For Better or Worse: Fundamentalists' Attitudes Toward Outgroups as a Function of Exposure to Authoritative Religious Texts

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For Better or Worse: Fundamentalists’ Attitudes Toward Outgroups as a Function of Exposure to Authoritative Religious Texts

Joanna Blogowska and Vassilis Saroglou

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Fundamentalism not only predicts prejudice toward outgroups but also prosociality toward proximal targets and ingroups. Taking things a step further, we hypothesized that because fundamentalists tend to show submission to religious authority, their attitudes toward unknown targets and outgroups may vary significantly depending on the nature of the authoritative religious texts to which they are exposed. In three studies using hypothetical scenarios, the association between fundamentalism and prosocial attitudes (a) became negative after exposure to a violent biblical text (Study 1; unknown targets), (b) reversed from negative to positive after reading a prosocial biblical text (Study 2; negligent targets), and (c) became negative or positive following a violent versus prosocial biblical text (Study 3; atheist target). Additional results confirmed the uniqueness of fundamentalism compared to general religiosity, quest orientation, and authoritarianism, regarding such dependency upon religious authority. Findings also support the mediating roles of reported submissiveness to religious teachings and perceived symbolic threat.

Personality and social psychological research on religious fundamentalism has mainly concentrated on two major topics: cognitive structures characterizing the fundamentalist “mind” and social consequences in terms of prejudice. Research attests that a fundamentalist mindset is characterized by dogmatism and authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005), need for closure (Brandt & Renya, 2010; Saroglou, 2002), and low integrative complexity of thought when it comes to existential and moral issues (Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994). A substantial body of research has also shown that fundamentalism is associated with prejudice against a large variety of outgroups: women, homosexuals, “sinners,” other ethnic groups, other religions, and atheists (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Both people that threaten values and outgroups in general seem to be targets of fundamentalist prejudice (Mavor & Gallois, 2008). Authoritarianism, highly overlapping with fundamentalism, has often been found to explain the fundamentalism–prejudice link rather than the religious component of fundamentalism (Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, ...
Nevertheless, recent studies also suggest that, at least with regard to specific targets, fundamentalism, beyond its overlap with authoritarianism, still predicts prejudice (Johnson et al., 2011; Leak & Finken, 2011; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009).

**ANTISOCIAL AND PROSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FUNDAMENTALISM**

Yet, the picture may be incomplete. There are several indicators that fundamentalism also reflects some other, less negative, characteristics and may predict some positive social outcomes. For instance, religious fundamentalism resulting in terrorism is often motivated by an altruistic ideology (Best, 2010; Qirko, 2009). When one distinguishes between the three components of authoritarianism, that is, authoritarian submission, conventionalism, and authoritarian aggression, it appears that fundamentalism is typically associated with the first two components but not necessarily with authoritarian aggression (Mavor, Macleod, Boal, & Louis, 2009). People high in fundamentalism tend to be slightly high in the personality dimension of Agreeableness (Saroglou, 2010) and to report valuing forgiveness (Brown, Barnes, & Campbell, 2007). European citizens with strong religious identification tend to vote for right-wing political parties but do not go so far as to vote for extreme right-wing parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). Education by fundamentalist parents implies a mixture of authoritarian educational style with love and nurture (Wilcox, 1998).

How is it that fundamentalism combines prejudicial attitudes and closed-minded cognition with some prosocial tendencies? To address this issue, we first argue that it is misleading to define fundamentalism as mainly authoritarianism (in structure) with a religious connotation (content). Rather, with regard to various social outcomes, the religious component of fundamentalism (general religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes) and the fundamentalist character of such religiousness (the orthodox and rigid version of the above) offer additional, independent, or even opposite, explanations to those (e.g., symbolic threat) provided by authoritarianism.

One way to resolve the aforementioned contradiction is to consider that, because of its religious component, fundamentalism differs from (simple) authoritarianism by implying, in addition to outgroup prejudice, prosocial tendencies toward ingroup members. In two recent studies (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011), fundamentalism, unlike authoritarianism, was found to predict, due to religiosity, limited prosociality, that is, willingness to help proximal targets (friends) or ingroup members (a student peer), but not necessarily willingness to help unknown targets or a target who threatens values (a feminist). In other words, fundamentalism seems to combine (a) authoritarianism-based outgroup prejudice with (b) typically religious minimal prosociality (Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005), possibly motivated by concerns for reciprocity, positive self-image, and reputation (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).

The present work investigates another way to resolve the contradiction between the antisocial and the prosocial consequences of fundamentalism. In doing so, focus needs to be placed on the distinctive characteristic of fundamentalism: strict conformity and submission to religious authority. In the context of religions following fundamental texts, this implies submission to the authoritative character of these texts. As is argued next, because of its attachment to, literal understanding of, and submission to the authority of fundamental religious texts,
fundamentalism should predict both antisocial and prosocial outcomes, depending simply on the very nature of the religious texts people are exposed to.

RELIGION, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND SUBMISSION

Religion can be seen, among others things, as a source of authority, power, and influence. Gods are portrayed as powerful supreme figures that require people’s submission and conformity to their will. Religious systems and texts proclaim norms to be respected and promise rewards and punishments, accordingly. Behavioral expressions of veneration in religious worship (e.g., bending, bowing, kneeling, and touching one’s head to the ground) represent displays of submission of low-rank individuals to high-rank individuals in human and nonhuman species (Burkert, 1996).

Recent evidence shows that religion induces submission and conformity, and does so mainly among people who are submissive. Among people high in dispositional submissiveness—but not necessarily among those low in it—subliminal religious primes activated submission-related concepts, by increasing their accessibility (Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009, Study 1). Moreover, among those high in dispositional submissiveness, these primes increased (a) submission to the experimenter’s injunction to show a morally problematic behavior such as revenge (Saroglou et al., 2009, Study 2), and (b) informational conformity to what other participants provided as information when completing an impossible numeric estimation task (Van Cappellen, Corneille, Cols, & Saroglou, 2011).

