Religion, multiple identities, and acculturation:
A study of Muslim immigrants in Belgium

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Abstract
In the present study, we examined how the religiousness of European (Belgian) Muslim immigrants is related to multiple collective identities (origin, new country, European, and cosmopolitan), attachment to one (origin or new) or both cultures, and acculturation as a process realized through a variety of domains in personal and social life. Two groups were included: young Muslims born of immigration from Muslim (Mediterranean) countries and, for comparison, young non-Muslims born of immigration from other countries. In both groups, high religiousness predicted attachment to origin identity and culture; low religiousness and religious doubting predicted identification with the host country and acculturation. Interestingly, the religiousness of Muslim immigrants also predicted high identification as citizen of the world, whereas the religiousness of the other immigrants was related to low European identity. Finally, some discrepancy between claiming new identities and effectively experiencing acculturation was found. Interpretations are provided on both a general level (psychology of religion and immigration) and a contextual level (specific to Muslim Europeans).

Keywords
Acculturation; Religion; immigration; Islam; European identity

Young Europeans born of immigration from countries with a Muslim tradition face particularly high challenges with regard to building up multiple collective identities and regulating their sense of belonging to several cultures. Not only must they work on the conjunction between the origin and the host identity and culture, but they also have to face changes internal to the European countries, i.e. the transition of the latter from strictly national territories to larger entities such as the European Union, not to mention the globalization process.

Concerning this issue, religion, both as an institution and in terms of personal attitudes and involvement, probably plays a role that should not be neglected. This is partly because, generally speaking, the construction of personal identity, especially among adolescents and young adults, is to a certain extent influenced
by religion (e.g., Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 2001; King, 2003). It is also because religion is part of a larger cultural whole with respect to which people regulate their degree of belonging. Additionally, the role of religion is very important for multiple collective identities, particularly in the context of immigration: religion seems to play a role in the construction, preservation, or abandoning either of local and ethnic/national identities or of transnational and global ones (e.g., Bastian, Champion, & Rousselet, 2001; Burris, Branscombe, & Jackson, 2000; Kent, 1994), and this is especially the case among immigrants (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005; Ebaugh, 2003). Finally, an additional challenge in the context of immigration to Europe from Muslim countries (often, Mediterranean ones) is that immigrants have to negotiate a place for the cultural systems of their country of origin—usually marked by the force and predominance of religion—within the cultural systems of their adopted European country often marked by secularization (like in Belgium; Halman, 2001)—not to mention the additional challenge of embracing the European identity per se (see, e.g., Hagevi, 2002).

It is on these questions, both classic and new, that the present study focuses. More precisely, we studied how young Belgians, or young people living in Belgium and born of immigration from Muslim Mediterranean countries hold these multiple, old and new, local, national, and transnational identities; how they adopt acculturation strategies; and the role of their personal religiousness on these multiple identities and acculturation strategies.

To do this, we also considered an additional sample of young immigrants in Belgium of similar age, coming from the same educational milieu (same school), but from countries other than the Muslim Mediterranean ones. This research strategy allowed us to contextualize the information received from the Muslim group because it provided us with the possibility of distinguishing between results due to the context of immigration in general and ones that can be specifically attributed to the young Muslim immigrants’ sample—whether this specificity be religious, cultural or historical. We thus avoided the risk of over-interpreting our results, as might have been the case had we referred only to Islam in our interpretative hypotheses.

This study is in continuity with two recent studies carried out in a similar context. The first study, carried out in January and February of 2002, i.e. six months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, focused on the issue of collective identities (Belgian, European, citizen of the world, origin country identity) and the role religion plays in these identities in three different groups of young people attending the same schools in Belgium: native Belgians, people born of immigration from Muslim Mediterranean countries, and people born of
other kinds of immigration (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). In the second study, two years later, the same questions were investigated in a sample of young Jewish adolescents attending Jewish schools in Brussels, Belgium (Saroglou & Hanique, 2006).

