Religious Fundamentalism and Limited Prosociality as a Function of the Target

JOANNA BLOGOWSKA
Department of Psychology
Université Catholique de Louvain

VASSILIS SAROGLOU
Department of Psychology
Université Catholique de Louvain

Two distinct research traditions have established that (a) religiosity implies prosocial tendencies, though limited to proximal targets, and (b) religious fundamentalism (RF) relates to prejudice, often because of underlying right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Through two studies, we investigated the idea that RF, due to underlying religiosity, also predicts prosociality that is limited to proximal rather than distal targets. Specifically, we found that RF, unlike RWA and because of religiosity, predicted prosociality towards a nonfeminist but not a feminist target in need (Experiment 1) and willingness to help friends but not unknown people in need in the same hypothetical situations (Experiment 2). Moreover, like RWA, RF implied negative attitudes towards the feminist. This limited, not extended, prosociality of people scoring high on RF was in contrast with their self-perceptions of being universally altruistic. Fundamentalism seems to combine religiosity’s qualities (in-group prosociality) with authoritarianism’s defects (out-group derogation).

Keywords: authoritarianism, fundamentalism, prosocial behavior, prejudice.

INTRODUCTION

Does religion imply altruism or prejudice and violence? Psychological research has emphasized that in answering this question it is important to distinguish between religiosity per se (general pro-religious attitudes, common religious beliefs and practices) and strong forms of religiosity such as fundamentalism, defined as a dogmatic and intolerant way of being religious. Pursuing that distinction, contemporary research based on findings from dozens of studies has confirmed that religiosity is, to some extent, related to a concern with others’ welfare, that is, prosocial values, traits, and behaviors (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Saroglou in press, for reviews). Religious fundamentalism (RF), on the other hand, relates to prejudice and discrimination against various kinds of targets, for instance, out-group members and/or people threatening their values such as members of other religions, atheists, women, racial targets, and gays and lesbians (Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010; Hunsberger and Jackson 2005, for reviews).

The objective of the present work is to bring these two lines of research together by addressing the question of whether fundamentalism, in addition to its link with prejudice towards some targets, is related to prosociality towards other targets.

Several studies questioned linking RF with prejudice and aggression. Those studies found this link to be entirely due to the authoritarian structure inherent to RF. Authoritarianism is the tendency to submit to authorities and conventional norms and eventually to punish those who violate them (Altemeyer 1996). When right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), a construct typically associated strongly with RF, is controlled for, the RF-prejudice link disappears; it is RWA that uniquely predicts prejudice (Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001;
Laythe et al. 2002; Rowatt and Franklin 2004). Similar results were found regarding the link between RF and violence (Henderson-King et al. 2004; Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009). Thus, some scholars tend to distinguish between an authoritarian structure and a religious content within RF, the two components supposedly exerting opposite influences on social behavior (Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Laythe et al. 2002). See also Mavor, Louis, and Laythe (2011), this issue.

The present work constitutes a clear extension of research suggesting that the religiosity of RFs does not imply prejudice. We examine whether RF, because of its religiosity component, relates to prosocial attitudes and behaviors toward specific kinds of targets, that is, those that usually benefit from religious prosociality.

Indeed, it would be a mistake to simply conclude from previous research that it is the type of religiosity (simple or RF) that accounts for the tendency toward prosociality in mere religiosity or violence/prejudice in RF. Instead, we propose that it is rather the type of target that makes the difference. It is, however, also an error to simply conclude that RF does not predict prejudice (including violence) when the underlying authoritarianism is partialed out. Even if multiple regressions suggest that RWA, but not RF, is statistically “responsible” for the RF-prejudice link, pragmatically this still means that people who are strongly RF are prejudiced in real life. In addition, some recent studies found that, even after controlling for RWA, RF still predicts negative attitudes and prejudice towards targets perceived as a threat to religious values, such as gay and lesbian people (Rowatt et al. 2009; Whitley 2009). Moreover, there is another question to consider: Apart from RF, is mere religiosity (i.e., religious belief and practice in general) negatively related to, or at least independent from, authoritarianism? This does not seem to be the case. When studies provide significant results, mere religiosity, not only RF, relates positively to RWA (e.g., Flere and Klanjšek 2009; Wink, Dillon, and Prettyman 2007). Finally, and more importantly, fundamentalists are religious people. Their religiosity should thus have an impact on the way they interact with others in interpersonal or intergroup contexts, and this impact should exist beyond or despite the role authoritarianism plays in these contexts.

Fundamentalism and Limited Prosociality

In the present work, we thus adopt a slightly different perspective, focusing on the relationship between RF and prosociality rather than the relationship between RF and prejudice. The main argument addressed by two studies is that RF, which is one among several forms of being religious (Hood, Hill, and Williamson 2005; Saroglou 2010), shares some prosocial tendencies with mere religiosity. These prosocial tendencies make the fundamentalist orientation differ from authoritarianism. However, the religious prosociality characteristic of RF should be limited to proximal targets, such as relatives or in-group members, and not extend to unknown people or targets that threaten religious values. With regard to the latter targets, RF, like RWA, should predict negative attitudes. The theoretical and empirical considerations upon which these assumptions are based follow.

