective unattainable given the time constraints on the entire project. The statistical approach has been useful, within the context of the analysis concerning each country, in presenting certain facts in an objective way (thus avoiding the possibility of our being carried too far from reality as it emerges from interviews), in stimulating hypotheses, and in verifying some hypotheses which emerged from qualitative data. The comparative analysis between countries was feasible in some cases, but only in a limited way.
SECTION 2 EDUCATION POLICY AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF MODES OF INSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

The societal contexts, the structures of school systems, the degrees of social inequality faced at school within each of the countries that have been studied in the context of this research are profoundly different. After having recalled these structural differences, this section will be essentially dedicated to the evolution of modes of institutional regulation at work in the five national realities considered. This will be done in two phases.

We begin with an analysis of the national education policy in sway over the last twenty years within each of these systems and we ask whether the education policies of the last twenty years has contributed to fostering a certain convergence of this point of view and/or if divergences and differences remain?

We shall defend the viewpoint that the policies carried on in fact present some common points: an increasing autonomy of schools, the search after a balancing point between centralization and decentralization of decisions, the introduction of a greater or lesser degree of free choice for parents, or even of quasi-market mechanisms, a certain development of diversification of educational offer, the introduction of evaluation mechanisms or, even, regulation by results. Moreover, we shall defend the hypothesis that these changes may form a system and should not be considered in an isolated way. Undoubtedly we face a change of “regime of regulation”. With important national variations, the bureaucratic-professional model of regulation of educational systems accompanied the construction and development of national “mass” educational systems in the 50s and 60s. Institutional regulation was based on arrangements like control of conformity with rules, the socialization and autonomy of education professionals or joint regulation (State/teachers' unions) of employment questions or curriculum. That model of regulation finds itself undermined by educational policies that tend to substitute or superimpose new institutional arrangements on these earlier modes of regulation, based either on the quasi-market model and/or the evaluative State model. Yet, these transformations take place at degrees, rhythms and various intensities, with more or less contradiction and coherence.

Necessarily centred on global tendencies, this analysis will be completed by a first, more detailed field analysis whose object is what we have called intermediate regulations. Based on case studies carried out in six relevant institutional spaces, we shall see that the institutional and organizational evolutions accomplished by (local or regional) public authorities or group actors (school associations, consultancies) in charge of local or regional level regulation, as well as the professionality of some of their agents, have been deeply affected by evolutions in the regulatory regime at work on national levels. We shall thus examine the degree of “multi-regulation” present in these authorities, the emergence of “post-bureaucratic” organizational forms and tools, and their degree of privatization, before looking into the ethos and professional competences and knowledge of their agents. These case studies are based both on interviews and observations shared with the staff of these intermediate regulatory entities.

Finally, in the conclusion, we shall offer a first exposé of factors capable of contributing to explaining the convergences and divergences in the evolutions of these modes of institutional regulation involving a “post-bureaucratic” regime, where evaluation by the State and market mechanisms are major characteristics, even if their expansion has taken place in very different ways.

1 System diversity and school inequalities

1.1 Differentiated societal contexts

Before detailing the variety of structures of the national school systems studied, it is worth briefly recalling what societies and what socio-economic contexts these systems fit into. These contexts present

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13 The point of departure of this analysis is a synthesis of the national literature or the research done by each team, dealing essentially with evolutions in modes of institutional regulation within secondary instruction; a first comparison was done by I. Bajomi and J. Barroso (2002).

14 One might rightly point out that neither the French Community of Belgium, nor England in the United Kingdom (UK) constitute nation-States. Formally speaking, Belgium is one of the “federated entities” within a federal State for and England a region/nation within the United Kingdom. Given their institutional autonomy in the area of managing and organizing teaching, and also given the relatively marked “national” character of these regions, we treat them practically like the national systems.
some common tendencies but also profound differences. Thus, under the influence of the secularization of society, the historical development of modern educational systems, differentiated from the society and under State control, is to be seen everywhere. Yet the separation of Church and State is more advanced in certain countries than in others\(^\text{15}\).

For that matter, these different countries have experienced generally common demographical tendencies: after the Second World War, most of the countries of the present European Union and Hungary experienced a considerable rise in birthrates whereas, during the thirty last years, we have observed a reversal of that tendency and an appreciable decline in birthrates.

Similarly, on the economic level, these various countries are all exposed to structural transformations that have generally been described as the advance of “globalization” and a passage from “Fordism” to “post-Fordism”. This has signified the transformation of markets and competition (internationalization bearing as much on the “quality” and variety of products as on price), organizational and technical transformations of modes of production and important modifications in the forms of political and institutional regulation of economic activity (the rise of supra-national authorities and the rise of politics termed “neo-liberal”). Yet from the socio-economic viewpoint, the five countries studied form a heterogeneous group: whereas England, France and Belgium form part of what Wallerstein calls the “Centre” bringing together highly developed countries, Portugal and Hungary form rather part of the “Semi-periphery” (notably missing the rise of the “trente glorieuses”, meaning ‘thirty glorious years’: 1945 -1975 ; Wallerstein, 1979). If since the abolition of the Salazar dictatorship, Portugal has been able to considerably reduce its lag in development, the various attempts at modernization undertaken in Hungary have had mitigated results.

From a cultural point of view, in the case of the Centre countries, the period of the ‘Thirty Glorious’ years can be described as one of “group individualization” (Beck, 1983): the middle classes enlarged but the old social ties (families, professional groups, unions, etc.) became distended, fading before the rise of individualization. This is why a paradoxical process has developed: people “collectively” turn towards education, which more and more appears as the number one factor in social integration (from the labour market viewpoint), but demand that it take the individual needs of their children into account. Education then is expected to be both an extensive (quantitative) development and an intensive development (qualitative, individualized and flexible and with the most reduced number of students possible).

This last demand has been amplified by “the 1968 effect” and a profound cultural change, of which revolt is but an epi-phenomenon: school forms an issue in the struggle in a society which has become aware of the fundamental and increasing importance of this institution in defining the position each and every one occupies in the social space. The absolute authority of the schoolmaster or the lecture course is contested. Cultural changes also favour diversification of curriculum and diversification in teaching purposes.

From another point of view, the countries studied form two groups: the first includes four countries and the second just one. In fact Hungary is the only country not to have had colonies and not to having made appeal to foreign workers during the XX\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The other four countries have been confronted with recent and relatively massive immigration. Whence new types of school inequalities: for example, students with a foreign mother tongue and “communitarian” or “multiculturalist” aspirations. Meanwhile, like other central European countries, Hungary is confronted with the question of Gypsy minorities.

Finally, each of the States has different traditions and political systems, particularly Hungary, which experienced a communist system from the Second World War until 1989. Such differences have profoundly affected the construction and forms of their school systems, as we shall develop briefly in the next section.

analysed elsewhere. So when we talk about national systems in regard to England and the French Community of Belgium, they should be understood as “regional” systems on the formal level.

\(^{15}\) So, if in France, teaching the catechism is banned in all public schools, that is not the case in English, Belgian or Hungarian public schools. The proportion of students in confessional schools varies considerably from one country to another.
1.2 Differentiated school structures

The school systems studied were chosen for their variety in terms of structure. Since the beginning of the project, we have insisted on the profound structural differences which have long separated them, even if more recently (late 80s/early 90s), we shall return to this, education policies have encouraged significant evolutions within each of these systems.

These systemic differences stand out in three dimensions relevant to our purpose (for more details, see Bajomi and Barroso, 2002):

- **Degrees of centralization or decentralization:** here we can oppose France and Portugal, long characterized by a centralized school system, which went along with the construction of a powerful and centralized State (Green, 1990; Van Haecht, 1992) and Belgium or England, where a variety of educational initiatives have been able to develop (various providers -réseaux d’enseignement 16-, like State schools, municipal and provincial schools, Catholic schools in the FCB; public sector, "voluntary aided" and private schools in England) in a context where the Central State delegated a number of responsibilities to private initiatives or to local public authorities. As Green has shown, this characteristic does not stand out from the particularities of State formation in that country and their slight intervention in the educational domain. Thus, in England a liberal tradition has been able to prevail, whereas in Belgium, a relatively "weak" State and a "consociative" democracy associating various key actors of the civil society (the various: socialist, Christian and liberal "pillars") have predominated (Draelants et alii, 2003). In this context, Hungary presents a particular profile due to the fact that its school system has been strongly marked by the centralization of its socialist political system. Yet, before the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the first measures of decentralization had already been initiated and have since been radicalized, so that its centralized system is now largely decentralized.

As Margaret Archer has shown (cited by Van Zanten, 2004) the differences in the natures of the States have consequences on the forms of schooling and show up in oppositions in the curriculum structure: France and Portugal are characterized by a national curriculum, centralized systems of certification and control of the teaching profession whereas the FC of Belgium and England have stood out, until recent periods, for the absence of a "national" curriculum, the strong "freedom of instruction" within the system, or the absence of national or standardized certification. If these characteristics have been subject to significant modifications in the last few years – see pt 2 below – these structural differences nonetheless remain extremely important and linger on in local educational realities, with the exception of Hungary where the rupture has undoubtedly been the most marked.

- **Curriculum structure:** we can oppose the countries marked by a relative curricular standardization to countries marked by a relative curricular variety between schools, linked, for example, to the presence of "tracks" within the secondary. In fact, according to Vaniscotte, (Vaniscotte 1996 cited by Zachary, Dupriez and Vandenberghe, 2002, pp. 261-262), two types of logics have presided over the definition of school structures in European countries “integrated teaching is the meeting of the three types of orientations mentioned and their three goals (academic preparation, technical preparation and professional training) in one single institution targeting the same age group. Differentiated teaching is the separation of these three goals into three distinct schools, having different objectives and curricula, welcoming students selected on the basis of the criterion of academic performance in primary instruction, as of 10/12 years of age”. In the 70s, the standardized model of a common curriculum for all students from the beginning of secondary has had a tendency to develop in all the countries studied; this is the case with the development of

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16 Three major “réseaux d’enseignement” (providers) exist in the Belgian educational landscape since the 60s. the schools of the Francophone Community of Belgium (the State for the francophone part of the country, provider of State schools), the schools organized either by municipalities or provinces (the provider composed of local political powers) and the federation of Catholic schools, sometimes called “free schools”. These providers are composed in fact of one or several “pouvoir organisateurs” (organising power) which have the right to organise schools with their own programs, pedagogy, evaluation system, and teachers if they comply with the general rules put forward by the State. These various providers are funded by the State and the schools are all “free” for the parents. The “freedom of instruction” (liberté d’enseignement) is indeed one article of the Belgian constitution. (Draelants et alii, 2003)
the “collège unique” in France, “enseignement rénové” in Belgium and “comprehensive schools” in England. Yet, these reforms have not for all that completely standardized the curriculum between the different schools, nor suppressed the tracks to the same degree and in fact we observe that the curricular standardization is more pronounced in Portugal (having standardized curriculum since 1986), in France (with its “collège unique”) than in England (where the “comprehensive schools” cohabit with the “grammar” and private schools) and in Belgium (where they remain rather distinct according to tracks and where promotion of a “common curriculum” during the first two years of secondary has nonetheless left a (decreasing) minority of students oriented towards professional training as of the first years of secondary school). In Hungary, a fundamental school (8 years) was created as of 1945, intended for schooling all students between the ages of 6 and 14 according to the same curriculum. Yet this standardized curriculum has been strongly compromised since the 1970s and 80s by the appearance of selective tracks, first on the upper secondary level and then on the primary school level. This tendency has increased since the regime change (see pt 2, below).

- Degrees of formal “regulation” or “freedom” of choice for parents in access to schools.

In France, the formal rules governing the assignment of students to public secondary schools are far from being liberal. Comparing it with the other spaces investigated, we would say that student admission is the most administered there. In fact, families are obliged to enrol their children in the school of their sector. For their part, schools are obliged to enrol students from their sector and cannot enrol students from other sectors without authorization. Families can request waivers, sometimes granted depending on the periods and academies. In the other European school spaces investigated, the margins of liberty for parents and schools are much wider. The most liberal situation prevails in Belgium, where parents have a total freedom of choice between the various schools and providers, whereas the schools have a wide latitude in “sorting” students presented to them, even if the State has recently sought to control it, in more formal than real ways. This situation resembles what also prevails in the private school sector in France and private and “voluntary aided” schools in England. In the other European spaces analysed, the situation is intermediate: families have the possibility of freely expressing their choice. Faced with it, schools have total freedom to sort the request. In all cases, the number of places available is fixed by regulatory authorities. Additionally, for granting available places, the norms are clearly more constraining in Portugal than in Hungary or England. We note in passing that in most of the national and local contexts, we have witnessed a tendency to grant more latitude to family choices; especially in England, in Hungary but also in France. Of course in doing this, the system’s modes of institutional regulation evolve (see pt 2, below).

1.3 Variously unequal school systems.

Different societies, school structures with differentiated forms and traditions, as well as school systems a priori, and variously unequal. In one of the sections of our research (Vandenbergh, 2003; Dupriez and Vandenberghe, 2004), we explored this question based on a statistical analysis seeking to compare the education systems of the countries concerned from the viewpoint of unfairness (inequity), as well as more broadly, all OECD countries or regions by means of international PISA data – Program for International Student Assessment – produced in 2000 by the OECD. At the end of the analysis, everything indicates that the degree of equity varies greatly depending on the country and region. We illustrate this particularly regarding the countries studied in our research.

In fact we observe that the inequality of results\(^{17}\) is singularly strong in the Francophone community of Belgium or in Greece in comparison to Finland or the Netherlands, if we consider only countries belonging to the EU (see table 1 in appendix). The situations in France and England are practically equivalent and

\(^{17}\) The conceptions of inequality used in this work are taken from chapter 1. To recall, equality of “results” is a situation where all the students obtain equal performances at the end of a period of study. This “ideal” situation is above all useful as a reference in measuring the gap separating them from that ambition. The measurement used in the statistical analysis is founded on the relation between the 9th and 1st deciles of the distribution of results in mathematics, sciences and reading comprehension coming from the Pisa survey.
less unequal among all the countries involved in our research. The situations in Hungary and Portugal are intermediate.

In taking as reference the notion of equality of opportunities, we find ourselves with situations contrasting according to the type of criterion specified. Thus table 1, below, presents the inequality of opportunities in the various EU countries that participated in Pisa, in terms of the mother’s diploma. The school system the most inequitable is again the FCB as well as Hungary, whereas, inversely, Finland, Ireland or Scotland are clearly more equitable. As for other countries involved in our research, Portugal and France are the most equitable, with England occupying an intermediate position.

**Table 1. Inequality as inequality of opportunities. Differences between the scores of youths whose mother has a weak education level (primary or secondary) and those whose mother has a higher education diploma (international mean = 500, standard deviation = 100).** (Simplified table based on Vandenberghe 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES - REGION</th>
<th>math</th>
<th>reading</th>
<th>science</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>-75.94</td>
<td>-94.59</td>
<td>-67.94</td>
<td>-79.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL_FR</td>
<td>-81.73</td>
<td>-74.30</td>
<td>-74.24</td>
<td>-76.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>-73.36</td>
<td>-73.11</td>
<td>-73.08</td>
<td>-73.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-60.48</td>
<td>-88.17</td>
<td>-62.74</td>
<td>-70.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>-50.86</td>
<td>-71.64</td>
<td>-67.04</td>
<td>-63.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLAND</td>
<td>-53.45</td>
<td>-58.28</td>
<td>-55.78</td>
<td>-55.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL_NL</td>
<td>-56.15</td>
<td>-59.77</td>
<td>-50.70</td>
<td>-55.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N IRELAND</td>
<td>-48.68</td>
<td>-56.95</td>
<td>-53.42</td>
<td>-53.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>-47.70</td>
<td>-55.86</td>
<td>-41.61</td>
<td>-48.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>-43.15</td>
<td>-46.44</td>
<td>-50.18</td>
<td>-46.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>-41.98</td>
<td>-47.33</td>
<td>-48.38</td>
<td>-45.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>-51.67</td>
<td>-47.56</td>
<td>-36.30</td>
<td>-45.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>-41.24</td>
<td>-46.30</td>
<td>-43.77</td>
<td>-43.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>-35.27</td>
<td>-42.21</td>
<td>-36.56</td>
<td>-38.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>-33.85</td>
<td>-35.71</td>
<td>-43.02</td>
<td>-37.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
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<td>-31.44</td>
<td>-37.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
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<td>-39.50</td>
<td>-38.44</td>
<td>-35.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>-30.35</td>
<td>-38.26</td>
<td>-38.09</td>
<td>-35.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>-33.71</td>
<td>-40.67</td>
<td>-25.63</td>
<td>-33.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICELAND</td>
<td>-32.09</td>
<td>-36.54</td>
<td>-28.93</td>
<td>-32.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>-22.88</td>
<td>-38.73</td>
<td>-33.36</td>
<td>-31.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>-28.10</td>
<td>-29.73</td>
<td>-32.49</td>
<td>-30.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>-21.48</td>
<td>-25.64</td>
<td>-19.45</td>
<td>-22.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source. PISA (2000)

Yet, if we choose another criterion we observe that the relative positions of the countries can change. Thus, in comparing the opportunities of students whose father is born in the country vs those whose father is born outside the country, we observe that Hungary occupies a clearly more favourable position than in the preceding case, whereas the rankings of France or England are inversed. Yet the FCB remains the most inequitable country from this viewpoint in the 5 countries considered and Portugal the most equitable, as with the preceding indicator (table 2 in appendix). Yet the application of this criterion to the Hungarian case appears irrelevant. The very weak proportion “ of immigrants “ in the country makes the comparison meaningless and the very favourable classification of Hungary is in fact an artefact.

The term is relatively polysemous. It is considered here in a relatively strong sense, close to the notion fair equalities of opportunities in Rawls, where it is a matter of seeing to it that each of the categories taken into consideration (girls vs boys, the rich vs the poor, persons coming from families endowed with cultural capital vs the others, foreigners vs nationals) should have the same level of academic performance globally. Equality of chances has therefore been evaluated in terms of gender, mother’s diploma, parents’ socio-economic status, or father’s national origin.
Finally table 3 (in appendix) proposes a classification of countries according to the correlation between the score of school performances and a mean socio-economic index of parents (HISEI index provided by Pisa). According to this classification, our five countries again obtain different rankings, except the FCB, still the most inequitable. Among the countries investigated for our research, France, followed by Portugal seem to produce school performances the least correlated with the socio-economic index, whereas Hungary and England occupy intermediate positions.

In short, the “relative situations” of each country vary according to the indicator considered. Yet we observe that the FCB is systematically the most inequitable school system, whereas France and Portugal appear the most equitable systems concerning equality of opportunities from the viewpoint of the mother’s initial cultural capital, or the family’s socio-economic status. Yet England is the most equitable in the area of equality of results.

It is apparent therefore that the situation is hard to interpret. For that matter, the question of determining school equity and thus explaining the gaps between country and region remains intact. In the work led by Vandenberghe in particular, a test of correlation between the degree of autonomy of the school and the degree of inequity did not therefore prove significant.

On the contrary, the degree of student segregation present in each country is correlated with the inequality of opportunities. Thus, it first of all appears that the countries analysed present very unequal degrees of segregation (measured by an index of dissimilarities\(^{19}\)) according to country (see table 2 below). We observe that Hungary and the FCB present the highest index of dissimilarity, whereas it is weaker in England, and then in Portugal and France (result corroborated by Gorard & Smith, 2004).

\(^{19}\) This shows the proportion of a population presenting a certain characteristic \(k\) (a weak score, a poorly educated mother or parents with a weak socio-economic profile) belonging to a given geographical zone (here a country or region) that can be displaced should one want to attain a situation of equal distribution among schools. The characteristics in relation to which segregation has been considered are i) a score below the value defining the 1\(^{st}\) quartile of the total distribution of scores in the country (poor students) ii) a mother not having a higher education diploma iii) a socio-economic index below the value defining the 1\(^{st}\) quartile of the total distribution of the variable in the country.
Table 2. Segregation. Estimates of percentage of students forming a minority group (weak score, poorly educated mother, weak socio-economic profile of parents (HISEI) who should change schools to eliminate segregation (Indices of dissimilarities)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES - REGION</th>
<th>Math FS</th>
<th>Read FHI FS MPD FHI 1</th>
<th>Sci FHI FS MPD FHI 2</th>
<th>FHI Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50 0.44 0.62 0.44 0.41 0.53 0.46 0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL.FR</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.41 0.49 0.61 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.40 0.47</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52 0.42 0.55 0.44 0.38 0.48 0.52 0.43</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.42 0.41 0.62 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.38 0.36 0.64 0.32 0.35 0.52 0.36 0.38</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL.NL</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36 0.37 0.54 0.32 0.36 0.52 0.37 0.38</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.35 0.40 0.57 0.30 0.36 0.51 0.34 0.38</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.33 0.36 0.59 0.31 0.34 0.52 0.36 0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.28 0.37 0.65 0.23 0.33 0.59 0.28 0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.36 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.39</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.39 0.35 0.55 0.35 0.33 0.46 0.38 0.36</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.IRELAND</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.33 0.38 0.49 0.32 0.34 0.50 0.37 0.37</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.37 0.41 0.48 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.37 0.40</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.33 0.39 0.46 0.30 0.35 0.47 0.32 0.37</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.39 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.39</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENGLAND</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
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<td>0.28 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.34</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.24 0.30 0.43 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.26</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICELAND</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28 0.36 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.34</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.33</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FS: weak score (below 1st quartile of the distribution in the countries)
MPD: mother with little schooling (not having a higher degree)
FHISEI: parents’ socio economic index highest (HISEI); weak (below 1st quartile of the distribution in the country) Source: PISA (2000)

But beyond this first observation, by a regressive analysis Vandenberghe shows a correlation between the indices of dissimilarity and indices of inequity of opportunities already mentioned (see graph 1 in appendix). The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.2 if we take 33 countries into consideration. In a subsequent analysis, Dupriez and Vandenberghe (2004) show that it is higher in considering only EU countries (0.32).

This result is not exempt from methodological limits20. Yet it shows an important result for it confirms that segregation may contribute to reinforcing inequalities across the differentials of the school public that it involves (“compositional effect” or “school mix” effect; on this point, see Thrupp, 1999; Thrupp et alii, 2002). But, precisely, school segregation may not be independent of the modes of regulation of the

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20 Notably due to the fact that the rank of each country in the area of inequity is based on the mean of ranks of countries established in terms of different measures of inequality of chances and results. But as we have seen, the ranks are often different depending on the criterion used. This limit has been corrected in the work of Dupriez and Vandenberghe (2004) which, on the one hand, have put aside the index of inequality of chances according to sex, which was not correlated with the others and, on the other hand, have constructed synthetic indices of inequality and segregation based on factorials rather than means.
educational systems we are going to return to presently. In short, this analysis has above all a descriptive value whose virtue is illustrating that all systems are unequal, but to various degrees and differently according to the criteria of inequalities specified. Our subsequent qualitative analysis of the impacts of modes of regulation on the basic actors in the school system should help us shed light on some of the processes favouring the production of inequalities, notably by looking into the local processes favouring or limiting segregation among them. The qualitative and local analysis of schools should moreover help us in underlining certain forms of “internal” segregation that a quantitative analysis like the Pisa survey could not show because of its type of construction.

2 Modes of institutional regulation: convergences and hybridation of education politics

In chapter 1 we defined the modes of institutional regulation as all mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control and balancing of the system set up by educational authorities. Thus it is a matter of “governance” activities of the system aside from those related to financing education or the “production”, properly speaking, of education service (Dale, 1997). On the basis of research work carried out on the modes of institutional regulation present in each school system (WP2) and their comparison (WP3, Bajomi and Barroso, 2002), our present purpose is to ask to what extent the modes of institutional regulation presently operating in each school system are comparable or at least are inspired by certain common principles or models. More precisely, we asked ourselves whether or not the education policies of the past twenty years have contributed to constructing a certain convergence from that point of view. And, simultaneously, what important divergences remain.

In the literature, the question of the convergence/divergence of education policies has sometimes been treated on the level of developmental conditions, of the content of education policies (origins, objective goals, justificatory speeches, measures adopted) or again their effects. Thus Green et alii (1999) have concluded more to a convergence of statement of education policies for EU countries (concerning decentralization, notably), whereas Bajomi and Derouet (2002) did the same for 6 countries of central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Whitty et alii (1998), concerning Anglo-Saxon countries (NZL, UK, USA, Australia) and Sweden, underline the joined presence of policies that simultaneously reinforce State control and favour the development of market forces.

Concerning us then, the comparison will be done principally on the level of models of governance/regulation of systems which education policies tend to put in place.

We understand by “governance models”, the theoretical and normative models which serve as cognitive and normative references, notably for deciders, in defining “good ways to steer or govern” the education system. These models include basic values and norms and are simultaneously instruments for interpreting the real and guides for action. Governance models participate in the process of regulating education systems without being confused with active modes of regulation. More precisely, they participate in the normative regulation of the system, notably through the baseline values they convey.

This position will lead us to accentuate the convergences of general orientations rather than detailed variations. Nonetheless, important variations may remain despite the common points in what inspires educational policies.

Our thesis then is that these policies partially converge in routes they trace around “post-bureaucratic” governance models and regulation - which present certain common points. So, depending on the country,

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21 Our analysis of the evolution of modes of institutional regulation is founded in studies of the principal morphological and institutional characteristics of the school systems of the five countries investigated and analysis of the educational policies they have applied in the last twenty years, as much those affecting these modes of regulation as the stakes and realities associated with the social inequalities faced in secondary school. The procedure was for each team to synthesize the literature dealing with the national reality considered (see the deliverable 3/wp2 for each country). Subsequently, a transversal synthesis (del 4/wp3, Bajomi and Barroso, 2002) was done, including a synthesis of the literature on different notions of regulation and modes of regulation.

22 This idea of model is close to the concept of “reference system” for public action used in cognitive approaches to public policies, which insists on the presence of cognitive and normative references that tend to orient the definition of problems and solutions political actors propose in various areas. (Muller, 2000)

23 The latter are explained further in pt 3 of this chapter; see also, deliverables 3 and 4 produced by each national team.
we can refer education policies to two post-bureaucratic models: that of “the evaluative State” and that of the “quasi-market” which, for that matter, are largely combinable and combined. They share their opposition to the “bureaucratic-professional” model which has prevailed and still prevails in these countries, to varying degrees and in different versions. (Barroso, 2000). Still, these partial convergences in the baseline models do not necessarily imply totally identical policies, on the one hand because the policies refer to these models to different extents and, on the other hand, because these policies developed on the basis of different contexts from the outset.

2.1 The lingering departure of the bureaucratic-professional model.

Despite the important differences in systems we have already insisted on, to varying degrees, the five countries studied have all been able to develop an institutional regulation of their system on the basis of the bureaucratic-professional model, which combines bureaucratic regulation and joint State/teacher regulation.

National school systems were in fact constructed in the XIX and XXth centuries using an institutional and organizational model combining bureaucratic components abutting a nation State responsible for the education of the people with professional components. Bidwell (1965) was one of the first authors to have described and analysed the school or the school system as a “professional bureaucracy” which is concretized to varying degrees in the different systems analysed.

In this model, to accomplish a mission of socializing young generations become ever bigger, more complex and progressively diffused throughout all social classes, the State first became educator State, to various degrees taking upon itself the implementation of education service 24. This education offer can be organized in a more or less centralized and differentiated way, but is underpinned by increasingly standardized and identical norms for all components of the system. This goes hand in hand with a division of educational work (vertical and horizontal between levels and subjects) and facilitates an exact definition of functions, roles and the specific competences required of everyone, relying on written and precise rules. Additionally, the State set up a hierarchy and controlled the conformity of all agents in the system to rules and procedures to follow. Based on the standardization of rules and conformity, this organizational form was then justified in the name of rationality and the need for the greatest universality of rules possible on the nation State scale, thus founding everyone’s equal treatment and equal access to education. Thus the bureaucratic dimension of school systems is to be found not solely in its structures but also in its principles of legitimacy. In fact we know that Weber not only associated administrative forms (hierarchy and an accelerated horizontal division of work, based on formal and general rules) with his bureaucratic ideal-type, but principles of legitimacy too: according to him, the bureaucratic model involves a positive reference, on the one hand, to respect for the law and, on the other hand, a valorization of rationality in the wider sense (Weber, 1922), including “rationality in value”.

Nonetheless, taking into account the complexity of educational tasks to be accomplished, these bureaucratic characteristics have always been associated with a large individual and group autonomy for teachers, an autonomy founded on their expertise and professional skills. Thus teachers have found themselves granted a wide margin of manoeuvre in the individual conduct of their teaching activity, notably for facing up to the “uncertainties” of their work. They are also closely associated with the management of their careers, via their professional or union representatives, or with the definition of programmes or pedagogy via a professional elite in charge of defining them (a body of inspectors).

This bureaucratic and professional model thus goes hand in hand with modes of regulation at once based on the control of agents' conformity to general rules, socialization and the spreading of norms, values and skills to teachers, and finally consultation and joint regulation of the system by the State and teachers' representatives. This model brings “State, bureaucratic, administrative” regulation and a “professional, corporative, pedagogical” regulation into cohabitation (Barroso, 2000, p 64), but with tension possible.

24 We might well have introduced many nuances into this presentation, for example by offering more detail on the chronology of the massification of schooling, by distinguishing the periods of development of primary and secondary education. The construction of standardized norms has, for example, posed more problems for the latter, insofar as most of these countries are introducing more diverse types of teaching (general, technical or professional), which pre-existed in various forms and institutions.
In fact in this system parents and users have practically no say in matters unless by arrangements wherein bureaucratic functioning is adapted to particular situations, thereby conferring important official power to various agents (Crozier, 1963).

All the countries studied share some of this model's traits, but it is undoubtedly France and Portugal that still today come nearest to it (van Zanten, 2002; Barroso, 2000), as well as Hungary (notably by means of its communist regime after 1948).

On the contrary, the FCB (Draelants, Dupriez, Maroy, 2003) or England (Green, 1990; Tomlinson, 2001), are undoubtedly further removed, notably through less standardization of norms, linked to far greater room being allotted to local initiatives and to the political and educational conceptions justifying them (a tradition of voluntary initiative, of a liberal nature in England, and valorization of “freedom of instruction”, the room made for school initiatives of religious origin in Belgium). In these two countries, the bureaucratic professional model has been combined with a model of “community” governance (Barroso, 2000), leaving a lot of room for familial or religious “communalization” (Weber 1922°). As we have seen, this is why the countries studied remain characterized by important structural variation, as much involving the degree of centralization, standardization or diversification of curriculum, or the more or less strong presence of free choice.

Beyond national particularities as to relationships established between State, school and civil society, the bureaucratic-professional model is still quite present in all the countries studied and beyond; it has not only been able to spread because of the rather general development of “mass education” but also because of “institutional mimetic” processes (Meyer et ali, 1997), the development of an educator State and standard norms that have generally been associated with “progress” as much on the economic level (growth) as the social (social mobility).

2.2 Partial policy convergences involving a certain number of common tendencies

For some twenty years now, we have observed many significant evolutions in modes of institutional regulation in the countries studied; most often they have been fostered by important legislative texts in education policy (like the Education Reform Act of 1988 in England and Wales, the “missions” decree (1997) in the Francophone Community of Belgium, the laws on decentralization and deconcentration, as well as a law of orientation (1989) in France) or again a major political turning point like the end of the communist regime in Hungary (1989). The country where the evolutions are undoubtedly still most modest is Portugal.

These evolutions are partially convergent and involve six tendencies:

- Increasing autonomy for schools. The promotion (or maintenance) of a form of increasing “devolution” of responsibilities to them is to be seen everywhere (policies relative to “self governing schools” in England; to the “autonomy of schools” in France, Portugal, Hungary or the French Community of Belgium (FCB)

- The search for a balancing point between centralization/decentralization

We observe a tendency to decentralize/deconcentrate decision making in the traditionally centralized States towards intermediate or local decision making authorities (France, Portugal and Hungary) and a tendency to reinforce centralization in the States that were strongly decentralized at the outset, notably as regards major curricular objectives in terms of competences to be attained (FCB, England). Furthermore, as for England, reinforcement of centralization has also focussed on evaluation of students, schools or systems. However these processes are accomplished with very variable means, degrees and timeframes. Moreover, decentralization and/or recentralization can take on rather varied significances depending on the context. Thus decentralization/deconcentration appears stronger in France than in Portugal, whereas English “recentralization” is clearly stronger than that in the FCB where the curriculum centralization has not been accompanied by certification procedures and more centralized evaluation, but has paradoxically gone hand in hand with the reinforcement of the various providers ("réseaux d'enseignement" and "pouvoirs organisateurs") traditionally playing a role of intermediate regulator as do the federation of Catholic schools, the various municipalities and provinces alongside the
State. On the contrary, in England, the intermediate level (Local Education Authority, LEA) has been bereft of its power either to the advantage of the Central State and its independent evaluation agencies (OfSTED), or to the advantage of schools.

- **The rise of external evaluations of schools and school systems**
  Increase in evaluation is above all born by the policy of the Central State (voluntarily and/or under pressure from users) and at times ramped up and relayed on intermediate or local levels. The degree of development of evaluation, its technical sophistication, its instrumentation as a "steering" tool and its publicity are rather unevenly perfected. In fact, it is in England (and to a lesser extent in France) that these plans have been developed most, and have really been put to work, functioning in a steering system. (see pt 3 on intermediate regulations for more detailed analysis). Thus, in England, the creation of OfSTED and setting up systematic inspections has led to detailed evaluation of performances, the obligation of defining plans for improvement of all weak points identified, with the possibility of mandatorily closing schools considered in “failure” situations (“failing schools”). With the publication of academic results obtained in external evaluation testing done all along student careers (“league tables”), this evaluation plan by inspection forms the keystone of official education policy, with the explicit goal of providing important information to local actors, and notably to parents, whose school choice possibilities have, in fact, been relaxed. In France, and to a lesser extent in Portugal too, external institutional evaluation has been promoted on a central level (with, for example, the central role of the Department of Evaluation –DEP– within the French ministry of Education between 1987 and 97) or regional level, yet with significant variations in application and follow-up on the level of academies or regional education Directorships. The concrete effect of these evaluations as a regulatory “corrective mechanism” on the system and schools still remains minor and their impact above all symbolic (van Zanten, 2002). For that matter, in France, it cannot be considered to be a totally external evaluation: the majority of evaluation reports are co-produced by the schools and the greater parts of the results remain “secret” (Demailly and Gadrey 1998). Yet three “indicators” are divulged to the press. External evaluation has also developed in the FCB and Hungary, but without having much concrete effect on the daily life of schools, nor publicity.

- **Promoting or relaxing parents’ “choice” of school**
  Parents’ possibilities of choosing are reinforced or maintained in all the countries studied. This may proceed from a political will, from a desire to relax administrative rules, as well as from a “laisser-faire” position on the part of public authorities. In England and Wales, we may observe a voluntarist State policy which tends to construct a “quasi-market” school: besides a greater liberty of choice of school by parents and students by the school, the government has promoted information for parents on “performance”. Hence competition between them and their increasing management autonomy are supposed to lead to greater quality and better response to the various demands and needs of families. Such a quasi-market in fact exists in the FCB. Freedom of choice of school by parents (guaranteed in the constitution) is accompanied by a mechanism financing them in terms of the number of students. These institutional arrangements, historically constructed to guaranty philosophical and religious pluralism, have been maintained in practice despite recognition of their perverse effects, so institutionalized and socially legitimised is “freedom of instruction”.
  Elsewhere, in France and Portugal, it is more social pressure from parents (notably middle class) that has led to a “soft” policy relaxing the assigning of children to schools (politically called “desectorization” in France, which gives parents the possibility of expressing three to five preferences for secondary schools). This policy has been applied differently depending on the academy and period25 (see section 3). Yet this practical or official “relaxing” takes place while seeking to preserve the egalitarian nature of offer (via a common and large curriculum and a will to preserve the social and educational mixity of schools).
  In Hungary, a school map has long co-existed with a tradition liberalizing school choices by parents. Thus it is easy to request and obtain an authorization for enrolling children outside the family’s zone of residence. This tendency towards relaxing parents’ choices is fed locally by

25 Thus, in France, in the 80s, parental consumerism was officially encouraged.
contexts of demographic decline and excess of “spots” in schools and the development of active choice strategies on the part of families, notably from the middle classes. (see section 3)

• **Diversification of school offer**
  We also observe a tendency to greater or lesser accentuation of the variety of school offer, as a way of accentuating the “diversity of choices possible” for students and their parents. This is the case in countries where the curriculum was defined in a central and relatively standard way, (Portugal, France and Hungary), but also in England, where decentralization goes hand in hand with the comprehensive school model. In France, for example, possibilities of offering more specialized courses have been authorized, in various ways, on the college level: “European classes”, “classes à horaire aménagé” (specially scheduled classes) incorporating optional disciplines like sports or the arts. In England, schools can claim “specialist” status, centred around a domain (commerce, media, etc.) and benefit from increased funding ; in Portugal, schools can vary the volume of class hours of different components of programmes within pre-established limits (non-disciplinary curriculum areas, creation of technological courses in secondary instruction; programmes for students in failing situations). In Hungary, certain schools can specialize in learning foreign languages (bilingual tracks) whereas others specialize with a view to ensuring particular treatment for certain categories of students (special needs students).
  The policy of diversification of school offer can or cannot be combined with policies defining common curricular standards, more and more centred on some central subjects (as in England, for example). Accentuation on diversification is less significant in Belgium because of a curricular structure that is already largely diversified from the outset and structured practically into “tracks” as of the third (or even the second) year of secondary instruction.

• **Increasing the control regulation of teaching work**
  A sixth tendency is common to all our countries: the tendency toward erosion of the individual professional autonomy of teachers, subjected to more and more varied forms of supervision of their practices, through training, the greater or lesser presence in the school of pedagogical councillors or inspectors (except in Hungary), good practice codes and pressure in favour of teamwork. This weakening of professional autonomy also involves the professional group itself, through a weakening of their union organizations’ positions in certain countries (above all in England and Hungary).

### 2.3 Two models of “post-bureaucratic” governance

Even if we might agree that each of these policies is underpinned by models and debates specific to each subject or each country (concerning the autonomy of management of - self-governing - schools, the question of “free choice”, the promotion of a more or less standardized or diversified curriculum, the centralization or decentralization of systems, etc), one can also refer them to broader governance models, cutting across these various dimensions. These policies can be referred to the “quasi-market” model or to the “the evaluative State” model, both of which share certain traits opposing them to the bureaucratic-professional model already presented.

**Quasi-market regulation**

In the “quasi-market” model, the State disappears. It still has the important role of defining the objectives of the system and the contents of teaching curriculum. Yet it delegates autonomy to choose the adequate means for carrying out these objectives to schools (or other local entities). Additionally, to improve quality and respond to the various demands of users, it installs a quasi-market system. The latter involves setting up free school choice by users, coupled with a financing of schools in relation to the student public they accept (financing on demand) (Bartlett and Legrand, 1993). In other words, schools find themselves in competition in carrying out the task of education, in reference to centrally defined objectives. Users have the capacity to choose their “school provider” which should, for that matter, submit to a good number of rules to be henceforth centrally defined: definition of programmes and certification, for example. These schools can then have various statuses, public or private. The Central State, via a specialized agency, encourages informing users/clients on the performance, efficacy and efficiency of different schools in
such a way that the rationality of users’ choices puts pressure on the local teams to improve their ways of functioning.

This market model was forged and has been widely promoted in Anglo-Saxon countries by certain neoliberal analysts, critical of the bureaucratic model (Chubb and Moe, 1990). For them, it is the bureaucratic character of the system that makes it inefficient and so we should foster competitive pressure coming from users to improve it. As Whitty et alii (1998, p 4) describe it, “advocates of quasi-market policies argue that they will lead to increased variety of provision, more efficient management, enhanced professionalism, and more effective schools. Such proponents, like Moe (1994) in the United States and Pollard (1995) in the United Kingdom have argued that such reforms will bring particular benefits for families from disadvantaged communities, who have been ill-served by more conventional bureaucratic arrangements. However, critics suggest that even if these reforms do enhance efficiency, responsiveness, choice and variety (and even that they regard as questionable), they will increase inequality between schools.” Such a model has strongly inspired English policies, (as well as, further afield: Australia and New Zealand; Whitty and al. 1998) and has been the object of an extensive critical literature in the Anglo-Saxon world (see for ex. Ball, 1993; Lauder et alii, 1999).