The present study was carried out in January 2005. In part, it constitutes a replication of the two previous studies—with regard to the hierarchy of multiple collective identities and the role of religion in them—but it is also an extension of these studies. First, rather than using simple indicators of global religiousness as in the previous studies, we included finer measures of five different religious orientations. These measures allow us to distinguish between (a) intensity of religiousness in general, (b) an intrinsic and (c) extrinsic motivation for being religious (see Allport & Ross, 1967, for this distinction), (d) a “quest” religion implying doubts in faith (see Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993), and (e) importance of spirituality in life (see Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005, for the distinction between religion and spirituality). All these dimensions share some common variance (they are all pro-religious dimensions, although the quest orientation may reflect low religiousness) but also constitute distinct dimensions that predict external outcomes in different ways (Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003; see also Saroglou, 2003, for spirituality).

Second, inspired by Berry’s model of acculturation (see Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002), adopted by many scholars in different countries (including Belgium; Manço, 1999), besides multiple collective identities, we examined the feeling of cultural attachment either to only the culture of origin (what Berry calls separation), or only to the culture of the host country—i.e. Belgium—(assimilation), or finally to both cultures (integration). Third, we included a measure of the degree/extent of immigrants’ integration/acculturation into the host culture, a measure that does not remain on the surface level of simply reporting identification or belonging, but goes into further detail by focusing on the specific domains through which acculturation is effectively realized: language, friendships, hobbies, customs, values, and willingness to transmit the host culture to the next generation.

This extension with respect to previous research also gave us the opportunity to investigate some additional, new questions in the present study. First, what are the links between (a) collective identities (identification as Belgian, European, citizen of the world, identification with the origin country), (b) the different trajectories relative to the cultural attachment of the immigrants (Berry’s model), and (c) acculturation as it is reflected in effective practice in a variety of everyday life domains? Is there a correspondence between claimed identities and effective
attitudes and behaviors displaying acculturation? Does the appropriation of the host culture by immigrants mean openness to the global world or does it constitute a limitation to what is local and national? Second, beyond its role in the holding of these collective identities by immigrants (Saroglou & Galand, 2004; Saroglou & Hanique, 2006), does religion play a role in the process of cultural integration into the host country in terms of real activities and cultural identification? In other words, is the role of religion limited to merely displaying some collective identities, or does it have an impact on the degree and extent of acculturation? These are the new questions of the present study, although the correlational design of the study only allows us to test these questions indirectly.

Method

Participants and procedure

The protocol was administered to 120 young students (mean, minimum and maximum ages = 18.3, 16, and 21 years), 57 of which were women and 63 men. Only six returned questionnaires were uncompleted and thus not retained for further analyses. The participants were last-year students of six secondary schools in Brussels, Belgium: three of them belonged to the State network of education and the other three belonged to the Catholic network of education. Both types of education are officially recognized, follow similar programs, and have an equivalent number of students. The schools were selected according to the neighborhood in which they were located in order to increase the likelihood of finding high rates of students born of immigration. The study was advertised as an investigation about several dimensions regarding values and youth. The protocol was administered in class with a teacher and one researcher present. The students were informed that they were free not to participate if they did not wish. It took approximately 35 minutes to complete the questionnaire. At the end, participants were thanked for their contribution and four months later they were informed of the results of the study through a summary.

On the basis of demographic questions (place of birth of participants, parents, and grandparents), we excluded the (only) 13 students who were native Belgians and we constituted two sub-groups:

1. Young students born of Muslim immigration, i.e. students who themselves or whose parents or grandparents were born in a Mediterranean
country of Muslim tradition (n = 64). Indeed, immigrants from North-African countries and Turkey constitute the largest immigration group in Belgium and are perceived as a group with some homogeneity (Manço, 2000). Forty-four participants originated from North-African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), 15 from Turkey, and the remaining five from other Muslim countries (Pakistan and Indonesia). All participants of this sub-group reported a Muslim affiliation. We will call them “Muslim immigrants” for brevity’s sake; no alternative label is perfect (e.g., “Belgian young Muslims born of immigration” presumes that all of them are Belgian citizens, which is not the case).

2. Young students born of other types of immigration, i.e. again students who themselves or whose parents or grandparents were born in countries other than the ones mentioned above in point 1 (n = 37). These participants were mostly Christians: 35 students came from countries of Christian tradition, half of them from South American countries and the others from Eastern European countries. Two additional participants came from Thailand. We will call them “other immigrants”, which is not an elegant label, but calling them “Christian immigrants” would not be exact, and calling them “Non-Muslim immigrants” would constitute a negative definition that does not reflect any psychological reality.