Such an interaction between individual disposition to submissiveness and religion’s power to induce submission and conformity may be particularly important for understanding the relation of fundamentalism with normative religious ideas and texts, and thus consequences for social behavior. First, a key feature of fundamentalism is the intratextual, literal understanding of the text’s meaning on the basis of information coming from outside the text (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). Second, because fundamentalism is strongly and consistently related to authoritarianism, including authoritarian submission (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Mavor et al., 2009), one can reasonably expect fundamentalists to be easily influenced by the religious authoritative texts and to align their behavior to them. Note that this should not necessarily be the case with general, personal religiosity whose links with authoritarianism are weaker and less consistent (Wink, Dillon, & Prettyman, 2007). In all three priming experiments just mentioned, individual religiosity did not moderate the submission-related effects of religious priming.

Three consequences can be drawn from the aforementioned. First, fundamentalists’ submission to religious authority and their conformity to religious message should be manifest independently of the nature of the religious message, be it socially and morally positive or negative in content. As just noted, submission to religious ideas may go as far as to result in nonmoral behaviors (Saroglou et al., 2009, Study 2). For strongly religious and orthodox people, religious norms are superior to society’s moral norms (Nucci & Turiel, 1993).

Second, unlike fundamentalism, general religiosity, which does not necessarily imply submission, may relate to social attitudes and behaviors in a more stable way, and so may not be strongly affected by religious texts with opposing content. This would more clearly be the case with quest religious orientation, characterized by autonomous thinking and postconventional
moral judgment (Barrett, Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005; Cottone, Drucker, & Javier, 2007), as well as prosocial behavior that is intrinsically motivated (Batson et al., 1993). Finally, fundamentalists’ tendency to submission should be specific to religious authority. Authoritarianism alone (i.e., when lacking a religious ideology) may not be sufficient to lead to conformity to religious authority and subsequent changes in social behavior.

THE OPPOSITE EFFECTS OF (PRIMING) RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AND THE INTERACTION WITH FUNDAMENTALISM

There is indirect evidence from previous priming research that religious concepts may have divergent social outcomes depending on the very nature of the religious ideas to which people are exposed to. Priming Israeli settlers with “synagogue” (a coalitional aspect of religion) increased support for ethno-religious violence against Palestinians in comparison to priming them with “prayer” (a devotional aspect of religion; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). Similarly, using the words “God” versus “religion” as primes increased prosocial attitudes toward, respectively, an outgroup and an ingroup (Preston, Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). Also, the religious primes that turned out to have prosocial effects (accessibility of prosocial concepts and willingness to volunteer) in Pichon, Boccato, and Saroglou’s (2007) study were positive in valence, whereas exposure to biblical texts legitimizing violence was found to make participants behave more aggressively (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007).

Obviously, different religious texts and ideas seem to lead to different, if not opposite, social consequences. The present studies aim to go further by focusing primarily on the unique interaction between fundamentalism and these divergent processes. Depending on the nature of the religious texts (compassionate vs. aggressive), fundamentalists alone when compared to simply religious people (not necessarily submissive), to simply authoritarians (not necessarily religious), and to people high in quest religious orientation (intrinsically, so stably motivated to be prosocial), would exhibit opposite (i.e., respectively prosocial vs. antisocial) tendencies toward nonproximal targets and outgroups.

This hypothesis challenges an established conclusion from previous research that fundamentalism only predicts outgroup prejudice and low willingness to help targets who threaten values (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, for review). Indeed, theory on group conflict suggests that, especially among people with strong ideology, outgroups are often perceived as symbolically threatening the ingroup’s own values (Jackson, 2011). Nevertheless, there is preliminary evidence that when mortality is made salient, exposure to compassionate religious texts attenuates fundamentalists’ support of ethno-religious violence (Rothschild, Abdollahib, & Pyszczynski, 2009). In the present work, we go further and aim to show that just as a religious text legitimizing violence activates fundamentalists’ antisocial attitudes, so a religious text praising prosociality not only decreases the antisocial attitudes but may reverse them by pushing fundamentalists to show prosocial attitudes toward outgroups.

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES

Three studies were carried out. Each study included exposure to at least one kind of religious text as well as a neutral condition. In all studies, the dependent measure was prosocial
attitudes toward hypothetical targets in need; mainly, willingness to help nonproximal targets and outgroup members. Fundamentalism, general religiosity, and authoritarianism were consistently measured postexperimentally. In Study 1, carried out in Belgium, we tested the effect of exposure to a biblical text where God legitimizes violence. We hypothesized that fundamentalism, in this case, would predict low willingness to help unknown people in need, in both absolute terms and compared to a neutral (no text) condition. In Study 2, carried out in Poland, we tested the opposite idea and hypothesized that fundamentalism, after exposure to a biblical text where God commands mercy and acceptance, would predict high willingness to help people who are negligent and thus responsible of their difficult situation. This effect should be both in absolute terms and in comparison with a neutral (no text) condition. In Study 3, also carried out in Poland, we integrated the two ideas in one study, replicated the findings of the two previous studies, and strengthened the argument by using a target in need that threatens religious values, that is, an atheist. We hypothesized that after exposure to a prosocial versus violent biblical text, fundamentalism would predict, respectively, high versus low (both in absolute terms and comparatively to a neutral, secular text, condition) prosocial attitudes (willingness to help and empathy) toward an atheist target in need.

Across the three studies, we predicted that this shift in prosocial attitudes as a function of the content of the biblical text would be unique to participants with high scores on religious fundamentalism and would not extend to people with high scores on general religiosity or authoritarianism. In addition, in Study 3, we also measured quest religious orientation and expected it to be immunized against our manipulation. In that study, we also tested two mediation hypotheses. Reported submissiveness to religious teachings should mediate the link between prosocial attitudes and fundamentalism but not the link between prosocial attitudes and general religiosity. Moreover, low prosocial attitudes against an atheist as a function of fundamentalism should be explained by the perception of atheists as threatening fundamentalists’ values.