The evaluative State or governance by results

The evaluative State model, (Neave, 1988; Broadfoot, 2000)26 (or “governance by results”) also supposes that the objectives and programmes to be carried out by the education system be centrally defined and that teaching units should enjoy broad autonomy of pedagogical and/or financial management. For that matter, the latter are subject to contracts. The Central State negotiates “goals to reach” with local entities (like schools) and delegates responsibilities and increasing means of reaching these goals, which matches the general missions promoted by the public trust authorities all in taking their public or the local school context into account. Elsewhere, a system of external school performance evaluation and a system of symbolic or material incitements or, even, sanctions, are set up to favour the improvement of performances and the fulfilment of the “contract” signed between the State and schools (or upper level entities).

What is aimed at then is a process of organizational and professional learning which results in improving the quality of education in these local schools. Thus the model ipso facto implies an autonomy of economic and pedagogical management of schools and a valorization of their ability to respond to requests made of them either from education control authorities or users. In any case it involves the diffusion and acceptance of an “evaluation culture” (Thélot, 1993) relying as much on institutional self-evaluation by teams seeking to improve their practice and results as on external evaluation.

Two variants of post-bureaucratic regulatory regime

These two models can be described as “post-bureaucratic” for two principal reasons.

As regards basic norms and values, they are no longer founded on the legitimacy of reason, rationality in value and law, typical of the bureaucratic model ; the valorization of results (Duran, 1999) and the search for efficiency (going so far as obligatory results) is privileged in relation to respect for the rule of law. Rationality remains valorized but is more and more reduced to instrumental rationality. Thus that very concern for improvement in quality, valorization of efficiency and “performativity” (Ball, 2003b) tends to disconnect itself from the goals it is supposed to serve. Valorization of instrumental efficiency takes precedence over respect for civic and solidarity engagement, over educational goals, briefly, over value rationalities that, in the bureaucratic-professional model, founded both teachers’ professional autonomy and norm standardization.

For that matter, the modes of coordination and control set up for guiding conduct are no longer founded solely on control of conformity of acts in relation to rules and procedures, as was typical of the bureaucratic model. Other modes of coordination founded either on the promulgation of baseline norms of (promulgation of “best practices”, training sessions, accompanying projects), on contractualization and

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26 This model is variously described: some authors call it steering or regulation based on “obligation de résultats” (Demailly 2001) or the “governance” model (Derouet, 2002).
evaluation (of processes, results or practices) or else, on individual adjustment and competition for the quasi-market model, are promoted. Yet we remain in the rule of law because we still produce an enormous amount of laws, decrees, circulars and rules, seen in the fact that more and more conflicts are decided in court, that more and more precautions are taken to avoid administrative nonconformity. This is why “post-bureaucratic” regime is indeed a descendant of bureaucratic regime, even if it is also partially in rupture.

Another point common to these two models is linked to the important role of the State: it defines objectives and sees to maintaining management of the system. For that matter a relative autonomy is granted to the school or local entities. Moreover, the State no longer wants to be seen as the sole offerer of legitimate instruction. Again we note that the valorization of efficiency and performativity in these two models is matched by an increasing threat to the professional autonomy of the teacher corps, unless it be “watched over” using new systems for evaluating its practice and results. Confidence in the professionalism of teachers is slipping away and their professional autonomy no longer seems a sufficient guaranty of the quality of educational services rendered (Maroy, 2002).

Beyond these common points, a major difference should be underlined: in the quasi-market model, it is above all competitive pressure through the intervention of an “alerted” user parent that should push the school to improve the educational service rendered, whereas in the other model, regulation happens more through evaluation of processes and results and by incitements/or sanctions meted out to schools in terms of their “progress” and results. This system of obligatory results is supposed to serve as a fulcrum in a process of organizational or professional learning on the part of schools. The two models are essentially opposed then as to the presence or absence of the role of competition and “market” as vector of quality education. Based on the model adopted, some policies are going to rely on the market whereas other are opposed to that and have recourse to steering through evaluation and results.

In practice, the models of the evaluative State and the quasi-market can be combined, as the English case will demonstrate. Yet these two models seem indeed intellectually distinct to us. In fact, the promotion of the autonomy of schools coupled with an evaluative State can very easily be envisaged without a “quasi-market”. For that matter, the quasi-market does not necessarily imply the presence of contractualized schools and a rewarding or sanctioning evaluation of their results with regard to goals set, as the evaluative State model implies. Market competition and its consequences in terms of school attractiveness or number/quality of students or professors is theoretically postulated as a strong and sufficient incitement for promoting the improvement of educational practices and adjustment to a variety of needs and demands. Yet the evaluation of schools’ performances in order to favour “users” rational choices through information is indeed part of the quasi-market model.

On the contrary, because of common points between these models, one might argue that in fact we are merely dealing with two variants of one and the same model of governance, an “intermediate” between the bureaucratic State and the market. Some have moreover rightly insisted on the hybrid character of the quasi-market (Vandenberghhe, 2002), which is a form of coordination attempting to combine certain traits of bureaucratic State intervention and certain market traits. Furthermore, the evaluative State may also be described as an attempt to go beyond the bureaucratic State’s malfunctioning. One might go further and advance the thesis that the market, competition, contractualization, evaluation and obligatory results combine within one single model which might be described as the “modernist” model (see for ex. Demaillly, 2001).

We will not decide in a debate that remains open. If we still insist on the existence of two models and variants within a post-bureaucratic regime of regulation, it is for a twofold reason. On the one hand, it is out of concern to leave room for alternatives and debates on “governance and steering models” that political actors in the various societies considered, might entertain. Accordingly certain political actors can be at least rhetorically demarcated from the market model and oppose a “counter-model” to it (that of the evaluative State or, further, a “democratic/participative” more minority model, supported by pedagogical movements, for example) which would allow modernization without developing the market in the education field. On the other hand, this option would help us understand differences between effective policies which are all more or less oriented towards something beyond the bureaucratic-professional model, but with significant variants. Those are the varying proportions between the two models which allow us to (partially) understand certain specific policies. Thus England has been able to connect and combine the two models.
(see infra pt 2.4) in a voluntarist way, whereas, at least on the level of declaring these policies, France has striven more to avoid drifting toward "the market", even if, in practice, forms of parental consumerism have developed and have sometimes been encouraged. Unless we assimilate the English and French policies into one another, which would obviously be nonsense, we cannot subsume them in a totally identical model.

Let us repeat that the “quasi-market” and “evaluative State” models are not the only ones present in the debates or the only ones inspiring educational policies, even if they tend towards hegemony. Thus in the area of evaluation use, Lise Demailly (Demailly, 2001) mentions the presence of “democratic”, “pluralistic” and “negotiated” uses in France, which refers to a participative and democratic version of the reform of the Educator State and is opposed to “authoritarian” uses of evaluation in the service of an Evaluative State which may become overbearing and, paradoxically, hyper rather than post-bureaucratic. Here we have a reference system approaching what Gather Thurler calls “negotiated steering” (Gather Thurler, 2001). The “community” model of governance (Barroso, 2000) also finds defenders both in England and Belgium. For that matter, certain political measures can be associated with these models (as, for example, the unequal and varied development of various local consultative or decision making councils wanting to associate parents or local actors with the definition of school projects (Bajomi and Barroso, 2002). These more minor models have an influence then and can foster resistance to dominant policies within different societies or educational systems. If we do not examine these “community” and “democratic/participative” models here, it is principally because our concern is first of all comparative and we are anxious to understand the central dynamics of European convergence on the level of educational policies along with evolution in the modes of institutional regulations. These countertendencies may nonetheless exist within each national reality. For example, Lise Demailly points out the resistance and innovative social constructions existing in Lille academy in terms of evaluation (Demailly, 2003).

Thus paths to “modernizing” educational systems while open are, as we shall see, tributary to the system’s past, to debates and socio-political relations within each system and nation State. Yet these debates and policies basically tend to place themselves in relation to the “bureaucratic-professional” model of regulation; the “governance models” being compared all seek to correct, rearrange or radically transform the bureaucratic-professional model. This is why we advance the hypothesis of the “post-bureaucratic” regime of regulation. Within that regime, many variants or models are of course possible. In fact, the idea of an regime can be taken either in the political-juridical sense placing the accent on a formal “fundamental” structure supervizing an institutional field, hoping to stabilize the margins of variability of practice, with variation being assimilated as a normal state of affairs, or in the more dynamic sense of the economists of “the French school of regulation”, who aim here at a type of systemic logic, resulting from the dynamic and dialectical tensions of a system, leading to producing regularities also compatible with variations (Théret, 1998).

2.4 Variations in policies and models

The education policies of the five involved countries studied are more or less inspired by the post-bureaucratic models mentioned, and particularly by the evaluative State model: hence the reinforcement of the autonomy of schools and promotion of evaluation, coupled with reinforcement of central goals and curricular standardization in the decentralized countries at the outset. Simultaneously, traits more inspired by the market model - tolerance or the promotion of free choice, the relative diversification of offer so as to meet the varied demands of users have also been developed. Yet the degree of intensity of policies carried out and the proportions applied among these models is very varied. The “exemplary” case of radicalism in reforms is undoubtedly England and Wales which simultaneously promote the quasi-market and the evaluative State through an explicit and voluntarist policy.

The relative importance of three authorities regulating offer (the central government, local authorities and the local market) has changed greatly in England in the last twenty years. Central and market control has been reinforced, to the detriment of the capacity for intervention of local authorities. Until the 80s, the traditional organization regulating educational offer was centred on the control of schools exerted by local education authorities (LEA). This control was realized by

27 This paragraph is largely inspired by Bajomi and Barroso, 2002.
the definition of norms, by direct financing of an ever increasing character and by a supervision in the hands of local inspectors who essentially assumed a function of counselling and pedagogical support. The role of central government principally took on a character of encouragement and global policy supervision, to the extent that it influenced and defined lines of orientation for decisions taken by the LEA and by the schools themselves. The national policies striving to promote unified secondary teaching (“comprehensivism”), during the 60s and 70s, are an example of this supple supervisory plan, insofar as the actual definition of concrete unification policies was left to the local level. This gave rise to numerous strategies and plans expressing the different attitudes adopted towards the governmental policy proposed, ranging from militant enthusiasm to radical opposition, from profound transformations to purely formal changes. In this context, the role of the inspection services (HMI) took on a complementary character, faced with the LEAs intervention, in a “friendly” approach in relation to schools, and faced with the LEAs and the professional world of education. Beginning in the early 80s, on the initiative of Conservative governments and taken up by the Labour governments that have followed them, the central government has developed a substantial policy of interventionism, encouraging competition between schools and favouring the free choice of parents, notably by means of broadening plans for external evaluation. But the development of evaluation went well beyond the simple need to inform “school consumers”. Its source was a logic of regulation of schools and their agents by their results. In this regard, one of the measures crucial to the reorganization of the HMI and the creation of a – formally independent – governmental agency was centred on the evaluation of schools (OfSTED) and a very incisive plan for their systematic inspection. This has involved detailed evaluation of performance, the obligation to define plans for improvement of all the weak points identified, with the possibility of mandatory closing of schools considered in “failure” situations (“failing schools”). With the publication of results obtained during external evaluation tests carried out all along student careers (“league tables”), this evaluation plan by inspection forms the keystone of official education policy.

The other countries have experienced less radical evolutions less directly the result of voluntarist policies. External institutional evaluation has hence developed but in a much more embryonic fashion (Hungary, the FCB and Portugal) and/or rhetorical (France). They are, for that matter, less oriented by the quasi-market model. The rise of free choice is a practice more tolerated than encouraged here; it is not a matter here of a voluntarist and revendicated policy (especially in Portugal and France) even if legitimacy of parents’ choice of is more recognized than before in the name of the need to satisfy the various demands of users. But, simultaneously, in France and Portugal, competition and the market are officially rejected as opposed to the valued ideals of equality of treatment for all. In Hungary, free choice is more and more recognized than before in the name of the need to satisfy the various demands of users. But, simultaneously, in France and Portugal, competition and the market are officially rejected as opposed to the valued ideals of equality of treatment for all. In Hungary, free choice is more and more encouraged in practice and has benefited from an “anti-centralizing” and rather liberal political climate. In the FCB, it has long existed and generates a de facto quasi-market which is often rhetorically criticized for its ill effects without being practically called into question.

In short, the two models reinforcing the evaluative State and the market inspire the policies of these various countries with very different accents. Yet the proportions between them are variable.

2.5 Effects of hybridation and recontextualization of models

The inspiration of educational policies by “post-bureaucratic” governance models does not signify strictly identical policies, not only because of differences of intensity or proportion between the models already mentioned, but also because different beginning situations can lead to different policies, precisely when the baseline models are similar. Thus, as we have seen, certain countries very decentralized at the outset like England and the FCB tend to centralize, whereas others decentralize. This movement, contradictory in appearance, can be explained in advancing the hypothesis of the rise of the evaluative State in all the countries concerned. For such a model to emerge, the States decentralized at the outset need to define their basic curricular goals on a national level and, furthermore, develop evaluation, while accentuating, preserving and developing an autonomy supervized by the base schools. Inversely, the centralized States, already possessed of a strongly standardized curriculum, with national certification tests, should above all increase the autonomy of base schools and develop the actors and tools capable of maintaining a close follow-up of them, once they have been confronted with external evaluations.
Policies autonomizing schools, coupled with the decentralization/deconcentration of responsibilities towards territorial communities or decentralized State entities/actors are now altogether strategic in centralized States like Portugal or France. In the FCB, the autonomy of schools was already fairly well developed for some providers and has above all been accentuated in the State schools but not in the Catholic. What is really at stake for the central government, in England as in Belgium, is more knowing how to limit (or instrumentally) ally itself with the major community, intermediate level actors (the various “organizing powers” in the FCB and the LEA in England).

But evolution in the modes of institutional regulation cannot be reduced to epidemic effects from models promoted by various networks of actors on the international level (international or academic organizations, experts in education policies; Whitty & Edwards, 1998; Ball 1998; we shall return to this in pt 4). The conditions for “receiving” these models should be taken into account, and we observe that governance models promoted do not spread from one country to another like an epidemic (Levin, 1998), without a translation process. There is a hybridation effect on these models due to the institutional and ideological contexts proper to each country. The terms in which the policies are going to develop will be largely dependent on the institutional structures, social contributions and actors forming an education system produced by its history. There is then a hybridation effect of models, consisting in the “superposition, the cross-breeding of different logics, language and practice in policy definition and action, which reinforces their ambiguous and composite character.” (Barroso and Bajomi, 2002, p. 21). This effect can occur at the policy statement stage as well as in their implementation.

Hence these policies are not mechanical transpositions of governance models without recontextualization in terms of the material, political or symbolic constraints of the systems they are adapted to. But, as we have already pointed out, these systems are profoundly different at the outset and are all crisscrossed by numerous forms of tensions and contradictions. The result is that these policies are never the pure pursuit of the models mentioned, because these policies simultaneously generate and bear the trace of tensions and contradictions between actors or between the various policy orientations they impel. In other words, due to the fact that educational systems are relatively “hybrid” and “composite” at the outset, policy hybridation effects develop from the very fact of policy forming processes. These hybridation effects can be illustrated in the various national contexts.

Hybridation in England is first of all linked to the fact that the two models, “the evaluative State” and the “quasi-market”, have been mixed by the policies carried out. This hybridation is partially the result of alternating policies. Thus, in 1988, the Conservative government voted in the Education Reform Act. English analysts have seen this as a result of the alliance between the New Right, more aware of the need to liberalize and modernize the system (whence the abandonment of school sectors, the promotion of choice, and the necessity of raising levels of competence), and the Old Right, more preoccupied with reinforcing traditional values via a reinforced national curriculum, the two poles agreeing on diminishing the power of unions and LEAs (Moore & Hicockx, 1994). If traits of the evaluative State were already present (for ex. the possibility of imposing changes of management or teams for “failing schools”) they were reinforced by the Labour government’s arrival in 1997. In fact, new Labour has not repudiated the structural reforms carried out by the conservatives (for example, the system’s division into different types of schools, the possibility of choice by parents, the possibility of schools selecting students, external evaluation programmes, etc) but have above all insisted on new “goals” to assign to the system in terms of results. It has above all been a question of promoting and raising “school standards” to deal with the weak results of the English system (through the School Standards and Reform Act, 1998); while developing or reinforcing certain programmes, like guidance and teacher surveillance, in order to improve their practice (Teaching and Higher Education Act). Briefly, new Labour has accentuated the central administration’s “dirigisme” (Breuillard and Cole, 2003), as well as accentuating certain key traits of the evaluative State model, without calling into question various inheritances from earlier periods, except those most closely identified with the conservative ideology (for ex. financial support for “deserving” students to attend private schools (Thrupp et alii, 2004).
In the FCB, education policies are always a compromise between the models and the complex, hybrid, or even, contradictory nature of the system itself, whose compatibility is far from being assured. A political will for reinforcing external evaluation, supposed to favour a better quality system, ends up being heavily constrained by existing institutions and the key policy compromises that founded the system (on freedom of instruction, notably). Thus the FCB government is going to develop external evaluation programmes but the results will only be rendered public on the “system” level, without publishing results for the various providers or schools, for fear of encouraging competition between them and thus favouring market logic, which the different parties and key actors rhetorically agree to denounce. Thus the political actors are led to moderate the evaluative State “model” and account for the composite or, even, contradictory character of the institutions and forms of coordination in place, to build a political consensus or respect the constitutional prescription (“freedom of instruction” is in the constitution). (see Maroy, 2000; Draelants et alii, 2003).

In France, hybridation shows up in the insistence placed on developing a “culture of evaluation”. The implementation of external, or semi-external evaluations has in fact developed without being matched with real institutional or economic “sanctions” on schools. The announced goal has been that actors “interiorize” evaluation as a norm and culture. This absence of sanctions may be interpreted as a measure anticipating the opposition and resistance the teachers’ unions or the teachers themselves might develop towards such a system, taking their power in the French context into account. Hence the evaluative State model has been relaxed to limit such oppositions and has been above all presented as a culture to be adopted.

The hybridation of new policies with existing practices and institutions can also contribute to producing effects the opposite of the intentions and goals intended.

Evaluation in France is supposed to be a key tool for correcting and regulating errors and malfunctioning in practice (notably of schools). In the eyes of teachers, it has become a supplementary bureaucratic control, for in its implementation it tends to be uncoupled from real teaching activity. The supposed “post-bureaucratic” logics of evaluation might in this way be reinforcing dominant bureaucratic logics (van Zanten, 2002; Demailly et alii, 2001).

In Portugal, the policy of promoting the autonomy of school management finds one of its favourite relays in the agents of regional education directorship. They are the decentralized vectors of reforms the Central State promotes; hence an autonomy paradoxically promoted by the Central State tends to relaunch the centralizing dynamics already quite present.

2.6 Additive political logics

Finally, the policies mentioned cohabitate with others or are superimposed on existing realities whose normative principles and orientations may be different or opposed. Thus a mosaic effect of educational policies is at play in the sense that what the State constructs with one hand tends to be deconstructed or counterbalanced by what it does with the other. Thus the resulting policy presents an “additive” character whose coherence may be very weak or even contradictory.

Thus, in England, as we have already pointed out, Labour has not repudiated the essence of the structural reforms installed by Mrs. Thatcher’s “neo-liberal” and “neo-Conservative” government (Thrupp et alii, 2004). Besides accentuating “dirigisme”, as mentioned, they have nonetheless set up an affirmative action policy in the form of Education Action Zones, seeking to promote social cohesion, but without for all that challenging other reforms or realities which may contribute to perpetuating inequality in the system: thus for example, “comprehensive schools” cohabitate with the older, more elitist “grammar schools”, which have not been called into question. On the contrary, a policy more in favour of school offer “variety” (via “specialist schools”) has been promoted, against the spirit of “comprehensivism”. Similarly, all promotion
of the quasi-market logic (via “open enrolment”, autonomy of management, publishing performances) has not been repudiated.

In Hungary, we witness the development of secondary schools equipped with long selective tracks, schooling youths between 10 and 12 years of age, whereas from time to time, in certain local regulatory spaces and - between 1998-2002 – on a national level, measures were taken with a view to overcoming the reinforcement of inequalities, where they tried to consolidate the positions of fundamental schools supposed to ensure equal schooling for all children between 6 and 14 years of age.

Belgium simultaneously aims at reinforcing the capacity for regulatory action by the State (via the definition of missions, basic curricular objectives, baseline evaluation models) while further recognizing and institutionalizing relatively autonomous intermediate regulations (the various providers within the system).

Intermediate Conclusion

Like a number of others in Europe or North America (Whitty et al., 1998; Green et alii, 1999), the countries studied have experienced major reforms of modes of institutional regulation of their educational systems over the past twenty years. The variety of countries and the number of countries affected by these reforms suggest that these changes are not just coincidental but appear to signal a change of administration of institutional regulation (Whitty et al., 1998). The “bureaucratic-professional” model of educational system regulation had accompanied, with important national variants, the construction and development of the “mass” national educational systems of the 1950s/60s. That model of regulation now finds itself undermined by educational policies whose orientation may be diverse but which, in varying proportions, tend to substitute or superimpose on these earlier modes of regulation new institutional arrangements, such as the promotion of evaluation (of results, functioning, personnel), the definition of objective curricular standards, the promotion of free choice for parents, the autonomy of management and pedagogical autonomy of schools, the development of continuing education and “proximate” accompaniment of professionals, the decentralization of States’ educational competences to intermediate or local grades. To give us an overall sense of these transformations, we have deemed it useful to employ the ‘evaluative State’ and the ‘quasi-market’ models, which seem to us on the horizon of orientations followed, even if in different proportions and intensities. A form of partial convergence around a new “post-bureaucratic” regime of regulation seems to be emerging in the five realities involved.

Yet this observation of partial convergence as to objectives pursued by these “reforms” does not signify that the policies be identical, on the one hand, because of initial differences in the systems, the effects of hybridation of policies with existing institutional realities and, on the other hand, because of differences in the voluntarism of policies (more or less “reformer”) and, finally, because of differences of accents sometimes placed on parents’ choices and market, and sometimes on evaluation.

These changes in institutional regulation and policy will presently be focussed on through an analysis of the intermediate levels of regulation that have been the objects of particular attention in our project. We will then ask, in concluding, about the principal internal or external factors in school systems that can explain the evolutions of institutional regulations mentioned so far.

3 The evolution of intermediate regulations: forms and agents in six school spaces

Investigation of the evolution of modes of institutional regulation of a system can reach an impasse on the intermediate levels of regulation. The institutions, organizations and agents participating on this intermediate level vary greatly across European countries but they share the common point of being situated between central public authorities and schools. They have developed analogous functions in terms of regulation. We are dealing here with public steering authorities and/or networks of actors (private and/or public) who, in various ways, seek to guide the conduct of actors in schools (directors or teachers). Their regulatory actions may focus on various objects: offer, student or teacher assignment among schools in the same territory, the functioning of individual schools or, again, the work of teachers. These
actions may take the form of control regulations effectuating reductions and transfers between central regulations and schools. They may also be considered as autonomous regulations.

To the extent that the heart of our research is investigating effective regulation of educational practice in the schools within the various local spaces in each of the countries studied, these intermediate regulatory activities have come in for special attention in our project (WP 7 and 8). So we are going to prolong our analysis of the evolution of institutional regulations while seeking to know the extent to which these intermediate regulatory entities and agents are affected, transformed or reinforced (or not) in each of the national contexts, doing this relying on the case studies carried out in the 6 regional or local institutional spaces.

The purpose of this paragraph then is to analyse empirically the evolution of intermediate regulations concerning some structural questions. How is their role evolving in the configuration of all institutional regulations? Is their importance increasing? What institutional or organizational forms are they taking? What are the professional and social characteristic of their agents? What is the nature of their work and their action? What tensions and contradictions do they encounter in their missions and actions?

Intermediate regulations are often greatly affected by the policy modifications in modes of regulation already mentioned; hence more and more they form a “fragmented multi-regulation”, describing which sociologists of public action today use the terms: coordination, governance, mediation, partnership, community of action, and networks. Hence showing us in particular the multiplicity of entities and actors present in the space considered, or what we might call the level of multi-regulation. We shall also envisage their degree of privatization, their functional and hierarchical relations as well as the coordination plans present between these entities. We shall also look into the organizational forms and technical tools mobilized, before situating the properties of their agents, and the new “professional figures”, the new occupations that are appearing to do regulation work on this level.

The analysis is derived from research work done in WPs 7 and 8 (See the deliverable 8 proper to each country and the transversal analysis by Demailly and Maroy, 2004). A word on the methodology used. We carried out six case studies - in five countries. The units studied are space(s) and regulatory entities institutionally relevant in each country. Moreover, their fields of competence cover “spaces of competition and interdependence between schools” studied in another part of the research (see section 3). In other words, these local spaces of competition and interdependence form part of territories where these intermediate regulatory bodies studied exercise their activities.

For Portugal, this involves the Regional Directorship of Education for the Lisbon region (DREL), a territory with 590,000 students, or 30 % of the country, heavily urbanized, with major economic development, a population education level above the national mean, but with strong social contrasts. The activity of a municipality within it has also been studied (Lingua). The Lille case deals with the biggest French academy (outside the Paris region), or 4 million inhabitants, 1 million of them students (but, in comparison with the Portuguese case, only 6% of the national territory), 41% subsidized, a high unemployment rate, a relatively weak presence of the middle and upper classes. The study of France also includes territories (academic inspections corresponding to the departments of the Seine Saint-Denis and the Val de Marne) belonging to Créteil academy (Paris region), 800,000 students, 31% subsidized, an equally high unemployment rate, a population more socially contrasted than in Lille and with more conflictual professional relationships. For Hungary, we are dealing with a district of Budapest (the XXVIIIth to use its pseudonym) formerly a working class quarter with 80,000 inhabitants, in strong demographical diminution. In England, we are dealing with the District of Wyeham (around 8,000 students), a very poor area (47.6 % of students benefit from free meals) a London enclave with a significant middle class population. The case chosen for Belgium is different from all the others from one angle: the field of study of intermediate regulations does not coincide with an administrative territory. The analysis deals with intermediate...

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29 This notion of intermediate regulation has already been used in OECD works on decision making in educational systems. These are decision making levels situated between the level of the school and central government in educational systems (OECD 1995). These are thus either decisions taken on the municipal level or the district level (lower intermediate level) or decisions on a regional level or by deconcentrated central government authorities (upper intermediate level). The first authorities are the level of decision making closest to schools, whereas the second are situated immediately below governmental decision making authorities.
regulation authorities and agents from various providers who intervene in the Charleroi school basin. These providers are not organized according to the same territorial division: the Diocese of Tournai for the Catholic schools, the Province of Hainaut and the town of Beaurenard of the Charleroi region for the provincial and municipal schools and a “zone” in the Charleroi region for the State schools. The structure of the population (400,000 inhabitants) and of employment still remains deeply marked by the industrial decline and the slow reconversion process. As in the neighbouring Nord Pas de Calais, the number of students declined 17% between 1988 and 2000.\textsuperscript{30} The reader will find in appendix (table 4) a presentation of the collective actors (decentralized administrations, territorial policy groups, private instruction, and private operators) present and studied in each of the zones investigated.

One might object that the comparative study deals with completely heterogeneous socio-demographic groups: in terms of size or relative weight in the school systems considered or, further, on the functional level, because one does not steer a group of 800,000 students like a group of 8,000. These differences refer in fact to national specificities: the size of the country and above all differences in centralizing or decentralized policies. It is only logical that the territories where intermediate regulations function, and hence are observed, in decentralized systems be much smaller than those of centralized systems. One might also object that the detail of what is observed in each field is not equivalent (cf. table 1 in appendix) and finally that certain fields were chosen for their innovative character, prefiguring future evolutions (Wyeham, Lille), others not: reasons of feasibility have in fact decided certain choices.

What assures comparability for us is the empirical implementation of the concept of intermediate regulation as we have defined it. The comparison has also been made possible thanks to a common methodology. In the six cases studied, we conducted interviews (with analogous interview grids, guided by the same theoretical referents) with management from different hierarchical levels and different providers, assembling local documentation, observing meetings, and following at least one operation relevant to regulatory actions, whether it concern teachers' work, school offer or functioning.

We shall present a comparative description of the state and dynamics of intermediate regulations from two successive angles: first, as to institutional forms and organizational means, then as to agents doing the work of regulation. Finally, we will ask questions about the tendential effects of these intermediate regulations in terms of their control over schools and teachers.

3.1 Development of intermediate regulations

In all the school spaces and countries observed, with the exception of England, we have witnessed a development in intermediate regulation. The size of their means are growing (in terms of personnel or resources), new systems of coordination or consultation are being developed in some of the countries (in France, Belgium and Hungary) or again we witness an accentuation of the autonomy or policy influence of these entities. Yet this development has assumed diverse forms depending on the national contexts, and depending on the structural characteristics of the educational systems and educational policies carried out. These are most often major legislative texts (or major policy turning points) setting off a process of reinforcement of intermediate regulations, whose local forms then differ according to the variety of local actors and policies at stake. Downstream, more autonomous regulatory initiatives combine with institutional control regulations.

In France and Portugal, these intermediate regulations have essentially been promulgated in stride with a policy of “deconcentration” and “decentralization” of State powers. Thus numerous entities developed, dependent either on the central ministry (decentralized administrations such “the academy”, “academic inspections”, the “regional directorships of education”), or on various “territorial collectivities” at varied levels (“regions” “departments” or “municipalities”). Their action is in turn democratized via numerous more or less transversal programmes and initiatives (bassins d’emploi-formation, districts scolaires). Besides the central State's political will (much stronger in France than in Portugal), reinforcement of intermediate regulation proceeds from the dynamics of local actors who ensure its development, in very different ways.

\textsuperscript{30} The names chosen for the municipalities are fictional in the cases of Beaurenard, Lingua, Wyeham and the XXVIII th district.
In Hungary, reinforcing the role of municipalities has taken place in the context of a weakening of central regulation and of increasing autonomy for schools. The change of political regime at the end of the 1980s reinforced the municipalities as key actors in regulation (initially as owners and managers of their schools; and, during a second phase involving strategic planification, the adoption of programmes or evaluation, etc.). The intermediate regulatory entities situated on a wider scale either have less power, this is the case of departments, or have been eliminated, as is the case of inspections. So reinforcement of intermediate regulation has taken place here with a backdrop of the Central State weakening regulations, in a more general context of liberalizing education (development of an educational services market), coupled with mistrust of the Central State. Intermediate regulation, on the municipal rather than the departmental level, has benefited.

In the French Community of Belgium (FCB), since the “missions” decree (1997), the regulatory activities of various providers ("réseaux d’enseignement" et “pouvoirs organisateurs”) have both been increasingly supervised as well as reinforced and recognized, whereas central norms have elsewhere been hardened. In fact, the pouvoirs organisateurs (organizing powers) go back quite far in the system and their structures of intervention are very contrastive. Thus the development of intermediate entities originates in an earlier autonomous initiative, but these entities henceforth fit into a stronger sort of control regulation emanating from the Central State. These intermediate organizations become willy-nilly auxiliaries and/or allies in a desire for increasing supervision of schools (in areas of offer or teaching work). From the outset, this process has unfolded in a context where the school system is quite decentralized and the State rather weak.

In England, since passage of the Education Reform Act (ERA, 1988), the intermediate regulation exercised by the Local Education Authority (LEA) has weakened to the advantage of development of central regulation by the State and by promotion of autonomous management of schools (Local management of Schools). The Central State defines itself less and less as a provider “of school services” or, even, as the financier of this education offer, but it sooner presents itself as “an evaluative State”, establishing standards to be attained and evaluation methods. Thus definition of a national curriculum and setting up independent and private evaluation authorities (Ofsted), the promotion of managerial culture and techniques, of free choice and quasi-market mechanisms are all key features supposed to contribute to the improvement of the system’s performances. Under these conditions, the LEAs are no longer autonomous entities able to define their own policy with sizeable latitude. They have increasingly become relays and “mediators” in applying and following up national policies.

3.2 Multiregulation, fragmentation and privatization

If we find a variety of intermediate regulatory entities everywhere, their number, their status (public, private, private-market), their relations (of hierarchy, of competition, of complementarity, of juxtaposition, etc.) and their respective weights vary greatly. And what is more, there exists a very unequal, and very unequally encouraged, development of coordination systems between these entities.

Here we will look into the degree of multi-regulation of the spaces observed and their degree of privatization: are these organized regulatory activities conducted by private entities (for profit or not) (Levin, 2001) ? We shall also study the coordination programmes present. The hypothesis underpinning this questioning is that the new modes of regulation of educational systems — and the theoretical and ideological discourse on the “governance” rather than “government” of public action underlying these modes (Merrien, 1998; Stoker, 1998; Lallement, 1997) — should tend to encourage multi-regulation, by, for example, stimulating the participation of various stakeholders within “dialogue” or “consultation” councils or committees, the promotion of partnership between public and private actors, “decompartmentalization” between various functionally differentiated public regulatory authorities, or “dialogue” between levels of local, intermediate and central government. At the same time, these new modes of regulation would have as their goal setting up transversal programmes for “coordination of coordination authorities” (Jessop, 1995).

We can in fact ask the extent to which the forms and modes of regulation on intermediate levels match (or not) the normative discourses on governing insisting that “good governance is where the State beats a retreat, loses its power, becomes modest, and works by network, with interests and private groups, in the role of a partner hardly superior to others. […] In some way we are moving from of a process of
government “from the top down” to an interactionist process” (Merrien, 1998: 62-63). The paradoxical counterpart of this type of evolution and model for schools may yet be to contribute to the fragmentation of their institutional environment in Meyer and Scott's sense. In this type of fragmented environment, the school “is dependent on and penetrated by numerous, semi-independent organizations and social actors, each presenting possibly conflicting, and at best uncoordinated sets of demands and pressures” (Meyer/Scott/Strang, 1987:187).

The real situation in the spaces observed is in fact much more complex and above all much more contradictory than the optimistic speeches on governance would have us think.

Multi-regulation is present in all the spaces observed but to various extents. Thus it is particularly strong in the FCB where there have long been various independent providers. In France and Hungary, multi-regulation has been reinforced in the last few years. On the contrary, it is still limited in Portugal, whereas in England, the simplification of regulatory entities has given way to a multiplication of programmes and projects bringing about a fragmentation of Central State policies which “transit” by the LEAs.

The privatization of regulatory activities is also in progress, but its development is very unequal depending on the country - and not always recent. In the FCB and England regulatory actions are directly entrusted to private actors. In the FCB, it is the “free” Catholic teaching which, of long date but increasingly, is officially recognized as an intermediate entity, just like public entities on the national, provincial or communal level. In England, and particularly in the borough of Wyeham, which we observed, regulation may be successively entrusted to a private firm or non-profit organization. In Hungary, besides the Churches that manage their own schools, whose number is still low but on the upswing, private agents are seen subcontracting various regulatory activities via the development of a market of “educational counselling” services, also present in England and Belgium. On the contrary, in Portugal and France, intermediate regulation remains essentially in the hands of actors and entities with public status.

In the intermediate spaces considered, the development of numerous regulatory entities with various statuses (public, private), on various levels (local, regional, national “decentralized”) has made regulatory actions considerably more complex and, above all, has reinforced the fragmentation of this regulation and the institutional environment of schools. To what point is multi-regulation fragmented? Or, on the contrary, are there attempts at coordinating and “defragmenting” this multi-regulation? Again the situation appears singularly contrastive. At Lille attempts at coordination are most developed, attempting to go beyond the problems of coordination and legitimacy between entities at very varied levels of legitimacy and expertise. The goal is to “work hand in hand” but, in fact, incoherencies and contradictions remain numerous. On the contrary, in Hungary and the FCB, the regulatory authorities are fragmented, separate and even in competition and essentially independent. Briefly, the coordination of coordination is totally absent, except for the new consultative areas which have been installed between the Belgian providers, or between towns and departments in Hungary but which still remain quite frail. For that matter, in Portugal and the Creteil academy in France, a certain hierarchy of power and legitimacy between national public authorities and local entities tends to lead to a division of labour, power and expertise among these authorities. Finally England, if it has not increased the number of regulatory authorities on the intermediate level, has multiplied its programmes, it being precisely up to the agents of the LEAs and schools to sort out the incoherencies and contradictions.

3.3 Towards post-bureaucratic organizational forms?

Beyond the institutional morphology of entities in charge of intermediate regulation, we asked ourselves about the type of organizational or technical means set up to do regulation work. It is important here to distinguish the opposition between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic forms. A bureaucratic structure is characterized by the size of the hierarchy and the horizontal division of work, founded on formal and general rules. Control and coordination by definition involve procedures and rules, conformity control being central. On the level of principles of legitimacy, the bureaucratic model, on the one hand, involves a positive reference to respect for the rule of law and, on the other hand, a valorization of rationality (Weber, 1995 [1922]). In efficient practice, such a model only functions in permanently doctoring between various deviations from rules and official arrangements, thereby adapting functioning to particular situations (Crozier, 1963).
“Post-bureaucratic” forms are by definition forms in transition, that are in rupture, but still partially descendent from bureaucratic forms. We point out some typical traits:

1) From the normative viewpoint, on the level of legitimacy principles, the valorization of rules and conformity to rules tend to make way for a valorization of results (Duran, 1999), a search for efficiency that can even range to a form of obligatory results. Rationality remains valorized but is more and more reduced to instrumental rationality.

2) From the viewpoint of structures, functional and hierarchical divisions are relaxed: shortcutting hierarchical lines, setting up horizontal structures which seek to alleviate the compartmentalization of strict functional divisions. Thus we see the development of evolutive structures, or ones simultaneously based on hybrid hierarchical and professional principles (matricial organization); elsewhere, numerous coordinational and consultative locales or structures are developing, combining agents of different hierarchical or functional origin. In a limited way, the network model can be substituted here for the bureaucratic model with its hierarchical-functional divisions (Veltz, 2000).

3) From the viewpoint of modes of coordination and control, conformity control tends to decrease in intensity and increasingly make room for other forms of coordination: first of all, evaluation of results (with regard to fixed goals) or, in a more reduced way, evaluation as a mode of organization of “reflexivity” and the “advertising of public action”, without strict and direct relation to predefined goals. Subsequently, various tools of socialization/diffusion of normative and technical reference systems, of norms, values, and “organizational cultures” can also be used as key modes of coordination.

This “postbureaucratic” context justifies the attention we have lent to “tools” and the material and immaterial technologies in use (Demailly, 2002). In fact, while the rule is one of the key instruments in a bureaucratic model, various tools of objectification, evaluation, communication, and training, etc., become strategic in an organizational context marked by modes of coordination and control based on evaluation (of processes or results) and the transformation of “good” practices into norms.

In the spaces observed, we witness the rise of a managerial rhetoric everywhere, in affinity with “postbureaucratic” forms, inspired by “new public management” or school management theories. Definition of goals, projects, evaluation, “worksites”, self-evaluation, accompaniment, steering, “client” logics, etc., more and more form part of the vocabulary of many regulatory agents in all the countries examined.

Yet post-bureaucratic structures are not developing with the same intensity in all the spaces observed. We add that when these structures develop, it is usually within an “additive” logic, where they are superimposed onto earlier structures (usually bureaucratic) without doing away with them. In fact three situations coexist.

**Significant development of post-bureaucratic forms**

Post-bureaucratic forms appear above all in England and in the academy of Lille. In Wyeham (a borough of London), due to many “project” appeals, a logic of “contracts” and evaluation between schools and the Learning Trust (LT), in charge of intermediate regulation since 2002, is being set up. Everyone receives defined (or negotiated) goals to be attained (targets) both by the schools and local education authorities and the students. These tools are matched by the distribution of normative models (related to the functioning of the school or educational teams) defining the context in which thought and action is to be guided within that school. On the normative level, reference is first made to efficacity, to the “performativity” of modes of functioning, without, for all that, suppressing all other normative references, notably to “equity”. In Wyeham, as for all New Labour policies, it seems that pragmatism is the order of the day; choosing “what works”, what gets results. Whence the strong evolution of organizational and institutional structures of intermediate agencies in the borough of Wyeham.