The Muslim young adults were mostly second-generation immigrants (83%), with the remaining 17% of first generation. None were third generation immigrants. The “Other immigrants” were mostly of the first generation (65%), and secondarily of the second generation. Only one participant was a third generation immigrant.

It is clear that splitting the immigrant participants into these two sub-groups is not ideal, but it was probably a good compromise with regard to the reality of our context (demography of immigration in Belgium in general and of secondary schools in Brussels in particular) and to our objectives: studying Muslim immigrants and contextualizing results in the light of other immigrants in general.

Measures

The protocol was composed of various religion measures and various identity- and acculturation-related measures. All measures administered included a Likert scale format of 7 points (from 1 to 7).

Religiousness: We administered measures of the following five different religious orientations:
(a) a scale of intensity of religiousness, i.e. seven items referring to the importance of God and religion in life, frequency of prayer, importance/attractiveness of religion with regard to meaning and values, emotions, community, and personal experience ($\alpha = .92$);

(b) an index of intrinsic religion, i.e. three items selected from the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale (Hoge, 1972), measuring personal engagement and investment in religion for reasons intrinsic to faith—religion is a goal in itself and has an absolute meaning in the person’s life ($\alpha = .69$);

(c) an index of extrinsic religion, i.e. three items, also selected from the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale (Hoge, 1972), measuring religiousness due to reasons extrinsic to the faith itself—religion is relativized and does not have a central place in the person’s life ($\alpha = .60$);

(d) an index of quest religious orientation, i.e. six items selected from the Quest scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; see also Batson et al., 1993). Following the results of a factor analysis on our data (principal component analysis with a varimax rotation), it turned out that our six items were better organized in a two-factor solution, i.e. one reflecting openness to the possibility of change in faith and even to the loss of faith (three items; $\alpha = .60$; we called this factor “Questing religion”), and the other reflecting openness to doubt in faith and to critical thinking (three items too; $\alpha = .52$; we called this factor “Religious quest”); and

(e) a simple index (one item) on the importance of spirituality in personal life.

Multiple collective identities. The following four questions measuring collective identities were administered: “How much do you define your identity in terms of… 1) citizen of the world; 2) European; 3) Belgian; and 4) other (please specify)?”. In this last question, 43 out of the 64 Muslim immigrants mentioned the country of origin and 19 out of the 37 other immigrants did the same. Participants did not have to select between or to rank these items but to give a score on all of them (1: Not at all; 7: Absolutely).

Cultural attachment. On the basis of Berry’s model distinguishing different strategies of acculturation among immigrants (see, e.g. Berry et al., 2002)—mainly separation, assimilation, integration and marginalization—we included the following four questions: “I feel that I belong the most to… 1) my culture of origin; 2) the Belgian culture; 3) both cultures; 4) neither of these two cultures”. Participants again had to evaluate their position on all four questions and not to
select between them (1: Not at all; 7: Absolutely). The fourth question turned out not to be discriminative: very few participants gave high scores on it. Therefore, we did not retain it for further analyses.

**Acculturation.** No established and cross-culturally valid scale of acculturation exists (Zane & Mak, 2002). We thus created a measure of acculturation (7-point Likert scale) adapted to the Belgian context and inspired by or clearly including items from previous scales: the *Acculturation Questionnaire* (van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz, & Feltzer, 1999), the *Acculturation Index* (Ward & Rana-Deuba, 1999), and the *Vancouver Index of Acculturation* (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). We then compiled 13 items tending to measure real insertion into the new, Belgian culture on a personal, familial, cultural, and social level. Following previous research favoring bipolar scales (origin culture vs. new country culture), we asked participants whether they preferred the origin (1) or the Belgian (7) culture (or the opposite for the six reverse items) in the following domains: friendships, sharing and communication of emotions, adoption of values, music and TV program preferences, ways of dressing, culinary preferences, language used, participation in festivals and family traditions, football team to be supported in case of a match between the two countries, values to transmit to the next generation, and partner preference for marriage. After deleting one item that decreased the reliability (festivals), the 12-item scale was found to show a good internal consistency ($\alpha = .76$).