**STUDY 1**

Study 1 investigated whether exposure to a biblical text commanding violence would decrease willingness to help unknown targets as a function of fundamentalism. Previous research suggests that religiosity (Saroglou et al., 2005) and fundamentalism (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011) are associated with willingness to help proximal people and ingroup members but not necessarily unknown people and outgroup members. We thus expected fundamentalism to be unrelated to prosocial attitudes toward unknown targets in the control condition, but, on the basis of the rationale developed in the introduction, to be negatively related to these attitudes in the violent religious text condition.

**Method**

**Participants.** Ninety-five young Belgian adults (64 women) agreed to take part in the study. The age of participants ranged from 17 to 35 ($M = 20.85$, $SD = 2.57$). The majority ($n = 70$) identified themselves as believers (67 were Catholics, one was Orthodox, and one was Muslim), and 25 participants identified themselves as nonbelievers or atheists (one person was a believer but did not mention religious affiliation). The questionnaires were administered
to psychology students and other young adults living in a university town. They filled in the questionnaire sitting in public places immediately after acceptance of the request.

**Procedure and measures.** Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. Those in the experimental condition were asked to read a biblical text where God legitimizes violence (Leviticus 24:10–16, NIV; see Appendix). Participants in the control condition did not receive any text.

Afterward, participants in both conditions were presented with nine hypothetical situations of everyday life adopted from previous studies (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011, Study 2; Saroglou et al., 2005; Study 2). Five of these hypothetical situations were about an unknown person in need: (a) when trying to catch a train, a person’s suitcase opens and the contents scatter; (b) a person needs to be taken somewhere by car; (c) a person asks to go first in line since he/she has only one item to buy; (d) a person asks for help moving out; and (e) a person asks to make a phone call that is necessary in order to resolve a problem. The situations were constructed in such a way that helping would imply some cost, respectively: (a) being in a hurry oneself, (b) the target needs to go in the opposite direction, (c) and (d) losing one’s own priority and/or time, and (e) the phone call is to be made to somebody we do not like.

Together with these five hypothetical situations we also introduced four distracting situations in order to divert attention from the fact that prosociality was the construct being measured, and thus to diminish the risk of introducing social desirability in the answers. These distracting situations had nothing to do with helping but were simply everyday situations that required some kind of reaction: (a) misidentifying someone in the street, (b) forgetting the birthday of a friend, (c) noticing that somebody is wearing the same clothes at a party, and (d) being the only person in a movie theater to laugh out loud when watching a movie.

In all nine situations (five involving the possibility of helping and four distracters), participants were provided with one possibility of reaction and were asked to evaluate the likelihood with which they would act in that way (7-point Likert scales). In each of the five hypothetical situations of interest, participants were asked to estimate the likelihood with which they would help the person, from 1 (low probability of helping) to 7 (high probability of helping). A global score of willingness to help was computed by summing the answers from the five situations.

At the end, participants were administered (a) a Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Funke, 2005; a 12-item French adaptation, Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011), (b) the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), and (c) a 3-item religiosity index (Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008) measuring the importance of God and the importance of religion in the participant’s personal life, and the frequency of prayer. Except for prayer (5-point scale), items in all measures were evaluated through a 7-point Likert scale.

**Results**

There was no overall difference between the neutral ($M = 24.29, SD = 3.95$) and the experimental condition ($M = 23.48, SD = 3.82$) on willingness to help, $t(93) = 1.01, ns$. In addition, there was no difference between the two conditions on the individual differences measured (fundamentalism, authoritarianism, and personal religiosity), $t(93) = 0.75, 0.94, and −0.17, ns$. 
TABLE 1
Coefficients of Correlations of Fundamentalism, Religiosity, and Authoritarianism With Prosociality Toward Targets in Need (Study 1: Unknown; Study 2: Negligent; Study 3: Atheist), Distinctly by Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Fundamentalism</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Condition</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Biblical Text</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial Biblical Text</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Study 1a
- Fundamentalism: .22
- Religiosity: .25*
- Authoritarianism: .17

Study 2b
- Fundamentalism: -.22*
- Religiosity: -.23*
- Authoritarianism: -.06

Study 3c
- Fundamentalism: .03
- Religiosity: .03
- Authoritarianism: -.21*
- Quest orientation: .18*

Note. Authoritarianism includes the components of authoritarian aggression and submission, but not the component of conventionalism (see Mavor et al., 2009).

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Correlational analyses (see Table 1) showed that religious fundamentalism, in the neutral condition, was unrelated to helping unknown targets in need, whereas after the exposure to a biblical excerpt where God legitimized violence, it was negatively related to helping these targets. Religiosity was positively related to helping in the neutral condition. This association disappeared but, unlike fundamentalism, was not reversed to negative after exposure to the violent biblical text. Authoritarianism was unrelated to helping in both conditions. Computing a moderated multiple regression of willingness to help unknown targets on condition, fundamentalism, and their interaction confirmed the significance of the Fundamentalism x Condition interaction (see Table 2; see also Figure 1, top left, for slopes). Introducing gender as a covariate in the regression did not change the results (interaction: $\beta = .24, t = 2.34, p = .02$). Computing two alternative moderated regressions that included authoritarianism or religiosity instead of fundamentalism failed to show a significant interaction between condition and authoritarianism ($\beta = .12, t = 1.19, ns$) or religiosity ($\beta = .14, t = 1.39, ns$).

Given the typical interrelations between fundamentalism, religiosity, and authoritarianism (see also Table 31), we computed hierarchical regressions in order to distinguish the role of each of these three variables on prosocial attitudes, distinctly for each condition. Following through on work by Mavor et al. (2009), for authoritarianism we did not include the component of authoritarian conventionalism (which strongly overlaps with religiosity), but we included the composite of the remaining two authoritarian components, that is, aggression and submission.