People who are religious tend to exhibit two basic personality dimensions having to do with morality, which are agreeableness (selfless concerns for others, trusting, and generous attitudes) and conscientiousness (socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-oriented behavior) (see Saroglou’s 2010 recent meta-analysis of 71 samples from 19 countries). The existing longitudinal evidence (e.g., McCullough, Tsang, and Brion 2003; Wink et al. 2007) favors the idea that people with basic tendencies of high agreeableness and high conscientiousness are predisposed to be, become, or remain, religious—if religion is available in the social environment (Saroglou 2010). Unlike religious dimensions, including fundamentalism, RWA reflects only high conscientiousness, but not necessarily high agreeableness (Sibley and Duckitt 2008).

Just as a prosocial personality may increase the likelihood of being religious, religiosity is known to predict moral behavior. Religion emphasizes beliefs (e.g., existence of a benevolent
God), symbols (e.g., for Christians: a cross reflecting sacrifice), rituals (e.g., communion), and moral values (e.g., compassionate love as virtue) that accentuate the importance of prosociality in human life. In short, prosociality fosters religiosity and religion fosters prosocial behavior. Experimental evidence suggests that exposure to religious priming, including subliminal priming, increases people’s tendency to behave morally, showing, for instance, honesty (Randolph-Seng and Nielsen 2007), willingness to volunteer (Pichon, Boccato, and Saroglou 2007) and to help in-group targets in need (Pichon and Saroglou 2009), cooperation (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007), and the tendency to retaliate less against perceived slights (Saroglou, Corneille, and Van Cappellen 2009: Study 2). Individual religiousness, either alone or in interaction with religious priming, is also often found to predict behavioral measures of prosociality, such as cooperation and donation (Ahmed 2009; Anderson and Mellor 2009; Malhotra 2010; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007: Study 2; Tan and Vogel 2008).

There is no reason to assume RF precludes fundamentalists from benefiting, like religious people in general, from the prosocial effects of religion. Since they are attached to the same religious tradition, RFs share with nonfundamentalist religious people, at least to some extent, the same beliefs, symbols, rituals, and moral values. Indirect empirical evidence is in favor of our assumption. The meta-analysis of studies on religion and personality mentioned above found that the religiosity-agreeableness association also applies to RF (mean effect size from eight studies, \( r = .13 \), although the effect size was lower than that for personal religiosity \( r = .19, k = 47 \) studies). Those who are low in openness to experience, that is, breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life (the mean effect size of the link between RF and openness to experience is \( - .21 \)), will tend to express their religiousness in a fundamentalist way. Moreover, the activation of religious compassionate values—in the context of mortality salience—was recently found to lead to a decrease of religious fundamentalists’ hostility towards out-groups (Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009). Finally, RF has also been found to relate not only to authoritarian educational styles, but also to high expressions of love and support of one’s own children (e.g., Wilcox 1998).

Note that these prosocial tendencies are connected to RF but not RWA. Right-wing authoritarianism is either unrelated or negatively related to prosocial constructs such as empathy (Bäckström and Björklund 2007; Duriez 2004), prosocial values (Cohrs et al. 2005; Oyamot, Borgida, and Fisher 2006), and altruistic behavior (Carnahan and McFarland 2007).

If fundamentalism, due to religiosity, implies prosocial attitudes, we should expect that the extent and limits of prosociality as a function of RF are the same as those of the prosociality as a function of religiosity. Recent research has established that, contrary to religions’ explicit discourse valuing universal altruism, compassion, and love, religious prosociality in interpersonal contexts (e.g., willingness to help) is discriminatory and limited. It does not apply to people who threaten religious values (Batson, Anderson, and Collins 2005); it is limited to the circle of interpersonal relationships within which reciprocity is engaged and does not extend to unknown targets (Saroglou et al. 2005); and it extends to a nation’s homeless but not foreigners in need (Pichon and Saroglou 2009). Several factors seem to be responsible for the limited and conditional character of religious prosociality: positive self-perception needs, rather than altruistic motivation (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Batson, Anderson, and Collins 2005); reputational concerns (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008); coalitional objectives (Kirkpatrick 2005); and the need for an ordered universe through the maintenance of specific just-world beliefs (Pichon and Saroglou 2009; see also Saroglou in press). We argue that these same limits and conditions also apply, and perhaps even more clearly, to RF, a religious dimension with a particular emphasis on between-group barriers (Altemeyer 2003), submission (Altemeyer 1996), and a just-world belief for others—a belief known to legitimize the situation of the unfortunate (Pichon and Saroglou 2009).

The difference between RF and mere religiosity, and thus the similarity of RF to RWA, should, therefore, exist not in the way RF functions with respect to in-group members and members of the network of close relationships, but in the way that RF functions with respect to out-groups and
people who threaten their religious and conservative values. In other words, negative attitudes, prejudice, and discrimination toward certain kinds of targets would be shared by both religious and nonreligious authoritarians. All the dimensions or traits of RWA, such as submission to authority, conventionalism, and aggression, can reasonably be regarded as responsible for such attitudes toward outsiders (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005; but see Mavor et al. 2009). In sum, “religious authoritarians,” that is, fundamentalism, would be expected to exhibit in-group-related prosociality, thus sharing in-group favoritism with mere religiosity. At the same time, RF should reflect high out-group derogation, as is the case with RWA in general.