**Results and Discussion**

**Hierarchy of multiple identities**

As indicated in Figure 1 (see also Table 1), among young Muslim immigrants the identification with the origin country is the strongest one, whereas the Belgian and European identities seem less important (without however being very low, for the means are still higher than the middlemost score on the Likert scale = 3.5). The citizen of the world identity is located in an intermediate position. Here are the results of the comparison tests: the origin country identity is stronger than the cosmopolitan one, $F = 5.34, p < .05$, and the Belgian and European identities are weaker than the cosmopolitan one, $F_5 = 12.98, 15.11, p < .001$. These results regarding the hierarchy between the four collective identities replicate results of a previous study in a similar sample (Saroglou & Galand, 2004; see Figure 1).
A similar hierarchy was found in the other sample of immigrants, i.e. young people born of immigration from countries other than Muslim Mediterranean ones: the origin country identity came first, followed by the citizen of the world identity, whereas the European and Belgian identities came last. Here are the results of the comparison tests: the origin country identity is stronger than the cosmopolitan one, $F = 3.94, p < .10$, and the Belgian and European identities are weaker than the cosmopolitan one, $F_s = 26.75, p < .001$, and $10.52, p < .01$. Again, these findings replicate results in a similar sample of non-Muslim immigrants in the previous study by Saroglou and Galand (2004; see also Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Hierarchy of multiple identities distinctly for each group. Both results of the present study and of a previous study carried out in 2002 (Saroglou & Galand, 2004) are presented.](image)

Such a hierarchy between collective identities is in line with other studies in the European Union. The last version (1999) of the European Values Survey (23 countries, i.e. the 25 member-countries except Cyprus and Malta) provided the information that, among young Europeans, beyond some secondary variations between countries, local identities (particularly the national ones) prevail over cosmopolitan and European identities (the latter is indeed in decline in comparison with the early 90s; Belot, 2005). Interestingly, the same European Survey revealed that European Muslims are characterized by a weaker attach-
ment to national identity (in fact, the adoption country identity, as most of them are born of immigration). Our study confirms this but provides, in addition, an explanation: attachment to the origin country is strong, even predominant, despite the fact that participants are mostly young, second generation immigrants.

**Mean differences between the two groups**

The cultural attachment measure did not indicate a significant difference between the two groups (see Table 1). Mean comparisons between the two groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Muslim immigrants ( (n = 64) )</th>
<th>Other immigrants ( (n = 37) )</th>
<th>Comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( M )  ( SD )</td>
<td>( M )  ( SD )</td>
<td>( t ) test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>4.86  1.41</td>
<td>3.77  1.62</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>4.36  1.20</td>
<td>2.97  1.91</td>
<td>3.94**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>4.31  1.44</td>
<td>5.03  1.37</td>
<td>−2.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious quest</td>
<td>4.16  1.58</td>
<td>4.33  1.25</td>
<td>−0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questing religion</td>
<td>2.88  1.26</td>
<td>4.36  1.55</td>
<td>−5.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirituality</td>
<td>5.15  1.97</td>
<td>4.22  2.06</td>
<td>2.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World citizen</td>
<td>4.88  2.16</td>
<td>4.97  1.98</td>
<td>−0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>4.37  2.06</td>
<td>4.58  2.02</td>
<td>−0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>4.39  1.87</td>
<td>3.67  1.71</td>
<td>1.90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>5.42  1.85</td>
<td>6.00  1.20</td>
<td>−1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural attachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>4.05  1.77</td>
<td>3.94  1.88</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>5.55  1.46</td>
<td>5.33  1.62</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double</td>
<td>4.64  1.95</td>
<td>4.11  1.97</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>3.35  0.82</td>
<td>3.97  0.86</td>
<td>−3.56***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p < .05 \). ** \( p < .01 \). *** \( p < .001 \). + \( p < .10 \).
revealed similarities in the origin, world citizen, and European identities, but a difference in the Belgian identity (see also Table 1). This latter identity relative to the new, adoption country was weaker among the other immigrants in comparison with the Muslim immigrants. This finding replicates a previous one (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). It appears then that despite the strong identification with the origin country and the rather mild identification with the new host country among all types of immigrants (see also a study on young Belgian Jews; Saroglou & Hanique, 2006), young Muslim immigrants are characterized by a stronger identification with Belgium compared to the other types of immigration.

This higher identification of Muslim immigrants with the new country, i.e. Belgium, compared with other immigrants could be explained by the evolution of this community leading to the establishment of a social, cultural, and political place within Belgian society (Kammaz & Manço, 2004; Manço, 2000). People coming from highly varied types of immigration, on the other hand, probably do not have the opportunity, like young Arab-Muslims, to belong to communities of a certain size, with some visibility, a specific history, and characteristics that facilitate the creation of a feeling of belonging to Belgian society.