In fact, the activities of these regulatory bodies' organizations and agents are highly operationalized on all levels via various long distance control tools – meaning both the actions of LT agents and the schools’. Wyeham LT service managers, for example, orient practices via the play of financial calendars and bids, following the use of funds in school development plans and activities or, again, by encouraging “good practices” in training sessions.
In Lille too, we discover a number of characteristics of these post-bureaucratic forms combining with earlier bureaucratic tools. Besides steering via “worksites”, evaluation development in all its forms, and measures for accompanying and training actors in schools, we find a concern to promote various programmes of horizontal coordination (“multi-categorial groups”, forms of matricial organization, etc). The tools mobilized in this activity are particularly well developed: the use of national student performance evaluation tools, the development of academy or school “control panels”, audits, the rise of “human resources” and support for institutional self-evaluation. Beyond the tools, structures and control methods, a rationalization of organized and educational action is sought through the promotion of reflexivity and institutional evaluation, the advertising of action and its results, by the construction of spaces for “dialogue” between actors.

**Compartmental development of tools and modes of post-bureaucratic organization in a dominant bureaucratic context**

These post-bureaucratic forms are very gradually appearing in the other spaces observed. Thus, in the Créteil academy, the backdrop remains a bureaucratic type functional and hierarchical division within a deconcentrated administration, opposing the political functions (the rectorship) to the administrative functions, supposed to technically implement the decisions of the first types of actors. Yet certain local situations and initiatives appear innovative (like, for example, the partnership between a voluntarist municipality and the academy in the education area) and lend a certain plausibility to a post-bureaucratic rhetoric seeking additional coordination between the different regulators or operators. Similarly, certain academic inspectors are seeking to develop a properly political role on the level of their department of responsibility and foster various consultative relationships with territorial communities. Yet the latter remain more related to issues of enrolment and justification, to the advantage of the logic promoted by the academic inspection than relations of open horizontal co-operation. For that matter, in the Val-de-Marne, there is wide use of evaluation in academic inspection.

The situation is fairly similar in Portugal or, again, in Hungary. Thus, for example, the DRELs mode of functioning is predominantly of a hierarchical and bureaucratic type, both in the most routine administrative activities and in promoting “policies” and “reforms” brought by the central government.

Yet the base staff as well as the intermediate and higher management insist on the need to go beyond bureaucratic logic and valorize “service” relationships with schools, with more informal and personalized responses to their demands. For that matter, we are also witnessing the timid appearance of “project logics” within the DREL.

In Hungary, the organization of the municipality of the XXVIIIth district of Budapest is also clearly hierarchical-functional, with a division of work between administration and political council. The services of the municipality make use of “development plans”, but also, more recently, have recourse to evaluations, notably relative to student performance. In accord with a private counselling company, the municipality has also developed an “instrument of self-evaluation” for each school's functioning. The municipality's service regularly brings the heads together, but in a context of tough competition between schools there will hardly be co-operation between actors. So if, on the municipality level, we glimpse the appearance of tools which might serve in a post-bureaucratic organizational logic (notably bids and evaluations), these last remain rather tentative innovations.

**The coexistence of prebureaucratic and bureaucratic forms**

In the Francophone Community of Belgium (FCB), the variety of intermediate regulatory entities is matched by a variety of modes of organization, ranging from a bureaucratic organization to a community organization, in a network originating more in a pre-bureaucratic than a post-bureaucratic logic.

On the one hand, with variants belonging to them alone, the province, the town of Beaurenard and the FCB have set up bureaucratic logics where functional compartmentalization, the separation between policy and administration are characteristic. The functional division of work, the definition of rules and conformity control are hence key resources in coordination. Each of its entities tends to organize the regulation of teaching work, the regulation of schools or the regulation of relations between them according to separate functional logics (with a clear distinction between pedagogical and administrative services, for example).
Elsewhere, the Catholic provider functions more on the basis of ideological solidarities and a multitude of spots for adjustment and consultation between the different members, some situated in the context of Charleroi or the diocese, and others on the FCB level. Coordination takes place less by standard rules than by a culture of adjustment and consensus where everyone can affirm a different viewpoint, as long as every effort is made to finally ensure a search for practical solutions. This logic of coordination supposes a shared ideological and cultural substratum (a consensus on Christian humanism) and also a strong density of places and channels of communication between the various network components (in the sociological sense of the term).

3.4 The work of regulatory agents: European convergences

A study of structures would not make sense without a parallel study of its actors. We have observed that the agents have margins for manoeuvre: the effects of a fragmented multi-regulation are strongly dependent on effective relations between organizations (autonomy and power relations), informal or, even, clandestine processes, initiated by agents and authorities where they work. It is indispensable then to study the practice of these agents to understand the reality of intermediate regulations.

For obvious reasons, it is hard to systematically and exhaustively describe the cluster of agents who take charge of intermediate educational system regulations in the European countries studied. These agents, whose number, as we have seen, has a tendency to increase and whose status is diversified, range from removable high civil servants to career employed civil servants to consultants, passing in review the various forms with precarious status. Their place in these hierarchical relationships is just as varied. Any categorization possible is based on the level of individual autonomy, the prestige of their functions, and their time of direct interaction with teachers, which is inversely proportionate to their position in the hierarchy.

Their forms of expertise combine capacities and skills for activities which can be analytically distinguished in this way: political and strategic capacities (to “govern” an educational system, to participate in its “governance”); pedagogical capacities, involving student-teacher relationships; administrative skills (for “managing” the tools, jobs, debts and social aid, etc.), as well as capacities for coordinating action.

These different components of organized action can be either intermingled (England and Hungary), departmentalized (France, Creteil), slightly mixed because of gulfs between the administrative and pedagogical (Belgium and Portugal), mixed by political will after a tradition of compartmentalization (France, Lille). Each authority participates in the other’s legitimacy in an atmosphere of pacific coexistence or, even, courteous co-operation, or, inversely, in increasing tension (Creteil), where everyone tends to discredit everyone else.

The contents and goals of regulatory missions are concretely coloured by public policies, which lend specific contents to the very vague terms of “quality” or “efficacity” or “equality”, but are also interpreted by the agents themselves. It is here that the professional ethos and ethical-political positions of agents play a powerful filtering role, of modulation and interpretation, which moves in the direction of an increasing voluntarism or, on the contrary, in the direction of inertia or resolute resistance to injunctions handed down to them. The ethos encountered are myriad and can sometimes be in tension in the same agent: 1) humanism; 2) attachment to rules as guarantors of equity for users, to law as a source of rationality; 3) elitism; 4) democratization of positions (struggling against school failure among socially underprivileged children); 5) organizational modernism (valorizing the rationalization of action, of the culture of evaluation, of thrifty management, of autonomy for first line actors, controlled a posteriori).

A point of convergence we can point out in these agents’ work is that it has become the object of a rationalization process achieved in three ways: reflexivity, tools, and the competition brought to bear by subcontracting.

Reflexivity: either the fact that lower management and middle management are inclined to take the time to discuss their ways of acting together, and with others. Upper management request studies from university researchers which give them a picture of their ways of functioning and its effects. This also brings to mind important developments in the training of trainers, or the many seminars for regulatory agents where a “common supervision culture” is presented as a practical ideal and where calling one’s own practices into
question is an exigency that cannot be imposed on others (teachers, schools) without being imposed on oneself.

Tools: its development is rather general, with a minimum in Belgium and a maximum in England.

Subcontracting: this is the third method possible for rationalizing the work of regulatory agents. Practiced in Hungary and England, it implies a form of externalization and privatization of services (pedagogical or school management) by recourse to bids.

These three rationalization procedures do not eliminate the “irrationalities” in functioning, whether they be due to forms of routine or disorder or be due to the role of ethical engagements.

We also looked into the possible emergence of specific professionalities involving intermediate regulation of educational systems in Europe. We propose three types. The first is transnational (except in Hungary31), and involves the proximate regulatory agent. The second is met with frequently and involves the “politicized” regulatory agent, assuming leadership tasks. The third is rare, but presents a certain consistency and busies the imagination of a certain number of deciders, he is the expert-consultant-agent rationalizer.

**Proximate regulatory agents: agents of accompaniment and persuasion**

These agents are middle level agents that are directly in contact with teachers or principals. The names of their occupations may vary depending on and even within the countries: they may be “pedagogical counsellors”, “accompanying agents”, “inspectors” or “trainers”. Through their work, they have direct contact with teachers. In this respect, there is a proximity to school professionals. Their official mission is often to “help” teachers in their work, to inform and/or train them about reforms, new pedagogical tools. Sometimes, they have an evaluation role as do inspectors. These occupations may be old (such as inspectors) or new, at least in certain countries: such as pedagogical counsellors. These agents present common characteristics: positive and happy experiences as teachers, a lively interest in pedagogy and professional training and development procedures or, even, of professional mobility. Characterized by a positive identity, involved and often motivated, they often see themselves as the bearers of new pedagogical norms — a constructivist pedagogy, differentiated by competencies, by cycles — and become their interpreters and sometimes even producers. This is why they do indeed form a professional elite within the teaching corps, an elite which can claim both field experience and a capacity for reflexive distance.

They are often faced with dilemmas and tensions in their relationships with teachers: their whole work consists in striking a balance between setting up a *rapport d’intéressement* (use of rules, knowledge and power in order to convince the teacher to act in a certain direction) and a *rapport d’évaluation* (use of rules and power in order to evaluate or control the teacher) (Eymard-Duvernay/Marchal, 1994), which does not endanger the enrolment of first line actors (Callon/Latour, 1991). Their work is generally appreciated by their colleagues, as long as they do not construct an overly technicist distance from daily pedagogical practice.

**The highly politicized manager**

Assuming directorial tasks, the “politicized” regulatory agent characteristically fits educational problems into a wider social context. His work time is mostly spent in meetings and in local negotiations and is organized around three components: 1) logistical and indirect budgetary management of school units (financial flow, student flow, flow of teachers, flow of tools); 2) politics, future strategy, visions of the system's evolution; 3) emergencies (accidents, sexual aggressions, “affairs”...).

This is an experienced professional who was a teacher at the beginning of his career and has a sense of the general interest or, even, of public service. He is politicized, either because he fits in as a “pillar” of society (in the French Community of Belgium) and is then by definition “politically marked”, or, in countries with traditionally neutral public administration (in France or Portugal), because he has lost his neutrality, 31

In a country where the administration has undergone considerable transformation since the regime change, the work of teachers has not so far been the object of significant interventions.
because his partisan allegiances or his ideological and ethical positions have become more visible and more “normal” in the context of developing intermediate regulations.

**The rationalizing expert**

The rationalizing expert has the status of an independent expert and works as an outsider in public regulatory entities. If he is employed, it is based on a relatively short term contract (a year or more) or with a strong turnover, which allows him to avoid having to assume long term working relationships in the “field”. His position in fact forbids his taking root, he should keep a certain distance from situations. He follows a path that may have nothing to do with teaching, but has to do with professional management. He believes in management. He is the defender of its quality, its efficacity, its objectivity, thus justifying his independent position and his “aloofness” from situations. His speech is critical of schools: the incompetence of staff, low expectation levels or weak leadership. He supports the idea that from time in time we should know how to scare pedagogical teams to get them moving (threaten closing, for example). He is held in low esteem and judged to be totally incompetent by the “field”, but may fascinate upper management bereft of a model (notably in France), or politicians who believe in the market economy (in Hungary) and politicians whose tool he is (in England).

It is possible that other professions emerge out of intermediate regulatory management (for example, agents in charge of horizontal coordination). We have limited ourselves to three professions which appear most consistent, most transnational, and most possessed of the specific professional skills intermediate regulatory organizations tend to develop.

3.5 Tendential effects: an increase in control regulation?

We are not going treat here all the effects or products of intermediate regulations – notably on the processes producing inequalities and segregations among schools. We shall return to this in sections 3 and 4. For the moment, we are going to concentrate on the tendential effects of these regulations on supervision and control of personnel. Talking about tendential effects signifies that we do not understand the notion of effect in the strong sense of objectively produced and duly observed effects. It is rather a matter of discovering the orientations and coherencies resulting from the decisions and actions of authorities and agents in intermediate regulation, and asking about their probable, improbable or impossible effects.

In most of the zones observed, the development or evolution of intermediate regulatory forms is justified by rhetoric, in appealing to an improvement in the “quality” of education systems, whether this be in the form of improvements in national “standards” (England, France and the FCB), adaptations and responses to expectations and needs of local users (Portugal, Hungary and France) or, further, of efficiency and economic rationalization of the means used (the FCB, Hungary and France). Reference to greater equality or equity of education service rendered while not absent is rarer (notably in the FCB, Lille, and in the XXIII\textsuperscript{th} District of Budapest). These justifications are invoked to guaranty a greater supervision of local practices of schools and the actors composing them (principally directors and teachers).

In all the countries, this political effort results practically in an increase of control, of supervision of the practices of these actors, except perhaps in Hungary where this tendency is almost absent. Yet, this tendency is not exclusively concretized by the action and mediation of entities of intermediate regulation.

Intermediate regulation plays a significant role in this increase of control, above all in England, France, in the FCB, and to a lesser extent in Portugal. In all these countries, there are regulations simultaneously imposed directly by the Central State on schools and their teachers (for ex. via the Ofsted in England, via ministerial services in Portugal, France or Belgium). We have seen elsewhere that the intermediate entities also had latitudes of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Central State, which may be very variable, some being almost exclusively relays (England and Portugal), while others enjoy veritable margins of institutional autonomy to carry out their own policies (France and the FCB).

Moreover, there are considerable local variations within each country that are hard to account for exhaustively. All the teams suggest various factors in variation, sometimes linked to entities present, to congruency or, on the contrary, to contradictions between different entities participating in “multi-regulation”, and sometimes to effective relations between actors and their respective logics of action.
Nonetheless, beyond these variations, we propose the following hypothesis concerning reinforcement of supervision of teachers or directors by intermediate regulation. We have observed that the countries where schools’ supervision is most accentuated are, simultaneously, the countries where post-bureaucratic forms of coordination and control are most prominently installed, even if this be to varying degrees and on wider or narrower objects. Thus, it is probably in England and, to a lesser extent, in Lille that these post-bureaucratic forms are most vital. Accordingly, in Weyham, the expectation “of accountability” is strongest, where each level (including the intermediate regulatory entities) is simultaneously subject to “targets” to follow and evaluation of results. There is also increasingly management by “projects” and “specific programmes” (with financial criteria and their own goals) seeking to mobilize personnel on all levels, whether this involve intermediate regulation or schools. If these numerous projects cause incoherencies and lack of coordination by this very fact, they originate in a tendency towards the hyper-regulation (Thrupp et alii, 2004) of field actors, on various objects. The organizational control here relies on post-bureaucratic forms, making appeal as much to process and results evaluations, as to regulation by orientation of financial means and calendars, and finally by a work of diffusion of values, and language tools deriving from managerialism. If these orientations are objects of resistance, among teachers or their union organizations (on their principles), if they become the objects of a more “technical” denunciation by intermediate agents in charge of applying them (more on means than on principles), they nonetheless seem to influence their practices, notably for guiding the work of intermediate regulatory agents and school actors.

In France too, and particularly in Lille, the new forms of post-bureaucratic organization and coordination embrace a type of coherence that undeniably touches all the first line actors: more transparency, explanation, reflexivity, publicizing of projects and practice, and collective work. More decompartmentalization of competences and territories, decompartmentalization of the administrative and pedagogical, decompartmentalization of the administrative and political (struggle against the “private hunts”, the “States” within a State, networks of influence), more globalized approaches (to the school, the child). We witness here a rationalization of public action, whether this be on the level of offer, where group planification tends to replace savage competition, or on the level of schools, obliged to reflect on themselves, with teachers invited to take an interest in the pedagogical effects of their action. Yet all this does not signify that every actor and his logics be henceforth “aligned”, far from it, but we do indeed see that the new pragmatic constraints weigh on everybody's action (the demand for rationalization and publicizing) without the result aimed at being attained for all that.

This preoccupation with reflexivity and rendering practice coherent is to be found to a lesser degree in the FCB, particularly on the level of regulating teachers' pedagogical work. Growth in the volume of proximate pedagogical staff, reinforcement of their role with teachers, development of tools for structuring teachers’ practices, are perceived as vectors of improvement, of harmonization of teaching practice, favourable to both the quality and equity of the education system. This regulation of teachers' practice by proximate agents, which has also developed in other contexts, thus engenders difficult relationships with teachers, relationships which combine a double rapport to the rule: a rapport d'intéressement and a rapport d'évaluation. These proximate staff members have to manage the tools or the rules, to convince teachers to use or respect them, whereas, at the same time, these staff also use the same tools or the same rules to evaluate, control and transmit a normative order to teachers, and enjoin them to adhere to “good practices”.

In three of these countries, where post-bureaucratic forms have developed to varying degrees, we do finally observe, to different extents and on variously understood objects, an attempt at a “proactive” policy of regulating and orienting the practice of base personnel, whose agents of intermediate regulation are relays, and/or autonomous initiators. This policy is more or less efficient, more or less in step with the field. It may have a sizeable fictional dimension, above all when the ultimate goal of decisions presented as anti-bureaucratic turns out to be cost management and turning budgetary rationing over to schools.

This situation is also present in Portugal but to a lesser degree. Thus we should point out that the development of decentralized bodies and intermediate regulation by the DREL seems to have favoured a reinforcement of centralized control thanks to a more intensive follow-up of the application of norms or central policy. In effect, the proximity of the professional culture of DREL agents to the schools and their practices of adjustment and adaptation there plays a “facilitating” role that is not negligible in the implantation of the reforms, helping schools adapt to governmental directives and helping government
convince them of the wellfoundedness of the reforms (some intermediate services have adopted “soft regulation” via “help and follow-up”). Besides legislative evolution, one of the factors reinforcing the “efficiency” of decentralized regulation is thus linked to actors, to their mediatory role in reform implantation. This mediatory efficacy of intermediate regulatory agents forges important links in the central strategies of State regulation.

4 Developmental conditions and variational factors in administrating post-bureaucratic regulation

Our analysis of the evolution of modes of institutional regulation is founded on analysis of educational policies which have been applied in the last twenty years in the five national realities considered, notably those which affect modes of regulation within secondary teaching. Hence the procedure was first to synthesize the existing literature. This analysis was completed by case studies dealing with six spaces relevant to intermediate regulation, within which the institutional and organizational evolutions of entities and organizations in charge of regulation were analysed, as well as the social and professional profile, the work and certain “interventions” or “operations” carried out by these agents. What can we retain as key results in these first parts of our research?

First of all, on the level of stating educational policies, we see that certain convergences appear. To varying degrees and in varying timeframes, everything takes place as if educational policies tended to partially converge from the viewpoint of governance models and the regulation they seek to install. On the one hand, certain partial traits of an evaluative State are appearing and we witness a reinforcement of the State’s will to evaluation, control and follow-up over “producers” (notably schools and their agents) and the “products” of their educational systems (student attainments), notably by means of evaluatory tools. On the other hand, and in a much more variable way, ingredients of a market model are being introduced by promotion of a plan favouring free choice by users, and, more rarely, by valorization of the virtues of competition between schools. Finally, by reinforcement of their management autonomy, they are urged to improve their functioning or results, in response to the various needs of their users or to goals assigned them by local authorities or central trusts. The policies of the last twenty years in the countries studied have certain common points then: increasing autonomy for schools, the search for a balancing point between centralization and decentralization of decision making, the introduction of more or fewer free choices for parents or, even, quasi-market mechanisms, the development of diversification in education offer, the introduction of evaluation mechanisms or, even, regulation by results.

The changes the policies have tried to advance in these different domains should not be considered in an isolated way. There are ties between them that the regulatory and governance models presented shed light on. In other words, we can advance the hypothesis that these changes may form a system and that we are undoubtedly faced with a change in “regulation regime”. The “bureaucratic-professional” model of educational system regulation, with important national variants, had accompanied the construction and development of the “mass” national educational systems of the 50s/60s. Institutional regulation was based on arrangements such as control of conformity to rules, the socialization and autonomy of education professionals or the joint regulation (State/unions teachers) of questions of employment or curriculum. That model of regulation has since been undermined by educational policies that tend to substitute or superimpose on those earlier regulatory modes new institutional arrangements, based either on the quasi-market model (especially in England) and/or the evaluative State model. Yet these transformations take place with various degrees, rhythms and intensities, with more or less contradiction and coherence.

- First of all, essential differences in educational policy may first of all be due to proportions in the baseline models: the market model is officially used less than that of the evaluative State in most countries, except England.
- They also depend on the intensity measures are applied with. Measures that are apparently near in statement (promoting external evaluation, favouring free school choice, accentuating school autonomy) can in practice have a different range and significance. For example, external evaluation is clearly more developed in England than in Hungary or in the FCB, and has much stronger concrete consequences on schools.
- Moreover, differences in policies can sometimes be explained by initial differences in systems, by the effects of hybridation of models with the practical or symbolic realities of the systems or societies considered.
This analysis of the effect of policies on modes of institutional regulation was completed by an empirical analysis -much more original- of the institutional, organizational and technical forms of intermediate regulation present in six institutional spaces of a regional or local nature. It has also focussed on the evolution of regulatory agents, on their socio-professional profiles as images of their professionality. Within these spaces, we simultaneously discovered numerous particularities, above all linked to the history belonging to those systems, but also certain convergences echoing political evolutions on a national level. We shall focus on the latter:

- More than before, regulatory process become first of all multi-regulation processes, not only due to the increasing volume of actors and entities present on the intermediate level (situated on local or regional levels), but also due to the combining of their actions with central levels of regulation, or with the autonomous self-regulation of schools or a group of directorships.
- Base schools may experience an increasing fragmentation of their institutional environment but, nevertheless, local spaces where an important effort is made to "coordinate regulators" are all but nonexistent.
- For that matter, this multi-regulation is favoured by most tools or organizational forms which cohabitate in these intermediate regulatory authorities. Whether it be a question of an academy or a local authority (municipality, LEA), we observe the use of new tools (evaluation, control panels, project steering tools) contributing to a rationalization of action. These tools can match the appearance of post-bureaucratic organizational forms. Yet even in contexts where they are more strongly developed (Lille and Wyeham), we observe a cohabitation of various forms and bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic tools which can sometimes produce effects opposed to those desired.
- The privatization of regulatory entities is another phenomenon present, but in very variable ways (more developed in Wyeham, Hungary and for years in the FCB).
- Finally, certain transnational images of professionality are emerging beyond local and national contexts: the figure of the proximate staff member, or the politicized board of director's member, for example.

These tendencies, we repeat, unequally developed, are in relative coherence with the governance models already mentioned: thus the development of tools (notably of evaluation), and the appearance of forms of "post-bureaucratic" organization are in relative coherence with the evaluative State model. We shall see subsequently (section 3) that intermediate regulatory agents and authorities seek either to make room for, get along with or struggle against the reinforcement of market logic.

Finally then we would like to propose some paths to explanation which may help us understand if not explain the evolutions mentioned. In particular, we have to understand the convergent factors favouring the emergence of a new regime of post-bureaucratic regulation, which has been more or less superimposed on the earlier mode of bureaucratic-professional regulation. Subsequently, we shall present the factors and processes that can account for the strong national and/or local variations in the phenomena observed.

4.1 Convergent factors

Many types of explanations can be advanced to explain the emergence of the governance models mentioned and the relative convergence of some orientations of educational policies around these models. These convergent factors, drawn largely from international literature on transformations of educational systems, seem to be of various natures: economic, political, social and cultural.

"Post Fordism" and globalization: a socio-economic context favouring the emergence of increasing demands placed on education by economic milieux

While we have insisted on the differences in socio-economic situations in the countries concerned, they are confronted with a context of relatively common techno-economic transformation. This context leads to stronger and relatively new demands on educational systems from economic milieux.

Thus the internationalization of economic relations on various levels (financial, industrial and commercial) and, in a wider sense, the rise of globalization, cause economic interdependencies leading States to have
to defend the “competitiveness” of their economy vis-à-vis other countries or regions of the world. Furthermore, above all in the “centre” countries with highly paid labour, competitiveness means innovation and the search for new products, product quality and the services associated with it, etc (Freeman & Soete, 1994). For that matter, the centre countries tend to export Fordist organizational forms towards less developed countries (south, central and eastern Europe), favouring forms called “post-Fordist” which facilitate the optimization of mixed economies as well as scale economies, and favour capacities for accelerated reactivity and renewal of products and ways of producing (Boyer and Durand, 1993; Elam, 1994). In this context of a “post-Fordist” economy in a globalized situation, many authors (Hicockx and Moore, 1992; Brown and Lauder, 1992) have insisted on the new demands which the economy and, more precisely, the economic decision making milieux have begun addressing to educational systems. In the logic of an economy centred on “innovation” or “knowledge”, speeches preaching the need to invest in human resources are heard more and more, which results in requests to see the “general level of education” rise, but above all to see the competences most demanded by the economy develop. This is the case not only for relatively common technical competences but strategic ones too (computer literacy, telematics, etc), various intermediate and high level technical and scientific competences in development sectors, as well as various competences and social talents, like autonomy, the capacity to communicate, work in teams, adaptability, etc (Adler, 1987). As Hicockx and Moore say, that results in a demand for closer correspondence between the level and forms of development of the education system and the production system. Notably in a desire and a social demand to see “performances” in the educational system improve in terms of basic attainments, as well as technical and social competences. As we shall see, in the post-bureaucratic governance models we have mentioned, this demand finds elements of an “answer” to the extent that both of them are crisscrossed by a concern for improvement in system efficiency and close attention to the “quality” of learning. We have furthermore been able to defend the thesis that the post- or neo-Fordist economy (we shall not distinguish the two at this stage) goes hand in hand with an economy of diversity (in contrast to the former mass consumption economy) in affinity with the evolution of modes of socialization and identity formation, favouring diversity, singularity and permanent change in the role and place of rationality and the universality structuring “modern” identities. So transformations of markets and ways of producing find affinities with the cultural changes characteristic of postmodernity (Ball, 1998). So this is how we should understand the social demand for more diversification in “educational journeys”, a request for “personalized” education corresponding to the personality of everyone who calls for a development of the diversification of contents, methods and curricula from the offer side.

**State financing “constraints” and neo-liberal policy contexts**

In this techno-economic context in transition, it is a commonplace that important changes in tone and public policy paradigms (référentiels d’action publique, Jobert 1992) are now with us. The “social-democratic” and Keynesian reference system, valorizing the positive effects of a heavy public investment by the State has given way to new “neo-liberal” discourses and paradigms which have begun to question the wellfoundedness of levels of public expenditures and more generally ask themselves about the efficiency and efficacy of State intervention. The “failure” and deficiencies of the largely dominant bureaucratic forms of public intervention have thus been sharply questioned by various theoretical and political currents (“public choice” theory, a new institutional economy ; see Le Galès, 1998). Therefore, since the 70s/80s we have been in a period of neo-liberalism (Jobert, 1994), favouring the “privatization” of a series of public expenditures in the name of the search for more efficiency, as well as imparting to the public sphere methods, language and techniques initially developed in the private sector, and supposedly bearers of higher efficiency in public services. This neo-liberal reference system has had that much more success in States more or less confronted with constraints and real limits on financing their public expenditures. We see here the relatively direct link which has been created between these ideological and theoretical currents and the “post-bureaucratic” models mentioned.

And what is more, the techno-economic transformations mentioned and this neo-liberal reference system encourage forms of precarization and flexibility which touch on “salary relationships”, including the public sector. Nor has this spared workers in the teaching sector and, notably, intermediate regulatory agents, some among whom have experienced forms of flexibility in their labour contracts, in varying degrees according to the country.
The legitimacy crisis of the Welfare State

Yet the economistic explanation cannot prevail alone. Many authors have shown that many, notably within the middle classes, questioned the legitimacy of Welfare State modes of intervention, underpinning the challenging of “bureaucratic” and “standardized” forms of public intervention (Habermas, 1978; Giddens 1994). Faced with a tendency to increasing individualization in social ties, social policies as well as education and training policies strive to diversify to respond to the variety of needs and situations. Whence a gain in value for certain entrepreneurial and individualized responses, to the detriment of bureaucratic and standard solutions (Rosanvallon, 1995). This crisis is in part endogenous: it is the very success and development of the welfare State that has created the conditions for its criticism. Thus individualization is favoured by the development of systems of indirect solidarity, insurantial at base, born by the Welfare State. For that matter, it is the development of services rendered by this social State that generates among citizens new needs, and so new demands made to it by its citizens, demands which may remain unsatisfied a time, accentuating criticism of it (Duran, 1999).

Middle class social demands and the massification of teaching

It is evident that the policy and economic transformations mentioned have been matched by major transformations in labour markets, a rise in unemployment, a more accentuated precarization of worker status, an increasing flexibility of work, of labour management, and accentuated professional and/or geographical mobility. At the same time, secondary teaching and now higher education may very clearly be characterized as “quantitatively democratized” in all of these European countries. In this context, the benefits of education begin to be re-evaluated and what is at stake with schooling becomes more crucial, above all in classes whose professional and social position is largely founded on cultural capital. The rise in unemployment and the inflation of academic degrees has transformed the diploma into a necessary but less and less sufficient passport for finding employment. A corollary to this evolution is the accentuation in competition for obtaining educational goods, which, as economists say, is a positional good: part of its value comes from its relative rarity, from the form of its distribution among social groups, among generations, among individuals and, more and more, among nation States. Whence the tendency among middle and upper class individuals, to use strategies of overschooling or distinction in acquiring educational goods, strategies which further feed the competition process. This crucial role of scholarly in the social and professional position of families in contrast makes the policy question of equality and success for all students particularly lively. It is the increasing stakes of scholarly and success in the social destiny of students which has precipitated socio-political demands of “success for all” and popularized the policy of struggling against failure in all mandatory secondary teaching. This demand is present even when the school’s quantitative democratization makes earlier pedagogical modes of functioning problematical: the school is more massively confronted with youths from popular milieux or immigrant origin whose relationship to knowledge, to learning, and scholarly do not correspondent to the expectations and models valorized by the school. This leads to problems of success but also of order in these schools. That is why the middle classes’ valorizing a policy of success for all may, on a more individual level, combine with valorizing schooling conditions for their children which spare them from or minimize the risk of failure. We can thus understand the social demand for “greater choices” of school by parents, a possibility which allows them to avoid educational contexts whose schooling levels or discipline and socialization conditions appear overly problematic to them ; similarly, the social demand for “quality” addressed to schools and teachers finds fertile soil in middle class anxiety over its own social destiny. This is why educational policies centred on improving the quality and efficiency of educational systems, by promoting one or the other of the regulatory models mentioned (evaluation and/or market) can find political and electoral support in the middle (and upper) classes. (on this theme, see van Zanten, 2001; Ball, 2003; Power et alii, 2003).

Various paths for disseminating basic regulatory models using transnational authorities

One last important factor in convergences of education policies has to do with various mechanisms for transferring and disseminating the models that variously inspire educational policies. We just saw in these mechanisms, the effects of a process of learning and borrowing from policies (Halpin &Troya, 1995) or, even, contamination from them (Levin, 1998 ). Broadly speaking, we can advance the hypothesis that various group or individual actors (international, academic organizations, experts in educational policies)
concretely contribute to transmitting baseline models in the area of regulation and systems governance (Ball, 1998; Derouet, 2002) as well as more widely on a number of specific themes (like for ex. autonomy or 'the school effect' on practices to be presented to teachers, etc). By complex recognition mechanisms, these models finally benefit from a sort of consecration, unavoidably transforming them into “doxa” (Bourdieu, 1980), into “reference systems” whose legitimacy is hard to call into question. This orthodoxy effect is undoubtedly not negligible in explaining the “contaminatory effects” of the models we have mentioned and the relative convergence of education policies. Nonetheless, we should not overestimate them (on this level, see the empirical analysis by Whitty & Edwards, 1998) and, on the one hand, consider that the structural factors mentioned earlier partially affect positive reception conditions and, on the other hand, that there are also many factors working in favour of interpreting and recontextualizing these models in terms of the specific contexts they are used in.

4.2 Factors of divergence

While there have been factors capable of favouring the emergence of new post-bureaucratic models and so favouring the beginnings of convergences between the different European States on the level of their modes of institutional regulation, it is also important to see the factors simultaneously explaining the variations and differences in paths followed.

**Particular institutional contexts and path dependence**

Regarding each national or local context, we have already insisted on the need to examine the material, institutional and symbolic conditions that can affect either the statement or the implementation of policies. Not all solutions and models can be implanted for lack of the political and ideological conditions for their local legitimation. Hence we witness the effects of hybridation of policies whose virtue and function is to adapt a model to existing national or local realities inherited from the past, and to acclimate it to local reception conditions so that it appear plausible. In this respect, national conceptions underpinning the “education model”, particularly the space that should be reserved to the State or private initiatives, undoubtedly form dominant cultural conventions which can greatly condition the statement of educational policies. Thus we can oppose national contexts which have historically privileged State public initiative and either discouraged or fought private control of education (France and Portugal), and contexts where private initiative has been recognized or, even, encouraged (Belgium and England). Conventions, such as the “republican model” (France), the recognition of pluralism and “freedom of instruction” (Belgium), a tradition of supporting local, voluntary initiatives (England) are still lively and can explain some of the specificities of educational policies, as well as a number of their contradictions, ambiguities or incoherencies. (cfr mosaic effects and the effects of hybridation).

These differences in conceptions of educational goods often go far back in history, notably as concerns Church/State relations. They may generate what the neo-institutionalists call “path dependence”, in the choices made. These path dependences refer to choices that appear “impossible” to policymakers in terms of constraints of a political, institutional, or symbolic nature or, again, a lack of the financial means to achieve them. Thus, for example, “quasi-market” schools and freedom of instruction are major “constraints” which condition and limit the development of any real programmes of evaluation and steering in the FCB. The weight of different social classes and the social demands of middle classes have undoubtedly also induced the Labour government not to call into question the variety of education “suppliers” or variety in the nature of schools (comprehensive, grammar or private). In France, a strong republican tradition, and agreements attaching to equality of treatment, for example, influence the implementation of decentralization/deconcentration practices.

**The play of actors and the effects of policy conjunctures on national and local levels**

On the national level, school policies are quite dependent on symbolic, material and institutional factors that accentuate the policies’ hybridation or path dependence. Also at play on this level are political parrying, agreements and their ups and downs, linked to the succession of governments and policies (van Zanten, 2004). Yet on a broader basis, we tend to think that educational policies are still greatly affected by the processes putting them to work, in relation to which we have to analyse the effects of the logics for adopting these policies used by local or regional actors and the irreducible incoherencies of each
regulatory institution (themselves hierarchized and structured). In every national context, there is a sizeable gap between policy statements and their actual orientations in local practices, to the extent that contingencies and local contexts, transactions and political games between actors ineluctably lead to variations and important latitudes in the construction of policy in the field. In fact this is one that led us to stress the vital logics found on the local level in this research.
SECTION 3 SIX LOCAL SCHOOL SPACES: INTERDEPENDENCIES, COMPETITION AND REGULATION OF SCHOOLS

Introduction

Examination of the evolution of modes of institutional regulation has shown us that parental “free choice” of school and “market regulation” has been taking on more importance in all the countries analysed in the more or less recent past - to varying degrees. Our goal at present is to analyse regulations in action, based on a local and detailed analysis of six local spaces, meaning a group of nearby schools that we consider, on an analytical level, as spaces of competition and interdependence. Within these spaces, their logics of action are marked to various degrees by “market” phenomena or, more exactly according to our conceptual vocabulary, by phenomena of competitive interdependence between schools.

Our purpose is to examine how effective regulations function in these spaces and understand how market regulation, institutional regulations emanating from various political authorities or, again, various autonomous regulations emanating from the schools themselves combine and interact. In other words, the various regulations which orient the practice and schools' logics of action will be the centre of our investigation.

In the various local spaces studied, we must circumscribe the point to which competitive interdependencies structure the schools’ logics of external action. We must also elucidate the factors and processes generating those competitive interdependencies. In fact, we shall see that they appear whatever the institutional context. They derive, and are more or less accentuated in terms of family strategies, socio-demographic contexts, as well as in terms of actions and rules applied by local or regional regulatory policy authorities.

We shall also examine the nature of their logics of action in underlining some of their characteristics. In this regard, it is striking to observe that the logics of action of schools situated in very different contexts present analogies or, even, similarities, which can be referred to certain transversal traits of spaces of competition and interdependence.

Finally, we shall conclude in asking ourselves what effects and impacts these competitive interdependencies, these “market” regulations produce on inequalities and hierarchies between schools. Symetrically, we will underline some of the impacts or limits of actions or rules set up by authorities and public regulatory agents (notably on the intermediate level) on the stakes of inequality, which are often considered important in overt policy speeches. It is worth recalling here that our research does not seek to measure effects of regulations in force on objective degrees of inequality, segregation or hierarchy among schools present in the various spaces studied. The goal is more to learn how actual modes of regulation impact on the practice, ethos and logics of actions of group and individual actors (notably directors and teaching personnel).

After having narrowed down our theoretical framework, as well as research and methodology questions, we shall first examine the forms and intensities of competitive interdependence and their determinants, before analysing the schools' logics of action more in detail. We shall finish with the impacts of these regulations on inequalities.

1 Theoretical and methodological details

1.1 Market, quasi-market, and spaces of competition and interdependence

To present the notion of space of competition and interdependence, it is undoubtedly useful to specify the notions of market and quasi-market as understood by economists.

- Market: in neo-classical economic theory, the market is defined in a minimalist way as a coordination mechanism between actors. The objects of exchange (goods, services or capital) the

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32 These logics of action of schools will be studied more in-depth in the following section (section 4) in taking all actors, functioning and internal actions into further consideration.

33 The work presented in this section sets forth the principal results of work done in WP 5 (see deliverable 6 relative to each country) and compared by B. Delvaux and A. van Zanten (2004) in WP 6 of our research. Given constraints in the volume of this research report, it cannot do justice to the wealth of all the theoretical and empirical contributions of these works.
market is structured around is subject to an offer and demand whose confrontation engenders a price and a determined quantity which defines the market equilibrium (Le Robert, 1999).

- Quasi-market: the educational quasi-market is an institutional form combining a principle of free choice of school by users and a principle of public financing in terms of numbers of students (Vandenberghe, 1999). It has often been presented as a hybrid coordination mechanism which joins certain elements of a bureaucratic type coordination by a “principal” (or a group actor having legitimate authority) and certain elements of pure market coordination (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1995).

We can identify four major differences between a market and a quasi-market:

- A quasi-market does not presuppose financial relations between the providers (here the schools) and consumers (here the parents).
- Education offer runs into many limitations in a quasi-market. For example, new offerers cannot enter the quasi-market freely, as would be the case in a real market. The State strictly authorizes and regulates the creation and functioning of public and private schools. For that matter, the offerers are not necessarily private and may not necessarily have maximizing their profits as their principal goal.
- Demand also runs into many deformations and restrictions in a quasi-market. For example, parent choices are restrained and constrained by the State: schooling is mandatory from and up to a defined age. In terms of course programmes, generally there are directives emanating from public authorities.
- In an educational quasi-market, the State remains the principal financier and regulator of the system, and generally proposes a substantial education offer (public schools). Briefly, the State remains the key actor in the education system. Quasi-market control does not exclude conventional administrative control, because financial resources allocated to schools are (at least in part) still public. While the quasi-market can still perfectly well arrange recourse to private financing.

We will use the notion of spaces of competition and interdependence in our analysis. This notion may also be called “market” but then in a way that is more metaphorical than exact and faithful to the economic theory. Spaces of competition and interdependence can in fact develop in institutional contexts where the coordination mechanisms promoted by trust authorities are of a rather “bureaucratic” nature, or closer to the theory of quasi-markets. For that matter, we find these two situations in our fields of study. They might a fortiori be able to be found in a hypothetical situation where a true “economic market” would be promoted.