1For all three studies, and distinctly by condition, the intercorrelations between the predicting variables (religiosity, fundamentalism, authoritarianism [authoritarian aggression and submission]), and, for information, authoritarian conventionalism, are detailed in Table 3.
TABLE 2
Moderated Multiple Regressions With Condition, Fundamentalism, and Their Interaction as Predictors of Prosociality Toward Targets in Need (Study 1: Unknown; Study 2: Negligent; Study 3: Atheist)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predictors of Prosociality</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>2.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.06, .04, .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Ns = 95 (Study 1), 160 (Study 2), and 242 (Study 3).
*p < .05. **p < .01.

(see Funke, 2005, for the correspondence between items and right-wing authoritarianism [RWA] components). In the first step, only fundamentalism was entered as a predictor, then authoritarianism was added, and then, in the final step, religiosity. As shown in Table 4, when other variables were controlled, religiosity turned out to be the main predictor of prosociality in the neutral condition, and fundamentalism was the only predictor of low willingness to help after the exposure to the religious text legitimizing violence.2

Discussion

This study confirmed our hypothesis that exposure to an authoritative religious text legitimizing violence would lead people scoring high in religious fundamentalism to show low willingness to help targets that are not ingroup members. This finding is more striking when one realizes that there was not an inherent link between people’s behavior to be punished in the biblical text (targets threatening religious values) and the nature of the targets to help (simply nonproximal, unknown persons). It was as if authoritative religious violence toward threatening outgroups decreased prosocial tendencies toward nonproximal people in general.

The moderating effect of this exposure held for fundamentalism only. Religiosity, which, unlike in a previous study (Saroglou et al., 2005, Study 2), predicted willingness to help unknown targets in the neutral condition, did not mirror fundamentalism in low prosociality after exposure to this text, although the religious prosociality of the neutral condition seemed to decrease when participants read a violent biblical text. Authoritarianism was, in line with the literature (Oyamot, Borgida, & Fisher, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), unrelated to helping in any way. Note that authoritarianism and fundamentalism share the tendency to submit to authority (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Mavor et al., 2009). The fact that fundamentalism but not authoritarianism seemed to be affected by the biblical text suggests that submissiveness

2The hierarchical regression presented in Table 4 was also computed with the whole authoritarianism (three components, including conventionalism) being included as predictor instead of the composite of authoritarian aggression and submission. The results were very similar to the ones found and reported in the main text and corresponding table. The same was the case with the similar hierarchical regressions of Studies 2 and 3 (see Tables 4 and 5).
alone may not be sufficient to elicit antisocial actions following religious authority. It is religious submissiveness, which is present in fundamentalism but not present in simple religiousness or authoritarianism, which seems to do it.

**STUDY 2**

The objective of Study 2 was to investigate the impact of an authoritative religious text on fundamentalists’ social behavior by reversing, compared to Study 1, the nature of the text from violent to prosocial. We expected a similar moderation of the link between fundamentalism
TABLE 3
Coefficients of Correlations Between the Individual Measures, Distinctly by Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fundamentalism</th>
<th>RWA Conventionalism</th>
<th>RWA Aggression and Submission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.71***, .73***</td>
<td>.37*, .51***</td>
<td>.22, .39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.39*, .39**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA conventionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.64***, .72***</td>
<td>.65***, .39***</td>
<td>.23*, .12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.66***, .56***</td>
<td>.23*, .32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA conventionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.74***, .69***, .71***</td>
<td>.62***, .42***, .57***</td>
<td>.37*, .26*, .39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.65***, .49***, .69***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA conventionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. For Studies 1 and 2, in each cell, the first number refers to the experimental condition (Violent text for Study 1 and Prosocial text for Study 2) and the second number to the neutral condition. For Study 3, in each cell, the numbers refer respectively to the prosocial text, the violent text, and the neutral conditions. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

TABLE 4
Hierarchical Regressions of Prosociality on Fundamentalism and Related Individual Measures, Distinctly by Condition (Studies 1 and 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1: Helping Unknown People</th>
<th>Study 2: Helping Negligent People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Violent Biblical Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = .05, .07, .05, .04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = .06, .07, .05, .09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>1.74†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = .13, .11, .06, .13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Authoritarianism includes the components of authoritarian aggression and submission, but not the component of conventionalism (see Mavor et al., 2009).

*p < .05. **p < .01. †p < .10.
and prosocial attitudes by the exposure to a biblical text, this time favoring unconditional prosociality. This effect should again be unique to fundamentalism, compared to religiosity and authoritarianism. We strengthened, with respect to Study 1, the outgroup aspect of the targets to help. A prosocial religious text might easily increase fundamentalists’ general prosociality toward proximal targets and ingroup members (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011). To make the hypothesized effect more striking, we measured willingness to help nonproximal persons, and not simply unknown persons, but people who do not conform to fundamentalism’s ideal of order and moral rigor. These were people who were in need because they were negligent and thus responsible for their own difficult situation. We hypothesized that, compared to a control condition (no text) where fundamentalism should predict low willingness to help these threatening targets (see Jackson & Esses, 1997), exposure to a prosocial biblical text would lead fundamentalists to show high prosocial attitudes even toward negligent targets in need, who are responsible for their situation.

Method

Participants. Participants were 160 Polish students from different colleges (139 women). The age of participants ranged from 18 to 30 ($M = 21.60$, $SD = 1.73$). The majority identified themselves as Catholics (149 persons), and 11 were nonbelievers or atheists. The questionnaires were administered and filled in during university lectures; additional participants were approached individually and filled in the questionnaires immediately after acceptance of the request.

Procedure and measures. Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. Participants in the control condition did not receive any text. Participants in the experimental condition were presented with a short excerpt from the Bible, in which God advocates unconditional prosociality (Luke 6:36–38, NIV; see appendix).