A different picture is obtained, however, when we focus on the measure of acculturation (see also Table 1). As mentioned earlier, this measure implies concrete attitudes and activities that manifest an insertion into the “Belgian way of life” in terms of personal, cultural, familial, and social life. Indeed, in comparison with the Muslim immigrants, the “other” immigrants report a greater familiarity with, and more use of the elements of Belgian life: language spoken, friendships, hobbies, customs, values, and willingness to transmit the Belgian culture to the next generation.

Several possible interpretations may arise from this contrast between Muslim and other immigrants regarding, on the one hand, the display of a Belgian identity and, on the other hand, a low insertion and concrete integration into Belgian culture. First, these two realities may indeed be somewhat distinct: it is possible to declare myself a Belgian (“I belong to this country, I am a Belgian citizen, I have rights because of that”) without translating this identity into an embracing of “classically Belgian” or “native Belgian” elements of social life (“I’m a Belgian citizen, but of a different culture”). Second, it is likely that the second dimension (acculturation in terms of appropriation of the way of life of the host country) is less easy to access and is achieved later in the time process for Muslim immigrants than the mere claiming of a Belgian identity. Because of a certain socio-economic marginalization of their community (Kammaz & Manço, 2004; Manço, 2000) and because of a certain cultural and religious distance—be it real or perceived—between “Oriental” Islam and “Western” Christianity, young
Muslims of Mediterranean origin may have more difficulty than other (in fact mostly Christian) immigrants in integrating the Belgian way of life. Finally, it is not to be excluded that young Muslim immigrants of Arab and Turkish origin, compared with other young immigrants, accentuate their claim to be (considered as) Belgians by reserving at the same time their right to live the reality of being Belgian in their own way.

Moreover, the two groups differ considerably in their degree of religious investment (see also Table 1). Whereas young Muslims report stronger religiosity and give higher scores to intrinsic religion and spirituality, other young immigrants have more doubts, question their faith more or seem to be more extrinsically motivated when reporting religiousness. These results confirm the important place of religion and spirituality among young Muslim immigrants today as opposed to other young people, natives or other immigrants, who seem to be marked by secularization (see also Saroglou & Galand, 2004). They also indicate the strong presence of a rather traditional faith, which has not gone through doubts and questioning. They suggest as well that high religiousness among young Muslim immigrants is not to be understood as a mere consequence of their immigration status, since other young immigrants are less religious. Finally, it is not to be excluded that the high scores on many indicators of religion reflect a more recent development, i.e. the intensification of affiliation with Islam as a way of protesting against marginalization or against Western values (Roy, 2005). Longitudinal data would be needed to support the plausibility of such an interpretative hypothesis. There is, however, some cross-sectional evidence in favor of this idea coming from data in France, comparing second with first generation Muslim immigrants (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005).

**Intercorrelations between multiple identities and between different types of cultural attachment**

*Intercorrelations between multiple identities.* As indicated in Table 2, for both groups, the European identity was positively associated with the cosmopolitan one. In addition, a strong identification with the new, adoption country (Belgium) was a sign of openness because it was positively correlated with citizen of the world and European identities.

Moreover, for both groups, the identification with the origin was independent from the identification with the new, immigration country: the two identities, old and new, are thus not necessarily in opposition. This result replicates a previous finding (Saroglou & Galand, 2004) and we have already interpreted this discovery as suggesting the co-existence of many possible pathways with
respect to these two identities. If we follow the acculturation model of Berry (see Berry et al., 2002), this means that, for some, the correlation between the origin and the new country identity could be positive (double identity or integration), whereas for others the correlation could be negative: identification with one pole would be to the detriment of the other (assimilation or separation).

However, an interesting difference between the two groups was observed. Whereas in the “other” immigrants an independence was found between identification with the origin and the cosmopolitan identity, in the Muslim immigrants, a high identity as citizen of the world was positively correlated with the identity of the origin country (see also Table 2 \( z = 1.81, p < .05 \)). If we take into account the fact that in our previous study (Saroglou & Galand, 2004) we found the motivations of the cosmopolitan identity to be different between young Muslims, other young immigrants, and young native Belgians, it is not to be excluded that the above mentioned, at first sight strange, association between cosmopolitan identity and identification with the origin country reflects a specific perception of globalization, i.e. a communitarian globalization of Islam (see the idea of Umma, i.e. the large community of all Muslims), and not necessarily universalism and multiculturalism in a very broad sense.