Self-Perception and Reputational Concerns

We investigated one additional issue that may help us better understand the link between RF and limited prosociality. This regards the desire of religious people to be perceived, both by themselves and others, as moral and altruistic and the possible discrepancy between self-perceptions and behaviors.

An intriguing question arises: Are the people scoring high on RF aware of the fact that their prosocial attitudes and corresponding behaviors may be limited to certain targets and not extend to all people? Systematic research carried out by Batson and collaborators (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Batson, Anderson, and Collins 2005) shows that, in fact, there is a discrepancy between religious people’s need to be perceived (by themselves and others) as altruistic and moral and their prosocial behavior, which is limited by cost (only low cost) and motivation (egoistic rather than altruistic). Batson and colleagues (1993), going slightly further, even wondered whether this discrepancy is an indicator of moral hypocrisy. Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) provide an alternative (evolutionary) explanation: religion promotes prosociality as far as it increases trust within coalitions; reputation thus matters. We investigated in the present work another form of religious discrepancy, which is between the self-perception of espousing universal altruism (prosociality extended to all people) and the limitation of real prosociality to relatives, close relations, and people we know. We hypothesized that RF, like religiosity in general, is followed by self-perceptions in accordance with the major religions’ ideal of universal altruism. Given that, as a function of RF, actual willingness to help should be limited to nonthreatening targets and close relations, we investigated the role of RF in predicting inaccuracy in self-perceptions as being universally altruistic.

Overview of the Studies and Hypotheses

We carried out two studies using a social experimental design in which we manipulated the status (proximal vs. distant) of the hypothetical target needing help. We investigated whether RF, religiosity, and RWA relate to prosocial attitudes toward a person who either threatens or does not threaten conservative religious values (Experiment 1) and either belongs to the sphere of close relationships or is unknown (Experiment 2). On the basis of the above theoretical and empirical evidence, we hypothesized that RF is positively related to (a) willingness to help in-group members, but not people, like feminists, who threaten the conservative religious values on men’s priority over women (e.g., Neff and Terry-Schmitt 2002) (Hypothesis 1: Experiment 1), and (b) willingness to help people who belong to the sphere of close interpersonal relationships, like friends, but not unknown people (Hypothesis 2: Experiment 2). In addition, we hypothesized that RF, but not RWA, shares with mere religiosity this limited prosociality (Hypothesis 3: both studies), whereas RF, but not religiosity, is similar to RWA in the negative attitudes towards targets who threaten conservative religious values (Hypothesis 4: Experiment 1). One additional, secondary hypothesis relative to possible implicit motivations was made. Following Batson and his collaborators’ (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993, Baston, Anderson, and Collins 2005) considerations on the discrepancy between religious people’s need to be perceived (by others and themselves) as moral and altruistic and their actual behavior, we hypothesized that religious
people, including people scoring high on RF, would overestimate their universal altruism. They would therefore be unaware of the fact that their prosociality is limited and does not extend to unknown targets (Hypothesis 5: Experiment 2).

**EXPERIMENT 1**

**METHOD**

**Participants**

The first author approached 212 Polish students (133 women and 79 men) from the colleges of humanities and economics who agreed to participate in the study. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 26 ($M = 20.03$, $SD = 1.50$). The large majority of participants identified themselves as Catholics (90 percent); the 21 remaining participants identified themselves as nonbelievers or atheists. One participant provided several outlier values and was thus not retained for analyses. The questionnaires were administered during university lectures or individually at two colleges in Warsaw. Filling in the questionnaire took approximately 20 to 25 minutes. Participants first received a hypothetical scenario describing a target in need. They were afterwards evaluated on their prosocial reactions toward that target. Finally, they were evaluated on individual differences on religiosity, fundamentalism, and authoritarianism.

**Procedure and Dependent Variables**

Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions: (a) experimental (threat to religious values) condition and (b) control (neutral) condition. In the control condition, participants read a short text presenting the case of a female student who participates in many after-class activities as well as prepares for her exams. After having fallen asleep on a bus, she was robbed of her bag containing all of her books and notes. As a consequence, she cannot successfully prepare for one of the exams, and in spite of her explanations to the professor, she fails. In the experimental condition, participants were given exactly the same story, but with the additional information that the student is a feminist activist and writes articles for a feminist magazine.

After reading the text, participants in both conditions were asked several questions (answer format: seven-point Likert scale) used to measure four types of attitudes towards the target (feminist or nonfeminist female student): (a) empathy toward the person, (b) willingness to help, (c) moral judgment, and (d) attributions of positive and negative emotions.