As in the first study, participants in both conditions were presented with seven hypothetical situations of everyday life. Three of them were about a person in need who, however, was responsible for her or his difficult situation due to some kind of negligence: (a) a person asks for help preparing a presentation, but this person is well known for spending more time partying than studying; (b) a person asks for help moving out of his/her apartment at the last minute even though she/he could have done so earlier; and (c) a person had promised something but then forgot to maintain that promise; later, she/he needs help. In each of the hypothetical situations of interest, participants were asked to estimate the likelihood with which they would help the person, from 1 (low probability of helping) to 7 (high probability of helping). We summed up the scores from these three situations to create a general measure of willingness to help. We also introduced the same four distracters as in the first study in order not to emphasize the fact that prosociality was the construct measured, and thus to diminish the risk of social desirability in the answers.

Afterward, as in Study 1, participants were administered the same measures of RWA, religious fundamentlism, and religiosity. Reliabilities were satisfactory, that is, respective $\alpha = .61$ (one RWA item was not included because it decreased reliability), .85, and .89.
Results

As far as prosocial attitudes are concerned, there was no general effect of the exposure to the biblical text in which God commands prosociality ($M = 11.48, SD = 3.17$) compared to the neutral condition ($M = 11.61, SD = 3.55$), $t(158) = -0.26, ns$. In addition, there was no difference between the two conditions on religiosity, $t(158) = 1.35, ns$. However, religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism tended to be higher in the experimental ($Ms = 43.86, 47.72; SDs = 12.74, 7.69$) than in the neutral ($Ms = 38.69, 44.24; SDs = 12.75, 7.64$) condition, $ts(158) = 2.56, p = .01$, and $2.85, p = .005$. In the absence of any theoretical reason, we suspect this may be due to family-wide error issues.

Correlational analyses (see Table 1) showed that, in the neutral condition, religious fundamentalism was negatively related to willingness to help targets who were responsible for their difficult situation because of negligence. However, after the exposure to God praising unconditional prosociality, fundamentalism’s relation to helping these targets became significantly positive. Personal religiosity was also negatively related to willingness to help in the neutral condition; this tendency disappeared after reading the prosocial biblical text but was not reversed to positive, as was the case with fundamentalism. Authoritarianism, which was unrelated to helping in the neutral condition, was associated with low helping in the prosocial biblical text condition. Computing a moderated multiple regression of willingness to help negligent targets on condition, fundamentalism, and their interaction confirmed the significance of the Fundamentalism × Condition interaction (see Table 2; see also Figure 1, top right, for slopes). Introducing gender as a covariate in the regression did not change the results (interaction: $\hat{\beta} = .20, t = 2.45, p = .02$). Computing two alternative moderated regressions that included authoritarianism or religiosity instead of fundamentalism failed to show a significant interaction between condition and authoritarianism ($\hat{\beta} = .04, t = 0.53, ns$) or religiosity ($\hat{\beta} = .10, t = 1.23, ns$).

As in Study 1, we computed hierarchical regressions to distinguish the unique role of each individual measure in predicting prosocial attitudes in each condition. In the first step, only fundamentalism was entered as a predictor, then authoritarianism was added (as in Study 1, the composite of authoritarian aggression and submission was included), and, in the final step, religiosity (see Table 4). Religious fundamentalism turned out to uniquely predict high willingness to help negligent persons only in the prosocial biblical text condition; and, in this condition, authoritarianism predicted low helping of the negligent targets. Religiosity turned out to show a negative effect in the prosocial text condition; this was obviously an artifact of multicolinearity with fundamentalism (see the correlational Tables 1 and 3).

Discussion

These findings importantly extend and symmetrically complement those of the previous study. As hypothesized, fundamentalism turned out to be sensitive to the authoritative biblical text by showing an important shift from low prosociality toward negligent persons in the neutral (no text) condition to high prosociality after reading the biblical passage where God commands mercy and acceptance. These findings are important if one considers that they suggest that positive religious messages have prosocial effects on fundamentalists’ otherwise negative attitudes toward an outgroup, that is, people who do not respect order, engagements, and rules, in this way violating values that are important in the context of fundamentalism. On the contrary,
simply showing positive effects of positive religious messages on fundamentalists’ attitudes toward proximal targets and ingroup members would have been trivial.

The present findings go far beyond those of two previous key studies. In the first study (Jackson & Esses, 1997), fundamentalism was found to predict low willingness to help threatening targets (homosexuals and single mothers) that were in need due to unemployment. The present study replicates these findings in the control condition but also shows, in the experimental condition, the power of positive religious ideas on people characterized by religious submissiveness. In the second study (Rothschild et al., 2009), compassionate religious texts only attenuated prejudice toward outgroups, and this after death-related terror was made salient. In the present study, a compassionate religious text reverses fundamentalists’ negative attitudes into prosocial attitudes, and does so without the activation of death anxiety.

Finally, in line with Study 1, the important shift between conditions was unique for fundamentalism and did not extend to simple religiosity or to authoritarianism. Surprisingly, authoritarianism turned out to predict low willingness to help following a compassionate religious text. It may be that authoritarians’ discomfort with people who do not respect order and rules was accentuated in the face of opposite religious values that emphasize compassion and tolerance of people’s faults.

STUDY 3

In the previous two studies, in comparison to a neutral condition (no text), exposure to a biblical text legitimizing violence (Study 1) or recommending mercy and acceptance (Study 2) led those high in religious fundamentalism to express, respectively, low willingness to help unknown targets in need and high willingness to help negligent targets in need. Can one conclude that religious authority, at least that portrayed by religious texts, makes people with high scores on fundamentalism act prosocially or antisocially toward outgroups depending on the positive versus negative content of the religious message? To make such a solid conclusion, the positive versus negative variation of the religious message must be integrated in the same study. Moreover, Studies 1 and 2 differ not only in the nature of the biblical text to which participants were exposed, but also in the study’s country, and the kind of targets needing help (simply unknown targets versus people responsible for their own difficult situation). Finally, in the previous studies, the targets were not strong outgroups for religious fundamentalism.