**Table 2. Intercorrelations between multiple identities, distinctly for Muslim (above the diagonal) and other (below the diagonal) immigrants.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World citizen</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Belgian</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World citizen</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>.22+</td>
<td>.36*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.28*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( * p < .05. \quad \text{**} p < .01. \quad \text{***} p < .001. \quad \text{+} p < .10. \)
belonging to two cultures (Berry’s model), it reflects more a reality of insertion into the new, adoption country culture and a relative indifference towards the origin culture (without, however, being to the detriment of the latter, because the correlation between double cultural affiliation and affiliation with the origin culture was not negative). Such a result is in favor of the idea that a double cultural attachment is rather asymmetric: one of the two cultures is predominant and constitutes a privileged object of investment. The above result is thus not in favor of the opposite idea that integration passes through the articulation of cultural traits from the country of origin adapted to the cultural requests of the new land (see Manço, 1999, for a review).

Links between multiple identities, cultural attachment, and acculturation

As detailed in Table 3, the correlations between the collective identities and the cultural attachment variables confirm (a) the correspondence between Belgian vs. origin identity and Belgian vs. origin cultural attachment; (b) some opposition between these two realities (reporting being Belgian and remaining attached to the origin culture seems possible, but having a strong origin identity and being attached to the Belgian culture seems unrealistic); and (c) an almost intrinsic link between European identity and the embracing of Belgian culture.

Table 3 also offers some additional interesting information. First, a cosmopolitan identity (citizen of the world) among immigrants does not imply or presuppose cultural attachment or acculturation to the new, adoption country. Rather, it is indicative of a simultaneous presence of multiple cultural attachments, i.e. attachment to both the origin and the new culture. Second, similarly to what was mentioned earlier with regard to the intercorrelations between the different types of cultural attachment, this double cultural attachment is not as double as one might think: rather, it is to the advantage of the new cultural reality. In both the Muslim and other immigrant groups, this belonging to two cultures (integration strategy, in Berry’s terms) is positively associated with the Belgian and European identity and negatively \( r = -0.24, p < .05 \), for the two groups taken as a whole) related to the identification with the country of origin.

Finally, acculturation—in terms of concrete attitudes and activities in the social, personal, and familial spheres—was negatively related, in both groups, to the origin country identity; and, in addition, among Muslim immigrants, it was positively related to the Belgian and European identities (see also Table 3). (However, one should exercise caution with regard to the interpretation of these results, because the acculturation scale was bipolar, the origin and new cultures representing two opposite poles.)
Although not in a systematic manner, the correlational analyses between the different religious dimensions and the different measures of collective identities, cultural attachment, and acculturation revealed that, when results are significant, a clear distinction exists between the role of intensity of religiousness or intrinsic religion and the role of extrinsic religion or a questioning attitude with respect to faith (as mentioned in note 1, these two dimensions also reflected low religiosity to some extent).

We provide here the intercorrelations between the scales in the total sample of our participants. Intensity of religiosity was strongly correlated with intrinsic religion ($r = .67$, $p < .01$). Extrinsic religious motivation seemed independent of intrinsic religion ($r = -.14$, n.s.) and...
More precisely, in the sample of young Belgians born of Arab- and Turkish-Muslim immigration (see Table 4), intensity of faith and religious practice was negatively related to Belgian identity and to acculturation within the Belgian culture. This religious intensity was in fact followed by an attachment to the origin culture. Low certainty in faith or low faith (quest religion), or an extrinsic motivation in religiousness, on the other hand, corresponded to high Belgian identity, sense of belonging and acculturation to the Belgian culture and to low attachment to the origin identity and culture. Finally, identifying oneself as citizen of the world seemed typical of people that find spirituality or religion important in their life.

These results replicate and extend (thanks to the indicators of cultural attachment and acculturation) the results of a previous study in young Muslim immigrants, where high religiousness predicted both an attachment to the origin identity and a cosmopolitan openness (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). They go

### Table 4. Coefficients of correlations between religion and immigration-related measures among Muslim immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration-related measures</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple identities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World citizen</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>−.17+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural attachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>−.19+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>.19+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double</td>
<td>−.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>−.22*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, +p < .10.