**Empathy toward the person** ($\alpha = .77$) was measured by four items: (a) “I feel sorry for what happened to this person”; (b) “The situation of this person is completely indifferent to me” (reverse scored); (c) “I know how bad I would feel if I were in her shoes”; and (d) “It is really sad what happened to her.” **Willingness to help** ($\alpha = .54$) was measured by the following items: (a) “I would help her prepare for the exam if she asked me”; (b) “I would surely lend her my books if she were my classmate”; (c) “If I knew she is a good student, I would sign a petition to defend her”; and (d) “If she were my classmate, I would try to plead for her to the teacher who failed her.” **Moral judgment** ($\alpha = .64$) was measured as follows: (a) “It is her fault; she should have prepared well before for the exam” (reverse scored); (b) “This should teach her a lesson; she should have paid more attention to her things” (reverse scored); (c) “This kind of situation could happen to anybody”; and (d) “It doesn’t surprise me that she failed; she should concentrate more on her studies” (reverse scored). The first three indicators—empathy, willingness to help, and moral judgment—were importantly interrelated ($r$s varied from .49 to .61). We thus summed all 12 items and created a global measure of **prosociality** ($\alpha = .82$). Prosociality was distinct from the attribution of positive ($r = .13$) and negative ($r = .01$) emotions.
We also measured positive and negative emotions attributed to the target by the participants. Participants received a list of 12 emotions, adopted from previous studies (Demoulin et al. 2004; Miroslawska 2006) and were asked to estimate how often the female student of the story feels each of these emotions in her everyday life (from 1 = she feels this emotion very rarely to 7 = she feels this emotion very often). We computed two scores: one for positive (hope, courage, admiration, contentment, surprise, kindness; \( \alpha = .70 \)) and one for negative emotions (disappointment, despair, fear, rage, melancholy, fright; \( \alpha = .83 \)). The two components, positive and negative emotions, were importantly interrelated \((r = -.53)\). We thus also computed a global score of negativity in emotions attributed to the target, by reversing the scores on the positive items and summing them with those from the negative items \((\alpha = .84)\).

Postexperimental Measures

Afterwards, participants were administered (a) an 11-item version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Funke 2005; \( \alpha = .70 \)); (b) the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale—short version (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; we replaced item 3 and added one using the items 3 and 5 from the original Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, scale; \( \alpha = .88 \)); and (c) a three-item Religiosity Index (Saroglou and Muñoz-García 2008) measuring the importance of God in the participant’s personal life, the importance of religion in personal life, and frequency of prayer \((\alpha = .88)\). This religiosity index is strongly correlated with a measure of intrinsic religiosity (Saroglou and Mathijsen 2007). Except for prayer frequency (five-point scale), in all measures, items were evaluated through a seven-point Likert scale.

Results

Descriptive statistics for all measures are provided in Table 1. There was no difference between the nonfeminist and the feminist target conditions regarding empathy and willingness to help, but we found inconsistent differences for other dependent variables (the feminist target received more negative evaluations but also less negativity in emotions; \( F_{(1,209)} = 4.70, 6.84, p < .05 \)). Religiosity and authoritarianism did not differ across conditions, but fundamentalism was higher in the nonfeminist condition, \( F(1, 209) = 5.57, p < .05 \), a finding that can be attributed to chance.

Table 2 details the correlations of RF, religiosity, and RWA with attitudes towards a nonfeminist and a feminist target. It also provides the results of the Fisher z-tests that compared the correlations between conditions. In the nonfeminist target condition, as expected, religiosity was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Nonfeminist Condition</th>
<th>Feminist Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>4.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>42.59</td>
<td>37.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>38.73</td>
<td>39.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prosociality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>23.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to help</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>22.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive moral judgment</td>
<td>22.15</td>
<td>20.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negativity in emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive emotions</td>
<td>26.91</td>
<td>28.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative emotions</td>
<td>29.14</td>
<td>26.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the measures used (Experiment 1)
related to prosocial attitudes, that is, empathy, willingness to help, and moral judgment (attribution of emotions was unrelated to religiosity). Each of these effects disappeared, though, in the feminist condition, with religiosity being unrelated to these prosocial attitudes. The shift of religiosity from a positive association with prosociality (as a global measure) to no association with it was significant, as indicated by the \( z \)-test. Right-wing authoritarianism was unrelated to prosocial attitudes toward both a feminist and a nonfeminist target in need (with regard to the latter, the correlation was, in addition, significantly different from that between religiosity and prosociality, \( z = 2.18, p < .05 \)). However, RW A was related to high attribution of negative emotions to the feminist target. The \( z \)-tests comparing correlations between the two conditions were significant as far as the associations of RW A with prosociality and negativity in emotions were concerned. This suggested a tendency for more negative interpersonal dispositions toward the feminist target as a function of authoritarianism. RF, like mere religiosity, reflected prosocial attitudes toward a nonfeminist student in need: again, empathy, willingness to help, low negative moral judgment, and attribution of positive emotions. However, a shift was observed in the feminist condition. RF, like religiosity, was unrelated to helping such a target. Furthermore, RF, like RW A, was associated with high negativity in attributing emotions to the feminist target. Each of these changes as a function of the experimental condition was significant (\( z \)-tests; see Table 2).

We also computed a moderated multiple regression with experimental condition, RF, and their interaction of the former two variables as predictors, and the global measure of prosociality as the predicted variable\(^1\) (see Table 3). This analysis indicated an overall positive effect of RF on prosociality, but this effect was moderated by the condition: when passing from a nonfeminist

\(^1\) A moderated multiple regression is a type of multiple regression where, in addition to the continuous variables inserted as predictors, their interaction is also inserted as predictor. This is a better, more informative approach, which has greater statistical power than the traditional ANOVA where continuous variables are transformed into categorical variables (e.g., by median split) in order to compute the interaction term.
Table 3: Moderated multiple regressions of condition, fundamentalism, and their interaction on prosociality in Experiments 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment 1:</th>
<th>Experiment 2: Friend vs. Unknown Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonfeminist vs. Feminist Confederate</td>
<td>Friend vs. Unknown Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors of prosociality</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism × Target</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 = .05, .32 )</td>
<td>( R^2 = .05, .32 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < .001; *p < .05; +p < .10 (one-tailed).