Study 3 was thus carried out in order to test more rigorously the aforementioned hypothesis that the same people (here, Polish young adults), as a function of their fundamentalism, may behave prosocially or antisocially toward outgroups who threaten their values, depending on the nature of the religious authority’s message. Furthermore, we investigated whether this would hold even for a prototypical outgroup of religious fundamentalism (i.e., atheists). Previous research indeed suggests that atheists, in predominantly religious societies, constitute a major target of negative attitudes and prejudice in society in general but especially among strongly religious people (Gervais, 2011).

Additional hypotheses were tested in Study 3. One referred to the role of quest religious orientation and the others to the role of two possible mediators. Quest religious orientation (i.e., valuing doubt and being open to the possibility of change in one’s own beliefs) is known to predict intrinsically motivated prosocial behavior that does not depend on external sources
of legitimization or reward (Batson et al., 1993). It reflects autonomy (Barrett et al., 2005) and postconventional moral reasoning (Cottone et al., 2007), and predicts tolerance of people who threaten religious values (Batson, Denton, & Vollmecke, 2008). We thus included a measure of quest orientation in order to test whether this orientation should predict different outcomes from fundamentalism and simple religiosity. We hypothesized that people (believers) high in quest would express prosocial attitudes toward an atheist in need across all conditions, and thus that their prosociality would not depend on the nature of the religious text which they were exposed to.

Finally, two mediation hypotheses were made, one focusing on the role of reported submissiveness to religious teachings and the other on the role of perceived threat to traditional values. If fundamentalism’s high sensitivity to religious authority is unique compared to religiosity (suspected to somehow imply stronger internalization of positive religious ideals) and authoritarianism (general submissiveness, no intrinsically religious concerns), then reported submissiveness to religious teachings should mediate the link of prosociality with fundamentalism, but not its link with religiosity or authoritarianism.

Similarly, fundamentalism’s negative attitudes toward atheists should be explained by perceived threat on traditional values, and this might be common with authoritarianism to the extent that atheism may be perceived as a threat in a traditionally religious society (Poland). Indeed, theory on group conflict and prejudice posits that stereotypes and prejudice exist not only in the context of a realistic conflict (e.g., available resources to share) but also when people perceive a symbolic threat, that is, perceive outgroup members as threatening their own values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic threats sometimes arise from people’s religious views: People with a fundamentalist approach to religion tend to see others in terms of whether they support or threaten their values (Jackson, 2011). Atheists, usually supporting secular and liberal moral values, would thus be seen as threatening fundamentalists’ traditional religious and moral values, and this perception would at least partially explain the link between fundamentalism and prejudice, in terms for instance of low willingness to help.

Method

Participants. Participants were 267 Polish students from different colleges (234 women). The age of participants ranged from 18 to 32 (M = 21.77, SD = 1.86). Christian affiliation was declared by 242 persons (214 women), 21 were atheists or nonbelievers, and four did not indicate their religious conviction. Because in this study we measured attitudes toward an atheist as a prototypical outgroup member, only believers were retained for the analyses. The questionnaires were administered to participants during university lectures or individually and were filled in immediately after acceptance of the request.

Procedure and measures. Participants were randomly assigned to three conditions, with different kinds of manipulation, that is, (a) exposure to two short biblical excerpts where God legitimizes violence and to two short neutral excerpts that served as distracters, (b) exposure to two excerpts where God commands prosociality and to the same two neutral excerpts as in the first condition, and (c) exposure only to the two neutral excerpts.

The excerpts in the violent biblical text condition were taken from Leviticus 24:19–20 and Leviticus 26:7–8. The excerpts in the prosocial biblical text condition were taken from Luke
Next, in all three conditions, participants were presented with a short text about a person in need. We provided randomly two versions of the text, with the gender of the target varying (target’s gender had no impact on the results). The text reads:

Imagine the following situation: Your neighbor is knocking on your door and says that while on the bus s/he was robbed of her/his bag containing documents, a mobile phone, money, a credit card. . . . Moreover, today s/he is leaving for a conference organized by an association of atheists. S/he is in charge of the conference, cannot abandon it, and, taking into account this difficult situation, asks you for help because there is no one to whom s/he could turn.

After reading this text participants in all conditions were asked several questions (answer format: 7-point Likert scale) intended to measure prosocial attitudes (i.e., willingness to help and empathy) toward the atheist target. For willingness to help, the questions were as follows: (a) It would not be a problem for me to lend my mobile to this person to make a phone call if s/he asked me, (b) I could look after her/his apartment in her/his absence if it was necessary, and (c) I could lend a modest sum of money to this person if it was necessary. For empathy toward the person, the questions were as follows: (a) I feel sorry for what happened to this person, (b) I know how bad I would feel if I were in her/his shoes, and (c) The situation of this person is completely indifferent to me (reverse scored). Empathy (α = .70) and willingness to help (α = .53) were considerably interrelated (r = .46). We thus summed the six items and created a global measure of prosociality (α = .70), which was our dependent variable.

Afterward, participants were administered the same measures as in Studies 1 and 2, that is, measures of authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and religiosity. Respective reliabilities were αs = .71 (one RWA item was not included because it decreased reliability), .88, and .86. In addition, the 12-item scale of Quest religious orientation (Batson et al., 1993) was administered (α = .72). Finally, the two hypothesized mediators (submissiveness to religious teachings and perceived threat to traditional values) were measured through multi-item indexes. The first measure (α = .90) included the following four items: (a) The tenets of my religion very often guide me in deciding how to behave, (b) I always live my life in accordance to my religion, (c) What my religion teaches is irrefutable to me, and (d) The tenets of my religion are always true. The second measure (α = .75) included the following five items: (a) Those who proclaim new currents in thinking undermine fundamentals of our culture, (b) The lack of values which characterize some groups of people harms what is the most important for our country, (c) People who have different religions and conceptions of life have a lot more in common than we used to think (reversed), (d) We shouldn’t be afraid of people who think in a different manner than ourselves (reversed), and (e) The more and more diffuse different points of view are, the greater the threat to our country’s homogeneity.