So what do we understand by spaces of competition and interdependencies ? (or by “market” in the metaphorical sense of the term)

It is a question of a space of relations hosting competitive interdependencies between schools. These interdependencies are principally provoked by a “competitive” situation between these schools in relation to various “resources” involving them, which are necessary or useful to their survival and development. Briefly, these resources are at stake for the schools in the space considered. These resources are generally the students (their number or their social or academic qualities) but, in a more or less connected way, they may also concern the teachers, the school's reputation or, again, the financial means. Competition will be that much keener if resources get rare, of if they are the objects of investment and important attention on the part of the school. Thus, in case of demographic decline in student number, competition may develop. Similarly, the number of students may be that much more of a resource if the amount of financial means received by the school depends on it. Inversely, if the amount of financial means and the number of teachers is independent of the number of students (in terms of the institutional rules applied in the space), the number of students will no longer be as important for the school. Resources that are the source of objective competition between these schools may vary from one context to another depending on the rules governing their distribution in the space.

This situation of relative competition in relation to resources gives rise to interdependencies between schools. An organization is in an interdependence relationship with another from the moment when the actions of one affect or are affected by the actions of the other, directly or indirectly (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1997). Interdependence does not necessarily imply, then, that there be interaction in the sense that one
actor enter into a face to face relationship with the other. For that matter, not all the actual interdependencies between schools have their sources in these objective competitive situations; other interdependencies may be linked to collaborations, various co-operations between the same schools. These interdependencies may moreover sometimes be strongly linked to the first (for example, when a collaboration pact unites two schools in different positions in one space). These “cooperative interdependencies” can, furthermore, arise from their autonomous initiative, like injunctions or incitements advanced by the trust authorities.

If we return to “competitive” interdependencies between schools, it is helpful to distinguish between first order and second order competition (Gewirtz et alii, 1995). Competition of the first order concerns the number of students. In a quasi-market situation, regardless of the places offered, competition may first focus on the number of students and sometimes a school may risk closing if its enrolment declines too much. Second order competition deals with the characteristics of students (characteristics in terms of academics, behaviour, social or ethnic origin, etc). This competition is linked to types of teaching, or the climate a school wants to promote or preserve.

In résumé then, we will concentrate on varied local school spaces, asking ourselves to what extent they can be analysed as spaces of competitive interdependencies (or as “markets” in the metaphorical sense of the term). Thus the notion of competitive interdependencies signifies that school X is (directly or indirectly) affected by the logics of action of other schools (the “offerers”) in the same (or neighbouring) space, by the behaviours of certain parents (the “consumers”), and this in relation to resources coveted by them (particularly students, teachers and reputation), and in relationship to which they are objectively and/or subjectively in competition. Hence the competitive interdependencies in this “market” take their source in the schools’ logics of action, parents’ choices, and the game rules deriving from the central or intermediate political regulation. These rules vary depending on time and space. “Market” particularities then are actively constructed and influenced by the national legal context, the (non) interventions of intermediate regulatory authorities as well as by the actions of schools themselves.

Using the works of Gewirtz et alii (1995), Lauder et alii (1999), Waslander and Thrupp (1995), we can advance the hypothesis that, with time, these spaces tend to maintain or reinforce polarization between schools, more or less hierarchized and divided in various complementary positions (variably described by the actors as “elites schools”, “good mixed schools” or else “trash” schools for “problem students”, or “ghetto” schools).

An important point in this notion that differentiates it from the notion of ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market’ in the economists’ sense should be underlined. Spaces of competition should be analysed in a contextualized way: the spaces of competition are going to be structured and vary in terms of national, institutional modes of regulation (see supra), as well as in terms of “local” characteristics; they are therefore dependent on contexts or actions which only develop and are seen locally. Thus many dimensions may have to be considered in establishing what C. Taylor calls the “geography of the education market” (Taylor, 2002):

- The socio-demographic characteristics of urban spaces considered (in terms of the composition and evolution of populations), as well as residential structures and transportation, are all going to play a role in affecting not only the parents’ possibilities of choice, but also, in a more or less mediated way, influencing the social composition of “school populations” in a zone; thus a heavily “impoverished” zone will not have the same school population as a socially more heterogeneous zone. These characteristics have as much an impact on the second as on the first order of competition;
- The characteristics of schools (their number, their history and their academic and social composition) are also going to vary from one space to another. Hence we will not be able to envisage all the spaces of competition in the same way. We deal with this in this section as well as in section 4, dedicated to the internal logics of action of schools;
- The social characteristics of parents and their perceptions of school realities are also going to affect the spaces: thus, depending on the local spaces and their sociological composition, the students’ and parents’ attitude towards the school (for example their conceptions of schooling, their definitions of a “good student”, of the “good school” (van Zanten, 2001) are going to vary. But we can also say that “perceptions of qualities relative to schools” are also going to be locally
structured. This is why Gewirtz et alii (1995) used the metaphor of landscape, developing the notion of “landscapes of choices” to signify the fact that schools do not only exist as an objective universe of choices and opportunities for parents, but that they are “perceived” and reconstructed from the actors’ viewpoint as a physical landscape is by a walker. We note that our empirical research has not dealt directly with parents and students. This analysis of parents’ perceptions and strategies was not carried out in our empirical work.

- Moreover, the action and/or rules of action of agencies or agents in charge of control regulation on an intermediate or local level are also going to affect competitive relations between schools. The same national regulations may be applied in different ways from one space to another (for ex. between Lille and Paris). Furthermore, the margins of autonomy devolving to local authorities may be different (depending on the country) and used differently within the same country. Within the same space, the logics of actions of various intermediate regulatory agents may again vary according to their institutional positions or their particular resources and ethos. All this may considerably affect relations between schools, relations between regulatory authorities and schools and the intensity of competitive interdependencies between these last. The actions or the rules of regulatory agencies can have as much an effect on the second as on the first order of competition. Thus the rules for financing schools can accentuate or attenuate the stakes represented by the number of students in a school. The central policies that assign them objectives to aim at in terms of results (in England) also lead to accentuating the stakes represented by the academic characteristics of students welcomed into the school: welcoming too many “middling” or weak students can put the objectives negotiated with the LEA in danger. For that matter, institutional regulations can affect as much the behaviour of parents (for example, in fixing strict rules of choice) as the schools' logics of action (in more or less regulating the admission practice and choice of students, open options practices and school offer, as well as practices involving class composition, etc).

- Finally, the more horizontal relationships between schools may come into play; the partnerships or co-operations may thus contribute to stabilizing or channeling relations and student flow between them (whether they be on the same level, or not, in competition or not).

Hence all these local characteristics may contribute in variously structuring the spaces of competition between schools, influencing their degree of competition, and the spatial forms competition within them assumes. Further along this will also affect the logics of action of the schools composing them or, further, the parents’ logics.

These contextual and local dimensions structuring spaces of competition and interdependence distance them from the theoretical fictions of market and quasi-market proposed by economic theory. The idea of a space in competition and interdependence is more like the notion of “local competitive arena” proposed by Glatter & alii (Glatter, Woods & Bagley 1997; Woods & alii, 1998) or that of a “lived market” proposed by Lauder & alii (1999), both of which also try to take the specificities of context into account.

1.2 Questions on empirical research

Questions in the literature, above all Anglo-Saxon, on the education market generally come in four types:

1) the importance and orientation of student flow between schools
2) parents’ logics of choice
3) the organizational answers of schools
4) market effects on changes in the social and academic characteristics

34 “We refer to a local competitive arena, in an ideal typical sense, as an area in which schools draw from a common population of parents and students. This arena is the battleground upon which schools vie with one another for parental and student support. In reality, local competitive arenas can be more or less closed, with boundaries that are more or less apparent. The notion of a boundary in school-environment interactions is in any case problematic and is largely a matter of individual perception” (Glatter & Woods, 1996, 57-58)

35 A “lived market” is in fact a “real market” which is not only determined by formal arrangements but also by informal arrangements deriving from actors' actions, particularly middle class parents. For these authors, markets should therefore be studied in context if we want to understand their real effects on “parents' choices” or the degree of segregation between schools. “… the outcomes of any specific market will be determined by the combination of formal properties and informal arrangements within the market. We call this combination of formal properties, informal arrangements, and outcomes the lived market.” (Waslander and Thrupp, 1995, 439).
of schools (the social polarization of schools thesis) (Sëppanen, 2002). Our empirical research has especially dealt with the first and third of these questions. Thus we have sought to outline the contours of competitive interdependencies within the spaces investigated and identify the structuration factors (spatial demographic and institutional). The third question has led us to develop a typology of answers schools give, by centring on their logics of action.

1.3 A succinct presentation of the local spaces observed and their criteria of choice

Before specifying the types of spaces studied from different points of view (the socio-demographic, school offer, and hierarchization), it is worth succinctly recalling why we have opted for this entry by the local, and what our criteria in choosing spaces have been, as well as the methodology used.

**Entry by the local**

Entry by observation of a local space has to consider many factors. First of all, as we have already argued, the phenomena of competitive interdependencies and market regulation of school functioning can only be observed in putting them in the context of determinate socio-demographic spaces. On the other hand, as to evaluating how these interdependencies are also modelled by the different sources of policy regulation (central and/or intermediate), we also have to analyse regulation in its actual accomplishments. In fact, many of the rules or institutional programmes defined by a governmental policy/or intermediate regulatory entity find varied means of application depending on the territories and agents applying them. Thus these agents have a non-negligible margin of manoeuvre and interpretation at their disposal, although variable depending on contexts, and as we already pointed out in the preceding section, we may consider that these agents’ ethos, as well as the concrete situations, the fields of opportunities and constraints they find themselves in, the strategies they develop, all can act in “filtering” “intermediate variables” that can colour and affect the type of active intervention, the type of concrete regulation they use in local schools, notably in wanting “to regulate” the “market” phenomena already mentioned (in acting for ex. either within the families’ logics, or the school’s).

This double consideration has motivated us to construct the heart of our empirical investigative work on a local scale, as involves both analysing agents and spaces of intermediate regulation (see their criteria of choices in section 2) and grasping the dynamics of interdependencies between schools. This entry by the “local” does not for all that signify that in explanation we only favour concrete interactions, that only micro-social or local processes contribute in affecting the logics of action or interdependencies between schools. We rather think the observation of the latter should be made in providing the means to grasp the social processes in “sufficiently fine grain”, without which they escape observation. So analysis of this locally grasped data in no way prevents our uncovering the presence of arrangements or processes of a more structural nature organizing them, at least in part. In short, the “local” observation level does not lead to an interpretative paradigm circumscribed by micro-social and interactionist logics.

**Criteria in choosing spaces to observe and methodology**

Defining a relevant space of investigation poses a problem to the extent that these interdependent spaces vary in terms of institutional contexts and, notably, the territories of intervention of local educational authorities, as well as in terms of socio-geographical contexts (residential morphology, school morphology and transportation morphology…). From this point of view, various choices have been made in the six contexts studied. Some teams favoured a division based as much as possible on actual interdependencies (Charleroi, Paris and Lisbon) whereas others preferred maintaining a territory corresponding to institutional spaces (Budapest and Lille). The latter methodological option has not prevented the territories so delimited from approximately matching a delimitation of actual interdependent spaces. Finally the English team combined these two procedures. The reader will find in appendix (Appendix to chapter 3) details of the principles of choice each team used.

He will also find exact information on the quantitative methodology used (statistical data on local contexts and schools) and the qualitative (interviews with representatives of local authorities and observations on the characterization of urban space, the attractiveness and positions of schools ; interviews with directors and some education professionals on the functioning and logics of action of schools). Analysis of statistical data has not been done with a view to an end to end international comparison, for example, on
school segregation indices or, further, indicators of school hierarchization. Lacunae in existing data, the
time of construction of original data, difficulties in developing a table of pertinent and comparable
indicators have made this goal unattainable in the time alloted to the research. Hence in the context of the
particular analysis of each country, the statistical approach has served to objectify certain facts (avoiding
that interviews wander from the real), to stimulate the emergence of hypotheses or, even, to verify certain
hypotheses spawned by the qualitative approach, and, in the context of international analysis, to ground
certain comparisons between countries, but in a limited way. The qualitative analysis seeks to enrich and
better interpret the contributions of the quantitative analysis on context but has, above all, helped us
collect surprising information on the logics of action of the schools studied in the zone.\footnote{In fact, this analysis of logics of action has been more in-depth on certain schools (see section 4)}

\textit{Principal characteristics of the spaces studied}

Table 3 takes up the principal morphological characteristics of the spaces studied.
Table 3. Synthetic Table of the characteristics of the local spaces selected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of the local space studied</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District of Wyeham*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>City of Lille</td>
<td></td>
<td>A part is in the town of Lingua*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of the city of Charleroi and towns of Beaurenard*, Chevreuil* and Perdrix*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Lille</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns of Mangue*, Saint-Raisin*, Vigne*, Figue* and Banane*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVIIIth* District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolis/aggomeration</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Charleroi</td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of the local space in the metropolis</td>
<td>A district of Inner London directly adjacent to the City</td>
<td>Centre and part is in the 1st and 2nd peripheral ring</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Part is in the 1st peripheral ring adjacent to Paris intra muros</td>
<td>District not adjacent to centre, situated to its east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population residing in the space</td>
<td>202,824</td>
<td>114,050</td>
<td>179,077</td>
<td>271,691</td>
<td>78,000 (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of the metropolis or agglomeration</td>
<td>8,017,000</td>
<td>401,567</td>
<td>1,000,900</td>
<td>9,645,000</td>
<td>1,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,324,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of students by year of study of levels studied</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools in the space</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools analysed in the space</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools analysed outside the space</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* all the names of towns and districts with asterisks are fictive.

We can complete this first presentation in sending the reader to the appendices for a better understanding of the local contexts the schools studied are situated in (Appendix to chapter 3). From the social viewpoint, we can characterize the spaces studied in relation to the metropoles or agglomerations they are situated in: three among them have a mean socio-economic profile below the mean of the reference agglomeration (Budapest, Charleroi and Wyeham); one has a more or less equivalent profile (Paris) whereas the last two have a more favourable profile (Lille and Lisbon). From the demographic viewpoint, the evolution of local spaces is differentiated: we register a clear decline in global strength in the XXVIIIth district, Lingua and the Charleroi region towns, relative stability in the spaces studied in Lille and Paris, and growth in Wyeham.

The contexts of the spaces studied should be specified further, as much from the viewpoint of the "school demand" which may appear (the socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics of the families in these spaces) as from the viewpoint of school "offer" (the institutional status, the years of study organized by the
schools in the space). These elements are detailed in the appendix. We point out here that from the viewpoint of institutional status, the schools are essentially products of the “public” sector, secondarily of a “mixed” sector (totally or partially financed by the public powers, but endowed with juridical and managerial autonomy (“*écoles privées sous contrat*” in France, “*écoles libres*” in the FCB, voluntary aided schools in England) and finally some private schools (only in England). The years of organized study have varied internal structures depending on the school systems, but have focussed on the 12-14 year old bracket, which is sometimes organized by primary teaching and sometimes by secondary teaching in each of the countries.

We have sought to characterize the residential segregation existing in all the contexts studied and contributing indisputably, and affecting the interdependencies between schools; for lack of fully comparable indicators, the comparison above all brought out the socio-cultural dispersion within each of the spaces considered without a comparison in terms of degree of segregation being established. Nonetheless, looking at the data available (see appendix to chapter 3, section 3), segregation seems to be stronger in Charleroi and the Paris region than in the Portuguese and English spaces.

### 2 Local school spaces and competitive interdependencies between schools

#### 2.1 Competitive interdependencies in all the institutional contexts of regulation

The interdependencies observed and analysed among the schools in the six local spaces observed above all have their source in student distribution. In fact, students are the most important resource of schools. In effect, the number and “quality” of students often in great part determines their obtaining other resources in the area of education offer (financial resources, number of teachers). Their characteristics moreover in large measure determine the working conditions, the contents of activities and the prestige of educational professionals. Finally, “the public effect” weighs heavily on both the school's position and attractiveness. So it is not surprising to observe that, in most of the contexts studied, the schools generally accord importance to everything involving the recruitment of students, as well as everything that is indirectly going to affect (the type of offer of instruction proposed, the school's promotion and image or, further, the management of discipline and organization of classes) even if these areas have their own logic.

There are then competitive interdependencies present between these schools linked to the distribution of “student” resources, important for all of them. That is the key resource, sometimes on the level of their number (first order competition), practically always as concerns their academic and/or socio-cultural characteristics (second order competition). These interdependencies linked to competition for a resource coveted by everybody, and more or less rare, does not signify that all the schools are going to develop “competitive strategies” (as we might have a tendency to expect once a vocabulary strongly connoting the market economy is used). As we shall see, it is not enough that objective interdependence be present for there automatically to be an active response constructed to meet it, and this response is not always “a strategy of offensive competition”. But this signifies that the evolutions of this school are affected by the space of interdependencies where it is to be found and so by the effects of competitive interdependencies or market effects surrounding it. These phenomena are present in all the spaces analysed whatever the institutional context and types of rules or plans attempting to regulate the assignment of students to schools. This is present in contexts which on a national and local level approach a quasi-market situation (England, Belgium and Hungary) as well as in systems where the assignment of students is administered by the local or intermediate public authorities who can, in a more or less discretionary way, take the “preferences” and “choices of parents” into consideration (France and Portugal).

### Formal plans regulating student distribution among schools

In the local French school spaces investigated (Lille and Paris), the formal rules regulating student distribution in public schools are far from liberal. Should we compare it with the other spaces investigated, we can even advance the hypothesis that it is the case where student admission is the most administered. In fact, families are obliged to enrol their child in their school district (*secteur scolaire* in French). For their part, schools are obliged to enrol students from their district and cannot enrol students from other districts without authorization. Families can request derogations, whose treatment varies depending on periods (stricter application over the last few years after a relaxation during the 90s) and academic inspections (application is much stricter in the Paris region than in Lille).
In the other school spaces investigated, the margins of liberty for parents and schools are much wider. The most liberal situation prevails in the space of Charleroi (Belgium), where parents have a total liberty of choice between the various schools and providers (réseaux d’enseignement) and schools have wide latitude in “sorting” students presenting themselves, even if recently the State has sought to control it in a way that is more formal than real. This situation resembles what prevails in the private school sector in France, and in private and “voluntary aided” schools in England.

In the other European spaces analysed (administrative spaces within the metropoles of Budapest, Lisbon and London), the situation is intermediate: families have the possibility of freely expressing their choice. Faced with them, the schools can sort the requests in total freedom. In any case, the number of places available is fixed by the regulatory authority. Furthermore, in granting the places available, the norms are clearly more constraining in Portugal than in Hungary or England. The formal regulations for choice by parents and schools is strongly contrastive then. Table 4 summarizes the situation.

Table 4. Typology of modes of inter-school regulation in force in the educational systems studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>freedom choices for families</th>
<th>Schools’ liberty to sort</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widespread</td>
<td>Widespread</td>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>All the schools</td>
<td>Private schools.</td>
<td>All the schools.</td>
<td>All the schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contrastive attractiveness of schools and the active role of family strategies

Nonetheless, in each of the spaces studied, we witness the phenomena of competitive interdependencies of various intensity. We shall subsequently specify the principal incentives in each of the contexts concerned. For the moment, we limit ourselves to showing that schools are variably attractive to families, so that some are sought out whereas others are “shunned” by students and families, notably from middle and upper classes. Reciprocally, certain schools will seek to attract and/or keep certain types of students to the detriment of others (perceived as more problematic on an academic or behavioural level) with the result that other schools will have to welcome them, more or less willingly. In addition to the actions of local authorities, competitive interdependencies essentially arise from this double movement.

Families who choose - in all the spaces

To find the empirical indices of these interdependencies, we can begin by advancing the hypothesis that in all the spaces, parents and students manifest choices and preferences for such and such a school, even if their preference is not always taken into consideration. These choices, once they weigh on the distribution of the quantity or quality of students among schools, are objectively going to create interdependencies between them.

Choice procedures are obvious in contexts where a quasi-education market has been institutionalized but are also present in contexts where student assignment is more administrative.

37 We note in passing that in most of the national and local contexts we witness a tendency to give families more latitude of choices; especially in England, Hungary but also in France.
38 Nonetheless we specify that the London district of Wyeham presents particularities, insofar as the norms of assignment are more developed (through 2003) than in other English districts, and this is inherited from the old policy of the greater London LEA, rather in favour of democratizing orientations (notably, the heterogeneity of schools).
39 This paragraph is largely inspired by the transversal report of research carried out by Delvaux and van Zanten (2004).
In Belgium, the proportion of families choosing their school approaches 100 % given that in urban areas we may consider that each family has many accessible schools at its disposal among which it is free to choose. Even if many actors underline the fact that many underprivileged families tend to enrol their children in the school nearest them, it is rare that there are not many near their place of residence. We can consider then that they almost always have a choice.

The same conclusions hold for the English local space: in fact, access to a private school always reveals a choice procedure, whereas the procedure for assigning places in the public sector necessarily implies the expression of a choice by the family. Schools then are first subject to the demands of families. The will to submit the system to demand is therefore, unlike what happens in the other countries, clearly revendicated. All families in fact enjoy the right to express their preferences. They are free to choose any school without condition unless they choose a private school, where one pays.

In France, the proportion of families opting for school choice procedures varies with the region. Their proportion is hard to evaluate because some families schooling their children in the college in the sector do so by choice and not by constraint, whereas for some among them, the choice of place of residence takes the reputation of the sector’s school into account. The proportion of families making a choice can be estimated by adding the number of students schooled in the private sector, the number of students for whom there is a derogation request and the number of students enrolled in specialized classes with entry examinations. Even if the French system discourages choice, we observe that the cumulative percentages are far from negligible, especially in Lille. In fact, in that local space, we should add to the 52 % of students attending private colleges those requesting derogations in the academy, that is 11 % of entrants in the 6th and an indeterminate proportion of youths in selective classes. For a total, then, of over 60 % of families opting for a choice procedure weaning them away from the college to which they were normally assigned. In the Parisian local space, the percentages are lower, even if, in this particular context, we should normally add to the following data choices made ahead of enrolment due to the fact that the school is a real element in choosing a place of residence. In taking the available figures into account, we observe that 13.7 % of students in the two departments attend private schools; the requests to avoid public colleges studied represent less than 4 % of the number of students finally enrolled in the 1st year in public colleges; as for entries in specialized classes, they are not counted. In the whole Paris region, these three types of choices barely involve 20 % of the students.

In Hungary and Portugal, the evaluation can be approached using a procedure similar to that adopted for France, that is in calculating the percentage of students not enrolled in the school of their sector. Based on a sample in Hungary, we observe that 56 % of students enrolled in the schools of the XXVIIIth district do not reside in the recruitment sector of those they attend. These 56 % represent the minimal proportion of families opting for choice procedures.

In Portugal, we do not have data at our disposal to permit a global measurement of the proportion of students schooled on the 3rd grade level who do not fulfill one of the geographical criteria of assignment, but we know that this proportion varies from 0 to 50 % depending on the school.

On the basis of these estimates, we can affirm then that the proportion of families making a choice is 100 % in Belgium and England, and at least 60 % in Lille, 56 % in Hungary and 20 % in the Parisian local space. Based on this criterion, the various systems can then be divided into three categories: the Belgian and English systems where choice is systematic; Lille, the Hungarian, and undoubtedly Portuguese systems, where a majority of families clearly express a choice; and, finally, the Parisian system where choice seems to be undeniably expressed by only a minority of families.

In the countries where not all the families opt for a choice procedure, it is fairly clear that this procedure is less frequent in socially underprivileged milieux. In fact, the higher the cost, the more choice strategies risk being reserved to families possessed of economic, cultural or social capital.

If families are to choose, they have the possibility of basing themselves on relatively systematic or official information in Wyeham, where school performances in external evaluations and projects are distributed to families. In France, information is not a priority and accordingly more reduced than in England. In the other

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40 Colleges can propose various classes with “special schedules”, including, for example, athletic or artistic options, where select admission is authorized by the académie.
countries, the information is neither available nor distributed (Belgium and Portugal), whereas in Hungary some information is distributed. Thus choices are only based on various “hot tips” (transferred by word of mouth) signifying the school’s academic and/or social style in the family’s eyes (Gewirtz et alii, 1995).

Unequally attractive schools

Therefore the practical criteria of family choice are going to weigh unevenly on the schools in the zones studied. Even when students are essentially selected in terms of the administration’s criteria, there are marginal choices made by the families which may affect the composition of the schools’ population in the zone, and form interdependencies among them. Some schools are in fact more attractive than others, judged notably in terms of parents’ criteria of choice41.

In most of the countries studied, it is hard to establish an exact way of measuring the attractiveness of schools. In Belgium, attractiveness can only be deduced from evolutions in each school’s market share and observations on the number of enrolments refused for lack of space. This latter piece of information is not yet available and we know that because of demographic decline in the local space, few schools are forced to refuse enrolments. In Portugal and Hungary, the proportion of youths residing outside the official recruitment sector is an imperfect indicator of attractiveness. In France and, above all, in England we have more exact measurements at our disposal, which, nonetheless, only deal with public instruction.

In England, enrolment demands in public schools are centralized by the district school authorities. This data illustrates the contrasting attractiveness of schools. Whether it be evaluated on the basis of the absolute number of demands (first choice) or ratio between the number of demands and the number of places, the classification of schools is practically identical. Three of those studied (out of a total 15) register demands below the number of places available. In all the others, the number of first choices is above the offer. The gap between offer and demand may sometimes be very wide: demands can be up to three times the number of places available and even up to ten times if we take the most reputed schools into account. These differences result notably from the perception families have of school performances.

In France, the data on public education gives us an idea of schools shunned and those sought after. In the Paris region, a first way of evaluating the phenomenon of flight consists in counting the number of students who, being part of an official recruitment sector of a public college, are enrolled in the private. For the first year of each public college, these flights are sometimes negligible but can represent two classes in the 6th. In public instruction, flights are evaluated on the basis of demands for derogation from the “carte scolaire” or school map, even if these relatively rare derogation requests mean that data may not completely represent a particular school year. For the academic year considered, the number of demands to avoid a public college varied from 0 to 13 students.

In Lille, many measurements of attractiveness are proposed, all carried out at the moment of college entry. The first, centred on differences of attractiveness between public colleges, based on examining the demands for derogation of entry into the first year of college: the difference between the number of demands for entry and the number of demands for avoidance ranges from −29 to +30 in Lille whereas this index only varies from −13 to +16 in the Paris region. The second measurement aims at identifying the public schools most shunned by calculating the number of students schooled in the elementary schools of their sector who are subsequently schooled in private instruction. This proportion varies from 26 to 60 %42. Thus departure rates from public education are high. Two factors can be advanced to explain this flight at the end of public primary school: the absence of sectorization of elementay schools (“having chosen the nursery school and then the primary school for their child, some parents find it legitimate to choose his/her...

41 These criteria of choice and, more widely, family strategies were not studied in our research. We know from other research work (see for ex. Gewirtz and alii, 1995 ; Power and alii, 2003, van Zanten, 2003 and 2004) that these criteria vary with social class. Particularly in greater London, the attractive schools are notably those appearing more “performant” because their “raw” scores on external tests are higher, notably due to the academic and social composition of the publics of these schools (and even if the “clear” performances are clearly less favourable). In fact it appears that school scores are the criterion of choice most commonly cited in Greater London (49 % of families say they take it into account).

42 Such an evaluation of the phenomenon of flight is approximative given the absence of sectorization on the elementary level and hence the fact that the sector’s elementary schools contains students residing outside the sector and so not destined to colleges in the sector.
college”) and the elitist strategies of certain families, passing from public technical schools to prestigious private colleges.

In Hungary, a comparison of school attractiveness should be based on an exact analysis of the relationship between the sector of residence and the sector of schooling. An attractive school might be one attracting students from other sectors while also attracting those of its sector. But the data on this is not yet available. Hence we can only measure attractiveness imperfectly, by calculating the proportion of students coming from outside the official recruitment sector. This percentage varies significantly depending on the schools, ranging from 30 to 75 %. If we abstract from schools situated on district peripheries, and hence having a propensity for recruiting outside the district, we observe that the width of the gap stays the same and that the group of schools in the centre contrasts with groups in the ‘cities’. The first recruit a minimum 55 % of students outside their sector whereas the second all recruit less than 55 %. For that matter, the centre schools have a mean vacancy rate below that of schools of the major district ‘city’.

In Portugal, attractiveness can only be measured for secondary schools by measuring the part of students from primary schools in their sector desiring to enrol in them. We observe significant differences because one secondary school attracts at best 40 % of the students from the primary school of its sector whereas another manages to attract nearly 80 %.

There are then important differentials of attractiveness between schools within each local space studied. In the local spaces where many measurements could be carried out, we observe that these measurements agree.

Yet, the choices of families cannot always be respected. In fact, in Belgium, while choice is totally free, its fulfillment is not guarantied since certain schools receive more requests than they have places available. For the families, the principal cause of non-success is tardy enrolment because the most coveted schools end their enrolments many months before the academic year begins. In France, the probability of getting one’s choice depends largely on derogation policies. And they vary significantly depending on the Academy. Thus, the rate of acceptance of derogation demands is high in the local space of Lille (75 to 80 %) and weaker in the Parisian (25 %), where the rare demands accepted are essentially justified by concern to balance student populations among schools.

Access to the desired school is far from being guarantied in the London local space. In all of greater London, only 70 % of parents manage to enrol their children in the school they want most (a few more after procedures appealing LEA decisions). This percentage varies significantly depending on the LEA. In Wyeham, because of a deficit in available places in public education, we observe that only 65 % of enrolment requests are met with in those schools.

In Portugal, chances of access are not guarantied unless one resides in the recruitment sector of the desired school. They are, on the contrary, guarantied upon addressing the school of one’s sector of residence. The same goes in Hungary. But no data exists for these two local spaces for evaluating the proportion of families who made requests on schools outside their sector and got their choice (12% of residents in the Hungarian space school their children outside the space).

Therefore the expression of family choice is an important, but variable, phenomenon in all the spaces analysed. In fact, these choices are not only going to affect the local authorities who are in charge of assigning students to schools, but also directly affect the schools through the social and academic effects of distribution in the various schools of the zone. Once students of one school are liable to move to another one within the same space, interdependencies are created between them, at least if the students are “desired” by the two schools.

Clusters and interdependent spaces

A good part of the work done in this part of the research has consisted in specifying and documenting the spatial or institutional factors contribute to effectively structuring competitively interdependent relationships between schools. On the one hand, it in fact appears that within each of the spaces studied, not all the schools are necessarily in “competition” with one another; on the other hand, many “clusters of interdependent schools” may be present in the same space. These clusters are a group of interdependent schools who, for that matter, may or may not be situated in the zone studied. In urban areas, due to the
effects of proximity, schools in neighbouring zones may indeed be in objective competition with those in the spaces studied. Moreover, we stress that interdependence is a relative notion. “Two schools may be said to be interdependent if a significant proportion of their students hesitated, at the moment of choice, between the two schools or if a significant proportion of students pass from one school to the other in the course of their studies.” (Delvaux and van Zanten, p 33). Yet, there is no theoretical threshold allowing us to declare the moment when a pair of schools pass from the status of independence to that of interdependence. So we have tried to define empirically a method for circumscribing the types of “interdependent clusters” within the space studied in each of the countries and sometimes, transversally, in many spaces.43

Here we shall present results related to two questions. First of all, do the interdependent clusters overflow the limits of the spaces observed? And then, within each space observed, can we observe one or many “interdependent clusters”? (for more details, see Delvaux and van Zanten, 2004)

On the first question we shall rely on the proportion of students coming from quarters situated outside the local space and the proportion of youths residing in the space but schooled outside. The higher the percentages, the more probable it is that the cluster(s) overflow the limits of the local space. As seen in table 5, we can say that it is probable that the spaces defined in London, Lille and Charleroi contain schools that are interdependent with others situated outside the space studied. At least this is the case in Budapest and Lisbon.

Table 5. Flow estimates between the space studied and neighbouring spaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of residents schooled in schools situated outside the space</th>
<th>% of students coming from outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>20 to 22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>min. 40 %</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>from 11 to 90 % depending on the school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleroi</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>from 4 to 11% depending on the school</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are more “incoming” migrations towards Lille and Charleroi; this can be explained by the fact that the spaces specified include the centre city. For that matter, migrations towards the exterior (youths residing in the space but schooled elsewhere) are, in most cases, below 15% (notably because of our relatively coherent criteria in choosing spaces from the viewpoint of student flow). Just the same, in Charleroi, around 20% of resident youths are schooled outside the local space (a notable indication of the deepseatedness and the effective use of freedom of school choice in Belgium) and this proportion is over 40% in London (because of insufficient school offer within Wyeham).

The second result involved the number of interdependent clusters, relatively independent from one another, present in the local spaces, either due to spatial factors - the “lived” spatial distances between the schools - or institutional factors. Thus, on the one hand, at play among the latter are the specificities of schools [on the level of offer, student body (girls/boys/mixed) or the school’s declared confession (Jewish or Muslim schools)] and, on the other hand, the spatial contours and variety of regulatory authorities over these schools. In effect, authorities regulating student flow operate over more or less vast territories (larger in France and Portugal; narrower in England, Hungary; with no regulation in Belgium). For that matter, many different authorities may coexist within local spaces in dealing with particular schools, notably on the religious level. Thus a regulation that is different by its rules and the actors exercising it co-

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43 Many types of indicators were used: 1# analysis of the range of choices families have; when not having a survey of families at our disposal, the analysis was based on the priorities of choice expressed to the LEA in the English case and on two approximations of this indicator in the other cases: a) the comparison of school recruitment zones (in Charleroi, Londres, Lille, Lingua and Budapest), b) analysis of requests for derogation from the “carte scolaire” or school chart (Lille and Paris) 2# analysis of changes of schools during the student’s career (Charleroi, Budapest and Lingua).
exists in France, England and Belgium, governing the public schools on the one hand, and the private or mixed schools on the other hand.

In short, Delvaux and van Zanten observe “that, in the Parisian local space, two relatively autonomous clusters coexist, separated in terms of borders between academic inspections (…). In the Lille local space, on the contrary, we observe an interdependence between all the colleges forming the cluster of centre city schools, joined to other peripheral clusters (…). In Charleroi, the outline is similar, with a central cluster surrounded by many clusters, one of which is part of the local space so composed of two clusters: that in the centre and one of the peripheral clusters. In Budapest, we see a cluster smaller than the District, not including the most peripheral schools, which are integrated into neighbouring groups. In Lisbon, the local space forms a whole, perhaps slightly overflowing its territorial limits and in any case joined to many clusters situated to the North and West. In London, the only space where the clusters are not only structured on a spatial basis, two relatively independent clusters coexist in the space (the Jewish schools on one side, and the others), with both overflowing the district's limits.” (Delvaux and van Zanten, 2004, 37)

2.2 Variation in intensity and competitive stakes: what are the differentiating factors in the spaces analysed?

There are, then, competitive interdependencies within many clusters of interdependencies present in all the spaces considered, whatever the type of institutional regulation in place. Nonetheless, these competitive interdependencies present themselves in varying intensities and hence favour differentiated perceptions of the stakes involved, as judged by the schools in the spaces studied. They are also differentiated within each space, depending on the schools and their positions in the local hierarchy of schools - we shall return to this. Here we shall try to specify the variations of intensity of competition depending on the space considered before further detailing the factors that explain them.

From this viewpoint, we suggest that the essential division is between, on the one hand, the space of Lisbon and all the others. In the Portuguese space, the stakes and the intensity of competition over students appear weaker than elsewhere. In the other spaces, variable factors may explain the greater intensity of competition; seeming to be most intense in the spaces situated in Belgium and Hungary. This intensity may in fact derive 1) from the nature of the institutional context regulating the assignment of students to schools (e.g., the presence or lack of a quasi-market), 2) from evolutions in demography or socio-urban contexts, 3) from strategies of the families themselves and their particular nature, 4) from the nature of the schools' logics of action 5) from the configuration of local institutional regulations (actions carried out or not, programmes set up or not, degrees of multi-regulation and fragmentation of regulatory authorities).

At the same time, the stakes are also evaluated differently by the actors, notably depending on the schools and their positions, making it necessary to take the actors ethos into account and their perceptions in defining the state of competition between schools. In other words, not only can one and the same objective situation sometimes be read differently, but moreover we can advance the hypothesis that these perceptions contribute to making the situation competitive. Yet it remains true that, beyond these actors’ perspectives, the objective factors mentioned also weigh on the development of intensity of competitive interdependencies.

First of all, interdependencies linked to student distribution appear to stand out particularly in Charleroi and Budapest. Thus, in Belgium, there is a tradition of autonomy of “schools” and “organizing power”. The rules directly imposed on all the schools and providers are hence often relatively relaxed and put in place while allowing margins of interpretation. This is the case, for example, for measures concerning student enrolment – and expulsion. Moreover, there is a system of free choice and quasi-market, developed years ago which has long encouraged families to exercise their power of choice vis-à-vis schools, by introducing middle classe families to criteria relative to educational quality, the sociological composition of school populations, discipline, etc. Hence student flow between schools is particularly significant in relation to other countries, notably during academic years (see Delvaux et alii, 2003). Finally, if the State (and sometimes the various providers) have been worried about the perverse effects of competition, first of all for public financing and, secondarily, for equity in the system, and if they have set up of forms of regulation, they do not directly touch on the question of flow between schools and free choice by families but only indirectly deal with questions related to school offer (see Delvaux and Maroy, 2004). Moreover, it

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should be noted that even in this area there is a very strong fragmentation of regulations, which operate practically independently, depending on their provider. The result is schools largely subject to norms that vary depending on the provider they belong to, even if the State sees to certain minimal, common norms. Briefly, institutional regulation is multiple and particularly fragmented, which does nothing to diminish the flow of students between schools and the consequent competitive interdependencies between them.

In Budapest too, in the context of a change of regime, the pressure of the political environment appears weaker, whether we are dealing with the Central State or municipalities which, for example, have always hesitated in closing schools whose populations have greatly declined. Schools are also strongly encouraged to take advantage of their pedagogical and managerial autonomy. Elsewhere, at least for certain schools, a lot is at stake in student distribution, to the extent that not only does the threat of school closure can hang over them (1st order competition), but also because middle class parents are relatively scarce in the zone (2nd order competition). Moreover, as in Belgium, existing regulations are uncoordinated and primary schools in the municipality find themselves in competition with secondary schools situated outside the District and dependent on other authorities (City of Budapest, Churches, Universities or Foundations).

In short, in Budapest as in Charleroi, the degree of autonomy schools have at their disposal is not negligible due to a political environment clearly exert less pressure than elsewhere. Then there is the context of demographic decline in students which makes the student stakes that much more crucial in that they influence the “financial resources” available or, even in certain cases, the school’s survival. But above all, student distribution among schools is heavily influenced by family choice. Finally, in both cases, regulatory authorities are numerous and fragmented, so that there is practically no institutional regulation of the overall student flow and/or competition between them. Hence market regulation is particularly active there and share the stakes with competitive interdependencies.

In Wyeham (England), the intensity of competition is not negligible either but a bit less intensive than in the Belgian and Hungarian cases. Thus, if on the one hand governmental policy clearly favours taking “parents’ choices” into account in school policy (notably in assigning them to schools), we must at the same time remark that the Learning Trust, replacing the LEA in Wyeham, has only renewed the “banding system” until the end of 2003 (based on the results of external evaluations) which moderates and constrains student distribution among public schools (community schools), favouring a relatively balanced student distribution among them according to “academic abilities” as measured in tests. Until now, this factor has been able to somewhat moderate competition between them, and that much more so since these same schools are invited to collaborate, notably in view of diminishing the number of students residing in Wyeham but schooled in another district. Thus, it should be pointed out that the local political environment exercised significant influence – and as a counter current in relation to governmental policy’s “pro-market” orientation – in regulating the assignment of students to schools, all the while taking pressure coming from the central government for a “mobilization” and developed management of schools into account. Another factor moderating competition between schools is the lack of vacancies, so that those having fewer demands than places available in the space analysed are unusual (three, in fact, in the sample analysed).