Figure 1
Prosocial attitudes as a function of religious fundamentalism and the type of target: Nonthreatening versus threatening (feminist) (left: Experiment 1), and friend versus unknown (right: Experiment 2)

to a feminist target, the prosociality of religious fundamentalists decreased. Figure 1 illustrates this interaction.

Finally, through hierarchical regression analyses, we investigated (a) the role religiosity may play in explaining the association between RF and prosociality towards the nonfeminist target and (b) the unique role RF plays in predicting the attribution of negative emotions to the feminist target. This was also important given the overlap between the three individual measures: religiosity, fundamentalism, and authoritarianism. In the first step, RF and RWA were included

\(^2\text{There were important interrelations between religiosity and authoritarianism (r = .43), fundamentalism and authoritarianism (.44), and religiosity and fundamentalism (.75). However, when controlling for multicolinearity, the VIF scores were acceptable. The interrelation between religiosity and fundamentalism was high, which may be due to the status of religion in the predominantly traditionally Catholic Poland. Nevertheless, RF was also distinct from religiosity in that it alone related to negative attitudes towards the feminist target. In addition, the moderate size of the association between RF and authoritarianism (compared to what is often found in U.S. samples using the Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale) may be due to the fact that, contrary to Altemeyer’s scale, the one we used in the present studies is almost free of reference to religion in the wording of items. Finally, a confirmatory factor analysis on the items representing the three dimensions of religiosity, RF, and RWA on the larger data set from Experiments 1 and 2 (\(N = 345\)) showed an acceptable model in which these three dimensions were distinct, \(\chi^2(296) = 1042.86, p < .001\), CFI = 0.933, RMSEA = 0.085. More importantly, this model fit the data significantly better (p < .001) than either a two-factor model in which religiosity and}
Table 4: Hierarchical regressions of constructs predicting prosociality, distinctly by condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experiment 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Experiment 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosociality</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Towards a</td>
<td>Helping a</td>
<td>Helping an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nonfeminist</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>t-test</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>t-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>2.65**</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>2.68**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.08, .11, .11, .04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>3.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-1.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>3.43***</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-1.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>2.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.17, .14, .21, .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (one-tailed).

as predictors, and, in the second step, religiosity was added. As shown in Table 4, religiosity turned out to be the main predictor of prosociality, totally explaining the link between RF and prosociality towards the nonfeminist target. Moreover, RF uniquely predicted negative emotions attributed to the feminist target, even when RWA was controlled for and despite the prosocial role of religiosity in predicting low negative emotions.

**DISCUSSION**

Experiment 1 confirmed Hypotheses 1 and 3 and, to some extent, Hypothesis 4. Overall, RF differed from RWA in that, as was the case for mere religiosity, it relates to prosocial tendencies towards a peer in need but not toward a target that threatens traditional values. Moreover, it was the religiosity of people scoring high on RF that explained this limited prosociality. These results extend to fundamentalism the findings of previous research showing that religious people’s prosociality exists but is limited and does not extend to targets who threaten their values, such as homosexuals (Batson et al. 1999), sexually promiscuous people (Mak and Tsang 2008), and foreigners (Pichon and Saroglou 2009).

However, RF differed from religiosity and paralleled RWA by showing negative attitudes in emotions attributed to the feminist target. This finding is in line with the idea that RF, like authoritarianism, implies prejudice towards out-group members. When including both RF and RWA as predictors in the multiple regression, RF turned out to be the unique predictor of such negative emotions and was not explained by RWA as might have been expected. The stronger association of anti-feminist attitudes with RF rather than with RWA may be due to the fact that RF combines both conservative and religious motives of anti-feminism.

Note also that RF was associated with negative emotions attributed to the feminist target, but did not imply further hostility, for instance, in terms of low willingness to help a feminist target in need. This suggests that RF clearly reflects prejudice (i.e., differential treatment) between nonthreatening and threatening targets, but not necessarily antisocial behavior toward the latter. When compared with two previous studies in Canada (Jackson and Esses 1997), where RF indeed

RF were collapsed, $\chi^2(298) = 1165.87$, CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.092, or a two-factor model in which RF and RWA were collapsed, $\chi^2(298) = 1204.51$, CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.094.
implied low willingness to help single mothers and homosexuals, the present findings may also suggest that feminists do not constitute a threat for RFs as significant as that constituted by other targets that threaten the very heart of family values.

Taken together, the results of the present study go a step further than previous research that has established either prejudice as a function of RF or the absence of negative attitudes toward out-groups once the authoritarian component is controlled for. Our findings suggest that RFs, despite and beyond their authoritarianism, tend to be prosocial, at least with regard to in-group members that do not threaten religious values (or better, are not perceived to be a threat to them).