More precisely, in the sample of young Belgians born of Arab- and Turkish-Muslim immigration (see Table 4), intensity of faith and religious practice was negatively related to Belgian identity and to acculturation within the Belgian culture. This religious intensity was in fact followed by an attachment to the origin culture. Low certainty in faith or low faith (quest religion), or an extrinsic motivation in religiousness, on the other hand, corresponded to high Belgian identity, sense of belonging and acculturation to the Belgian culture and to low attachment to the origin identity and culture. Finally, identifying oneself as citizen of the world seemed typical of people that find spirituality or religion important in their life.

These results replicate and extend (thanks to the indicators of cultural attachment and acculturation) the results of a previous study in young Muslim immigrants, where high religiousness predicted both an attachment to the origin identity and a cosmopolitan openness (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). They go

religiousness (r = −.18, n.s.; notice however that the associations were negative). It was questioning the faith itself that reflected low religiousness in general and low intrinsic religion in particular (r = −.45, −.56, p < .001), whereas the other component of the quest scale, i.e. valuing doubts, was independent from religiousness and was slightly related to extrinsic motivation (r = .29, p < .01). Finally, spirituality went together with intensity of faith and intrinsic motivation in religion (.60, p < .001; .36, p < .01), was negatively related to extrinsic religion (−.23, p < .05) and was independent from the quest religious orientation (−.16, n.s.).
further, however, since they suggest some conflict between classic religiousness and the new, Belgian identity or the cultural and social insertion into the culture of this adoption country. They are in line with a previous study carried out ten years ago (1994-1995), in a large sample of 1675 young Moroccans and Turks living in Belgium, where strong attachment to the origin country was found to characterize participants with highly religious attitudes, whereas strong attachment to the immigration country was typical of low religiosity (Manço & Manço, 2000). In that same study, it was found that immigrants with high religiosity hold a more traditional (subordinating) conception of the status of women, have traditional matrimonial practices typical of their origin countries, and have a stronger perception of being discriminated against by Belgian society. A recent study in France confirms that, among Muslims born of immigration, those with high religiosity are more attached to the origin country and to conservative values relative to sexuality and to the status of women (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005).

Interestingly, data from the sample of other immigrants proved to be overall similar to the Muslim immigrants results (see Table 5). High religiosity or spirituality was related to low attachment to the Belgian and European identities and high attachment to the origin identity; religious questers and extrinsically religious people tended to endorse a high world citizen identity; and high doubting in religion was followed by endorsement of the European and Belgian identities, and by attachment to the Belgian culture or integration. (One exception was the negative association between one component of quest religiosity and belonging to Belgian culture.)

Taken together, these results in the two samples suggest a remarkable similarity between the two groups. Therefore, a certain conflict between religion and acculturation does not seem to be specific to Islam, but is rather typical of a variety of immigration contexts and may concern psychology of religion and immigration in general (see also our study on young Jews living in Belgium, Saroglou & Hanique, 2006).

What seems specific to the group of young non-Muslim immigrants in comparison with Arab and Turkish immigrants is that, in the former, high religiosity or spirituality was negatively correlated with European identity. It is interesting that this apparent conflict between personal religiousness and the European identity was also found in a previous study among young Jews in Belgium (Saroglou & Hanique, 2006), but was not found among young Muslim or other immigrants in the study by Saroglou and Galand (2004). We have interpreted this low European identity as a function of religiousness among young Jews as resulting from the perception by the Jewish community of the European Union as Christian in character and of an increasing anti-Semitism in European countries.
However, this interpretation does not help us to understand why we found the same result in the present study among the group of other immigrants (who are mostly from the Christian tradition) and why this was not the case with Muslim immigrants in this or the previous study.

A second difference between the two samples concerns the citizen of the world identity. Whereas in the Muslim immigrants sample religiosity and spirituality were followed by the cosmopolitan identity (a result also found with young native Belgians; Saroglou & Galand, 2004), in the other immigrants it was a religiosity with many doubts and questions or a non-intrinsic religion that was associated with the cosmopolitan identity. As will be presented below, it is not to be excluded that different individuals and groups have differing, even opposite, conceptions of the “citizen of the world” identity.