Results

There was no overall effect of the exposure to religious text on prosocial attitudes toward an atheist: mean levels were similar between the violent text condition (M = 37.15, SD = 4.27),
the prosocial text condition \((M = 36.35, SD = 5.24)\), and the neutral condition \((M = 36.25, SD = 4.48)\), \(F(2, 239) = 0.87, n.s\). Moreover, there was no difference between conditions on the religious measures (fundamentalism, religiosity, quest religious orientation), \(Fs(2, 239) = 1.66, 0.04, \) and 0.11, \(n.s\), and the two mediators, \(Fs(2, 239) = 0.10 \) (religious submission) and 1.01 (perceived threat), \(n.s\). Only RWA was different across conditions, \(F(2, 240) = 3.09, p = .04, \) with higher scores in the neutral condition \((M = 43.94, SD = 8.53)\) compared to the violent text condition \((M = 40.72, SD = 7.81)\), Tukey test = 3.23, \(p = .04\). In the absence of any theoretical reason, we suspect this may be due to family-wide error issues.

The coefficients of correlations between the four individual measures and prosocial attitudes towards the atheist target in need are detailed in Table 1. In the neutral condition, fundamentalism and religiosity were unrelated to prosocial attitudes. However, considerable differences were observed when focusing on the two experimental conditions. The association of fundamentalism with prosociality toward the atheist was negative after the reading of the violent biblical text and positive after the reading of the prosocial biblical text. Religiosity was positively related to prosociality in the prosocial text condition but was unrelated to it in the violent text condition. Authoritarianism was negatively related to prosociality across all three conditions. In contrast, Quest orientation was positively related to prosociality across all three conditions. As detailed in Table 2, regressing prosociality on condition (i.e. a contrast of prosocial text vs. neutral vs. violent text conditions, respectively coded as 1, 0, and \(-1\)), fundamentalism, and their interaction confirmed the significant interaction between fundamentalism and the religious text condition (see also Figure 1, bottom, for the slopes). Introducing gender as a covariate in the regression did not change the results (interaction: \(\hat{\beta} = .22, t = 3.42, p = .001\)). Computing three alternative moderated regressions including each time authoritarianism, religiosity, or quest instead of fundamentalism failed to show a significant interaction between condition and authoritarianism \((\hat{\beta} = .03, t = 0.55, n.s)\) or quest \((\hat{\beta} = .11, t = 1.74, n.s)\) but showed a significant interaction between condition and religiosity \((\hat{\beta} = .18, t = 2.82, p = .005)\). Introducing together in the regression the two interactions, the one of the condition with fundamentalism and the other with religiosity, showed clearly that the former interaction was a significant predictor of prosociality \((\hat{\beta} = .17, t = 1.87, p = .06)\), but not the latter \((\hat{\beta} = .05, t = 0.54, n.s)\).

Similar to Studies 1 and 2 hierarchical regressions for each condition with fundamentalism (first step), authoritarianism (added at the second step; again, the composite of RWA aggression and submission was included), and religiosity (added at the last step) showed the uniqueness of each construct in predicting prosociality (see Table 5). Authoritarianism seemed to be, across all conditions, a unique predictor of low prosociality toward an atheist. In the violent biblical text condition, fundamentalism was an additive predictor of low prosociality, and this in opposition to the religiosity’s unique (once authoritarianism and fundamentalism were controlled for) effect on high prosociality. In the prosocial biblical text condition, the prosocial effect of fundamentalism turned out to be due to the religiosity associated with it.

Finally, we computed, when applicable (Baron & Kenny, 1986), mediation analyses. Submissiveness to religious teachings was expected to mediate fundamentalism’s, but not religiosity’s, association with high prosociality in the positive biblical text condition. Perceived threat to values was expected to mediate fundamentalism’s and authoritarianism’s association with low prosociality in the violent biblical text condition. In addition, in the latter condition,
submissiveness to religious teachings was tested as a possible mediator of the fundamentalism–low prosociality link.

Self-reported submissiveness to religious teachings turned out to mediate the relationship between fundamentalism and prosocial attitudes toward the atheist after exposure to the religious text commanding prosociality. The beta coefficient of this relation diminished from .23 \((p < .05)\) to .10 \((ns)\), Sobel test = 2.79, \(p < .01\). This was not the case with religiosity, where self-reported submissiveness to religious teachings did not mediate the religiosity–prosociality relation in the same condition (\(\beta\) changed from .37 to .45, Sobel test = 1.94, \(ns\)).

In the religious legitimization of violence condition, perceived threat to traditional values partially mediated the relationship between fundamentalism and low prosocial attitudes toward the atheist. The beta coefficient of this relation decreased from \(-.26\) \((p < .05)\) to \(-.18\) \((p < .10)\), Sobel test = \(-2.95\), \(p < .01\). Similarly, threat to traditional values mediated the relation between authoritarianism and low prosocial attitudes toward the atheist in the same condition. The beta coefficient of this relation decreased from \(-.33\) \((p < .01)\) to \(-.17\) \((ns)\), Sobel test = \(-3.92\), \(p < .01\). Nevertheless, submissiveness to religious teachings failed to mediate the association between fundamentalism and low prosociality toward the atheist in that condition (submissiveness to religious teachings was unrelated to prosociality in this condition).

Discussion

The present findings integrate, reinforce, and extend those of the previous two studies. They suggest that among the same kind of people, from the same country, and selected with the same
method, those who are high in fundamentalism may develop prosocial or antisocial attitudes towards a prototypical outgroup member (i.e., an atheist), depending on the specific nature of the authoritative religious ideas to which they are exposed.