**EXPERIMENT 2**

The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate and extend Experiment 1, by focusing on the distinction between prosociality toward known (friends) versus unknown targets. RF, but not RWA, which is known to be unrelated to helping, was expected to parallel mere religiosity in prosociality restricted to friends (Hypotheses 2 and 3). In line with Experiment 1, religiosity was expected to mediate the link between RF and helping friends. In addition, Experiment 2 aimed to investigate whether this “discrimination” between targets is contradicted by the self-perception held by people scoring high on RF and religiosity that they favor universal altruism (Hypothesis 5).

**METHOD**

**Participants**

Participants who took part in the study were 136 Polish students from two different colleges in Warsaw (86 women and 50 men). Their age ranged from 19 to 28 ($M = 21.42; \ SD = 2.06$). They were all Catholics or had received Catholic education. Two participants provided responses that were outliers for several measures; their data were thus not retained for analyses. As in Experiment 1, the questionnaires were administered to the participants during university lectures and also individually. Completing the questionnaire took approximately 20 to 25 minutes.

**Procedure and Dependent Variables**

Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions: the helping a friend condition or the helping an unknown person condition. In both conditions, participants received a written description of eight, short, hypothetical situations of everyday life, partly adopted from a previous study (Saroglou et al. 2005: Study 2). Four of these situations were about a person in need: (a) when trying to catch a train, a person’s suitcase opens and the contents scatter; (b) a person needs to be taken somewhere by car; (c) a person asks to go first in line since he/she has only one item to buy; and (d) a person asks to make a phone call that is necessary to resolve a problem. Depending on the condition, the target in each of the four situations was either a friend or an unknown person.

The situations were constructed in a way that helping would imply some cost, respectively: (a) being in a hurry oneself, (b) the target needs to go in the opposite direction, (c) losing one’s own place in line and thus losing time, and (d) the phone call is to be made to somebody we do not like. The inclusion of personal cost was aimed at making the occurrence of helping behavior more realistic. Moreover, in an attempt to deemphasize prosociality as the construct being measured, and thus diminish the risk of introducing social desirability in the answers, in addition to the above four hypothetical situations we also included four distracting situations. These had nothing to do with helping but were simply everyday situations that required some kind of reaction: (a)
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients between willingness to help and hypothesized constructs, distinctly for friends and unknown persons (Experiment 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Fundamentalism</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Universal altruism</th>
<th>Willingness to help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friends (N = 68)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>5.20 (1.43)</td>
<td>48.59 (12.23)</td>
<td>42.81 (7.63)</td>
<td>16.54 (3.74)</td>
<td>20.60 (3.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to help</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.18+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal altruism</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown targets (N = 62)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>4.61 (1.82)</td>
<td>44.82 (12.81)</td>
<td>43.45 (7.29)</td>
<td>16.30 (3.96)</td>
<td>15.35 (4.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to help</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.18+</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal altruism</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons between correlations across conditions (z tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Willingness to help</th>
<th>Universal altruism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.68**</td>
<td>1.81*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (one-tailed).

misidentifying someone in the street; (b) forgetting the birthday of a friend; (c) noticing that somebody is wearing the same clothes at a party; and (d) being the only one in a movie theater who started to laugh out loud when watching a movie.

In all eight situations (four involving the possibility of help and four distracters), participants were provided with one possibility of reaction and were asked to evaluate the likelihood with which they would act in that way (seven-point Likert scales). In each of the four hypothetical situations of interest, participants were asked to estimate the likelihood with which they would help the person (from 1 = low probability of helping to 7 = high probability of helping). A global score of willingness to help was computed by summing the four answers.

Postexperimental Measures

Afterward, as in Experiment 1, participants were administered the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, the RF Scale, and the Religiosity Index. We also investigated participants’ self-perception as applying universal altruism in their behavior through the following four questions (α = .67): (a) “If somebody asks me for help, it does not matter to me if it is a member of my family, a friend, or a person I do not know”; (b) “I think that people should help each other regardless of the degree of closeness or blood relationship”; (c) “Definitely, a difficult situation for a person close to me would be much more important to me than a difficult situation for somebody I do not know at all” (reverse); and (d) “When an unknown person asks me for help, I feel as responsible towards this person as I would toward a member of my family or a friend.”

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics for all measures, distinctly by condition, are presented in Table 5. The manipulation of the proximal (friend) versus distal (unknown) status of the target was effective. Participants were more willing to help a friend than an unknown person in need, $F(1,132) = 54.38, p < .001, \eta^2 = .30$. With the exception of religiosity, there was no difference between the two conditions as far as the individual differences measures were concerned (fundamentalism, authoritarianism, universal altruism).

As also detailed in Table 5, both personal religiosity and religious fundamentalism were associated with high readiness to help a friend in need. However, these prosocial tendencies did not extend to helping unknown targets, and the decrease in the associations between conditions
was significant, as shown by the $z$-tests. Right-wing authoritarianism was unrelated to helping friends, and this correlation was significantly different from those of religiosity and RF, $zs = 2.43, p < .01$, and $1.53, p = .06$. It was even negatively correlated with helping unknown persons, an association that was marginally significant. A moderated multiple regression analysis (see Table 3), with the type of target, fundamentalism, and the interaction of these variables as predictors of willingness to help, confirmed a main effect of the target type and, similar to Experiment 1, indicated an effect of fundamentalism and an interaction between RF and target type. Indeed, the overall positive association between fundamentalism and willingness to help decreased when moving from friends to unknown people (see also Figure 1).