**Conclusion**

With regard to this process of confronting multiple identities and cultures, where people find themselves torn between their origins and the new land, as well as between local or national and global or transnational identities, the challenges are many for young immigrants, especially for Muslims.
Through a certainly oversimplified but possibly useful synthesis of our many findings, a double pattern of possible trajectories seems to emerge. On the one hand, identifying oneself with the host country and culture (Belgium, in this case)—as difficult and problematic as that may be (remember the opposition found between origin identity and either cultural insertion into the adoption country or the sense of belonging to two cultures)—seems to constitute a springboard for openness to larger and more complex identities, i.e. the European and the cosmopolitan ones. Within this rationale, quest religious orientation, extrinsic religiousness, or even low religiousness were found to be factors favoring integration into the new (Belgian) society.

On the other hand, a strong, classic religiousness turned out to be a factor consolidating identification with and belonging to the origin country and culture; it even seemed to be an obstacle for cultural insertion into the new country of belonging. Surprisingly at first sight, among immigrants from Muslim Mediterranean countries, this same high religiousness and attachment to the origins seemed to predispose them towards a strong citizen of the world identity. However, this cosmopolitan identity as a function of religiousness had a strange, unique status: neither the European nor the (new) Belgian identity, which were positively inter-related with the citizen of the world identity, were positively related to religiousness.

Further studies should focus more deeply on discovering the exact meaning of this “world citizenship”. It may be that people vary highly in the specific representations and motivations they have when referring to a globalized human community (real or ideal). We need, for instance, to test the hypothesis (see Roy, 2005) that the contemporary emergence of a certain type of Islam reflects the vision of a globalized Islam rather than (or not only, if we base ourselves on our results) a cultural Islam delimited by identification with, and attachment to one’s origins. First, as the European Values Survey indicated, among Europeans in general the feeling of belonging to Europe and to the global world is associated with some permissiveness in ethical issues, a certain rejection of authority, and the recognition of equality between all people (Belot, 2005). Interestingly, both Manço and Manço’s (2000) study of the role of religiousness in maintaining tra-

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2 The role of religion in broadening the frontiers of belonging from natural groups to cultural groups and to larger coalitions has been underlined in previous theoretical work from a sociobiological (Batson, 1983) or evolutionary psychology (Kirkpatrick, 1999) perspective. However, both theories specify that this extension of natural borders thanks to religion is not unlimited; there are important boundaries separating the ingroup from outgroups.
ditional practices in Turkish-Belgian immigrants and research on religion and values in general (Bréchon, 2003; Campiche, 1993; Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004) suggest the discomfort of classic religiousness with such openness to universalistic values. Second, several results of a previous study (Saroglou & Galand, 2004) suggest that, under the guise of “world citizenship”, each religious community may have its own conception of an enlarged “universal” ingroup, the Church or Umma, for instance.

We should be wary, however, of hasty conclusions and extrapolations. First, as the results of this study suggest, the apparent conflict between religion and acculturation in the context of immigration does not seem to be specific to Islam and may concern every religion, because of the conservative and identity-shaping dimensions of the latter (see also a recent study where intrinsic religiousness was negatively related to acculturation among Asian Americans and African Americans: Ghorpade, Lackritz, & Singh, 2006). The possible role of an identity-shaping religiousness in a globalization that is only partially universalistic does not concern one particular religion. As emphasized by Roy (2005), “the problem is not Islam, but religion per se, or better the contemporary forms of the return of religion” (p. 172, our translation). Second, the causal direction that goes from religion to the process of immigrant acculturation or to globalization is not the only direction of which we can conceive. We may also imagine the opposite causal direction, where religion is the symptom rather than the cause. The assertion of religiousness either to affirm one’s collective identity or in protest against the host culture, especially in the context of globalization, may be the consequence of a certain marginalization, particularly in the case of immigrants (see, e.g., Manço & Manço, 2000), but also in the case of formerly dominant religious communities in general, such as the Christian Churches that today feel marginalized in many secularized contemporary societies (Roy, 2005).

Finally, the small size of the samples, the self-report character of the measures used, and the specific age of participants constitute important limitations of this study and call for prudence before any attempt at generalization. Nevertheless, the results do not stand alone: they are in line with, and prolong previous studies. It is this accumulation of coherent results that solidifies scientific knowledge in this domain of research concerning the interaction between religion, multiple identities, and acculturation.

References