Yet, despite this, competition is far from having disappeared for many other reasons. First of all, the regulation mentioned only applies to public, and not to mixed and private schools (voluntary aided), nor even to Specialist Schools which can in theory select 10 % of their population. This is in fact one of the reasons explaining why the banding system has been abandoned in 2004, thus permitting student distribution to be carried out in terms of parent preferences alone. When one knows that, already today, the banding system is applied with a slant (the most sought after schools are, in fact, overly represented by better students and the inverse is true for the less sought after), we fear that abandoning this regulatory programme may accentuate an unequal distribution of students.

In fact the strategies of middle class families who tend to school their children outside the borough –for fear of finding too many ‘undersirable’ children in the zone’s schools– ipso facto construct competitive

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44 “Zone councils” try to regulate availability of options in secondary schools, but that is done via a consultative procedure between schools and organizing powers, held separately, depending on the “official and non confessional” network on the one hand, and the “confessional” network on the other.
interdependencies between the schools of the zone and outside schools that the local authority obviously has no control over. This is yet another factor accentuating competition for certain schools. Finally, their institutional variety (public, religious or private) on the one hand, and the spatial structure of clusters of interdependencies which cut across many districts on the other hand, lead to a fragmentation of regulatory authorities whose activities must necessarily be coordinated, if the political will is there, to moderate or regulate student flow in order, on the one hand, to reduce the intensity of competition and, on the other, to favour a more equitable distribution of students.

The French cases of Lille and the Paris region illustrate another dynamism that also results in a relatively strong intensity of competitive interdependencies, at least for certain schools and with significant indirect effects for the others. Many factors supposed to lessen competition are present in these zones. On the one hand, the demographic context is settling but without being in steep decline as in Belgium and Hungary. On the other hand, this is a context where the political will and institutional programmes for moderating inter-school competition from the aspect of student distribution are the most urgent if not always the most efficient: assignment takes place in a centralized way (by academic inspection) based on formalized criteria, with an announced political will to promote, a priori, social and academic heterogeneity within colleges. Nonetheless, in reality, and especially in Lille, derogations from the school map are relatively numerous, notably due to the effects of competition among private schools eluding the sectorization system; elsewhere, there is also a sizeable student flow, shifting between public and private schools. We can furthermore hypothesize that the policies relaxing sector boundaries are not independent of a competition which is thus going on in a clearer way in Lille (over 50 % of students in private teaching) than in the Creteil academy. Witness to this is the fact that the measures relaxing sectorization put in place in Lille in the mid 80s were justified by concern to check departures towards the private. So there seems to be a link between the policy of derogation and the rate of private school attendance.45

Thus in France, we might be led to think that competitive interdependencies result first from the demands of families capable of causing competition between schools and, particularly, public ones on the one hand, and private on the other. Furthermore, family demands also find expression via various regulations authorizing public schools to propose classes with “special schedules”, which can thence partially select their students. Besides family choice strategies that, here as elsewhere, seek to preserve “good” learning conditions for their children, it is essentially the cohabitation of two types of educational offers, and differences in the rules characterizing them, coupled with the absence of coordination between the public or private authorities who respectively regulate them, that can account for the relative importance of competitive interdependencies in a system that seeks a priori to limit them as strictly as possible.

Finally it is in Portugal, in Lingua, that competitive interdependencies manifest the lowest intensity. Many reasons explain that: on the one hand, there is a relative institutional homogeneity among schools in the zone, which are all public and depend on the same trust authority. We do not have, as we do in France or Belgium, the presence of many types of schools subject to contrasting and uncoordinated regulations. Institutional regulation is clearly less fragmented here. Moreover, if parents’ preferences in their choice of school are taken into account and authorized in the Portuguese system, notably at the moment of passage from primary to secondary, few parents express the wish to choose their child’s school in terms of “quality” criteria. In addition, schools have very limited margins of manoeuvre in the area of accepting students (they are, for example, obliged to accept students living in the municipality). On the contrary, demographic developments create a surplus in available places in schools, but the rules in application reduce a school’s risks of losing students. In fact, student loss does not involve, as in other contexts (Belgium, Hungary and England), a practically automatic loss of financial resources or allocations of teachers; teachers having lost class hours can bus themselves with other educational activities (libraries, etc.). For that matter, these losses are partially compensated by the acceptance of students coming from adjacent spaces. This is why schools do not experience attracting students as crucial and that much more so since an ethics of public service seems to deter actors from struggling over “good” students. Only the

45 The example of Lille testifies to the impact of the private on public policy; the example of the Parisian region seems to show that the relation between the two variables also functions in the other direction. In effect it appears that the recent hardening of conditions for granting derogations has an impact on the frequentation of private schools: the stricter policy followed by the two academic inspections in Paris seem in fact to cause a reduction in the number of requests for derogation and an increase in flow towards private teaching. An inverse relation seems to verified by the past.
distribution of “problem” students seems to solicit a certain degree of mobilization on the part of schools. All these factors (institutional unification of regulation, less impact from losing students, parents little inclined to consumerism, school ethics, and relatively strict rules governing schools sorting students), all, in short, lead to competition between schools for students being the least intense here.

2.3 School hierarchy and social hierarchy

In all the spaces analysed, we have observed a hierarchization and segregation which are most often condoned by the functioning of these local systems (see infra). Hierarchization can be defined as a differentiation of schools (in various dimensions, such as the composition of the student public from the academic, social or ethnic viewpoints; teaching offer; types of teachers or buildings, etc) commonsensically provided with unequal social valorization; the school actors (directors or teachers) may, for that matter, consider it as right or unjust, legitimate or not. This is what happens with differentiations that consist in concentrating prestigious offers and reputedly “good” students in certain schools, whereas others amass options and aid programmes aimed at students in difficulty.

To understand hierarchy and use equivalent indicators in the different contexts, we have defined two dimensions: the academic level and the socio-economic level of public schools.

To the extent that they concern characteristics of populations, these dimensions also refer to student segregation phenomena: the more the schools contrast with one another, the greater the segregation.

The statistical data available in each country on the academic and social levels of students is not identical. Accordingly we have concretized the two dimensions by different indicators depending on the country. These indicators have thus been crossed with one another before being crossed with the institutional characteristics of schools, on the one hand (public status, mixed or private; the years of study they organize) and their geographical location, on the other hand.

Three results emerge from this analysis.

- The high correlation between the two types of indicators is the first lesson. The correlative coefficient between the two variables is always above 0.750, except in the local space of Lisbon.
  
  The link between these two variables is not surprising; it merely confirms the many studies attesting to the statistical relation between social origin and academic success. The weak correlation observed in Lisbon can in part be explained by the small number of schools in the sample and by the rather weak variation in the academic indicator (the proportion of students not lagging behind, in fact, only varies from 81 to 92%).

- The classification of schools was crossed with their institutional status (public, private or mixed). In London, Lille and Charleroi, the mean indices of mixed schools are higher than those of the public, and the gap between the two types of schools is clearer in the socio-economic dimension than in the academic dimension. Yet this comparison of means should not hide the fact that for all the spaces where we have comparative data at our disposal, we count the privileged schools among the public schools and the underprivileged among the schools of mixed status. Graph 4 in Appendix to chapter 3 illustrates it.

- Finally, the relative positions of schools are sometimes associated with the years of study they organize (in London and Lisbon) and their geographical position (for example, the more socially privileged schools are in the city centre: Lille and Charleroi)

3 External logics of action

Let us summarize. Within all the spaces considered, whatever the type of institutional regulation put in place, we have observed many clusters of competitive interdependencies between schools. Yet the

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46 The indicators are detailed in the appendix as well as the principal graphics of the results.

47 The coefficients of correlations equivalent to 0.938 in Lille, 0.879 in Paris, 0.853 in London, 0.804 in Charleroi, 0.798 in Budapest and 0.462 in Lisbon.

48 We do not have any data on the private schools in Paris, London, and Budapest; elsewhere, in the Portuguese space analysed, there are no private or mixed schools.
intensity of this competition varies and the stakes they represent may also vary depending on the local spaces.

Our purpose now is to examine the extent to which the schools’ “logics of action” (see ch. 1 for a definition) are going to be affected by these “market” dynamics. What types of logics of action are schools going to develop? What are the determinants? We nonetheless postulate a priori that these logics of action cannot be mechanically derived from either external determinants (like the market environment or institutional environment), or characteristics of internal actors. Each school and its actors benefit from a greater or lesser relative autonomy, which can be used strategically. This autonomy has a tendency to be used in a conscious and strategic way if what's at stake seems important to them: for example a major loss of students, an important change in the school's internal climate, discontent on the part of some of the parents, etc. Yet all the logics of action do not involve such strategic calculations and a mobilization of schools for a major project; in fact, logics of action are intended to orient their conduct in various areas of action, through decisions, routines or practiced choices, as they are reconstituted by an observer ex post facto. The coherence of logics of action throughout various areas of action may be variable, just like the internal cohesion among actors in a school.\(^49\)

In this section, we shall basically examine the external logics of action of schools situated in all the positions of the hierarchy in each space. These logics are essentially shown by basing ourselves on interviews with their directors. This analysis focuses on many areas of action chosen both because they are the ones that seem to play the most important role in the effort to modify the school's attractiveness and external position, and because they are the ones by which the schools enjoy a relative autonomy allowing forms of adjustment or, even, collaboration with each other. Three of them correspond to basically external logics (student enrolment, educational offer and promoting the school) and three other basically internal logics (organizing classes, activities directed towards underprivileged students and managing discipline) but able to be the object of various forms of external relations.\(^50\)

We shall describe three dimensions through which the oppositions of logics can be brought to light. These various dimensions can be combined in schools' effective logics of actions. These logics are obviously described here in an idealypical way.

Active/passive, offensive/defensive logics

Talking about “market regulation” and “competition” between schools might perhaps lead readers to think that all of them involved in these market contexts naturally developed more or less aggressive and openly competitive logics vis-à-vis schools they are interdependent with. This is not the case at all. On the one hand, in certain local contexts, although characterized by a quasi-market logic (as in Belgium), most directors, are careful to refuse economic rhetoric in describing their relationships with parents or other schools. Their missions and relationships are described more in civic, domestic or professional, rather than in commercial terms (see also Dupriez, 2002). On the other hand, not all logics of action necessarily result from the school's mobilization, whether it be a question of defending or improving its position in competition. We can make a distinction between such active logics (which may be offensive or defensive) and logics presupposing less internal mobilization and which are thus more “passive”, in practically all the hierarchical positions of schools. In middle and upper positions, we can oppose the entrepreneurs' offensive strategies to the other more passive strategies of rentiers, whereas other schools in mean

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\(^{49}\) Section 4 studies these logics of action more in-depth based on two or three case studies per local space, where the schools were analysed much more intensively, by supplementing interviews with the directors by observations, interviews with the parents, teachers, students and educators.

\(^{50}\) Yet we should underline that all these domains were not studied systematically by all the teams due to the characteristics of the schools and contexts studied, but also due to theoretical and methodological choices. In fact the approach adopted is far from being perfectly homogeneous. Certain teams (Charleroi, Lille and Budapest) adopted one entry per domain. Among those teams, Charleroi, therefore, distinguished different logics of action per domain. On the other hand, those in Lille and Budapest subsequently proposed a global typology of logics of action. Other teams distinguished “external” and “internal” strategies while indicating sub-domains of action and types of strategies (Lisbon and London). Finally the Parisian team, after having distinguished the internal and external handicaps and resources of the various types of establishment, analysed how the latter, applied to different domains of action, compose distinct logics depending on the school.
positions struggle against declassification while defensively seeking to modify their image. In the bottom positions, there is no other choice than offensively or passively adapting to the reality of the publics they contact.

**Rentiers and entrepreneurs**

We can make a distinction between schools that tend to develop "rentier" logics, tranquilly valuing what ensures them a relatively favourable and enviable position and the logic of "entrepreneurs" aimed at improving their internal functioning, attracting new "parents/clients" and/or preserving the fidelity of older ones and so actively improving/preserving their relative positions in a school space where they know nothing is attained forever.

The opposition between logics of "rentiers" and "logics of entrepreneurs" is more likely to develop in privileged positions. B. Delvaux and A. van Zanten (2004, p 95) point out the nature of passive "rentier" logics within French and Belgian spaces: "The schools who have been at the top for years are naturally those least worried about competition. In France, for example, the most reputable schools are characterized by their location within zones where families of the bourgeoisie or upper classes have lived for many years, and sometimes for two centuries. In both France and Belgium, such reputable schools are characterized by a high level of standards in the subjects most valued, like French and mathematics and, especially when they are private, by strict discipline." These schools, relying on their tradition, may still find themselves in competition with "the action of "entrepreneurial" schools that propose other forms of excellence involving international sections, European options or bilingual classes in France, or German or history in Belgium. In fact, if the bourgeoisie and an important fraction of the upper and middle classes still favour the first type of offer en masse, other, more "worldly" or "modernist" fractions of upper and middle classes may prefer the second. This movement is favoured by the displacement of these categories, either towards new suburban zones earlier bereft of colleges, or towards centre city quarters deserted by working classes whose schools see themselves constrained to transform their offer. For that matter, not all students with privileged backgrounds are apt or motivated by classical options, which leaves room for a diversification of offer and demand for both the "rentiers" and the "entrepreneurs"" (ibidem, p 95).

In the spaces of London and Budapest, many factors coincide to make the logic of entrepreneurs largely prevalent among schools in middle and upper positions, so that the rentier/entrepreneur opposition makes less sense. In London, middle class spatial mobilities lead to the "gentrification" of certain quarters hitherto disadvantaged (like some quarters of Wyeham), so that "attractive" schools are never altogether assured of their positions whereas mid range schools may come under pressure from new parents, in a context where parental choice is completely open. For that matter, governmental policy, relayed by the local authority (the Wyeham LT) induces schools to "proactively" mobilize to attain their goals, notably by developing a "specialization" that they aggressively promote outside (vis-à-vis parents or the local environment) with a view to obtaining the status of "specialist school". A relatively intense state of competition is maintained then in London, both by the parental logics and by the government, which induces all relatively well positioned schools to gamble on a rather offensive and entrepreneurial logic. In Budapest, it is above all the demographic decline and weak percentage of middle classes that prevents schools isolating themselves in a "rentier" logic. Inversely, the weak competitive tension hardly induces the Portuguese schools (whatever their position) to mobilize to face competition, either offensively or defensively.

Yet this competitive factor among upper or upper-middle positions should not be isolated from others, and we should recall that the schools' mobilization capacities are also linked to internal actors and their own dynamics. Some remain in a "rentier" logic, even if their position and attractiveness begin to fray (due to nearsightedness in dealing with change, a lack of dynamism in the school head, the existence of sharp conflicts among personnel, as is the case in certain colleges in the Paris region). On the contrary, other schools are sometimes "entrepreneurs" beyond what their present situation demands because of the dynamism of their headteachers (see section 4).
Defensive mobilization and falling back on underprivileged publics

Another form of mobilization logic, more defensive than offensive, may also appear particularly in the middle positions, among schools “struggling against declassification”. In these positions, they are objectively and subjectively very aware of their situation of dependence vis-à-vis better positioned schools (rentiers or entrepreneurs). These are the schools, for example that tend to lose their better students to those judged more attractive by parents. Slight though favourable factors within the school (relative consensus, confidence in their capacity to act), they can, via a strategy and/or (pedagogical and political) ethics, seek to preserve their image and avoid becoming ghetto schools and remain sufficiently attractive for middle classes. This strategy may, in fact, be encouraged by trust authorities (as in Lille). Thus this mobilization strategy aims at preserving their “mid range” position by certain less prestigious offers than those of “rentier” or “entrepreneurial” schools, like “sports-studies” options in France or “social sciences”, “expressive arts” or “infographie” in Belgium. They may also have recourse to other strategies, such as 1) the selection of their pupils, when this proves possible, at least on a behavioural basis, 2) overall segregation between classes in terms of student levels and behaviour and 3) strict disciplinary methods, notably seeking to isolate or exclude students most “problematical” for the school’s functioning and image (like the Meunier school in Belgium, see section 4).

Finally, in less favourable positions, the dominant logic is adapting to the public they welcome. Yet this adjustment can take place in a sort of resignation or, else, more strategically and offensively. This adaptation to their public above all stems from the fact that these schools consider themselves very dependent on logics of student distribution resulting from parent behaviour and the logics of other schools; they in fact consider themselves incapable of reversing or modifying those logics.

Just the same, their logic of action can be offensive when this adaptation to the public becomes, in fact, the basis of identity of a school, of an internal logic wanting to specialize in a logic of success vis-à-vis students in difficulty. This logic can take on various tones but it often tends to favour an educational and socializing function (citizenship too) rather than favouring exigency and progress in academic learning. (see section 4 for development). Finally, this logic may be favoured by the local authorities (in Budapest for ex.) who protect and encourage these schools, and by national regulatory actors who subsidize these publics substantially, so that, in a declining population context, some find a strategy of “reconversion” in specialization vis-à-vis underprivileged publics, helping them avoid closure and preserve teacher employment.

In short, the emergence of (offensive/defensive) active logics vs more passive logics depends on the state of competition and perception of the threat it represents in the eyes of the school’s actors. Position and attractiveness may thus be seen by the school’s actors as more or less problematical. That’s why, from this point of view, there is no automatic link between the positions and the type of logic, because interpretation of what’s at stake and the problem, like the capacity for an offensive response from the school, are affected by various internal factors (the director’s role, internal consensus; we shall return to this in section 4). They are simultaneously dependent on the institutional and political context, which may encourage directors to go on the offensive.

Logics of specialization or diversification

The logics of schools are not only delineated by direct policies seeking to influence their publics (via enrolment or promotion policies), this also takes place via policies dealing with their education offer, which also indirectly affect the public they attract. In fact strategies of this sort are at least partially intended to make schools more attractive in the eyes of parents. Perceptions professionals have of education concerning parent expectations plays a role then, which can be greater or lesser depending on local and national contexts. Yet the logics in the teaching offer area are those most closely influenced by the institutional staff and administrative logics of trust authorities, who govern the distribution of options fairly strictly across the board. But the actions of “competing” schools also greatly orient these strategies, for very often the goal is to imitate others or delineate oneself by proposing counter models or specializations.

We can therefore distinguish schools that clearly have a policy of specialization from those that, on the contrary, tend to play the role of general practitioner while diversifying. They eventually find the type of student public that evidently suits them.
These logics are greatly influenced by market logic and the effects of the school's past status. Logics of specialization are to be found particularly in the high or low positions of the hierarchy of schools. It all seems to happen as if they sought to create “niches”, differentiating them from another. Thus, as we mentioned earlier, those in strong positions can either specialize in preserving their “traditional offer”, or aim at new publics by more modern offers. Inversely, schools with academically or socially less advantaged publics can make it their speciality.

Thus the schools in mid range positions tend most to diversify their education offer and simultaneously open options aimed at keeping “good students” while retaining others more accessible or attractive to students with less favourable academic profiles. This kind of “bipolarization” model has developed in Budapest and France, but is found in other contexts too.

Yet these logics do not automatically result from their positions. We have already emphasised the role of the educational or consultative authorities the schools have to submit their ideas to in this area for approval. In fact in France the trust authorities support relatively voluntarist policies aimed at favouring heterogeneity in schools as well as a diversification which can turn into bi-polarization. In this respect, we might note in passing the “homogenizing” effect of institutional and political pressure, which encourages “heterogeneous and varied” schools, but in England favours the entrepreneurial logic.

Logics of adjustment, logics of following rules, logics of collaboration.

Schools develop logics of action spawning various relationships with other schools in the local space: logics of adjustment to evolutions in “competition” (offer) and the “market” (demand), logics independent of others, essentially oriented in relation to the trust authority and characterized by respect for rules hammered out in negotiation, and finally a logic of explicit collaboration with other schools.

The first logic is made up of individual adjustments designed to address other schools’ actions, not including adjustments to meet parental demands, in short, the market environment. In this case, they go in for “institutional scanning” by examining the information available on other schools or, more often, by spreading filtered information they have on students, parents, teachers or the inspectors who circulate among schools. Rather than purely reproduce their past logic, these schools take their competitors’ practices, or evolutions in demand, more or less into account and make greater or lesser adjustments, which sometimes may be of “external dominance” when the areas concerned are related to enrolment, offer or promoting the school, and sometimes of “internal dominance” (related to class composition, managing discipline, action vis-à-vis students in difficulty).

The second logic consists in following only the rules and procedures which are imposed on them or proposed for them by the trust authorities, without being guided by other schools or demand. In the third logic, their actors develop projects, organize activities or exchange information or services in view of a common goal.

These logics are not totally exclusive and can be combined (for ex. collaboration and adjustment). The dominance of one logic over another can still be influenced by various factors already mentioned: intensity of pressures due to market effects (pressure linked to logics of parents or other schools in direct competition), their position, the institutional pressure of trust authorities, or inside factors.

Thus in Charleroi, given the strong market pressure, schools have a tendency to adjust their logics of action to those of others. At the two extremes, an adjustment oriented towards the internal situation carries the day. Whereas schools situated at the top of the hierarchies are generally oriented towards preservation of quality offer without worrying too much about the strategies of others, except for those placed on the same level or nearby levels, those on the bottom rung also intervene little in offer and care little about other schools upon whom they are nonetheless dependent, except when they lose their students. It is those who are both prey to the loss of students and who have a middling and unstable reputation who most adjust to external dominance, either via a modernization limited to offer, or via a more radical modernization which allows them to conquer new markets. In any case, adjustment favours specialization and segmentation of publics and tends to reinforce the hierarchy existing among schools in the local space. The inter-school co-operation sought by “concerted” regulation plans within “zone councils” for overtures and new options, only end up reinforcing those logics which contribute to the status quo.
Elsewhere there are collaborations between schools with the same provider; however they make sense in relation to competitive contexts between providers: thus to moderate competition among Catholic schools on the level of external promotion and defend group interests vis-à-vis public providers, the Catholic sector has organized a collective promotion of its schools. Here, as we see, co-operation makes sense in a competitive context.

In Budapest, as we have already pointed out, market pressure also favours logics of adjustment which lead to the specialization of the two extremes of the hierarchy (oriented towards “problem” students or better students), and to “bi-polarization” logics for mid range schools. No noteworthy collaboration is seen among them.

In France we see logics of adjustment rather like those in Budapest. Thus advantaged public schools tend to adjust in terms of equivalent private schools, through logics of borrowing and imitation (schedules, organization of trial exams, “bilingual” classes). Elsewhere, adjustments in the area of options offered are made in the direction of middle class parents faithful to the public sector (options authorized in the context of a unique college or clandestine “level classes”).

Yet, at least on the rhetorical level, trust authorities favour a logic of adjustment oriented toward diversification of offer and publics; meanwhile, certain schools have latitudes of negotiation permitting them to escape pressures in this sense (in this vein, a school has been able, with parents' support, to hold “European classes” against the will of the academy) and, furthermore, the inconstancies of the policies followed as well as their reactive or timid character, mean that, overall, the schools’ offer remains rather specialized and their publics segmented by school. Some schools in mid range positions are nearest to this sought after logic: diversification of publics and offers (but also with tendencies towards “bi-polarization”).

For that matter, it is worth noting that strong collaborations, also favoured by trust authorities, have developed within public schools to face up to student flight towards the private. Again, cooperation becomes sensible in relation to the specific forms competition between public and private.

In Wyeham, a logic of adjustment predominates in the sense that schools seek to specialize and distinguish themselves from others but, paradoxically, this tendency is strongly supported by the central government, and transmitted by the LT, so that, in short, this search for inter-school “variety” leads to forms of homogenization of practices, and that much more so in that collaborations between schools are also encouraged here in order to “exchange good practices” and favour keeping borough students in the zone. These logics of adjustment and collaboration are thus simultaneously favoured by both market regulation and the pressure of local regulatory policy.

In Portugal, the competitive pressure is much weaker and inter-school logics of adjustment, or vis-à-vis demand, are almost imperceptible. The predominant logic is respect for rules and negotiation on the margins of their application. Some spontaneous collaborations exist between them, intended to regulate problems of assigning new students or those expelled from other schools.

4 Market regulation, institutional regulation and inequalities

Competitive interdependencies between schools, in all the spaces observed, have to do principally with students (their number and/or their social or academic characteristics); in effect, recruitment of students by a school often affects other organizational realities crucial to them: finances, or the number and quality of teachers. Moreover, student characteristics (academic and/or social) colour teaching conditions, the prestige of teachers, as well as the image and reputation of the school.

This “competition” for students occurs in all the institutional contexts – logically in the “quasi-market” officially set up in England and as practically developed in Belgium and Hungary - as well as in contexts where the assignment of students is supposed to be much more administered, as in France and Portugal.

Yet this does not mean that all the schools are in competition with one another; many “clusters” of interdependencies form in all the spaces observed; moreover the contours of these clusters frequently overflow the borders of the institutional spaces these schools fit into (municipalities or districts, for example).
This “competition” nonetheless presents variable intensities. The sources of this differential intensity are notably the following.

- A demographic decline and surplus of places available in the schools of the zone
- A limited presence of middle class students in the zone due to the social characteristics of its demography.
- Families oriented more towards stakes of quality than concerned about proximity or facility, as concerns choices and decisions in the area of schooling. This more “strategic” orientation of families becoming more aware “consumers” of school goods is favoured in “quasi-market” contexts where past school policies encourage families in that direction.
- The type of institutional regulatory system encouraging (or not) choices in major proportions: quasi-market vs. administered assignment of students to schools
- The difficulties of local and/or regional authorities to reduce or avoid phenomena of competitive interdependence between schools, when they want to do it;
- The institutional rules linking “high” stakes to other organizational stakes for schools (as in Portugal, the stakes are lower because the number of students has less of an influence on their financing or the number of teachers)
- The schools' logics of action, which reinforce competition insofar as they are more offensive and oriented towards the preservation or improvement of their positions in the distribution of students in the zone considered

The presence of one or many clusters of competitive interdependencies between a part of schools does not destroy or prevent the development of interdependencies based on co-operation. Yet we were able to observe that certain co-operations, encouraged by trust authorities, might simultaneously be predetermined by the logics of competition mentioned above: thus, in taking into account the competition exerted by the public providers, the Catholic schools of Charleroi got together and launched a common promotion, consulting one another on available options ; the public schools of Lille or Wyeham got together to try and limit the flight of students towards “private schools” or other districts.

The logics of individual actions of schools are directly or indirectly affected by these competitive interdependencies, even if this external influence is mediated by many givens within the school. These logics of action may be analysed in many partially complementary dimensions: active and offensive logics vs. passive logics ; logics of specialization vs. logics of diversification ; logics of adjustment, of following rules or collaboration. These logics of action will be studied more in depth in the following section which will further consider how the dynamics within schools can filter external influences.

We have already observed that these logics of action may contribute to stabilizing, or even, reinforcing the hierarchization of schools and therefore segregating students. Thus logics of specialization into niches, oriented either towards “good” students, or towards problem students tend to organize a sort of social division of work between schools, which “specialize” in differentiated publics. We have also observed that certain logics of action tend to maintain the intensity of competition in the local space, to the extent that they adopt offensive external strategies, seeking to improve their positions (entrepreneurial logics). Generally speaking, we dare say that logics of action in areas of external dominance tend in fact to be relatively strategic logics of action, in the sense that they incorporate a form of calculation, of anticipation and planification of action (for ex. concerning enrolments, decision making in the area of offer, promotion and image). Offensive logics of action are moreover encouraged by the institutional environment in certain local contexts, to the extent that, for example, in England, all these schools are invited to become “entrepreneurs”, “motivated” to improve their performances and reputation and so become more attractive in the eyes of families. Yet the “banding system” in force in Wyeham up through 2003 put a relative limit on the consequences of intensification of competition on the segregation of students among schools.

Schools in mid range positions have interesting logics in that some of them may attempt to maintain their positions in the hierarchy while seeking to diversify their academic offer, to guaranty a sufficient degree of social and academic heterogeneity in their student bodies. The first source of this logic are strategies within the school and its directorship anxious to avoid “declassification” but it may be further reinforced by intermediate or local political authorities, as in the French and Hungarian spaces. All the same, the risk of seeing an internal segregation reappear in these schools seems not to have been altogether avoided in
some of them, where internal class levels have been appearing, created to retain students and parents liable to leave the school as much for motives of socialization as academics.

There are then complex but established ties between the hierarchization among schools, the tendency to segregation of their publics and the schools’ logics of action. For that matter, the latter are not independent of the school’s position in the local space, the intensity of the reigning competition, but also the action or inaction of regulatory policy authorities, notably intermediate.

The conditions of development of this “regulatory” action on the part of intermediate regulatory authorities deserves being looked into. Two points deserve being made. On the one hand, the political stakes of regulating student distribution among schools in a local space are not perceived the same way in the different spaces analysed, and, on the other hand, intermediate regulatory authorities run into problems of efficiency when they seek to limit tendencies towards segregation.

The political will to see local and regional authorities play the role of “regulator” of “market effects” varies greatly depending on the contexts analysed. Beyond the fact that national institutional regulations more or less limit the possibility of local authorities intervening in this sense (the presence or lack of freedom of choice of school by parents and latitude in “sorting” on the part of schools), the political orientation of regional or local intermediate regulatory authorities, and the ethics of their agents make them more or less aware of what’s at stake in this regard with inequality and market effects. Thus we have been able to observe that the stakes of hierarchization among schools and segregation was in the forefront in the local spaces analysed in Belgium and France, but with greatly different means of intervention. What’s at stake with inequalities is above all perceived in Hungary from the aspect of internal actions carried out in each school without questions of student distribution between schools or that of segregation being raised or, for that matter, the problems being resolved (like that of students passing from one district to another).

Similarly, in Portugal, it is above all the question of “special needs students” that is featured as at stake regarding relations between schools. In Wyeham, what’s at stake in student distribution among them is clearly perceived, but everything takes place as if it were no longer a political priority, neither on the national, nor on the local level, resulting in an old instrument (the “banding system”) being abandoned, in part because it is judged handicapping for “community schools” who depend on the LEA in relation to other types, who are not dependent. In fact, we touch here on a fundamental point, which our international comparison will shed light on.

Institutional authorities find it hard to launch efficient interventions for regulating perverse market effects in terms of inequalities and segregation. Why ? Besides the factors indigenous to each local context, two general factors belonging to the structures of competitive interdependencies can be put in evidence:

• Usually, the institutional borders of territories for which authorities in charge of intermediate regulation have geographical competency (for ex. municipality, district, or academy) do not correspond to the actual geography and real contours of student “flow” between schools. In other words, the clusters of competitive interdependencies between schools are often wider and cut across many institutional regulatory territories/authorities, being why a more or less important percentage of parents are capable, for finding a school which suits them, of changing municipality or providers (changing from of a public school to a private school);

• Hence the authorities and regulations applying to these clusters of interdependent schools are often multiple (multi-regulation) and fragmented in their action and intervention. Put otherwise, these regulations are neither harmonized, nor coordinated, neither between the various public authorities in charge of different public schools (State, departmental or municipal schools, for example), nor between the latter and private schools. The result is that these different intermediate regulatory authorities are incapable of avoiding or seriously diminishing competition between schools dependent on different “institutional providers” (or to use Belgian terminology different “organizing powers”).

This relative political “impotence” of local or regional authorities can therefore lead them, not without ethical dilemmas for that matter, to moderate their actions or draw their own conclusions and hence develop defensive strategies for the “schools” in their local space (cfr. logics of defensive co-operation, already mentioned).
Complementarily, this sort of sociological fatalism in the face of “market” and segregation phenomena may also encourage school directors to develop strategies and logics whose rationality is first constructed in reference to the school, more than in relation to the effects of combining the logics of these schools in the interdependent local space.

We are now going to deepen our analysis of schools’ logics of action, in taking all the dynamics and play of their internal actors into consideration.
SECTION 4 SCHOOLS’ LOGICS OF ACTION: BETWEEN EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS

In the previous section, we have already shown some dimensions of the logics of action developed by schools in various positions within each research setting. We have insisted on various factors that can favour these logics in each local space. In this section, we will develop this analysis on the basis of more in-depth case studies, which should allow us to take the internal actors and the internal conditions specific to the school more into account. Indeed, there is no mechanical relation between the external environment of the school (position in the space, institutional authorities) and the logic of action developed by the school.

We will thus be focusing our examination on internal school regulation and the objective dominant logics of action that can be identified across a set of case study schools drawn from the six research settings. Each of the social and policy settings and the market positions of the case study schools within them, and the interdependent relationships of the case study schools to their ‘neighbours’, have already been described in some detail in sections 2 and 3. We then move on to consider the inter-play between the external forms of regulation, market position and conditions of actions each school is set in and the different forms of internal logics of action identified. At various points we put forward attempted explanations or hypotheses to account for differences in the logics of action of the case study schools. Our analysis is founded on the premise that the logics of action of schools is a significant mediating and interactive variable, a space of interpretation, struggle and necessity, between changes in modes of regulation and patterns or forms of social inequality. Here we focus upon those processes of mediation and interpretation – rather than their outcomes in terms of specific equity effects.

The case study schools were selected from among those initially identified and studied within the areas of interdependence already presented in section 3. The basic criteria for selection of the case studies (see Table 1) were ‘position’ (in the sense of reputation and status within the local ‘pecking order’) and ‘performance’ (in the narrow sense of academic indicators of student achievement). These criteria were in no sense intended to select out ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools. Nor do we accept either performance or reputation as unproblematic descriptors. Nonetheless, the choice of schools did reflect the ‘local commonsense’, however inappropriate or inaccurate that might be. Alongside these more subjective or superficial indicators it was also possible to consider the choice of case study schools in terms of a more objective categorization of differences as outlined in section 3. The final selection of schools was further complicated by national specificities. This is most obvious in the examples of France and Belgium, each of which has three case study schools, including in each case one private, Catholic school.

One concern which may be raised about the relationship between the selection of the schools and the analysis which follows is whether there is a circularity embedded in the identification of particular logics of action with certain positions and conditions. There is some foundation to this concern but the analysis presented below does attempt to isolate a set of specific features which animate the internal logics of the schools, and a set of specific aspects of market position, and of institutional regulation contexts, which impinge upon or limit the possibilities of such logics.

The case studies undertaken by the research teams sought to identify the strategies of Principals and the transactions between the professional groups in each school, especially as they bear on questions of equity and achievement. The leadership styles of the Principal and the primary sites and forms of decision-making were also addressed. But the case studies also considered the extent to which prevailing

51 This section is based on the case studies realized by each research team (WP9/deliverable 10) and the transversal comparison of deliverable 11 (Ball and Maroy, 2004).

52 This was represented in the Portuguese material as ‘attractiveness’ – ‘the ability that a school has in rousing the will of students to attend’. A further elaboration of the concept differentiates ‘passive’ from ‘active’ attractiveness. The former refers to a situation where exogenous factors are most important in influencing parents’ decisions to send their children to a school, factors beyond the control of the school, like locality, social composition, buildings, staffing, and curricula. The latter refers to those schools that set out with the intention of influencing or ‘capturing’ choices through such things as the development of educational projects, extra-curricular activities, special programmes, deployment of ‘social capital’ – and in some countries, the deliberate exclusion of ‘other’ students as a tactic to ensure forms of exclusivity.
modes of regulation tended to inhibit, constrain or 'steer' the schools' logics and strategies and in particular the effects of their 'market position' in the shaping of these logics and strategies.

The cases studies were undertaken and written in a fairly 'open' way so as to convey something of the dynamism, complexity and vicissitudes of the inner life of these schools, and the struggles over purpose, the stresses of change, and the pressures of recruitment, competition and performance come to bear within them.

The case studies rest primarily upon interviews conducted with key personnel and a cross-section of actors within each school [between 10 and 20] in each case. In addition visits to the schools enabled the researchers to attend school activities and rituals, sit-in on meetings of various kinds, and wander around the buildings. School documents of various kinds were collected. In some cases the Principals were 'shadowed' through their working day. However, the schools varied in the extent of their co-operation and openness and the limits placed upon the researchers’ access. Most researchers reported a welcoming attitude while others [e.g. Renoir and Balzac (F) – confronted a degree of suspicion or wariness]. At Balzac it was parents who were ‘aggressively suspicious of researchers’. Not all of the ‘targeted’ personnel were willing to be interviewed, or in some cases suitable arrangements for the interviews were impossible. However, in every case a variety of roles and perspectives and interests were represented.

Table 6. Selection of Case Study Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>High performing schools with secure positions of popularity within their local market</th>
<th>Schools with moderate or improving positions of popularity within their local market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Blue school</td>
<td>Pink school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tennyson</td>
<td>Merchants’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Boileau</td>
<td>St Madeleine* / Meunier**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Martyn</td>
<td>Ruten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, Paris</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>St Saens / St Paul*</td>
<td>Ferry***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, Lille</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Renoir</td>
<td>Balzac</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Private Catholic school; ** Meunier is in fact in a better academic position than Madeleine, and is therefore in an “intermediate” position between the other two Belgian schools *** Ferry has improved its reputation in the past few years

It is important to note that the positions are defined in each local space and related to this local space. Therefore, they cannot be compared from one national space to another. That is to say that there aren’t objective criteria which could be used as universal rating criteria.

We will first develop the various logics of action observed. Secondly, we will explore the internal and external conditions which should be taken into account to understand the logics of action present in each setting. This will lead us to develop a model for understanding the school's logic of action. The roles of market positions, policy regulation, and internal actors will be stressed.

1 The school's logics of action: similarities and differences

In this section, we intend to develop a synthetic overview of the case study schools with regard to their dominant logics of action. This synthesis is presented in the first authority in terms of a simple binary - two essential and contrasting school types - but we will go on to muddy this simplicity by suggesting a third type of school which is ‘in balance’ or ‘in movement’. As we go on to explain more extensively in the following section, the two types of schools identified here are very clearly embedded in and responsive to their particular ‘market’ environment and regulatory context and are involved with that environment and context in particular ways. While the key point of our analysis here is that general differences in market environment rather than national specificities are most important in differentiating between the case study schools, we remain alert to and where relevant will review the nuances of the latter.

Let us begin then with our binary and an initial categorization of schools as having a dominant set of logics of action which are either instrumental or expressive. These terms are borrowed from Bernstein's work (1996, pp 97-99) but here do not carry the full sophistication and weight of Bernstein's development of them over time. The important point to emphasize here is that each school type has its own instrumental
and expressive order. What we are suggesting here is that in some schools the instrumental order is the dominant and defining characteristic and in others the expressive order is dominant and defining. Following Bernstein, as he in turn draws on Douglas (1966), and ultimately on Durkheim, in the former types of school the forms of speech and organization are closed and pure [mechanical solidarity], and in the latter they are open and mixed [organic solidarity]. In effect, in the instrumental schools the expressive order is embedded and taken for granted. In the expressive schools, the expressive order is more explicit and actively worked-on, and is in part a means of achieving individual student achievements. Some of the specifics of Bernstein’s analytical framework apply here and are used as he intended ‘to generate explicit principles of description for empirical exploration’ (p. 100). As well as structures and practices related to curriculum and pedagogy and staff-student relationships, as in Bernstein’s framework, we encompass the relationships between staff, and staff and Principals. And to paraphrase Bernstein, in the following section we will attempt to connect the modalities of organization and speech institutionalized in the schools to forms of regulation.

The expressive schools are markedly socially heterogeneous and this heterogeneity is celebrated. Variety and mix among the students is considered important but there is a concomitant emphasis on a common curriculum and a minimizing of differentiation by routes or into groups, except insofar as curriculum choices are offered on the basis of cultural and class ‘relevance’, as a form of positive opportunity, but certainly not on the basis of ability. There is a related emphasis on tolerance and the value of social mixing. These schools also have an open relation to their environment, in a number of ways - they are ‘accepting’ and integrative - for example in being willing to take in students who have been refused or excluded from other schools, ‘boundary relations are blurred’, and they are reluctant to exclude students themselves and have procedures and tactics which are aimed at avoiding exclusions. Strategies for equality, the ‘aspirations of the many’ as Bernstein puts it, are to the fore. The ritual order of these schools celebrates participation/co-operation and teacher-student relations of control are interpersonal or articulated in terms of ‘caring’ and pastorality but there is nonetheless a strong focus on issues of behaviour and systems and structures are put in place to respond to student ‘problems’ and to respond quickly to points of conflict. In effect, the expressive orientation, and the emphasis on care and management of social and educational problems, become a matter of expertise within these schools and part of their public reputation. The primary institutional values stress sociality, and talk of equity is clearly in evidence. High priority is given to practices intended to address problems of inequalities. Staff relationships also reflect these more open relationships with an emphasis on interpersonal relations between staff and staff and Principals. Collaboration is an important aspect of work relations, often extending across subject or age-group boundaries and based upon open discussions of pedagogy, pedagogical principles and innovations. Group based projects are based on these collaborative relations and open discussions. Principals are more likely to take up the role of ‘leading professional, allowing for the possibilities of consultation and a recognition of devolved expertise and responsibility. Principals in these schools tend to rely on interpersonal relations as a basis for authority and as a means of enacting policies and are regarded as ‘accessible’ and ‘visible’.