As in Experiment 1, we conducted hierarchical regressions for each condition, with fundamentalism and authoritarianism being included as predictors of willingness to help in the first step, and religiosity added as a predictor in the second step (see Table 4). Helping a friend was uniquely predicted by religiosity, a construct that explained the association between RF and that kind of help; authoritarianism was unrelated to willingness to help a friend. Helping an unknown target was uniquely predicted by (low) authoritarianism, whereas religiosity and fundamentalism were unrelated to such helping.

Religiosity and fundamentalism were also positively associated with the measure of universal altruism (see Table 5). This was not the case for right-wing authoritarianism. Although both fundamentalism and mere religiosity implied a self-perception of behaving in accordance with universal altruism, the experiment showed that these religious dimensions actually differed by privileging friends over unknown people when helping. Prosocial behaviors (more exactly, intentions) as a function of RF and religiosity in general were thus in discrepancy, if not in contradiction, with self-perceptions of being universally altruistic. Note that our universal altruism measure showed content validity, being positively correlated not only with helping friends but also with helping unknown persons (see Table 5).

**DISCUSSION**

In sum, Experiment 2 replicated and extended Experiment 1. RF—similar to, but also due to, religiosity—implied a willingness to help friends in need across a variety of situations. Moreover, this willingness was not extended to unknown targets in need in the same situations. These findings are in line with the idea that religious prosociality is limited to people with whom one has close interpersonal contact (Saroglou et al. 2005), whose perception counts (Batson, Anderson, and Collins 2005), and with whom a reputation is important to maintain (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). Again, as in Experiment 1, this discrimination in helping did not mean that RF was related to low willingness to help unknown people. This confirms rather that RF does not necessarily imply antisocial attitudes and behavior toward unknown or threatening people, but more clearly, it implies limited (to known and nonthreatening people) prosociality.

Interestingly, this “discrimination” in helping contrasted with the self-perception of religious people, including fundamentalists, as being universalistic in their altruism. This finding could be seen as favoring the hypothesis of moral hypocrisy as a function of religiousness, when one contrasts self-perception and behavior (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; but see more in the Discussion). Finally, Experiment 2 shows that RF differs from authoritarianism, which overall is unrelated to prosociality and may even be negatively related to willingness to help unknown people.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

Across two studies using a social experimental design, we investigated similarities, commonalities, and differences between RF, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and religiosity on
prosocial attitudes toward proximal targets (friends and in-group members), unknown targets, and a target who threatens traditional values (in this case, a feminist). Like authoritarianism, RF, despite its association with religiosity, implied negative attitudes towards the threatening target. However, RF differed from RWA by leaning, like religiosity in general, to prosocial attitudes (empathy, willingness to help) toward in-group members (student in need) and friends but not unknown people. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that in both experiments, the religiosity dimension of RF was fully responsible for these prosocial effects.

The two kinds of distinctions between targets (nonthreatening vs. threatening in Experiment 1, and friends vs. unknown people in Experiment 2) highlight two complementary processes that are important to understand when studying social behavior (prosocial or antisocial) as a function of RF. In a recent paper, Mavor and Gallois (2008) found that RF seems to be concerned with two kinds of in-group–out-group distinctions. One has to do with whether others share religious/traditional values and the other has to do with more basic, “natural” proximity or distance (in terms, for instance, of ethnicity). In the present study, both “natural” (friends vs. unknown, unrelated targets) and “symbolic” (a feminist’s threat vs. no threat to values) barriers seem to play a role in moderating RFs’ prosociality.

These findings allow us to examine our understanding of RF in a new light. As suggested previously by other scholars (Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Laythe et al. 2002), RF is not mere RWA, and the religious component may be responsible for some attenuation of the tendencies for negative social behavior, in parallel to RWA. In addition, it has been found that after some priming (e.g., religious priming combined with terror management), people scoring high on RF show less support for violent actions against outgroups (Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009). In the present work, we go further by showing that (a) RF, beyond or despite its underlying authoritarianism, implies the tendency to be prosocial, at least within the general limits of religious prosociality; (b) this is due to religiosity; and (c) this is part of RFs’ personal tendencies, since no activation of religious compassionate values or reduction of death-related terror is needed to activate these tendencies.

Given the high intercorrelations between religiosity and fundamentalism across the two studies, one could think the RF scale that we administered to students from the general population (i.e., not specifically religious) measures high versus low or nonreligiosity rather than fundamentalist attitudes per se. However, such strong intercorrelations are typical in many studies that include both constructs. More importantly, the differential behavior of the RF and religiosity scales in the present studies is in favor of the distinctiveness between the two measures. RF, like RWA but unlike mere religiosity, implied negative attitudes toward the feminist target (Experiment 1), and all associations with prosocial tendencies toward friends and in-group members (in both studies) were stronger with mere religiosity than with RF. This is what we know from research on religious personality: across studies, the mean effect size of the religiosity-agreeableness association is higher than that of the RF-agreeableness association (Saroglou 2010).