The instrumental schools put greater emphasis on striving for homogeneity - to the recruitment of particular sorts or categories of students, those who are willing and able to subscribe to academic values. They are more likely to be selective or exclusive or excluding, stressing exclusivity as an ‘attractor’ to potential parents. The primary values of these schools lay a heavy stress on academic excellence and typically they will often offer special programmes and esoteric subjects aimed at ‘able’ students and based on traditional academic values and preparation for higher education. There is a much greater use of forms of curricular and ability differentiation in terms of structures, routes or forms of specialization. Sporting excellence is also stressed and these schools are able to offer special facilities for sports. Relationships with students are primarily articulated in terms of their performances and indeed much of the organization of these schools is related to performance maximization and improvement. High profile systems of monitoring ‘progress’ are used. And student performance is a central feature of their public reputation and their appeal to client and policy audiences. Strategies of equality are marginal or invisible. There is an absence or subordination of speeches of equity, and practices addressed to problems of inequality are subordinated to the goals of performance. Student-teacher relationships are based on authority and positional control - and this is also reflected in the form of relationships among staff and between Principal and staff, which are ‘closed’ and based on position and authority, although the strong consensus around academic values and excellence and staff stability often provide for friendships and good social
relationships among staff. Nonetheless, collaborations are limited and importance is given to teacher autonomy within the classroom; pedagogies are not discussed outside of subject departments. Principals are more likely to take up the role of ‘manager’ and direct, with little recognition of devolved expertise and responsibility in organizational matters. The Principal relies on indirect forms of control and communication is limited and uni-directional.

Now having begun to outline these principles of differentiation, we should say quickly and emphatically that not all the schools referred to below fit totally and unproblematically into the binary. What we suggest is that they display particular clusters of characteristics which enable us to differentiate them sufficiently in relation to the binary framework - excepting those which we discuss later as hybrid schools.

**Table 7. Essential characteristics of School Types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental</th>
<th>Expressive</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous, selected intake.</td>
<td>Open intake and programmes aimed at students with special needs</td>
<td>Various or changing intake profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrowly defined teacher-student relationships based on student's academic identity and teacher authority</td>
<td>Teacher-student relationships based on familial roles and principles of care</td>
<td>Attempts to blend academic and social relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents viewed as social, policy and academic assets</td>
<td>School may be part of local community but some parents seen as unsupportive of students and/or school</td>
<td>Attempts to attract middle class families and gain support of parents for school aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk of equity marginal or ‘irrelevant’</td>
<td>Talk of equity central to philosophy and practice</td>
<td>Dual emphasis on equity and performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esoteric programmes for HE preparation and ‘high ability’ students</td>
<td>Special programmes for educational and behavioural needs</td>
<td>Mix of esoteric and special programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive use of ability differentiation</td>
<td>Minimal use of ability differentiation</td>
<td>Selective use of ability differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited collaboration between teachers Principal is manager</td>
<td>Collaboration between teachers is normal practice Principal is leading professional</td>
<td>Collaboration is an important factor in innovation and change Principal is innovator or entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between Principal and staff are formal and distant Principal's decision making is closed</td>
<td>Relations between Principal and staff are open and informal Decision making is consultative and devolved</td>
<td>Relations between Principal and staff are tactical and emergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We need to be clear here that these categories of schools are primarily heuristic. They were developed from the analysis of case study materials and the deployment of theoretical material, from Bernstein and elsewhere. While we have been able to allocate most of the schools back into the categories, there are some, Ferry or Balzac in particular, which are not easily accommodated into what are ultimately ‘ideal types’ which enable us to develop a purposeful discussion and analysis of the complex relationships between institutional logics of action and policy and market conditions of interdependence between

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schools. We attempt in the discussion which follows to use and disturb, at the same time, the category system outlined above.

It is also important to stress that schools may not be irrevocably fixed in the categories they are allotted. Furthermore, we are not attempting to assert that schools separated into the binary categories have nothing in common. They clearly do, they operate within the same regulatory context and have to accommodate to this context but they accommodate differently in relation to the opportunities and constraints of their market position and market environment. Our categorization stresses differences within similarity.

**Table 8. Categorization of Case Study Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hybrids*53</th>
<th>The Expressive Order is Dominant</th>
<th>The Instrumental Order is Dominant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Pink school</td>
<td>Blue school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Merchants'</td>
<td>Tennyson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>*St Madeleine</td>
<td>Boileau, Meunier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Ruten</td>
<td>Martyn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Ferry</td>
<td>St Saens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St Paul*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>Balzac</td>
<td>Renoir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*private school

2 “Hybrid” logic of action

We want to emphasize again the heuristic status of the binary with which we have been working so far and the dangers of epistemic violence it brings into play. Like most binaries it obscures as much as it reveals and it is certainly not intended to separate out the heroic from the villainous nor to describe one set of schools in terms of what is lacking in the other. It certainly also brings together schools which encompass considerable variations amongst themselves. Our point is that within each category there are enough similarities and between the categories enough differences to make the categories sustainable and useful. They indicate patterns of common accommodation within and across different regulatory regimes and cultural and policy histories of education. But now we must address those schools which do not ‘fit’. These are ‘hybrid’ schools, and in the following section our discussion of them is particularly revealing in indicating both the internal and external dynamics of change within regulatory regimes. The hybrids may be thought of as either ‘balancing’, that is in a stable state of mix between logics or ‘in movement’, that is in the process of shifting between logics. As we shall see, hybridity often reflects the way in which schools respond to the changing or mixed social demography of their intakes or the attempt to attract a different sort of intake or to re-work the schools’ image or reputation in some way. As with the instrumental and expressive categories there are degrees of variation among the hybrid schools, indeed perhaps a greater degree of variation. The point is not that the hybrid schools are alike, rather that they display different mixes of expressive and instrumental logics, but neither is clearly predominant in these schools. These variations are illustrated in table 9.

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*53 We will see that in this way, some schools are closer to the expressive type, like Balzac or Ferry, and others to the instrumental type (St Paul).
Table 9.  Table: Schools as mixtures of expressive and instrumental dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expressive</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the diagram indicates, the three categories of schools represent different sorts of relations of dominance between the instrumental and expressive cultures which are principles of organization and grammars of power. It is not, as we tried to make clear previously; that the 'instrumental schools' have no expressive culture, obviously they do, and expressive values in terms of an institutional identity – developed through rituals, symbols and things like sports – are often of considerable importance. Equally, the 'expressive schools' have instrumental values in terms of student performance, for example, which are of importance. The diagram is also intended to indicate that within the spaces of the categories there are possibilities for different positions, different relations of dominance, and this is particularly important for an understanding of the hybrid schools – hybridity involves a variety of different kinds of resolutions between expressive and instrumental values. Furthermore, as well as providing a diachronic glimpse of the positioning of schools within the category system the diagram also serves to indicate the synchronic aspects of change and movement, along the sloping cross-time. In some cases, as we shall see, our data indicates that schools have or are changing position in terms of their relations of dominance, either by design, and effort of re-positioning, or in response to changing conditions of interdependence.

3. Conditions and determinants of logics of action

3.1. A heuristic model

Before considering the specific conditions and factors that have affected the logics of action in each setting, we would like to present the model which underlies the analysis. This model has been derived from the empirical data and draws upon various theoretical sources (in the sociology of education and sociology of organizations) as well as previous personal research on schools as organizations (Ball, 1987; Maroy, 1992). The deployment of the model enables us to interpret and organize our data. It is summarized in figure 1 and explained briefly below.
Figure 1 Model of analysis: school’s logic of action and social context of the school

- Socio-demographic characteristics of the area
- Degree of competition between schools within the local space
  - Influence of parents
  - Influence of other schools
- Regulation policy
  - Central, intermediate, local
  - Specific rules and interventions
- School position in the local market
- School mix (academic and social)
- Dominant logic(s) of action within the school (external and internal)
  - Consensual or conflictual
  - Coherence (weak or strong)
  - Among different domains (enrolment, curriculum, classes building, pedagogy, discipline, etc.)
- Micro politics
  - Type of leadership
  - Relations and alliances among groups
  - Consensus or dissent; tensions
- Principal’s professional ethics
- School Culture
- Teacher’s professional ethics
- Professional culture
- Social and professional composition of staff
3.1.1. Logics of action

The school logics of action are at the centre of our figure. This is what we have to understand and explain. The conceptual and empirical features of these logics have already been presented. It is important to recall that we can define these logics as “the consistencies that derive, ex post facto, from the observation of practices and decisions in the organization in relation to various aspects of the functioning of this organization, or to its functioning as a whole”. (See chapter I)

The overall coherence of this logic is an empirical question. We could conceive of this coherence as a variable which is dependent on the specificities of schools. In some, several logics may coexist in different departments or domains of action. Moreover, the organizational logic may be the result of the individual logics of different actors, whose power and autonomy vary within the organization. Different individual actors may promote or not, accept and support or not a common logic of action for the school as a whole. The logic of action of a school as a whole may thus be more or less consensual (or conflictual) and more or less coherent.

This logic of action might appear in the external decisions or practices of the organization (for authority: enrolment, external partnerships, public image) or in internal decisions and practices (concerning school development plans, curriculum and options, class training and organization (groupings and setting), discipline and social order inside the school, performance and targets to be reached). The logic of action may also have a bearing upon the management of human resources and staff mobilization and commitment to their job and school.

The whole school logic of action therefore has to be seen as dependent upon both “external” and “internal” conditions and factors. Note that we will stress the relations (see arrows in the figure) that seem to us important in understanding the logic of actions. It doesn’t mean that our figure embraces all possible relations.

3.1.2. External conditions

Two main external conditions are present.

1) The conditions related to the “market competition” present in the local space.

Following on from several points developed in chapter 3, we are able to state that there may be a more or less developed climate of competition and competitive reality between the schools, in relation to the recruitment of students or other resources in the local space. This competition may be of the first order (competition to get a sufficient volume of students to fill the places available in the school) or the second order (competition for student “quality”, either from an academic or social point of view, or both).

As a result of such “competitive interdependencies” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), a school may be more or less dependent upon the effects of parental choice in the space and/or upon the actions of others schools. Of course these competitive interdependencies are not a “natural” phenomenon. They stem firstly from all the policy decisions to allow parents to choose between schools and/or to allow schools to select students. As seen in chapters 2 and 3, these conditions vary considerably between the case study countries, and even between localities. Moreover, the issues related to competition may be different for each school, for example whether the number/quality of students recruited is related or not to the funding of the school, or to the number of teachers available (this is, for example, not the case in Portugal but surely the case in Belgium) etc.

The nature and degree of competition stems also from the geo-socio-demographic characters of the local space: competition may become more intense if there is a demographic decline (as in the Hungarian, Belgian, French and Portuguese fields of study), if the local space is surrounded by other spaces which are attractive to local families (as in metropolitan contexts), if parental choice is driven by concerns over “quality” rather than proximity and practical considerations. Moreover the actions of regulatory bodies, responsible for the application of rules of admission, may increase or decrease competition and its consequences. For example, the DRE in Portugal seems unconcerned by the movement of students into schools in other sectors and municipalities, this ‘laissez-faire’ attitude is partially related to the
demographic decline in the municipality of destination. In France, the “rectorat” of Lille is now applying the “catchment area” rules to each school more rigorously than was the case in the early nineties. The rigour of local rules is still more developed in the case of Creteil academy in Paris. Thus, the local regulatory policy and practices can inhibit or liberate the interdependencies among schools and affect the intensity of competition.

As discussed in chapter 3, competition interdependencies between schools are not incompatible with the development of what Pfeffer and Salancik call “co-operation interdependencies”. That is, the development of partnerships, joint ventures or coordination of practices between schools and with other social partners in the local area.

2) Regulation policy (central and local)

The rules by which the action and policy of the regulatory bodies operate can be extremely important constraints or resources for the actions of individual schools. Indeed, policy regulation organizes many of the “domains” of action referred to above in relation to the school logic of action. To what extent are enrolment, administrative procedures, performance targets, the curriculum, groupings and settings, pedagogy and evaluation, framed by general or specific rules enacted by policy regulation? To what extent is regulatory control strong or weak on these matters? How is funding used as an incentive and a means for action? All of this is part of what we call policy regulation.

These two external factors are interrelated. On the one hand, as we have said, the market is partially constructed by the rules of the State or intermediate regulatory bodies. On the other, policy regulation is affected and influenced by the strategies of each of the actors within the local competitive space. Thus there is a reciprocal interplay between them.

3.1.3. School position and intake

Another important variable, both internal and external, is the ‘school mix’ (ie. The academic and social composition of the student body) and the position of the school in the local space. This variable could be considered, either as producing a strong effect on the logic of action and/or as a result of it. Alongside other external social and spatial factors (social and economic composition of the population in the local area, transport, etc) and internal factors (especially, previous position and reputation of the school, school(s) facilities and buildings, etc), the two main external policy factors mentioned above tend to affect/produce the distribution of students amongst the various schools available within the zone. The outcome of the inter-relation of all of these factors will be a more or less developed social segregation between the schools. In other words, these factors greatly determine the intake of each school. Intake is clearly associated with the school's social position within the local market. In these terms, a school may have an upper position (it aims to be attractive to and is characterized by a high or middle class intake, and students of ‘high ability’), an intermediate position, or a lower position (an under-subscribed school, composed of students frequently refused entry to or excluded from other schools, coming from working classes or socially excluded groups, with poor academic results).

The ‘school mix’ (intake) and ‘market position’ may well of course have a significant effect on the internal functioning and daily life of the school (Thrupp 1999). Clearly, all these factors are subject to change: for example, schools are closed or new ones created (in Belgium or England); the social demography of the area/municipality may also change and affect the social intake of the schools in the area, as has been the case for those in the English and Hungarian case studies.

3.1.4. Internal conditions

Two main kinds of internal variables impinging on us help us understand the sources of logics of action. One kind being policy, or rather micropolicy, and the other cultural.

The logics of action may indeed be an issue in the school. That is to say, the Principal (or more generally the school management team or the board of governors) may adopt certain orientations and practices which are options, choices and decisions contributing to the formation of the school's logics of action. These practices, decisions or orientations may be convergent (or otherwise). In other words, a school's logics of action might be associated with consensus, or tensions and dissent amongst the staff as a whole. Opposing logics, or dominant and subordinate logics may be in play at any time (as at Tennyson (E) and,
to a very limited extent, Boileau (B). The logics of action are part of the micropolicy of the school (Ball 1987). Therefore, it is important to consider both the style of leadership present in the school and the types of alliances and relations amongst different categories of staff. Management, containment or avoidance of conflict or dissent are also of importance. Parental representatives or other external actors may also have some influence on these internal micropolitics. But these micropolicy processes are also rooted in and related to the various cultural and social characteristics of the school. Three types of variables must be taken into account 1) the professional ethos and culture of the various actors present (especially the teachers and the Principal) 2) previous trajectories, and social properties (the age, gender, class and ethnicity) of these actors 3) the culture of the school, related to its past, and its philosophy or ideology of education. As represented in figure 1, all of these conditions, both internal and external, tend to be inter-related and produce the dominant logic of action in each school.

3.2. Some convergences

Basing ourselves partly on the model presented above, we will now present some convergences and patterns which are identifiable among the various cases studies. These are summarized in a general form (ideas or proposals) before being illustrated by data from the case studies.

3.2.1. Congruency of the internal and external conditions, Principal’s role and internal policy

Proposal 1

In many cases, there is some form of coherence, congruency or affinity observable between the various internal and external conditions of the school's logics of action. The dominant logic of action seems to be a result of these internal/external conditions and there is a general ‘fit’ between these conditions and the logics of action. In other words, teachers’ ethics, the style of leadership, have to a certain degree to fit with the policy demands of the regulatory bodies, and with the prevalent parental expectations, which are all related to the school intake and its position in the local space of competition.

All these factors may result either in a prevailing “expressive” or “instrumental” logic of action. However, many specific conditions affect and produce variations in these generic types (see below).

In Tennyson (E), an instrumental logic of action is present. This logic is firstly privileged by the managerialist ethos of the Principal; it is oriented to cope with the demands and expectations of the middle class parents present in the school and to improve its “earned” advantageous position in the local space, while at the same time, meeting the policy criteria for success articulated in State policy. Raising the level of student performance is a form of investment which allows the school to secure future attractiveness to the middle class families present in the borough, as well as the image of the school for the central regulatory bodies. The school is indeed oversubscribed, and already has a higher proportion of “good academic students” (band 1) than allowed for by the local regulatory body.

However, there is no perfect convergence here, nor is there in other cases: many of the students come from “liberal aesthetic” middle class families who are not fully supportive of all the actions of the Principal, concerning for example the emphasis on hard work and norms of dress and behaviour (uniforms for example). There are also tensions within a small minority of the staff who do not support the orientation toward more differentiation of “routes” and ability grouping after the age of (KS 4). They continue to espouse “comprehensivist values” and “mixed ability teaching”. Finally, there may be some tensions between the school and the Education Foundation of Wyeham. To a great extent, in each respect the Principal is successful in mediating these contradictions.

In Ruten (H) and Madeleine (B), an expressive logic of action is present. In both cases, the dominant logic of action results in a certain degree of specialization in the schools’ “offer” and the organization of provisions to cope with students coming in with social, psychological, or academic problems. One aspect of this specialization is the hiring of various “non teaching” professionals and the setting up of units and courses aimed at “special needs students”. There are thus very open boundaries, an absence of selection and a low level of academic expectation. Moreover, the differentiation of the curriculum is reinforced by the close attention paid to issues of inequality and exclusion. Even if this attention does not necessarily reach its target. This logic is supported by both external and internal factors: on the one hand, the schools are in a lowly position in the local market. In a period of demographic decline in both cases, they have increasingly come to admit students who are unable to get places in other schools. In the case of Ruten, the school’s specialization has in effect become a special service to the municipality, which sends various “special needs
students” to Ruten. Neither school is in a position to change its intake and alter its position in the local space of interdependence, in the short term at least. This logic of action also matches the expectations of the regulatory bodies or central requirements of the State: for example, Ruten has been able to retain their full complement of teachers, despite the drop in student numbers, because they receive additional funds from the municipality as recognition of the particular demands involved in working with “special needs” students.

Madeleine’s response to the reorganization of the “common curriculum” (first degree) by the central government also matches the pedagogical and policy orientations of the reform pushed ahead by the central state and the Catholic provider.

On the other hand, internal factors are also important: in Madeleine, the ethos of the Principal and, more generally, the “Madeleine spirit” is of great importance in explaining the relative consensus around the school's logic of action. In Ruten too, there is a sort of consensus, rooted in the ethics of the Principal and teachers. Moreover, in Madeleine, the consensus is reinforced by the school's autonomy in relation to staff recruitments, whereby teachers are assessed in relation to this Madeleine spirit.

As elsewhere, there are however various tensions and the congruency is not total.

Proposal 2

This coherence between internal and external conditions and logics of action is not a “natural” phenomenon of adaptation of the organization to its internal and external environment. It is an active and policy process (conscious or partly unconscious) where the role of the “Principal” (or more broadly the management team), as well as the other actors inside the school are very important. The role of management is to construct this coherence or to maintain it. Evidently, “exogenous” internal or external change may affect the school and its logic(s) of action, but the “reactions” to these (more or less important) changes are a matter of agency. Moreover, this agency may be more or less conflictual or consensual. In particular, the “reading” of changes and their interpretation for colleagues are part of the policy process.

We can thus illustrate the importance of the management team’s role in two kinds of situations: the first is where the coherence and congruence is strong and where there is no dissent about the orientations to follow; thus the Principal's role is often to “maintain” this situation of internal and external coherence. This situation does not mean an absence of change; it may involve cases where the management reacts to changes in the environment with quite different strategies, but all oriented by constraints or the need to maintain coherence, at least to a certain degree. In other words, there is a will and a policy oriented to a form of dynamic equilibrium between logic of action and internal and external conditions.

Conversely, some schools and some “management teams” have to cope with a lesser degree of integration between these different conditions, either because of some important changes in the context which have “destabilized” a previously existing equilibrium and coherence and/or because there is internal opposition, contradiction and tension. In these situations, the management may try to improve coherence by implementing different strategies or simply live with this “relative incoherence”. Let us illustrate this general idea, and the two types of situations

Proposal 2.1 Congruency among internal and external conditions and Principal roles and strategies

Where there is sufficient congruency, the action of the Principal (or the management team) is usually aimed at maintaining or improving this “congruency/coherence over time, even though there may be ongoing developments within the school. The Principal will try to develop a school logic of action which is compatible with the various internal or external conditions. The case of Blue School (P) is illustrative of a situation where the external and internal conditions are relatively stable.

Blue School has developed an instrumental logic of action with the following practices and values: demand management (informal selection for the 3rd cycle), a proactive policy of external attractiveness (improvement of physical and security conditions), development of different routes within the curriculum, extra-curricular activities, promotion of sports, of “value and excellence” boards, and awards initiatives. This dominant logic of action is actively promoted by the Principal, through his managerial style and political ability in dealing with these internal micropolitics. More precisely, his entrepreneurship has resulted in the development of new activities (but contributing to the same logic of action), and this ensures continued support from staff inside the school. He is also very involved in the school's formal administrative bodies (school council, pedagogical council) in order to assure the convergence between his perspective and the different groups which are able to express themselves in these coordinating bodies: parents and teachers. His personal style of leadership (managerial), his resources (control of information in different bodies, external contacts) are very important in
assuring the continuity of equilibrium between internal and external conditions. As a result, the instrumental logic of action is not contested or discussed, it meets both the internal and external demands of the main actors: the internal expectations and educational ethos of teachers, and the requirements of parents, coming mostly from the middle and upper classes of the area. There is therefore considerable congruency between all these internal conditions and the attractive and high status position of the school in the local market. In other words, the logic of action both fits (and derives from) the social composition of the intake, itself related to the school’s “market position”. Moreover, the requirements of the state and local regulatory bodies are not a constraint; they are interpreted in specific ways, compatible with the logic of action: emphasis on performance, efficiency and effectiveness of school outcomes, even to the detriment of a more active policy of promotion of equality of opportunities. The Principal preserves this circular reinforcement of internal and external conditions through his active promotion of the instrumental logic of action within the school and through his managerial and political competence.

But, it is possible that changes in the environment (especially, social changes in the school’s catchment area) or internal changes may destabilize the internal congruence. Changes might be interpreted as a “threat” to the dominant logic of action and the equilibrium, and the strategy might be to buffer the school from this threat. This would provoke reactions or strategies from the internal actors, and especially from the management team. On the other hand, such change might be read as an opportunity to be used as a “resource” to reinforce the logic of action and dynamic equilibrium of the school. Meunier (B) illustrates the first case. Pink School (P) the second case. Both these two schools are in their own way examples of “dynamic equilibrium”.

In Meunier (B), the Principal tries to buffer environmental changes while seeking internal conditions that can guaranty the resilience of the logic of action (mainly instrumental) and more generally, coherence among the various internal and external conditions. The school occupies an intermediate position in the local space (position 2 on a continuum of 4 positions) and regulatory policies are not very constraining. With a relatively local recruitment, the school has a lower class intake but seeks to maintain a high level of academic expectation. There are various forms of internal academic selection and differentiation (through the creation of ability groups, emphasis put on work, order, effort and discipline). This situation suits the majority of teachers. There are very few interventions from parents. Furthermore, what the central state expects from regulatory policy is formally respected (especially concerning the organization of the common curriculum in the first two years of secondary school).

Preservation of the internal order of the school is of prime importance, even though there has been a gradual shift in intake towards students with lower levels of academic achievement and, in some cases, with behavioural difficulties. Therefore, in order to seek congruency and equilibrium among the different elements, (especially emphasis on social order and the implicit expectation that the students adapt themselves to the school and not the opposite) the management team was willing to expel 30 students even though this resulted in a reduction in funding. This Principal's policy was strongly supported by the teachers.

In Pink School (P), change in the socio-demographic composition of the environment has been an opportunity for the Principal (and other actors) which has enabled him to construct a logic of action, or reinforce one already present.

Pink School develops an “expressive logic of action” and is neither a “ghetto school” nor an “elite school”. It occupies an intermediate position in the local space and endeavours to maintain its image as a “good secondary school” even though the social composition of the area changed in the 1990s. The logic of action is oriented towards preventing both some students from being rejected and others from being instigated to flee. This internal logic of action is rooted in some internal conditions, especially a kind of school culture, which emphasizes “multiculturalism, respect for difference, participation and pedagogical flexibility”; this ethos is reinforced and maintained by the (veteran) Principal and a mobilized group of teachers who support him. Even though there are debates (formal or informal) and even some dissent in the school, favoured by the Principal's “democratic leadership”, there is a global consensus about this logic of action. These internal conditions allow the school to adapt smoothly to changes within its environment (massification and arrival of immigrants) without dramatic internal changes. More precisely, the action of Pink School's Principal has succeeded in preserving and developing the expressive logic of action, even though the environment of the school has changed. The arrival of African migrants has been both a constraint and a resource for the Principal (and staff), in order to reinforce and maintain the expressive logic of action. A constraint because the new students bring new problems, and a resource, because it can justify the direction taken. The role of the Principal here is extremely important in maintaining the logic of action, despite demands from a minority of teachers for more egalitarian orientations, as the Portuguese team underlines: "the Principal's activity (and his staff's) is decisive in the construction and implementation of this logic of action. The emotional and
informal dimension of his relationship with the other governing bodies and school members, his long period in charge and his social concerns make up so strong a leadership (supported by a core of indefectible followers) that he clearly guides school group action in the sense of the integration of all.” (Barroso et al, 2004)

Finally, we might add that if the equilibrium and congruency among the various conditions has been secured for long, it may be translated into a kind of “school culture” or narrative identity of the school which can reinforce its internal regulation and consensus among the actors. In many case studies, we have observed these “narrative identities”, which may be more or less recent: the “Madeleine spirit” (B) for example, the tradition of the “good” (Pink School (P)) or “elite school” (Boileau (B), Renoir (F), Blue School (P)) or “innovative school” (Balzac (F). However, the school culture may also be evolving and adapt itself to new conditions (the spirit of the “Merchants’ girl” (E) for example, see below).

Proposal 2.2 Contradictions, tensions and the Principal's roles and strategies

There are several schools where there may not be (sufficient) congruency among the various conditions already mentioned. The Principal may then try to improve the coherence between logic(s) of action, internal and external conditions but s/he is always facing certain contradictions and tensions that require managing. The Principal's role essentially becomes that of a mediator, more a political role. The Principal has to develop a real political strategy, in order to promote her/his views or proposals. S/he has to contract some alliances to overcome resistance or keep the peace among the different actors or logics of action present. In that case, the political role and competence of the Principal (and more broadly of the management team) are particularly strategic and important.

Boileau (B) has the reputation of being an “elite school”, rather well positioned in the local market. But it is losing students in a context of demographic decline. This decline is more important in the first years of secondary school. The volume of teachers is therefore at stake. The director has been at the school for two years and has had to cope with some contradictory demands: on one side 1) demands from upper echelon teachers to keep the school’s “quality” image and keep the informal policy of selective enrolment and orientation 2) the demands of middle class parents for good schooling and, on the other side, 3) the necessity of maintaining the number of students on roll and consequently the volume of teachers, 4) the ethos and demands of young teachers in the lower school who are more inclined to accept all students and apply the “new” constructivist pedagogical norm promoted by the government. Moreover, their job security is more at risk from the demographic decline in student numbers.

Therefore, the management strategy is always to strike a balance between these contradictory demands. For example, the first year (grade) classes are no longer composed by subject (and implicitly by student ability) as a response to demands of the young teachers but at, the same time, there is still “informal selection” of students who want to come into the school.

Some situations of “failure” or falling roll, or declining results, more or less related to important changes in the environment of the school, may lead to more drastic change in the internal logic of action. The management staff may try to change the equilibrium and promote a new logic of action. That may mean, for example, developing activities intended to change the “school mix”/ intake (in order to gain some adhesion from parents or teaching staff) or changes in the composition of the staff in order to reach a consensus about the logic of action promoted by the Principal. Such situations rarely feature in our case study schools at present, but some have undergone such “crisis” situations in the past.

This was the case for Martyn (H). At the beginning of the 1980s Martyn was an “average school” before being confronted by a dramatic fall in student numbers; the Principal decided to promote an “excellence strategy”, which takes advantage of the new regulations allowing parents free choice within the municipality. The pedagogical orientation of the curriculum (foreign languages at the age of 6; differentiation of routes with or without sports), extracurricular activities etc., were set up to satisfy an elitist demand by parents. This policy was accompanied by a real “restructuring of the work force” since 80 % of the teachers were replaced. According to the Principal, they were unable to follow the new “direction” adopted. Thereafter, the logic of action, the choices and the policy of the “charismatic” Principal were supported by the whole school, and now there is a real consensus, even though the managerial style of the Principal may be authoritarian.

Merchants’ (E) used to be a “grammar school” for girls but became a “comprehensive” in the 1970s. The population of the school started to change during the seventies and eighties, with more and more immigrants in the school. The decline of the reputation and a period of instability in the mid-1980s led the governing body to select a “charismatic” new Principal, when the old Head retired. This new Principal set about restoring the image of the school, without changing its social intake. She decided to ‘get rid of the teachers “thinking in the old ILEA way” and for this reason came into conflict with the trade unions. But she has succeeded in keeping
only the teachers who are loyal to her (or to the culture of Merchants'). New teachers are recruited on short
term contracts, so that they can be released if they do not ‘fit’ into the school. The Principal emphasizes the
necessity of cohesion and actually there appears to be consensus now among the staff, due to the selection
of the teachers by the Principal. For several years, the strategy of the Principal has been to “accept” and
assume the position of the school in the local market but to promote the expressive logic of action of
Merchants’, to improve working conditions in the school by an external quest for various resources (funding
via specialist school status, long term partnerships with local partners). It no longer operates at a deficit and
results in national tests are improving, which is important for the Principal and staff.

Proposal 3

There is usually some form of consensus among the various actors of the school, if the “congruency” or
internal fit among the conditions is reached to a sufficient degree. This was observed in many of the cases
already referred to.

However, the consensus is never total and, in some cases, it may be a “consensus of appearance”, when
some groups, more or less numerous, more or less unsatisfied, have no room to express their dissent.
This is particularly the case for Blue School (P) and Renoir (F) for example, where the style of leadership
discourages public expression of dissent. It is also the case at Merchants’ (E), where teachers are either
“loyal” supporters of the management, or teachers unable or scared to express serious concerns, or those
on temporary contracts who are less inclined to get involved. At Martyn (H) as well, where the
management is “authoritarian” and does not allow space for the expression of dissent.

In schools with a dominant logic of action and some global coherence among internal and external
conditions, there may however be “semi open”, “latent” tensions and conflicts, with some actors who
disagree with the central logic of action.

In Madeleine (B) for example, there is an “semi open” opposition of the lower secondary school teachers to
the “therapeutic model” promoted by the Principal and many teachers; for them discipline and the social
order is at stake. The “consensus” within the school has been preserved by a member of the management
team (lower level coordinator) who acts as mediator.

In Balzac (F) and Boileau (B), there is also some room for expression of dissent, but not in well-
organized and legitimized ways.

Besides, there are some cases, or moments in the history of the school where greater tensions or conflicts
may appear among the different groups of actors. In particular, if the management team tries to change
the school’s logic of action, it may lead to major tensions among the actors. This is the case whenever the
management introduces some “imposed changes”, in order to improve the external position or change the
logic of action. It was the case at Martyn (H) and Merchants’ (E), when the Principal introduced a new
policy and internal relations, and ‘got rid of’ a significant proportion of staff.

Moreover in some schools, there may be some tensions among the staff, often between lower secondary
school and upper school teachers. It may be about pedagogy (visible versus invisible pedagogy, as in
Ruten (H) or Balzac (F)), discipline (Madeleine (B)), or enrolment policy (Boileau (B)). These tensions may
be rooted in different professional identities or the teachers’ initial training. Often, the Principal tends not to
definitively solve these mostly “low intensity” tensions, but to cope and live with them.

3.2.2. Logics of action and position within the local “market”

Proposal 4

Beyond the national diversities, it is striking that the instrumental and expressive logics of action are
related, at some level, to the different social intakes (but there are some variations and important
exceptions) and, beyond this, to different positions within the local space (also with some variations).

The instrumental logic is more widespread among upper and middle positions within the “market”. In these
situations, it is not the learning or teaching conditions that push the various actors to support the
instrumental logic; it is rather an awareness of the families’ demands and their potential aggregated
effects on the school’s intake and the ‘knock on’ effect on the relative position of the school in the local
market. In these schools, there is in fact a clear awareness of the dynamics of the position on the market: 1) recruitment is open to possibility of change 2) there may be “vicious” or “virtuous” circles of intake –
reputation or performance – intake.
However, in these positions there are also different external strategies available, which are not only determined by the position in the local space. This variation has already been underlined by Delvaux and Van Zanten (Del 7, 2004). The instrumental logic may be related to different market strategies: those of the “rentiers” and the “entrepreneurs of excellence” in higher positions. These different strategies are rooted in the ethos of the actors, the school culture, as well as in the “regulatory regime” and the action of the regulatory bodies.

The “rentiers” (those having inherited wealth or capital) are schools which may benefit from their previous position or from a favourable evolution of the social composition of the local space. Their reputation (or in certain countries their raw performance, measured in external tests) is good enough to assure a relative stability in their position. Their curriculum is rather classical (teaching languages such as Greek and Latin), the discipline is strict and academic expectations high. This is, for example, the case of Boileau (B) but in this particular case, the school's position and its “instrumental logic of action” as an elite school are slowly being eroded by the demographic decline in the local area and the actions of its main competitors (in fact, two other schools which parents may choose, in the Belgian free choice regulatory administration).

In the dominant or intermediate positions, there may also be schools with explicit strategies of “entrepreneurship” which are more on the offensive and oriented explicitly to improving their position or the performances of their students. For example, Renoir (F), Saint Saens (F) Blue School (P) in the higher positions, Tennyson (E), Martyn (H) in various “intermediate” positions are all trying to develop their internal performance and improve their position. Almost all of them (except maybe Blue school) try to attract middle or upper class parents; it is done through the “school provision and curriculum” (early bilingual classes, European classes, etc), through image management, extracurricular activities (sports), management of discipline and order within the school, and the individual attention given to parents’ demands and concerns.

This “entrepreneurial” touch in the logic of action is not only the result of the market position; it is also related to the Principal's ethos and projects, to her/his relationship with staff. Moreover, it seems that we are more likely to find “entrepreneurial” schools in countries where the regulatory regime is urging them to improve their performance (in France and England especially, see del 8 and del 7). Therefore, in these countries, some features of entrepreneurship are observable, even within schools coping with a more popular intake and “special needs” students. Merchants’ (E) for example in England, with its expressive logic of action, also has an 'entrepreneurial' attitude, but one which is not necessarily oriented towards an improvement of its position, but the improvement of its “professionalism”, and its attractiveness as a “school for lower ability students”. Therefore, the Principal (and a motivated group of teachers) expend much energy obtaining social support and partnership in the area, achieving Specialist School status, in other words allowing it to work in better conditions, without aspiring to change its social intake. Ferry (F) with its “hybrid logic of action” is also defined by this characteristic, even though its shares many other characteristics, due to its social intake and other conditions (see below).

The expressive logic is more widespread in schools whose curriculum and provision are less attractive for middle class parents (for example, special classes for disadvantaged students, curriculum oriented toward specific immigrant cultures, etc), whose social intake is heterogeneous or coming from working classes. In short, they are the schools in intermediate or lower positions. In other words, they might almost be referred to as “ghetto schools” (such as Ruten (H) and Madeleine (B)) or “heterogeneous schools” threatened by the loss of “good” students (Pink School (P), Merchants' (E)). In these cases, the real conditions for teaching and learning may be an important condition of the logic of action. In other words, the adoption of this logic is not related to an effort to change or improve the position of the school, relative to others. In a voluntary and activist way (Madeleine (B), Ruten (H), Pink School (P)) or in a more passive, resigned way, the expressive logic of action is a form of adaptation to the heterogeneity of students.

But as for the other logics, their “market” position and the related intake is insufficient for understanding the conditions necessary to the development of this logic. As the examples presented so far illustrate, the expressive logic of action has to be assumed by the Principal and staff, as well as be supported by a “school identity” or professional ethos which make issues of access and the success of “disadvantaged youth” an objective, and which value tolerance, openness and inclusion of all (see Madeleine (B) and Pink School (P) for example). The fact that the school can get financial support from local partners, from local authorities (Ruten (H), as well as Merchants' (E)) is also of importance.
Thus, school's position's effect on the logic of action is not automatic at all. Indeed, we observed “exceptions” where heterogeneous social intake goes along with a rather instrumental logic of action. Meunier’s (B) intake has a lower class composition than Madeleine (B) but has a better academic position in the local area (students who are less academically behind than at Madeleine). This is at the same time the result of and the reason for its “instrumental logic of action”. In an intermediate position from an academic point of view, it has to preserve the “quality” of its students, and especially the “academic requirements” applied so far, even though recruitment is determined by the geographical position of the school in a rather deprived area, where parents do not really choose for reasons other than proximity. This demonstrates that the school's position alone is not sufficient to induce any logic of action.

The situations at Ferry (F) and Balzac (F) are also good examples where intake and school position in the local space of interdependencies are not mechanical factors of any logic of action. Indeed, as already seen, these “colleges” share some characteristics based upon “expressive” and “instrumental” logics of action; they are tending to become more heterogeneous, to attract middle class parents or at least avoid them fleeing and, at the same time, they create a space for offensive initiatives oriented towards lower ability students. At Ferry, as at Balzac, the logics of action are here influenced both by their intake, by some internal conditions (the “professional” leadership of some management staff, the mobilization of some teachers, and the teachers' democratic ethos) and also by the “values” and policy promoted by the regulatory bodies (State and academy), which stress the importance of social mix and good performance for all students, including those from lower classes. The school (college) has to both “democratize” and “embody high academic expectations”. To a lesser extent, Pink School (P) is not far from these logics, but with a higher status socio-demographic population.

In the conclusion of this point, we cannot consider that the “market effect” in all positions signifies a direct effect of the actions of their “competitors” (other schools) and their “clients” (parents). We have to distinguish between the upper and the middle positions in the “local market” and the lower positions, with a less favoured intake. In this latter case, the position of the school in the market can be deemed to produce some effect through the “intake”, which effects the “conditions for teaching and learning” in the school, as well as the logic of action. This is “a school mix” effect which can produce a “conditional competition”: the school doesn’t want to change its position but is mainly looking to improve its schooling conditions. In the former case, conversely, we could consider the production of “position effects” or “market effect” in the sense that the school's logic of action is more directly sensitive to parental demands or the behaviour of competitors. There is a “positional competition” where the school wants to maintain or improve its position, its ranking. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this external position of the school is not the only factor to consider in understanding the school's logic of action.

### 3.2.3. Logics of action and policy regulations (central or local regulatory bodies)

#### Proposal 5

There are more situations with continuities and compatibilities between school logics of action and policy demands or expectations than situations where there are discrepancies, tensions and oppositions. This trend toward “continuity” is favoured by the variety and ambiguity of the policy programmes, wills or orientations. This situation of continuity might be illustrated in various national and local contexts. Of course, the policies developed are not identical from one context to another, but the convergences between the local school and the regulatory demands or requirements are nonetheless present.

Ruten’s (H) logic of action is expressive and the school has become more and more specialized in its intake of special needs students (with some risk of “medicalizing” social problems). This orientation is supported by the local municipality which sends all the students with various “problems” and “disabilities” there; it also gives funding for these students (more than average funding) and directly funds various professionals dedicated to these populations. There is thus a continuity between the Principal's ethos and action, the school's logic of action, and the political will of the municipality. However, nobody seems to be aware that this kind of policy is constructing or reinforcing social, and importantly, ethnic segregation between the various schools in the municipality.

Tennyson (E) or Merchants’ (E) are both in relative continuity with the requirements of the Education Foundation and more generally the state-driven policy, in that their Principals are oriented towards a “proactive”, managerial, entrepreneurship attitude, which intends to improve the performance of each school, even though they are relatively specialized in different “niches” and contrasted in their logics of action. Their
specialization is also a matter of continuity between the choices of these schools and the state policy of “diversifying”.

Ferry (F) also developed a hybrid logic of action which is strongly supported by the local municipality (with a stronger partnership than elsewhere, namely because the Principal is also a member of the local council), as well as by the “academy inspectors”. There is thus an internal consensus on the logic of action (democratizing and “high profile” expectations) underlined by the external support and public legitimacy given the logic of action developed by the school. In contrast, few parents in this school voice their opinion for or against its logic of action.

In other schools, the continuity between logics of action and policy perspectives or the demands of regulatory bodies may be less developed, without becoming conflictual. This is the case at Balzac, where the academie is hoping for more success in keeping middle class parents in the school. There, the Principal’s “timidity” is denounced by more activist teachers and the vice-Principal (Principal-adjoint).

Proposal 6

Specific policy regulations related to inequalities or segregation (i.e. regulation on enrolment, curriculum, evaluation, and special needs students) are very often largely interpreted by local schools in such a way that there is some compatibility with their dominant logic of action. Moreover this is facilitated when there is a “rhetorical” support for the local “adaptation” and “translation” of general policy guidelines, within general policy discourse. These local adaptations and “translations” of general and open guidelines coming from central or local political bodies are particularly striking in the cases of Portugal and Belgium, but they exist everywhere.

In the three Belgian schools, the same State device (organization of special classes or courses for “students in difficulty”) is organized and conducted in very different ways, which are strongly influenced by the general patterns of each school’s logic of action. For example, at Boileau, the class reserved for these students is mostly centred on academic learning, contrasting with Madeleine where psychological, social and academic help are simultaneously developed. Meunier, for its part, is mostly oriented to preventing the social disorder that these students might cause.

For the Portuguese schools, Blue School and Pink School, the general requirements of the State or Regional regulatory bodies have not been hard constraints and have been interpreted and selected in a way compatible with the internal conditions; for Pink School, this has meant an interpretation which emphasizes equality of opportunity in terms of access and success, which relativizes but does not ignore concerns about efficiency and effectiveness of learning procedures and outcomes. For Blue School, it means emphasis on performance, efficiency and effectiveness of outcomes even to the detriment of a more active policy of promotion of equal opportunities.

Proposal 7

If there are open and strong oppositions between the action of the regulatory bodies and a school’s logic of action, political games and negotiations designed to buffer it from the effects of regulations may be observed. In our study it was noted that the Principal of higher position schools, with middle class or upper class intakes, tended more than others to “transgress” or elude the requirements of the regulatory bodies. The exemplar case here is Renoir (F), but these kinds of practices also occur at Martyn (H).

Renoir (F) has had to face a policy change on the part of the local policy regulatory bodies. Since the mid-1990s, the latter have been promoting “heterogeneous classes” and social mixity within schools, whereas the Principal’s previous policy was oriented toward satisfying middle class “elitist” demands and maintaining “elite” subjects and “routes” (European classes, language courses) within the curriculum. This type of school provision allows “good” students from other districts to apply for entry to the school. Moreover these pedagogical orientations fit the “internal elite image that the school wants to show and maintain and does not meet internal resistance from the teachers. But now there is a main contradiction between political regulation and the school’s logic of action, leading the Principal to active policy strategies for coping with and eluding the political demands. On the one hand, the Principal “bargains” and makes transactions with the rectorat, complying with part of its demands (renouncing the organization of second or third language options in the first and third years of secondary school) in order to keep the “European classes” (elite classes). On the other hand, the Principal does not hesitate in acting illegally (keeping tennis classes in the school, despite the opposition of the rectorat) and seeking support from outside agencies such as sports associations and parents in order to put pressure on the rectorat.
3.3. Specific variables related to local spaces or schools

Proposal 8

The expressive logic of action can also be favoured by a specific school culture and its “narrative identity”. Notwithstanding the schools’ intake, or position in the market, Catholic schools, as it happens, tend to value and develop an expressive logic of action, e.g.: Sainte Madeleine (B) with a lower class intake and Saint Paul (E) with a higher class population. This is probably due to the cultural content related to the Catholic educational project in general, which tends to emphasize the education of the “whole person”, insisting both on “education” or socialization of the entire person, and on “instruction”. Therefore, the expressive dimension of education is always more or less present in these schools. In the case of Madeleine (B) however, the emphasis on instruction is seriously eroded, whereas it is obviously present at St. Paul (hybrid case).

Merchants’ (E) is also influenced by the “Merchants’ girl ethos” which fits with the expressive logic of action. The school has no particular religious affiliation. The expressive logic has more to do with its history and the loyalty of former students to it. The ethos is similar to that of a private girls’ school (values of mutual respect, tolerance, achievement for all) but with an intake which is different in terms of class/educational capital, but not necessarily in terms of ethnicity.

Proposal 9

Conversely, even with a lower class intake, the instrumental logic of action can be encouraged or reinforced (in a local space or in a specific school), when, beyond the educational goal to be achieved (inclusion of all, etc), emphasis is put on performance, the results to be obtained, the academic content to be transmitted. This emphasis might stem from the regulatory bodies and political regulation and/or from the teachers’ or the Principal's professional ethos

For example, in France, in recent years, the official policy and regulatory bodies are largely in favour of the promotion of social mixity within schools. The political intention is to avoid “ghetto schools” and, for example, the Lille academie has been urging Balzac to become a more “heterogeneous” school, to improve its academic results, as well as its attractiveness to middle classes.

This policy may be relayed by the inspectors, as well as by the Principal and groups of teachers, as is the case for Balzac and Ferry (F). These two schools are particularly distinctive in the sense that they both try to advance special initiatives to meet “less able students” or “deprived groups” (mentoring, “relay classes” “support classes”, team work, special classes for non-Frenchspeaking, etc) and to keep the general level of expectations relatively high, namely in order to avoid middle class students fleeing elsewhere. This might mean ability groupings in Maths at Ferry and, more broadly, an emphasis on a strong policy of “peacekeeping” at the school, against any problems, and often those related to order and discipline.

This “double” or “composite” policy may find internal actors who defend one side more than the other. In Balzac, there is a “mobilized group” of teachers, led by the Principal adjoint, which is oriented towards democratization of the school and modernist pedagogy; they insist on actions against academic failure. At the same time, there is also action led by middle class parents (at Balzac, for example) which tends to resist some initiatives and restate the need for quality education in the school.

More broadly speaking we can hypothesize that, in the countries where the regulatory regime emphasizes performance improvement and where there is an active use of external testing and evaluation (France and England, especially, as well as, to a far lesser degree, Portugal), there is an ideological language, a pragmatic context which can lead local actors to counterbalance the trend toward the “expressive logic of action” favoured by the social intake of schools situated in the lower positions in the local space.

Finally, we have to realize that teacher’s professionalism, the type of ethos they received during their own education and professional experience may lead them to support more or less expressive or instrumental logics of action, or hybrid logics of action. For example, in Belgium, as opposed to the Catholic provider and its emphasis on education, the teachers of the State provider (Meunier, Boileau) are more disposed to advance academic expectations and academic teaching and learning as a priority. The contrast between Meunier and Madeleine (Catholic provider) is striking, although they are close in terms of social intake.
Intermediate conclusion and synthesis

As an intermediate synthesis, we might stress four points about these internal logics of action, rooted in different internal and external conditions.

The schools develop different logics of action, that in many cases result from congruent and relatively coherent internal and external conditions. One of the major factors seems to be “intake” (from an academic and social point of view) and beyond that, the school’s position in the local hierarchy, since instrumental logics tended to be observed where there was an intermediate and upper class intake, and expressive logics where there was a lower class intake or in heterogeneous schools. But this factor is far from being the only one, since there are active internal agencies which are involved in constructing the logics of action. Moreover we have stressed the role of the previous or specific culture of the school (regarding Catholic schools or French schools, modulated by specific educational and cultural patterns). This may partially explain the presence of a third “hybrid logic of action”, which shares features of expressive and instrumental schools.

Whilst on the one hand we insist on the relative coherence and congruence of different internal and external conditions which have to be in place for the development of any logic of action, on the other, we would like to emphasize the important role of actors (Principals, staff, parents) in the construction, maintenance or changes in the logics of action.

Principals are key images and actors. In almost all cases they play a key role in mediating between external regulatory systems and internal organizational and cultural design, although mediation ranges from pro-active engagement with the policy intermediaries and active re-interpretation of policy into more compliant re-statement. The Principals are also key in maintaining and changing organizational arrangements and cultures. Indeed in a number of cases Principals have acted as agents of change (e.g. Tennyson (E), Merchants’ (E), Ferry (F), Martyn (H)), re-working organizational arrangements and culture in attempts to improve student performances, change reputations and re-position schools in the local education marketplace. Not all Principals however are ‘successful in maintaining authority or ensuring institutional consensus, or at least not all the time (Madeleine (B) for example). The Principals also go about their work in different ways – either as managers or pedagogical leaders, and either in authoritarian or closed modes, or through more interpersonal and more collaborative modes. Thus, the problems of group coordination are solved in different ways, giving rise to various micropolitical forms.

The Principals ‘success’ in maintaining stability or bringing about change is in part dependent upon their staff, in a number of senses. Schools vary in terms of their ability to retain and recruit teachers. The instrumental schools, given their locations, their reputations and their student intakes tend to have lower levels of staff turnover and find it easier to recruit new staff. Some of the expressive schools which display well-established cultural consensus and strong community links are also able to retain a ‘core’ of committed teachers but on the whole are less able to recruit and retain teachers. A stable or established staff can be double-edged, for Principals with a project for change, teachers who represent ‘failed’ values can be an obstruction and the Principals at Merchants’ and Martyn sought to replace ‘older’ staff with others who ‘fit in’ better with the ‘new’ values.

For the instrumental schools, parents are both a resource and a constraint. As suggested already, a resource inasmuch as they are able to mobilize political influence on behalf of the school to obtain resources or to meet or circumvent local policy decisions. They are also active within the schools in support of activities and may be a source of extra funding through fund-raising or special payments. They are also supportive in ‘carrying over’ school values into the home. On the other hand, these various forms of action can be interventionist or obstructive. These parents are active in monitoring the school and teachers’ work and can act critically if their expectations are not being met. Principals are often adept at managing or diffusing parental concerns. For the expressive schools, parents are less likely to be regarded as a resource but may be generally supportive of the school. The schools ‘reach-out’ to the community rather than having parents who are willing and able to involve themselves in the school. In some cases, these schools have long standing relationships with well-defined local communities and local families and employ graduates.
4 Conclusions and policy implications

The modes of institutional regulation of an educational system are closely linked to all the mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control and balance of that system. But system regulations do not only derive from the control regulation exerted by political authorities, it also has its source in “autonomous” game rules, defined by “the base”, by actors constructing the reality of this system. These regulations are concretized in various institutional arrangements promoted by the public powers – bureaucratic rules related to the functioning of a school, to its financing or student enrolments, promotion of a market logic as well as post-bureaucratic modes of orienting behaviours like evaluation of results – as well as in “game rules” forged and negotiated by local actors, out of practice and concrete use.

The goal of the Reguleducnetwork project has been to understand how different modes of regulation combine in six school spaces, situated in urban contexts (Budapest, Charleroi, Lille, Lisbon, London and Paris), how they evolve under the influence of national educational policies but also in relation to local or global social evolutions. We have sought to understand how these changes affect the functioning and logics of action of schools situated in these spaces, and indirectly contribute to rearranging the local processes of production and reproduction of the social inequalities the school faces. The goal here is less one of definitively diagnosing the objective effects of these new regulatory processes on the quantitative indices measuring the inequality of opportunities or inter-school segregation than of documenting how they contribute to redefining the way local actors (in schools, local regulatory organizations) problematize, construct and manage the question of inequalities.

We begin by summing up the principal results of our work in relation to the theme of inequalities, the hierarchization of schools and the segregation of school publics in terms of social or academic criteria. Then we delineate the principal political implications, in briefly specifying the normative references we adopt.

1 CONFIGURATION OF REGULATIONS AND INEQUALITIES

Evolutions in the modes of institutional regulation of educational systems, as they derive from the educational policies of the five countries/regions analysed over almost twenty years, show partial convergences on six tendencies, variously presented:

- An increasing autonomy of schools
- The search for a balancing point between centralization/decentralization
- The rise of external evaluation of schools and school systems
- The promotion of “free choice” of school by parents
- The will to diversify school offer
- Erosion of the professional, individual and/or collective autonomy of teachers

It all takes place as if educational policies were oriented, in varying degrees and proportions, on the one hand, by a reinforcement and/or a transformation of the means of action of the Central State around the logic of “the evaluative State” (inducing it to a clearer definition of the system’s key objectives while reinforcing an autonomy of schools, or local authorities, but “watched over” by various new evaluative and long-distance control systems) and, on the other hand, by reinforcement or introduction of mechanisms ensuring school choices for parents, more or less inspired by the “quasi-market” model. Certainly the proportions between these two models are quite variable, certainly the societal and educational contexts they are implanted in are different and the logics of hybridation of these models with other institutional, symbolic or material constraints, visible. We can, nonetheless, decipher the influence of these “governance” models beyond national particularities.

For that matter, this relative convergence may be referred back to many major evolutions which have subjected these various governments to pressures or demands in an at least partially convergent sense.

- The development of economic globalization and “post-Fordism” has accentuated the demand in economic milieux for a greater efficiency of public education systems, but also greater attention to the economy’s needs for competencies
• The Welfare State’s crisis of legitimacy and rationality, and the rise of neo-liberal political paradigms have led to calling the “bureaucratic” modes of managing public action into question and to importing managerial worries heretofore characteristic of the private sector (preoccupations with efficiency and accountability) into the public

• An increasing social demand on the part of many groups has also come to light, favouring more “quality”, choice and individualization of the educational careers of their children. Aside from the influence of the increasing individualization of social ties, this demand has its source in middle class anxiety faced with the fragilization of their social and professional positions, earlier attained by the extension of schooling.

• We might finally ask ourselves if a part of these convergences is not also due to the phenomenon of globalization of policies, at least in the form of the distribution of baseline models by various bodies and individuals, feeding the construction of new “reference systems” or models, which sometimes serve to inspire, sometimes to legitimize the construction of national policies, notably in the context of transnational organizations (OECD, EU etc).

Yet these partially common evolutions should not make us forget the profound differences which separate the national contexts of study, and if the policies carried out do indeed bear the trace of the regulatory models mentioned, the policies are simultaneously marked by logics of hybridation and recontextualization processes differentiating them. For that matter, the policies are often oriented by added logics, which lead to superimposing new programmes or functions, without always transforming and restructuring the existing institutional arrangements, which we have shown share many traits with the bureaucratic-professional model. The policies are differentiated then for many concomitant reasons: differences of contexts at departure, hybridation with existing realities, or the “mosaic” character of policies carried out.

Our empirical study is thus centred on six local school spaces – all situated in urban or metropolitan contexts. We have approached the ongoing transformations and local effects of the new modes of institutional regulation by two complementary entries:

• Study of the interdependencies between the schools situated in these spaces - in particular those deriving from their “competition” for various “resources” (as, for example, students) and the influence that they might be having on their logics of action. This study has been above all useful in grasping the impacts of a greater choice of schools by parents. The goal here then is to learn the effect of a “market” excess on the regulation of educational systems, in learning it as one would a “real” market, as it is in a local context and not as it is theoretically supposed to be.

• Study of the “intermediate regulations” exercised by local or regional authorities (or some providers, like Catholic schools authorities) over schools in the above mentioned spaces: study of development, the institutional or organizational forms, as well as the agents. The empirical work aimed at here is documenting the other tendency in modes of institutional regulation: the rise of new “post-bureaucratic” institutional arrangements, like the emergence of modes of ex post facto control by evaluation, or ex ante, by socializing action involving the perceptions, practices or identities of professionals in the field (professors and directors).

These two complementary entries are going to be the objects of successive exposés on the principal research results, before moving on to policy recommendations.

Local interdependencies between schools and logics of action

In all the spaces observed, the competitive interdependencies existing between schools have basically to do with students (their number and/or their social or academic characteristics); in fact, the recruitment of students by a school often affects other organizational realities that are crucial to them: financing, the number or quality of teachers. Moreover, students’ characteristics (academic and/or social) colour teaching conditions, the prestige of teachers, as well as the school’s image and reputation.

This “competition” for students happens in all institutional contexts – logically in the “quasi-market” officially set up in England and practically, as developed in Belgium and Hungary - as well as in contexts where student assignment is supposed to be much more administered, like France and Portugal.

Yet this does not mean that all the schools are in competition with one another; many “clusters” of interdependence appear in all the spaces observed; moreover, the contours of these clusters frequently overflow the borders of the institutional spaces the schools fit into (municipalities or districts, for example).
Nonetheless this “competition” presents variable intensities. The sources of this differential intensity are, notably, the following.

- A demographic decline and an excess of places available in the schools of the zone
- A limited presence of middle class students in the zone due to the social characteristics of its demography.
- Families more concerned about the quality at stake than worried about proximity or facile access, when making choices and decisions in the academic area. This more “strategic” orientation of families become more aware “consumers” of school goods, is favoured in “quasi-market” contexts where earlier school policies encourage families in that direction.
- The type of institutional regulatory system encouraging (or not) choice in major proportions: quasi-market vs administered assignment of students to schools
- The difficulties of local and/or regional authorities in reducing or avoiding the phenomena of competitive interdependencies between schools, when they want to do it;
- The institutional rules linking the stake in “students” to other organizational stakes for schools (as in Portugal, the stakes are lower because the number of students has less of an influence on financing or the number of teachers in the school)
- The schools’ logics of action, reinforcing competition when they are more offensive and oriented towards the preservation or improvement of their positions in student distribution in the zone considered

The presence of one or many clusters of competitive interdependencies between some of the schools does not prevent or destroy the development of interdependencies based on co-operation. Yet we have been able to observe that certain co-operations, encouraged by trust authorities, might simultaneously be predetermined by the above-mentioned competitive logics: thus, in taking the competition exercised by the publics providers into account, the Catholic schools of Charleroi got together and launched a common promotion, consulting one another on opening new programmes; the public schools of Lille or Wyeham got together to try and limit the flight of students towards “private schools” or other districts.

The individual logics of actions of schools are directly or indirectly affected by these competitive interdependencies, even if the external influence may be moderated by many other aspects of the school. This does not mean that “market” phenomena generate the large scale deployment of openly “competitive” logics (in the strongest economic sense of the term) among all the schools but it does signify that their logics of action will, in varying degrees, have to take into account the logics of other directly “competitive” schools, and the effects of evolutions in “demand” resulting from parental choices, as well as the “regulatory” activities of local or regional authorities, who may also take measures to encourage, guide or channel the phenomena of parental choice or school strategies. Briefly, talking about the effect of competitive interdependencies signifies that they act either as constraints or resources for schools and that, to various degrees, they should all take the position they occupy in this market into consideration. In various degrees and ways, they are all affected by the objective relations and constitutive actions of the interdependencies in the space.

These logics of action may be analysed in attending to many partially complementary dimensions:

- Active and offensive logics (“entrepreneurs” who seek to enlarge their “clientele” in launching new innovative school options, in promoting their public image) vs. passive logics (“rentiers” who preserve their favourable position by perpetuating practically identical recruitment logics, school offer or internal organization - which have been proven over time) or, again, defensive logics (schools struggling against declassification while seeking to modify their public image by maintaining certain attractive options for middle class parents, or a “stricter” climate and management of discipline)
- Expressive logics vs. instrumental logics: the areas of action where these logics develop concerned here both “internal” areas (organization of the school, ways of forming classes, managing discipline, or school climate) and “external” areas, such as types of recruitment, promotion and development of new school offers. Instrumental schools develop the following traits: a greater selection of publics, teacher/student relationships oriented by academic roles, arduous programmes oriented towards higher education and “good students”, marginal programmes in favour of school equity, a wide differentiation (of classes, options, etc) depending
on their academic capacities, managerial logic of the directorship, and “parents” defined as resources. They are more frequently found in middle or upper positions. Expressive schools are on the contrary more characterized by: more diversified school populations and the presence of school programmes oriented towards those in difficulty or “special needs” students; teacher/student relationships are based more on family roles and an “educational” preoccupation; concerns over equity are more central in the image and practice of the school; programmes for “special needs” students or those in difficulty; a restrained use of differentiation based on academic capacities; a professional logic emanating from the directorship; parents defined as taking part in a local community. They are more often in the “unattractive” positions.

- Logics of specialization vs. logics of diversification: some schools tend to specialize in “niches” characterized by specific programmes oriented towards differentiated publics; others see to maintaining the greatest variety of options and publics within the school.

These ideal-typical differences are obviously not found in a pure condition in all the cases studied, and many schools present more “hybrid” profiles.

To understand these logics, we should take into account their positions in the local market (more or less attractive; more or less valorized from the viewpoint of “academic” or “social” characteristics which, in the local common opinion, hierarchizes the schools). Yet a position does not mechanically engender a type of logic of action. In fact, the external influences are mediated by various internal factors. The director’s role, in particular, is determinant for he must seek mutual compatibility between both the demands or external pressures (linked to logics of other schools, to “market” pressures or demand, to demands or injunctions from local authorities) with demands or dynamics from within the school (demands from teachers, parents and students...). This balancing process is largely influenced by his ethos and becomes the object of variable consensus among the different actors in the school. Furthermore, the institutional regulatory regime unique to each country may influence the logics of action: thus, entrepreneurial logic is more frequent among the English cases analysed, whereas the logic of “diversification” appears more among the French and Hungarian cases. There are also effects produced by the specific history of each school and, notably, by the weight of its narrative identity (specificities of Catholic schools accentuating the expressive dimension), the degree of cohesion proper to the school, favouring its degree of mobilization or, further, the already mentioned importance of the school head.

We can of course understand and admit that the logics of action of each school are established on its level to preserve a specific interest, balance particular internal situations or improve its position in the local hierarchy of schools. Yet if the logics of action are sometimes pertinent and adjusted to problems and constraints the schools meet with, it remains nonetheless true that certain logics of action contribute to producing undesirable group effects, once the “common good” viewpoint is adopted (being notably a viewpoint opposed to inter-school segregation; for a justification see below).

From the viewpoint of their effects in terms of inequalities, the logics of action observed contribute rather to stabilizing the hierarchy existing between schools and rather induces a segmentation of publics depending on the school. Beyond this the social inequalities the school faces are reinforced. Many elements of logics of action are particularly important in this regard and should be pointed out:

1) The logics of specialization of schools are particularly frequent in high or low positions in the hierarchy (the formation of niches, more oriented either towards publics in difficulty or towards “good” students, by traditional or more modernistic teaching offers). Ipso facto, they reinforce the segmentation of publics and comfort one another. Logics of diversification can go in the opposite direction in favouring schools whose school populations are heterogeneous, but then everything depends on the internal organization of that variety within the school, favouring (or not) ability level classes (classes de niveau) and internal segregation.

2) Worries in the struggle against inequalities are hence developed in very different ways depending on the schools and their logics:

   - Thus, they are weakly developed in schools in high or middle positions, developing “instrumental” logics.
• They are more likely to be present in “expressive” logics of action. Yet in schools which tend to specialize in “special needs publics”, worrying about “success”, and “struggling against failure” praiseworthy as they might be, can sometimes cause effects opposed to what egalitarian intentions had sought. Here we often observe the predominance of strictly “educational” logics or, even, “therapeutic” logics, to the detriment of academic learning, notably due to the phenomenon of adaptation to the expectations of professionals in relation to the supposed “capacities” of their public. For that matter, in certain schools, the predominant preoccupation is “keeping the peace” without other goals/or possibilities of further ambitions.

• Schools seeking more “diversification” of students and school offer frequently become worried about equity, which may become the object of major internal debates and tensions. In certain Hungarian and French cases, they are resolved by an internal “bi-polarization” and by simultaneously conducting “instrumental” and “expressive” logics within the same school.

3) In schools attracting the middle classes, the internal policies tend to be constructed in preserving the support of parents who often have more influence at their disposal than others. Thus balancing between worries about “equity” and worries about “quality” often tends, above all, to occur in taking the latter into account. For that matter, the cultural and economic resources these schools have at their disposal (via external partnerships and/or a concentration of students of culturally and/or economically privileged families) tend to be larger.

In short, the logics of action observed and, furthermore, the market dynamics encouraging them, tend to reinforce the social inequalities the school faces: 1# in preserving or reinforcing school segregation 2# in reinforcing differences of experiences or learning opportunities offered students 3# in offering students unequal resources (from the viewpoint of instructional or educational activities or from the viewpoint of support).

The local authorities’ political will to make the “market effect” play a “regulator” role varies in strength, depending on national and local contexts. In fact, the action seeking to regulate either parents’ strategies or schools’ strategies is very unevenly developed for many complementary reasons:

• National institutional regulations more or less limit the possibility of local authorities intervening in this sense: they are more or less favourable to free choice; they more or less leave an institutional margin to local and/or regional authorities to act in this sense.

• The orientation of national, as well as regional or local policies, the ethos of agents involved in these local/regional authorities are more or less aware of the risk of inequalities and market effects in this regard.

• Moreover, institutional authorities experience difficulties in intervening efficiently on this subject.

When the political will is there, the difficulties of local or regional authorities to efficiently “regulate” the perversity of market effects in terms of inequalities and segregation, are due, beyond other factors more specific to each local context, to two general factors:

• Most often, the institutional borders of territories over which the authorities in charge of intermediate regulation have geographical competence (for ex. municipality, district or academy) do not correspond to the actual geography and real contours of student “flow” between schools. In other words, the clusters of competitive interdependencies between schools are often wider and crisscross many institutional regulatory territories/authorities, the reason why a good part of parents are capable of changing municipality or provider (passing from a public school to a private school) in order to find a school which suits them,

• Hence the authorities and regulations applying to these clusters of interdependent schools are often numerous (multi-regulation) and fragmented in their action and intervention. In other words, the regulations are nor harmonized, nor coordinated among the various public authorities in charge of the different public schools (State, department and municipal schools, for example), nor between these last and private schools. The result being that the different intermediate regulatory authorities are incapable of avoiding or seriously diminishing competition between schools dependent on different “institutional providers” (or to use Belgian terminology, on different “organizing powers”).
Consequently certain local authorities (publics or private) may be led to defend “their schools” against the schools of another district or provider. (in promoting for ex. co-operation between them to avoid the “flight” of students to another municipality or provider). This may in the end reinforce competition. Inversely, when all the schools present in a space depend on the same regulatory authorities and the interdependent clusters overflow a few institutional contours, the regulatory actions may be more efficacious (as in Lisbon).

**Studying intermediate regulations and their agents**

In the majority of countries studied, evolution in the modes of regulation of education systems is accompanied by a reinforcement of entities and agents of intermediate regulation, to varying degrees. Only England is an exception. Yet, beyond a common rhetoric justifying them (promoting quality, adapting to local needs), these developments take place in very contingent ways, and we can observe a strong anchorage of these forms of intermediate regulation in the political, ideological and demographic contexts of nation States, and a “path dependence” of these forms in relation to institutions inherited from the past. Thus, the decentralized entities appear above all in the systems most centralized at the outset (France and Portugal), whereas in the FCB, the new regulations rely on strong players who were in the system before (various providers, like Catholic schools, municipal schools, etc). The two countries where the relative ruptures are clearest are England (with an accentuated degree of privatization notably in the space observed) and Hungary where the Central State’s loss of power is particularly strong, and marked by radical change of political regime.

At the same time, the evolutions present analogies. In all the spaces observed, we observe an increase in the number of regulatory entities and diversification of their statuses. In varying degrees, intermediate level regulation is thus a multi-regulation favouring a fragmentation of the school's institutional environment. In fact, the development of organizational forms or entities helping “regulate the regulators” or “co-ordinate co-ordinations” is in fact relatively embryonic. Meaning that from the school's viewpoint, regulations are always experienced as departmentalized and rather incoherent. This fragmentation is even more accentuated if, additionally, one takes into account the regulations the Central State exercises directly over the schools, whose programmes or policies are, themselves too, subject to parcelling up. This situation is accompanied by tensions not only rebounding on the local level but felt as well as by the intermediate agents themselves.

We moreover observe a relative development of intermediate staff, in particular proximate staff, in practically all the spaces observed. These proximate staff, products of the teaching field, are confronted with problems fairly near at hand: relays or interfaces between directives and reforms to be promoted, coming from intermediate grades or the Central State and first line actors. Their work oscillates between a logic of enrolment and a logic of control. Their relationship to rules in dealing with actors unceasingly balances between *rapport d'intéressement* and *rapport d'évaluation*. Briefly, they unceasingly need to compose and compromise, while sometimes being called upon to judge, control and evaluate, in the name of rules or a rationality emanating from commanders of their actions (situated on the central or intermediate levels). And yet they are professionally and ethically near school actors.

Their professional action is nevertheless ever more structured, notably by evaluation tools, which are becoming increasingly central in doing regulatory work. In the spaces where the modes of organization and post-bureaucratic functioning have become vital (particularly Wyeham and Lille), the instrumentalization and rationalization of their work become decisive in regulation. In parallel with the rule, they do their work of regulating the action of schools and their agents via “control panels”, “indicators”, “audits” and other more or less prestructured forms of evaluation. It is also the staff and all their properties that count in the task of influencing and persuading that makes up the work of regulation. Their relationships with school actors are not only mediated by tools but also by the “personalized” character the proximate management succeed (or don't succeed) in giving to the exchange. The notion of “personalized service” or “dedication” to such and such particular school demand is mentioned in all the spaces observed. This observation should be seen in light of the fact that, in all these spaces, we observe that most of the regulatory agents come from teaching milieux, with experience of teaching and, sometimes, of directing schools.

Certainly to very different extents in terms of the cases observed (in England especially), these evolutions perhaps reveal a form of loss of confidence on the part of academic authorities in the self-regulatory
capacity of professional milieux (notably teachers), in their ethical concern and in their technical capacity to develop and improve their practice and performances in an autonomous way. Steering by results, the promotion of a “culture of reflexivity and evaluation”, promoting transparency and publicizing practice, the development of support and at-hand counselling, might thus be indices of an increasing and finer meshing of control regulation and, in certain cases, of a decline in joint regulation.

Yet this intensification of control regulation does not mean that the development of regulation is either without tensions and contradictions and realizes the promise of fine adjustment and steering the goal of regulation might describe. In this regard we can underline two types of problems and tensions brought up by heads and teachers in schools.

- For school heads, multi-regulation and its “post-bureaucratic” rationalization may signify an increasing fragmentation of their institutional environment, and added weight in their administrative charges. This may give rise to a form of opportunism faced with differentiated or, even, contradictory demands made, in short a risk of loss of “meaning” as to policy orientations justifying the development of regulation.

- For teachers, the risk of a sentiment of loss of collective autonomy by the profession, in their work and their working conditions. Which would mean that proximate staff attempts to implement their practice risk becoming that much more difficult.

2 POLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

We shall distinguish these recommendations depending on whether they concern the question of inequalities or the mobilization and regulation of schools’ actions.

Regulations and inequalities

Before anything else, we should recall the extent to which hierarchization and segregation of students among schools can be socially problematical. As a review of the literature has shown, a segregation depending on the “academic qualities” of students (strongly linked to students’ socio-cultural characteristics), if it does not have a probative effect on students’ “mean results”, has a tendency to increase their disparity (Dupriez and Draelants, 2004). This reasoning can be maintained on the level of classes within schools, but we can also transpose it to segregation between them. As we saw, then, in chapter 3 section 2, on the European level there is a significant correlation between the indices of dissimilarities among schools and inequality of chance (see also Dupriez and Vandenberghe, 2004).

The first problem posed by segregation among schools is that of accentuating the inequalities of opportunities among students - depending on many criteria: not only between students defined as “strong” and “weak students” (as measured by national or international tests), but, furthermore, between students depending on their cultural origins or socio-economic resources (see Section 2 and more generally Duru-Bellat, 2002). This accentuating the inequality of results and the inequality of chances in terms of cultural origins (already particularly high in certain countries/regions analysed, and particularly in the French Community of Belgium, or Hungary) is undesirable from the socio-economic viewpoint at the very moment when a new wave of development in education appears on the political and economic agenda (Brown & Lauder, 1992) and seems to necessitate raised competences all around. Furthermore, from a political point of view, it runs up against the democratic ideals held by all European countries, implying the quest for a maximal equality of chances among all citizens.

Furthermore, academic and social segregation between schools poses problems of social cohesion and undermines conditions fostering the development of the exercise of responsible citizenship by everyone in the society. In fact, an increasing disparity in school conditions between youths in all the societies considered, poses not only problems of “school peace” in certain schools and/or quarters, but downstream increases chances of social and professional exclusion. These risks of exclusion are generally focussed on as regards working classes, but, following Giddens (1998) we can, paradoxically, mention them for certain groups issuing from upper classes. The school attendance of socially privileged “élites” can, in fact, engender a decline in their sentiment of social solidarity with regard to the society as a whole, and vis-à-vis other social groups in particular, to the extent that the young there are no longer confronted with a sufficient social and ethnic variety. Thus, “exclusion” from the society can also signify a form of retreat.
from democratic solidarity, in a semi-wilful way by certain favoured groups. For that matter the exclusion of popular classes are subjected to can undermine their sentiment of solidarity to the extent that they no longer perceive the effects of the social solidarity generally defended within European States (cfr the “European social model” and certain articles of the future “European constitution”). This sentiment of lack may already be felt in the course of school socialization and indelibly marks the cultural attitudes of important fringes of European youth issuing from underprivileged class origin.

Hence it seems to us imperative to struggle against the processes generating this segregation and these school inequalities, which run up against the democratic ideals the entire EU adheres to.

We shall limit ourselves here to processes that have featured in what we have learned by the research, in focussing on the functioning of local school spaces, on the dynamism of competitive interdependencies cutting across them, and the logics of action of schools it encourages. Therefore our recommendations will deal particularly with possible action on the level of “intermediate” authorities (on the local or regional level) or, again, on the school level. But of course these levels of action indirectly involve national policy and, beyond that, the processes of “convergence” of these policies a European method like “Open Method of Coordination” tends to encourage.

Another preliminary should be dealt with. It is very important to take the national and local contexts in which the fields of action here mentioned might be envisaged into consideration. The “concrete measures” to be envisaged do not in fact necessarily have to be the same, even if their normative inspiration be identical.

1. The fact that the “market” and competitive interdependencies be present in all the spaces analysed should not lead us to a form of “sociological fatalism” as to the possibility of regulating these “market forces”.54

2. If we accept (and this is a political decision) that one of the principal missions of “intermediate” regulatory entities (regional and/or local) is to avoid that the local market dynamism should lead to more segregation and inequalities, we have to reinforce the local or regional authorities and give them the means to accomplish the potential role of regulation.

3. This above all signifies generalizing and harmonizing the rules and regulatory actions applied in all the schools of a zone, concerning key questions such as student recruitment, school offer, or conditions of expulsion and exclusion of students.

• Presently, the disparity of school practices from these points of view is favoured by the presence of different relatively independent “providers” (often public and private providers) whose rules and regulatory practices are differentiated.

• Families, notably middle class, tend to take advantage of these variations for schooling their children in the best (or minimally bad) conditions, but this tends to engender a certain number of undesirable collective consequences, like an increase in competition and segregation.

• At the same time, fragmentation and “multi” regulation are important limits to the efficacy of intermediate public regulatory authorities. Hence it is crucial not to eliminate all the institutional variety between the “organizing powers” (cfr the idea of “the unique school” which seems politically impracticable in many countries, and perhaps undesirable too), but to promote strong coordination and a harmonization of rules and interventions by authorities responsible for regulation. This implies a coordination and a regulation of the various authorities (public or private) present in a local territory. It demands a “coordination of the coordinators” as Jessop puts it or a “meta-regulation”, a regulation of the regulators. This may limit “opportunistic” behaviour on the part of certain schools capable of getting rid of students they don’t want (for academics and/or behavioural reasons) and of transferring their schooling responsibilities onto other schools or providers.

• This process can only be imagined in taking national and regional specificities into consideration. The forms of harmonization and standardization desired should be decided on that level, as well

54 In the contexts analysed, this “potential” role is already practiced in France, although still in a partial and relatively inefficacious way - and variable too given the constraints and options of academies.
as the processes to attain them (this is able to variably include State imposition or consultation between the institutional actors involved).

- Moreover, this implies a strong consensus on goals (less segregation and more equality) even if efficacity and quality should not be abandoned, as complementary goals.

4. This reinforcement of power (empowerment) of intermediate regulatory authorities also implies forging/developing entities whose geographical competence is wide enough to cover the real flows of students between interdependent schools.

5. This also signifies the development (or maintenance) of regional observatories of market effects and their consequences for schools and families. Such a tool may be useful for the different trust authorities (regional, national or even local) for example, in order to redefine the contours of academic sectors should they judge it useful. Such objective data can be further elaborated for consultation and negotiation between the various providers.

6. In short, present policies, oriented towards an accentuation of the autonomy of schools should necessarily be counterbalanced by a reinforcement of intermediate authorities (local and/or regional) whose “harmonized” regulation may be applied to all the schools situated on the territories they are competent for. Thus this reinforcement of power goes hand in hand with a strong harmonization and coordination of regulations, if many coexist within the same territories.

7. On the level of schools and their teaching teams, an effort of should be made to educate and accompany them, with a view to making them aware of the wider repercussions of what they do. This is particularly true for the “privileged” schools which are often characterized by:

- A weak knowledge of teaching conditions in the schools less well situated in the school hierarchy
- A tendency to gloss over inequalities. By their actions they tend to externalize part of the problems of schooling more difficult youths, which seems perfectly normal to them whereas it presupposes that other schools take charge of them.
- A tendency to absolve themselves of responsibility vis-à-vis inequality problems met with at school: usually responsibilities are referred back to families or attributed to a lack of means.

8. Training and accompanying educational teams should moreover be oriented towards the struggle against their school’s “internal segregation”.

9. Financial incentives to socially diversify the populations of schools can also be set up. Experiences in this sense are ongoing in Belgium and Hungary. Thus in the FCB, financing the functioning of schools in the years to come is going to be partially determined in terms of the students’ socio-economic characteristics, according to a principle called “positive differentiation”.

10. Yet it is important to remember that the school system is built into the society. For example the tendencies observed toward increasing segregation should be seen in relation to general evolutions of the labour market or the housing market. Hence policies against inequalities do not arise from the school domain in isolation. Social policies against socio-economic inequalities or urban policies against excessive residential segregation are necessary complements to exclusively school-oriented policies.

Regulation and control of base schools

11. Faced with the present risk of “deprofessionalization”, a loss of individual and group autonomy, teaching personnel need to see to preserving or reinventing forms of “joint regulation” which, in many systems, have so far assured the construction of game rules in the area of work autonomy, as well as employment conditions and statutory guaranties. In other words, it is important that the evolution in regulatory modes not be constructed against the teaching profession, but in negotiation with it.