These findings may have importance when trying to compare different kinds of ideological radicalisms. For instance, although radical religious people tend to be high in ethnocentrism and prejudice towards threatening targets, and they tend to be characterized by several closed-minded sociocognitive structures (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005), they often do not “go so far” as to vote for extreme right political parties (Camus 2007; Arzheimer and Carter 2009). Also, contrary to typical authoritarians who value only obedience and authority in education, religious fundamentalists value both obedience and love (Wilcox 1998). Moreover, altruistic and even sacrificial motives with regard to the in-group have been conceived as underlying contemporary religious terrorism (e.g., Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg 2003; Qirko 2009). It seems reasonable to expect that the activation of prosocial religious values among RFs will be particularly beneficial in either decreasing violent tendencies towards outgroups (Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009) or increasing prosocial tendencies towards proximal targets.
Why is it then that those who score high on RF, although similarly prosocial to (nonfundamentalist) religious people, can show prejudice and hostility towards several kinds of targets? Our findings suggest that this is not because they are less religious. Indeed, RFs are similar to intrinsically religious people, who discriminate, even if they do not show explicit hostility and prejudice, by being less willing to help a target who threatens their values (Batson et al. 1999; Mak and Tsang 2008). However, religious fundamentalists often go further than mere religious people in out-group derogation, showing hostile attitudes and behaviors. This is probably because religious submissiveness in the context of RF leads to a high sensitivity to negative, antisocial religious influences legitimizing prejudice, discrimination, and violence towards specific targets and out-groups. There is some indirect evidence for this assumption. Submissive people—unlike nonsubmissive religious or nonreligious people—after being subliminally primed with religious ideas, tend to (a) show higher accessibility of submission-related words (Saroglou, Corneille, and Van Cappellen 2009: Study 1), (b) display higher conformity in a morality- and religion-free social influence (Van Cappellen et al. in press), and (c) be swayed easily to negative action (in this study, they complied with the experimenter’s request to take revenge on a confederate who criticized them) (Saroglou, Corneille, and Van Cappellen 2009: Study 2).

An interesting finding came out when participants in Experiment 2 reported their self-perceptions as being universalistic in altruism, defined here as acting prosocially independent of the target’s status. Embracing religious ideals of universal altruism, love, and compassion, religious participants, including fundamentalists, reported having high universal altruism. However, the results of the experimental manipulation contradicted their positive self-perception, since willingness to help as a function of RF and religiosity was limited to friends. This discrepancy in the extent of prosociality constitutes an additional aspect of the broader discrepancy between religious people’s positive self-perceptions as altruistic and their real prosocial behavior, which actually is not unconditional and is often motivated by egocentric rather than altruistic motives (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993). Strictly speaking, it is, of course, premature to call this discrepancy “moral hypocrisy” since that term presupposes an intention to appear altruistic although aware of not being so. However, this finding at least highlights the ambivalence of religious discourse that promotes universal love, while at the same time tolerates, creates, or reinforces versus out-group barriers and moral legitimation of discrimination of some targets (for these two dimensions in religious prejudice, see Mavor and Gallois 2008).

The need for positive self-perception or self-presentation may be related to concerns for the expansion of one’s own in-group. Solidification of cooperation within groups that extend natural kinship to genetically unrelated others seems to be one of the major functions of religion (Batson 1983; Kirkpatrick 2005; Wilson 2002). Therefore, reputational concerns, that is, the importance religious people attribute to how positively they are perceived by others (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008), is a key mechanism explaining prosociality toward people whose opinion counts and who can be trusted, but not toward people whose opinion does not count and cannot be trusted.

We do not suggest considering these results as definitive or as necessarily generalizable. Paper-and-pencil measures were used; thus, effective prosocial behavior as a function of RF still needs to be tested. Moreover, participants were students. Although most studies on RF from a social psychological perspective operationalize RF as a continuum and draw conclusions from student samples or adults from the general population, it has yet to be confirmed whether the results would also apply to known groups, for instance, participants who effectively identify highly as members of RF groups. Finally, recent developments in distinguishing between different components of authoritarianism (Funke 2005; Mavor, Winnifred, and Sibley 2010) and different relations of these components with fundamentalism (Mavor et al. 2009) may help us better understand what is common or different between RF, RWA, and religiosity when predicting social behavior.

On the basis of these studies, what we do suggest is that it may be heuristically fruitful and socially important to conceive of RF as being located in the middle between mere religiosity
and RWA, at least regarding social interaction with various kinds of targets. Religiosity implies overall in-group favoritism and in-group-related prosociality but not out-group derogation (these two do not necessarily go together; see Dovidio and Gaertner 2010). Right-wing authoritarianism implies out-group derogation but not in-group-related prosociality. RF combines some qualities of religiosity (in-group favoritism) and some defects of RWA (out-group derogation). Only very specific religious tendencies such as quest (Batson et al. 2001; Batson, Denton, and Vollmecke 2008), devotional instead of coalitional religion (Hansen and Norenzayan 2006), and spirituality (Saroglou and Muñoz-García 2008; Saucier and Skrzypińska 2006) may constitute dimensions overcoming in- versus out-group barriers, thus opening the possibility of universal altruism.

REFERENCES