12. The development of new post-bureaucratic tools will not really be useful in the improvement of the practice of educational teams, unless the latter perceive the sense and coherence. Without which they will be only perceived as one more bureaucratic tool, completely uncoupled from teaching activity and its goals.
13. More generally speaking, we should pay attention lest the development of post-bureaucratic models blur the values founding the goals of the educational act and system, to the point of reducing them to pure instrumental logics, reduced to acts without finality, to a pure “performativity” disjoined from the goals they are supposed to pursue.
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6 Dissemination

Dissemination strategy during the life time of the project

Internet publications
All during the life time of the project the agreed deliverables were made accessible to the public by being on the project’s website as soon as it was possible to do so. The website offers access to all 29 deliverables that have already been handed to the European Commission on this date.
http://www.girsef.ucl.ac.be/europeanproject.htm

The Portuguese research team also published all along the working period a web page giving relevant information about the research project and giving access to the Portuguese deliverables and the transversal (European) analysis contained in deliverables 3,5,7,9 and 11.
http://www.fpce.ul.pt/centros/ceescola/requledc.htm

Feedback reunions with field-workers
At the end of the project every research team took contact with the regulation agents and school actors they had met while collecting the information. Feedback reunions were held in every region. The main objective was to bring the results to the most concerned actors that had shown a lot of interest in the research work.

Conferences and seminars
During the second and third year of the project many researchers participated to colloquium, conferences and seminars, presenting research results to three main types of actors; policy-makers, field-workers and members of the scientific community (mainly educationalists, economists, sociologists).

By presenting national results to local and regional policy makers and to field-workers, teams pursued two main objectives;
- Give new information on mechanisms that affect inequalities in school results, thereby enhancing understanding of school segregation.
- Identify the most efficient organisational modes and the best local level of responsibility in the fight against school inequalities. And launching debates.

By presenting transnational comparison results to national and European policy makers, teams also pursued another two objectives (to be added to the two previous objectives);
- Bring to the attention of policy makers the possibility of a convergence of European regulation methods. Although underlining specificities of different national contexts which affect regulation and its possible impact.
- Reinforce European exchange of information on policies and on their actual impact, helping defining best practices.

By presenting results to the scientific community, teams’ members pursued three main objectives;
- Reinforce the European research network that will lead to more comparative analysis across EU member states
- Presenting a new comparison methodology, extending the analysis to local processes and interactions, thus going well beyond the scope of research produced by supranational organisations (Eurydice and Cedefop) and traditional comparative analysis (mainly focused on institutional and pedagogical aspects).

Press releases
Although less frequent than other types of dissemination modes, teams stimulated press articles in order to touch a larger public concerned by school regulation. This was the case at the beginning of the project
as well as in the end of it. These smaller articles put the accent on the accessibility of information on the project’s website.

**Articles in scientific reviews**

These types of articles are mainly addressed to the scientific community. They focus on scientific advancement in the field of educational sciences, public policy analysis, theories of organisation analysis.

Some of these articles are addressed to a wider community; they focus then more on results and follow the same objective as conferences and seminar do.

**FORESEEN DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW UP OF RESULTS**

The reguleducnetwork has planed a publication of the final results. A French publication based on the final report and the 5 national transversal analysis, should be made possible around autumn 2005 (editor: Presse Universitaire de France).

The research teams from each country have worked on a national transversal analysis, summarising the most important results of the research in order to produce a 75000 character text that will be submitted to publication.

Other publications based on parts of national results as well as participation to different conferences are also planed for the months to come (particularly, ECER conference of the EERA, AISLF sociology of education conference).

Most importantly, the material and information collected during the life-time of the project represents a wide corpus of information that different team members will continually go back to while working on school regulation.
This table does not include the list of all agreed deliverables. This list is presented in the annex to the final report.

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<td>« The impact of local educational action on social inequality and social exclusion in France » Workshop Education, Inequality and Social Exclusion, Bruxelles, Commission Européenne, Conférence débat de, invitée par le Rectorat de Reims, sur le développement de l'évaluation dans les zones d'éducation prioritaires. Présentation lors d'un réunion des chefs d'établissement du x\textsuperscript{eme} arrondissement de Budapest, sur la base du rapport élaboré dans le cadre du troisième volet de la recherche, les principaux résultats des investigations portant sur les politiques éducatives à visée égalisatrice.</td>
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mutation des systèmes éducatifs en Europe / Recomposiçao do ofício
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This final report is also based on the work of more than twenty researchers coming from the various countries and universities involved in the “reguleducnetwork” project. Their involvement all through the project has been a tremendous factor of success and has moreover made this research a very rich human experience of “European collaboration”.

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Christian Maroy
### Table 1. Inequality of results. Relation between the 9th and 1st deciles. (countries or regions of the EU which participated in the study) (Table simplified following Vandenberghe 2003)

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<td>1.78</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.87</td>
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<td>1.70</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PISA (2000)
Table 2. Inequality as inequality of treatment/opportunity. Difference between scores of youths whose father was born outside the country and those whose father was born in the country (international average = 500, interval-type = 100). (Table simplified following Vandenberghe 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY-REGION</th>
<th>math</th>
<th>read</th>
<th>sci</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>-83,01</td>
<td>-73,41</td>
<td>-85,76</td>
<td>-80,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL_NL</td>
<td>-81,47</td>
<td>-72,44</td>
<td>-56,87</td>
<td>-70,26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>-63,17</td>
<td>-65,04</td>
<td>-58,54</td>
<td>-62,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
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<td>-56,12</td>
<td>-60,34</td>
<td>-57,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>-44,48</td>
<td>-67,97</td>
<td>-58,84</td>
<td>-57,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL_FR</td>
<td>-63,23</td>
<td>-53,54</td>
<td>-54,46</td>
<td>-57,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>-37,46</td>
<td>-45,63</td>
<td>-56,91</td>
<td>-46,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>-49,86</td>
<td>-37,28</td>
<td>-26,66</td>
<td>-37,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N IRELAND</td>
<td>-48,00</td>
<td>-37,33</td>
<td>-27,19</td>
<td>-37,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-33,95</td>
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<td>SPAIN</td>
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<td>-36,73</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLAND</td>
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<td>-18,97</td>
<td>-22,41</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>-1,17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>15,57</td>
<td>9,92</td>
<td>20,46</td>
<td>15,32</td>
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</table>

Source: PISA (2000)
Table 3. Inequality as inequality of treatment/opportunity. Correlation between highest socio-economic index for parents (HISEI) and score (Table simplified following Vandenberghe 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY-REGION</th>
<th>math</th>
<th>read</th>
<th>sci</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEL_FR</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
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<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
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<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
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<td>1.88</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL_NL</td>
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<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>2.14</td>
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<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N IRELAND</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1.85</td>
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<td>FRANCE</td>
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<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
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<td>1.61</td>
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<td>1.34</td>
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<td>1.63</td>
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<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICELAND</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PISA (2000)
Graph 1. Segregation/dissimilarity correlated with inequity. Interarticulation of countries by rank (1= dissimilarity/segregation high and inequity high) Coefficients of correlation significantly different from zero to the threshold value of 2.5

Rank in terms of inequity

Rank in terms of dissimilarity
Table 4.  Intermediate regulatory bodies studied in each country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>State agency departments</th>
<th>Municipal agencies</th>
<th>Special public administrative authorities</th>
<th>Private operators responsible for regulation of public schools</th>
<th>Administration of private schools</th>
<th>Business, trade union, and association representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England/London/Wyeham *</td>
<td>Council of Wyeham *</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Learning Trust of Wyeham *</td>
<td>Administration of religious schools</td>
<td>Trade union representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB (academic authority for Charleroi)</td>
<td>Province of Hainaut</td>
<td>Municipality of Beauraenard *</td>
<td>Functionaries of the CFB, working in Charleroi</td>
<td>Diocese of Tournai / Directorship of Catholic schools</td>
<td>Teachers' unions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France/Academy of Créteil</td>
<td>Dpts of Sandre* and the Veyle *</td>
<td>Municipality of Mangue</td>
<td>Academic inspections</td>
<td>Parents 'and trade unions' representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France/Academy of Lille</td>
<td>Dpts of Pas-de-Calais, and the North.</td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>Office of Academic Dean/Academic inspections</td>
<td>Trade unions' representatives and parents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary/XXVIIIth district of Budapest</td>
<td>Mayor's Office of Budapest</td>
<td>Municipality of the XXVIIIth* : Municipal department and school board</td>
<td>Regional office, responsible for evaluation since 1999 per OKEV</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>Autonomous local council of the Gypsy minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal/Lisbon region</td>
<td>Municipality of Lingua in the Lisbon region</td>
<td>Regional administration of Education of Lisbon (DREL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* entities marked with * have fictive names
entities marked in yellow were studied by national research teams.
Appendices to chapter 3, section 3

**Methodology for the analysis of interdependent spaces**

*Principles of selection for the local educational spaces studied*

In Charleroi, the space chosen for study was defined on the basis of an examination of the places of residence of students and the schools they attended, rather than on the basis of mapping the territory of the institutions involved. In this manner, the local space was defined such that the schools which were located there (which were all studied) had large areas of overlap as regards recruitment, and were therefore in a situation of interdependence as regards the distribution of students, at times a matter of competition. In Paris and Lisbon also, a similar procedure was employed, even where no statistics were available on which to base the choice. The Portuguese team concentrated on the eastern section of one municipality, noting that this part was quite distinct from the rest of the municipality, in that the schools located there were relatively autonomous in relation to those in the neighbouring municipality. The Paris team sought out a heterogeneous territory within which it was supposed that there were aspects of interdependence between schools. Five municipalities were selected, which came under two different academic inspection authorities.

In two other contexts, the selection was initially established on the basis of institutional territories: in Budapest, the space chosen corresponded to a particular city borough (which was also in charge of practically all the schools serving students of the age group under examination). In Lille, one municipality constituted the space studied, whose boundaries corresponded with those of a single academic inspection authority. In both cases, the institutional divisions observed were directly linked to the main regulatory authorities of the schools studied. As for the London space, it was defined according to a mix of the two procedures described just above. Beginning from the boundaries of a borough, our study eventually came to include several schools which lay outside the borough, but which drew in a certain number of the students who resided there.

With regard to the part of the metropolitan area they belong to, the spaces chosen are in different cases. In Lille, for example, the space chosen was in the centre of the city. In London and Budapest, the spaces were not in the centre, but still considered part of the city proper. In Lisbon and Paris, peripheral areas were studied, while in Charleroi the centre and a part of the periphery were included. These spaces also differed as regards size of student population. This variable can be evaluated by taking account of the whole range of populations served by the schools studied, or, since the number of years of study handled by the different schools varies itself from one country to another, by taking account of the number of students registered for study in any one grade or level. The latter number varies from 600 to 2,600 students. The local spaces defined at Budapest and Lingua listed relatively few students per grade (630 and 711, respectively), but in the other spaces this number exceeded 1,600. The choice made by the teams varied also as regards the selection of schools studied within the boundaries of the space thus defined. In Lille, Budapest, and Charleroi, every school in the zone was studied. In Paris, only a few private schools declined to participate in the research. In Lisbon, an a priori selection was made within the municipality, in order simply to limit the size of the research focus, while in London the selection had to do more with the difficulty of access to certain schools. The reader will find in Table 5 the main characteristics of the spaces studied.

---

55 Number of students in the seventh year of study in 2001-2002.
56 In London, 1,683 (number of 15-year-olds enrolled in the schools studied, including those residing outside the borough), at Lille about 2,200, in Charleroi about 2,450 and in Paris, about 2,650.
Table 5. Synthetic table of characteristics of local spaces selected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of the local space studied</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borough of Wyeham*</td>
<td>Borough of Inner London directly adjacent to the City</td>
<td>Centre and eastern part of the 4th and 2nd peripheral bands</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Eastern part of the 1st peripheral band, adjacent to Paris intra muros</td>
<td>Eastern part of the municipality of Lingua*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/metropolitan area</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Charleroi</td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of the city or metropolitan area</td>
<td>8,017,000</td>
<td>401,567</td>
<td>1,000,900</td>
<td>9,645,000</td>
<td>1,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of students per year of study in the levels studied</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools in the space</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools analysed in the space</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools analysed outside the space</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*all names of municipalities and boroughs have been invented and are fictitious.

Methods of inquiry

Our research has made sure to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Data and statistical analysis

Ideally, the statistical approach should have sufficed, within the context of analysis judged proper for each country, to objectify certain facts (to prevent interviews from deviating too much from reality), to stimulate emergent hypotheses, even to verify certain hypotheses stemming from qualitative analysis, and in the
framework of the international analysis, to ground some of the comparisons between countries. The first objective already presented certain difficulties (since in some cases data were not available for private schools, some variables were not collected, or we were obliged to collect data ourselves), but the second objective presented a real challenge. The available variables are in fact not the same in all countries. Also, the elaboration of indicators with a truly common signification is complicated by the specificities of each system. Given these constraints, and given that our research was not intended to constitute a set of transnational indicators, we did not seek to make one-to-one comparisons between varying terms. In our synthesis, we employ for comparisons data 'of the same order', not exactly similar, but which when interpreted carefully permit nonetheless to make apparent certain similarities and differences between the various local spaces.

The statistical data aim on one hand at characterizing a context, on another at describing the schools, and finally to enumerate certain administrative decisions. As for the context, the data collected were essentially intended to define the characteristics of the resident population (at the level of professional activity, income, education level, nationality and ethnic identification) and its types of housing. They also intended to characterize certain demographic changes. The objective was not to limit ourselves to global measures of a local space. We were in fact interested in taking account of residential segregation as accurately as possible, and so to obtain data on a smaller scale. For this kind of work, we were entirely dependent on the statistical bureaus of the countries in which we worked, and thus were constrained by their limitations in terms of variables and also in terms of the dates of data collection or the territorial scale of the collection of individual data sets. In this respect the statistical services of France, England, and Portugal proved more helpful in these matters than those of Belgium or Hungary.

The other category of data collected obviously concerns the schools themselves. Our attention was essentially concentrated in this regard upon the student population, and also upon their social as well as academic characteristics, and finally upon the sequences of their academic progression. In Paris and London, access to relevant data for certain private schools was unavailable. In other cases, the efforts the teams made to obtain such data varied, notably in respect of the centralized condition (or lack thereof) of the data. Three teams had to collect certain necessary types of data themselves at various schools. In Lisbon, the research team distributed a questionnaire to all students in the 9th and 10th years of study, with an 81% response rate. In Hungary, a questionnaire was sent to the school directors in order to learn the characteristics of their publics, and data concerning changes of schools. In Charleroi, the team depended in part upon data files which had been collected by them between 1995 and 2000, which allowed them to follow the academic progress of each student who had attended one of the schools in that local space.

Finally, a third type of data was sometimes collected: here it was a matter of administrative data taking account of decisions made by regulatory authorities. Thus the French teams themselves applied data concerning derogations, and the English team made use of data concerning priorities of choice expressed by families and the eventual response to this.

Data and qualitative analysis

We have used qualitative analysis to enrich and better interpret the results of quantitative analysis, basing ourselves on information collected primarily through interviews and document analysis, but also through the consideration of certain 'anecdotal' hypotheses. This analysis has been brought to bear upon three objects. The first (the least important) concerns the characterization of urban spaces with the help of maps, newspapers, projects and evaluations, as well as interviews with the representatives of local political authorities, educational administrators, or officials of other administrative bodies and a diverse group of associations. The second concerns the subjective characterization of positions and the attractiveness of schools through written presentations (signage, projects carried on by them), above all through the words of those who work in there. We have tried to relate these subjective characterizations to the objective data collected for each school. Finally, the essential aspect of qualitative analysis bears upon the functioning and logic of action of each school through analysis of documents and certain observations, but mostly through interviews.
These interviews with school directors and other education professionals had to do with the following points:

- Their vision of academic, social, and ethnic characteristics of the student population of their school, and comparisons with the student population of other schools.
- Their vision of the characteristics of their school in terms of academic programme offerings (sequences, options), of the ‘level’ of their programmes, of the ‘educational’ opportunities offered in a larger sense (pedagogical support activities, cultural activities, sports), and the general ‘climate’ of the school (discipline, behaviour, violence, suspensions), also considered in comparison with other schools in the same space.
- Their vision of the teaching staff: qualifications and competence, mobility, individual commitment, relations with students, relations between colleagues, relations with administrative staff.
- Their vision of the internal policies of the school: its ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’, the means at its disposal, the pedagogical and educational project of the school, internal organization (classes, level-specific groups), projects in cooperation with those outside the school.
- Their vision of the external policies and of the ‘marketing’ of the school: what was shown in presentations to parents and to the public at large, means of promotion (brochures, visits to the school, general external presentation of the school…), internal changes made in relation to promotions.
- Relations with parents of students at the school, and their participation in its functioning, and the existence or lack of academic strategies involved in the choice by parents of this school, any eventual link with residential strategies, the number of requests for admission, any departures toward other schools.
- Their vision of the urban environment and the area of primary recruitment for the school, their knowledge of the urban environment, and any eventual links to local associations or facilities.
- Their knowledge of the other schools in the area which send them students, and to which they send students, and their relations with these schools; their knowledge of schools at the same level which compete with them for students, in the same space or not, and their relations with them;
- Their relations with local education authorities and their opinions about the education policies these authorities support.
- Their relations with political powers at the local level, and their opinions concerning the actions of these people as this affects the area of instruction.
- Their point of view on inequalities in education in the local context, and their own connection to the logic of operation of the school, parental strategies, and local and national policies.

Each team nonetheless adapted this procedure to the context of the local area being studied, to the limitations on its own working procedure, and above all to its primary interests. Thus two teams (Charleroi and Lille), which had accorded a high importance to the quantitative analysis of positions and changes, only carried out interviews with administrators and those responsible higher in the hierarchy, and used in their interpretations mostly these interviews and information gleaned from various types of documents (signage, projects, evaluation reports). In return, the four other teams (Paris, London, Lisbon, Budapest) gave qualitative analysis a central place, and proceeded to interview other types of subjects (mostly teachers and parents), while still using some written materials and in some cases making some observations. The use of qualitative material, especially interviews, also points up certain differences. Some teams (notably Paris and London) used these extensively, while others, particularly the Charleroi team, rarely or ever used passages from interviews to illustrate their analyses of the functioning and the strategies of a school.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SPACES STUDIED

Social composition

The London borough of Wyeham is distinctly underprivileged compared to most other London boroughs. Based on the Government Index of Deprivation of 2000, it is the second most underprivileged in the city. The unemployment rate in Wyeham is higher than that registered for metropolitan London as a whole (9% as against 7%). The borough also has a high proportion of immigrants and refugees; about 40% of the population belongs to a minority ethnic group, the most numerous being Afro-Caribbeans (25%).
The metropolitan area of Charleroi, a region once highly industrialized, today presents a profile which is less favourable than that of many other sub-regions of Wallonia. Taken as a whole, Charleroi is not too far below Walloon averages, but important disparities exist within the various districts or areas that make up the entire urban area. Schematically speaking, the city can be divided into three horizontal bands. The northern and southern bands (especially the south), in social terms, have distinct advantages over the central band. The local space studied is found in the eastern part of this central band. No matter what the indicator, this central band appears less privileged compared to the metropolitan area as a whole. The unemployment rate in June 2001 was 24.3% (as against 20.8% for Greater Charleroi). In 1991, 15.7% of habitations were rated ‘very comfortable’ (as opposed to 29.8% for the entire urban area). At the same period, 28.6% of households said that at least one person living there had a diploma signifying completion of instruction at the higher secondary level (as opposed to 49.5%). In 1999, the inhabitants of the central strip had an average income amounting to only 61% of the income average for the whole urban area.

The City of Blanche is generally far more privileged than the metropolitan area in which it is contained. In fact it is classic to oppose ‘the north-east sector’ (Roubaix, Tourcoing) in which great social difficulties have existed since the decline of the textile industry, to the southern sector, more privileged, including Lille and the new city of Villeneuve d’Ascq, a true centre of development for tertiary employment. Statistics confirm this impression. For example, in 2001, the unemployment rate was less for Lille than for the whole of Roubaix-Tourcoing. The five municipalities of the Parisian region - another local space studied in France – form a fairly heterogeneous group, with important areas of segregation within their space. Overall, this group presents a mix of professional-status persons little differing from that of other French urban areas. French public statistics allow us to compare the two French local spaces included in our study. We see the the number of diploma-holders of 30-39 years of age is a little higher in the Lille local space, that professionals aged 30-49 are a little more often situated very highly in the hierarchy of their profession if they live in Paris, and that there are fewer inactives there. All in all the social characteristics of these populations are not very different, but they deviate by contrast more significantly from the characteristics of the average Frenchman as a whole.

Table 6. Comparison of some statistics concerning the characteristics of the populations of the local spaces in Lille and Paris

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Professions of 30-49 age group</th>
<th>Education level for 30-39 age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farmers and craftsmen</td>
<td>White-collar and intellectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris local space</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille local space</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 28th arrondissement is very large in area (32 sq. km.), with a fairly heterogeneous population, even if the proportion of high social status cases is lower than in the more attractive districts of the capital. It may be considered as a working-class borough, in which the industrial sector is still the main employer (26% of the active population). The educational level of the population is less than the average of Budapest, but still higher than the national average.

The municipality of Lingua may be considered as a typical urban territory in the Portuguese context. However, when we look at certain statistics such as the rate of diploma-holders of the resident population, we see that the five districts of Lingua which make up the local space under consideration appear relatively well off. Taking all age groups together, we find that 27.5% of the population of the local space are diploma-holders, as against 26% for the whole municipality, 18% for Greater Lisbon, and 10.6% for the nation of Portugal as a whole.
All in all, it appears that the characteristics compared, of populations residing in the local spaces and in the adjacent spaces, do differentiate the spaces studied. Three of them have an average socio-economic profile which is inferior to the average of their metropolitan area (Budapest, Charleroi, Wyeham). One is more or less on a par (Paris), and two are higher in socio-economic terms (Lille and Lingua).

Demographic changes

Socio-demographic changes can have an important effect on the process of distribution of students. The increase or decrease of the school-age population affects the competitive relations between schools: when population trends are down, competition for the number of school-age children each school would like to enroll becomes more fierce and groups of interdependent schools have an opportunity to develop, since some are pushed to recruit farther from their home territory.

There is a contrast in the demographic trend in the local spaces. In Paladomb*, Lingua, and Charleroi, there was a distinct drop in the number of school-age children. Lille and Paris, relative stability, and an increase at Wyeham. In Paladomb*, the number of children 6-13 fell almost 25% between 1990 and 1998. In Lingua, the diminution was hardly less severe; a 22% drop in the number of students in all the schools in that local space. In Charleroi, the number of children enrolled in secondary school in the region fell 17% between 1988 and 2000. In Lille, it appears that there was a demographic drop, but one less severe; the number of children in the 6th year of study fell from 2,200 in 1994-95 to 2,100 in 2001-02. In Paris, a drop in the number of school-age children was observed in Mangue and Banane, while there was a significant increase at Vincennes, and a lesser increase at Saint-Figues and at Raisin. For Wyeham, the number tended to rise. In fact, it has been noted that in this London borough, there was a rise of 13% in population among the 0-15 age group between 1991 and 2001.

Families

We have presented above the main socio-economic characteristics of the populations inhabiting the local spaces. These general characteristics give us a preliminary idea of the characteristics of the families in these spaces, although the indicators were almost all quite general, describing the general population without singling out parents with children in school at the age level we are studying. The profile of such parents, in fact, is not necessarily similar to that of other age groups, notably as regards having earned diplomas. We have no way to correct this 'bias', or to give any better insight into the diversity of families, but we do study the dispersion in space of different types of families, thus dealing with the question of residential segregation, which may have an effect as concerns academic segregation as a phenomenon, and the question of the hierarchization and interdependence of schools. Residential segregation was observed by all the teams. Nonetheless, for lack of similar indicators and for lack of available recent data which would break the local space into small enough parts, it is difficult to objectify this fact, and still more difficult to compare the realities of different local spaces.

In Lisbon, we observed a social heterogeneity at the level of districts as well as neighbourhoods. So, for example, we found that the proportion of adults with higher education diplomas varied from 26% to 41% by district.

In Lille, segregation is a fact. Some sections of the city are affected by the phenomenon of social pauperization connected either to the problem of large populations (the high-rise cities of the southern part are among the most deprived and stigmatized neighbourhoods), or to the heritage of an urban environment marked by an industrial past and a preponderance of abandoned industrial sites. Other neighbourhoods, by contrast, are experiencing the phenomenon of ‘gentrification’ on the heels of extensive urban renewal in the historical city centre. There has also been a marked increase in the rate of segregation for foreign families, and a slight increase as regards segregation of those at either extreme of the social ladder. This is manifested in the variable weight of the population of whitecollar workers and intellectual professions in various districts from which students may be recruited. This proportion, which
varies from 2% to 40%, clearly indicates that the areas of recruitment designated by the authorities are not enough to compensate in a significant manner for the consequences of residential segregation.

In London, in the Wyeham sector, there is a small but significant middle class population. Most of the people are from the lower income class. Still, there are differences between neighbourhoods, and the same process of gentrification is underway as in Lille. The types of segregation are apparent from statistics: the Haggerston district scores more negatively than Clissold on most indicators. Segregation has an ethnic dimension: by neighbourhood, the non-white population varies from 27% to 52%, with the population of blacks varying from 14% to 37%.

In Charleroi, the local space, composed of 12 individual localities, is far from homogeneous in socio-economic terms, even if the most affluent strata are hardly represented at all. For all indicators observed, important differences appear when we analyse the available data at the level of 152 statistical districts within the local space. For example, the percentage of individuals holding at least one diploma in higher secondary education varied in 1991 from 16% to 60% by neighbourhood.

In Paris, the departmental boundary which runs through the local space is not only of administrative significance. It separates two municipalities (Banan and Mangue) which include an important fraction of the inhabitants of the lower income strata and which are led by Communist mayors, from two others (Vincennes and Saint-Raisin) which count among their residents a significant portion of the inhabitants from the middle and upper income strata, and which are led by right-wing mayors. We also observe a marked contrast between Banane, Mangue, and (in a lesser degree) Figues on one side, and Saint-Raisin and Vincennes on the other. For example, the proportion of white collar workers and those in intellectual professions in the 30-49 age group reaches 38% in Saint-Raisin and Vincennes, 19% in Figues, but less than 14% in the two other municipalities. The same gap is observed at the level of diploma-holders in the 30-39 age group, where over 50% have the ‘baccalaureate + 2’ in the first two municipalities, 35% in the next, and less than 27% in the last two. Patterns of segregation are also apparent on a smaller geographical scale. Population profiles vary widely within the neighbourhoods of Mangue: two of them have a relatively higher number of inhabitants working in intermediate professions and white collar jobs, while three others are characterized by a marked over-representation of workers and especially hourly employees. The inequality of territorial distribution of various social categories within Figues-sous-Bois is also manifest.

In Budapest, in the Paladomb borough, there are some neighbourhoods which have markedly more comfortable quarters than the average, and others which are markedly deteriorated. The centre, the most urbanized but also partially rehabilitated, is composite. The neighbourhood of the Little Valley, at the edge of the city, is slightly more advantageous. It lies beside a neighbourhood of council housing, similar to that found in French suburbs, but in a much less favourable setting. A large part of the population lives in the deteriorated urban area or ‘city’ known as the Grand Valley. As for peripheral neighbourhoods, they are different from each other. One in particular (the city ‘of rail workers’) is one of the most rundown in Budapest, and is inhabited mostly by Gypsies. But other peripheral areas, such as the City of officers or the Pavilion Quarter, boast superior housing.

The data available in the reports does not allow us to picture in really objective terms the level of segregation. Still, important social disparities characterize the borough: the proportion of holders of diplomas in higher education, higher level white-collar workers, and business executives is 26% in the ‘best’ area, though only 1% in the least privileged area. However, in about two-thirds of 32 separate zones, the proportion varies between 5% and 18%.

The national case studies show that it is difficult to distinguish segregation patterns which are continued over fairly large spaces, and those which become apparent on smaller scales, from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and even within neighbourhoods, as in Lille or in the region of Paris. The only transversal approach we have attempted consisted in measuring for four local spaces the Gini indexes with regard to

57 Figures from the census of 1999.
one or two indicators. This is thus a quite modest effort and does not permit a real comparison which would allow us to affirm that such and such a space is more or less segregated than another. In fact, from one space to another, we have had to vary not only the indicator (looking sometimes at diplomas, at professions, or at ethnic characteristics) but also the preciseness of the division (very narrow in Charleroi, where we analysed data at the level of neighbourhoods, very wide in Paris, where municipalities were taken into consideration, intermediate in London or Lisbon). Also, the sub-groups whose more or less homogeneous dispersion in space we have measured have different weights within the total population (representing between 20% and 40% of the population according to the indicators). But it is known that all indices of segregation are sensitive to this relative weighting, so much so that we cannot compare the indices which are applied to sub-groups of significantly different weights.

The graphs above present these measures of segregation. Segregation is greater where the curve deviates from the oblique at right, which represents the situation of absence of segregation. It appears that in Lingua and in London, the deviation of the curve is very weak, which indicates a fairly low degree of segregation in that space, at least with regard to that indicator and in terms of the division of spaces taken into account. Segregation appears more pronounced in Charleroi where the same indicator, calculated on a larger scale (that of localities) makes a less pronounced segregation appear, which result testifies to a reality which juxtaposes a relative mixed condition of populations at the scale of localities with a phenomenon of internal segregation at the level of neighbourhoods. The highest degrees of segregation appear at the level of the local space in Paris with regard to the two indicators used, and where measurements were taken at the municipal level.
Graph 2. **Indicators of Gini taking account of degree of residential segregation within local spaces**

**Charleroi**
Adultes ayant au moins un diplôme de l'enseign. sec. supérieur dans l'ensemble de la population ne suivant plus d'enseignement 1991 (par quartier)

**Oeiras**
Adultes ayant au moins un diplôme de l'enseignement supérieur dans l'ensemble de la population ne suivant plus d'enseignement 2001 (par secteur)

**Londres**
Population non-blanche (losanges) Population noire (carrés) 2001 (par quartier)

**Paris**
Adultes de 30 à 49 ans cadre ou prof. Intellectuelles (losanges) Adultes de 30 à 39 ans ayant au moins un diplôme bac+2 (carrés) 1999 (par commune)

Schools
Two characteristics of schools are described here: institutional characteristics on the one side, and characteristics of courses offered on the other. The first set refers to the type of financing and the structure of administration of schools. The second set is limited here to the type of programme length (years of study) which is organized in various schools. These two dimensions of analysis are important to us because the first has to do directly with existing regulatory arrangements, and these are often differentiated as a function of the institutional characteristics of schools; and the second has to do with
the way different schools offer programmes of different lengths to students who could choose between them.

Institutional status of schools

If we inventory the titles used by different educational systems to differentiate the various types of academic organizations, we see that these are numerous and also not standardized, which might lead us to refer to similar realities by different names, or different realities by the same name. In order to arrive at a classification of academic organizations in different countries, we have placed two criteria at the forefront:

Mode of financing, which allows us to distinguish between schools principally financed through public funds, and those which are not;
Structure of administration, which again allows a distinction to be made between schools which are essentially administered by public authorities, and those which are not.

The combination of these two criteria allows three main categories of schools to be distinguished: those which are paid for with public money and which are directly administered by public authorities; those which are essentially paid for through subsidies from public funds, but which maintain a large degree of autonomy in administration; and those which are independent from public authority in financing and administration. The first, we call public schools. The third, private schools; and the second, schools of mixed structure. In this category fall, for example, private schools under contract which are found in France, the ‘voluntary aided school’ found in England, and Belgian ‘free schools’.

Table 7. Division of schools and students in each local space according to type of academic organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England 58</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Lille59</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>(5) 58.2 %</td>
<td>(11) 42.9</td>
<td>(9) 51.5 %</td>
<td>(17) ?? %</td>
<td>(17) 97.0</td>
<td>(9) 100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>(4) 31.7 %</td>
<td>(11) 57.1</td>
<td>(8) 48.5 %</td>
<td>(7) ?? %</td>
<td>(1) 3.0 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>(6) 10.1 %</td>
<td>(22) 100.0</td>
<td>(17) 100.0</td>
<td>(23) 100.0</td>
<td>(18) 100.0</td>
<td>(9) 100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: number of schools in parentheses. The percentages refer to the total student population.

The criteria mentioned above allow our six research foci to be compared, by calculating the proportion of students registered in the six types of schools we have defined. The table allows us to observe that except in the case of Portugal, all the spaces include a diversity of types of schools. It also shows that private schools not financed by a state are absent from five of the spaces, and play only a modest role in the sixth. In the categories of mixed or private schools, there is a distinction according to whether the organizing authority is religious or non-religious in nature. Non-religious schools are always in the minority in the mixed or private sector, except in Hungary, but they are represented in all the spaces, except for that of Lille. Within the category of religious schools, the typology conforms to the various religions present in particular academic regions. We observe that religious schools make up the majority of the private or mixed schools, except in Hungary, but this category is not represented in all the spaces. We also observe that all the religious schools in Belgium and France are Catholic. The English local space is the only one which has a great diversity of religious schools.

58 Wyeham and environs only. Based on students aged 15 years in 2002 (league tables).
59 In 2000 for the City of Lille, number attending college.
### Table 8. Division of schools in each local space according to type of academic organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralized or deconc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate level</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local level</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-religious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private or mixed</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Characteristics of schools in terms of number of years of study offered

In all countries, the course of study a student follows is divided into a succession of stages. The sequence prior to higher education is divided into two or three major levels of instruction (primary, secondary, etc.), themselves divided into sub-stages called cycles, degrees, ‘key stages’, etc. The segment of this succession which was studied was that offered to students at 12-14 years of age, assuming no falling behind. This segment forms part of secondary education in England, France, and Belgium, but is still considered part of primary school in Hungary and Portugal.

In Hungary, these two years are the last of the higher cycle of primary education. In Portugal, they are the first two years of the third and last cycle of basic instruction, which lasts three years. In France, they are the middle cycle of the lower secondary level, commonly called college; this lasts for four years of study, preceded by one year of preparation, and followed by one year of orientation. In England, these two years are the last in ‘key stage 3’ which lasts three years, and forms the beginning of secondary instruction. In Belgium, they are the ‘first degree’ of secondary instruction.

In all the countries studied, this segment of instruction is organized by schools in various ways as regards the number of years of study included. This variety can sometimes be very important, as in Portugal where not less than 11 types of schools can be in control of the particular segment upon which we have chosen to focus. The local spaces studied still do not include examples of all the kinds of schools existing in that country. All analyses, except for that dealing with Hungary, cover several types. The notion of school we are using does not necessarily match any administrative division in force in particular countries. It refers to a grouping of school buildings located in a common space or in nearby spaces, which is controlled by a single administrative authority. If we stick to this definition, we come up with one kind of school in Hungary, two in Lille and Charleroi, three in the Portuguese local space, and four in the spaces in Paris and London.

In France, the lower portion of secondary education is generally organized through schools called colleges, which are limited to a four-year programme at this level. Nonetheless, some private institutions frame this college sequence within sequences which also contain primary schools, lycees, or both. Thus there are four types of schools which handle the age range under the title of lower secondary instruction. In Paris and Lille, four types of schools coexist: most only organize the four years of college, but four Paris schools and four in Lille offer primary school, college, and lycee together in a continuous sequence, while two in Paris and three in Lille offer primary school and college under the same authority, and two in Paris and one in Lille associate college and lycee instruction. All these educational groupings are in the private sector, except for one public school which organizes primary instruction together with the years of

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60 Wyeham and environs only.
61 One of these is public.
college. We must however note that some public colleges, often the oldest, have remained administratively attached to the lycée they once were a part of, and have thus an adjunct principal instead of a principal. This is the case in the local space in Paris.

In Belgium, the first degree can theoretically be organized by four kinds of schools. The most numerous are those which put together 6 years of secondary education. But there are also some which concentrate exclusively on the first degree of secondary education. These two types do not normally integrate primary instruction into the sequence, but this arrangement does exist in certain schools organized by the French-speaking Community. There are none concentrating on the first degree of the study, so we are only counting two types: those of the majority which organize six years of secondary education, and those which also organize the six years of primary instruction.

In England, in the space studied, the three years of ‘key stage 3’ are organized by four kinds of school. Public schools are of two types: ‘secondary schools’ cover ‘key stages 3 and 4’ while the others, called ‘sixth form schools’, take care of the two following years as well. Private schools may add to these arrangements the years of primary or pre-primary study, thus encompassing the entirety (or nearly) of school instruction preceding higher education.

In Portugal, the three years of the 3rd cycle may be offered by a wide variety of types. The Portuguese yearbook of statistics lists no fewer than eleven types of schools which organize this cycle. If we limit ourselves to those which attract a significant number of 3rd cycle students, we observe that besides those which only offer the second and third cycles of basic instruction (the most numerous case; this takes in 5 years of study), there are secondary schools which include ‘preparatory’ sections for the third cycle and sometimes even the second, and also integrated basic schools which offer the entire course of three cycles of basic instruction (with and without kindergarten). These three arrangement types are found in the local space studied here.

In Hungary, we can find three types of school present which handle the last two years of the higher cycle of primary instruction: general schools limited to eight years of this course of instruction; eight-year lycées which offer four years of the higher cycle of primary instruction, plus four years of secondary instruction; and finally six-year lycées which add only two years of secondary instruction to four on the primary level. In the local space studied, there were only schools of the first type, general eight-year primary. However, six and eight-year programmes outside the borough drew a limited but significant number of students from the upper classes living in the local space.

The table below sums up these various characteristics, presenting in order for each country the length of obligatory schooling, the particular division in terms of levels and degrees of instruction, and the various types of school according to the number of years covered, as well as the number of each type of school observed in the local space studied.
Note to the reader: This table features several lines for each education system. The first indicates the limits of obligatory schooling in terms of age. The second presents the structure of various systems in terms of levels and degrees; the degree which is at the centre of our study is shaded in grey. The following lines indicate different types of existing schools, mentioning the number of years of study they offer. The right column lists the number of each type of school which is present in the local space studied. In France, where two local spaces were studied, P refers to Paris and L to Lille.
Hierarchization of schools in spaces studied

Indicators used

As regards the academic dimension, we wanted above all indicators which would take account of the level of competences acquired at the beginning of a certain level of study. That was only possible in the case of France. In other countries, we sometimes used grades received at the completion of a certain level of study, and sometimes data related to students who fell behind in school. Nonetheless, all these indicators concentrated on the level of study we were examining. Thus, in Paris and Lille, we used the percentage of successful or passing grades obtained on cumulative tests in mathematics and French in the first year of college. In London, we used the average of points scored on tests at the end of key stage 3, which completed the level we were studying (2002). In Lisbon, the proportion of students who had fallen behind in their academic progress over the three years making up the 3rd cycle, that is, the entire level studied, was used (2000-2001). In Budapest, the average of test scores in reading, mathematics, and English were used (the tests were administered by the Institute of Pedagogy of Budapest for 4th year, 6th year, and 8th year students (2001). Finally in Charleroi we used the average number of years fallen behind in the classes for the two years of the 1st degree course of study (2000-2001).

As regards the socio-economic aspect of the research, the indicators are even more heterogeneous, taking account now of the educational level or profession of the parents, now of characteristics related to place of residence, or the level of aid granted to students. In the final analysis we settled on these criteria: in Paris, we noted the proportion of parents working in white collar occupations or working in upper-level intellectual professions. In Lille, the proportion of privileged PCS (2001). In London, we took account of the proportion of students not eligible for free school meals (2002). In Lisbon, the average number of years of study completed by both parents of students in the 9th year of study, evaluated on the basis of a questionnaire given to students, and measured against the theoretical number of years of study necessary for obtaining the highest level diploma offered (2003). In Budapest, the average education level of fathers as stated by students themselves (2001). In Charleroi, the average socio-economic level of the places of residence of the students, each neighbourhood being characterized in accordance with a basket of 11 indicators including income, housing, professions, level of study, and jobs (1998). Over and above this disparity in the definition of indicators, the analyses are handicapped by a lack of data in regard to some schools, for example from the private schools of London and Paris. Despite these limitations, the indicators used allow initial comparisons of the various local spaces studied to be established. (Delvaux and Van Zanten, 2004, p. 68-9)
Graph 4. Position of schools in the local hierarchy as distinguishing the status of the schools

Legend: white squares indicate mixed-status schools. Black lozenges indicate public schools.
Note: for London, the graphic also mentions the five schools studied which are not located in the borough.
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