Again, as in Studies 1 and 2, it was fundamentalism and not authoritarianism that turned out to be sensitive to the different contents of the authoritative religious message, be it for better or worse. Authoritarianism, in a traditionally religious country such as Poland, seemed to predict low prosociality toward the atheist target in need consistently across conditions, the atheist being obviously perceived as a member of a major outgroup. Quest religious orientation also remained stable across conditions in consistently showing, as expected, due to its tolerant character, opposite outcomes (i.e., prosocial attitudes). In contrast, fundamentalism turned out to vary importantly in its associations (i.e., from high to low prosociality), as a function of the specific content of the religious message. As suggested by the hierarchical regressions, the religiosity component of fundamentalism was responsible for the prosocial effects of compassionate religious ideas, whereas the fundamentalist dimension (beyond authoritarianism) was responsible for the antisocial effects of violent religious ideas.

The mediational analyses of the role of reported submissiveness to religious teachings and perceived symbolic threat shed additional light on the underlying processes. First, only fundamentalism, but not religiosity, predicted prosociality toward the atheist in the prosocial text condition as a result of high submissiveness to religious teachings. Second, the same submissiveness to religious teachings failed to explain fundamentalists’ low prosocial attitudes toward the atheist in the violent text condition. These antisocial attitudes were partially mediated, as for authoritarians, by symbolic threat. Thus, taken together, these mediational results suggest that it is not only or fully submission to religious teachings that makes fundamentalists prosocial or antisocial. Processes may be more complex. Prosocial religious texts seem to inhibit fundamentalists’ prejudice toward targets that threaten values and lead to prosocial attitudes through religious submission. Violent religious texts seem to accentuate fundamentalists’ perceived symbolic threat, thus leading to antisocial attitudes.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across three studies with predominantly Christian samples, we found that exposure to a biblical text commending and legitimizing violence decreased fundamentalists’ prosocial attitudes toward nonproximal targets and outgroups and led fundamentalists to express low willingness to help unknown targets (Study 1) and an atheist (Study 3) in need. Exposure to biblical text commending prosociality increased fundamentalists’ prosocial attitudes toward outgroups and led fundamentalists to show high willingness to help negligent targets (Study 2) and an atheist (Study 3) in need. In the violent biblical text conditions, fundamentalists’ low prosociality toward an unknown target or an atheist was, respectively, unique to fundamentalism (Study 1) or partly explained by the underlying perceived symbolic threat to traditional values (Study 3). In the prosocial biblical text condition, fundamentalists’ high prosociality toward negligent people or an atheist in need was, respectively, not explained by religiosity (Study 2) or explained by reported submissiveness to religious teachings (Study 3). In sum, aggressive religious texts seem to induce fundamentalists’ perception of unknown people and outgroups as threatening, thus leading to low prosocial attitudes toward them, whereas compassionate religious texts
seem to inhibit such perception and lead, through religious submission, to prosocial attitudes even when the target in need comes from a prototypical outgroup (i.e., is an atheist).

The full dependency upon the prosocial or antisocial nature of the biblical texts in showing, respectively, prosocial or antisocial attitudes toward nonproximal people and outgroup members was specific to fundamentalism and was not characteristic of simple religiosity, quest, or authoritarianism. Religiosity, although partially sensitive to positive religious texts, thus showing increases in prosociality (but not because of submissiveness to religious texts), did not mirror fundamentalism in showing low prosocial attitudes toward unknown persons or an atheist after exposure to violent biblical texts. In other words, it was only among high scorers on fundamentalism in particular and not on religiosity in general that exposure to biblical texts had such an impact for better or worse. Authoritarianism (which implies submission but not necessarily submission to a religious authority) was overall unaffected by the religious text. The same was the case for quest religious orientation when measured in Study 3: It was unaffected by the text manipulation and showed constant tolerance across conditions through willingness to help the atheist target in need.

Fundamentalist prejudice toward a variety of outgroups, whether those threaten values or not, and its explanation through perceived symbolic threat is in line with previous research (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Mavor & Gallois, 2008). However, the present work clearly nuances and perhaps challenges previous research, by suggesting that fundamentalists’ attitudes toward nonproximal targets and outgroups are importantly malleable, for better or worse, due to fundamentalists’ dependence on religious authority and the very nature of authoritative religious texts. Consequences may be positive if the religious message is compassionate, such as increased positive attitudes toward various outgroups; or they may be negative, such as increased negative attitudes toward outgroups, if religious messages legitimize aggression.

These three studies also provide experimental evidence confirming information from two reviews of studies on religious prejudice across several decades: When a type of prejudice (e.g., racism) became socially proscribed, the fundamentalism–prejudice link (or even the religiosity–prejudice link) tended to disappear (Batson et al., 1993; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). They also concur with, but go beyond, two previous studies showing that (a) compassionate religious texts may, under death-related terror, attenuate fundamentalists’ prejudice (Rothschild et al., 2009; here, prejudice was reversed to prosociality; no death-anxiety was necessary), and (b) an aggressive religious text may increase aggression, especially among religious people (Bushman et al., 2007; here we distinguished between fundamentalism, religiosity, quest, and authoritarianism).

Note that the present work also suggests that the positive shift among fundamentalists to prosociality toward an outgroup member may be superficial because it seems based on submissiveness to religious teachings—which was not the case for simple religiosity. Submissiveness and dependence are not the best guarantee for internalization of prosocial and moral values (Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, & Aquino, 2010).

The limitations of the present studies must also be considered. Paper-and-pencil measures of prosocial attitudes may be contaminated by social desirability and concerns for self-image and may not necessarily translate into real behavior. Nevertheless, the dramatic shift in fundamentalists’ attitudes following exposure to different religious texts (for better or worse) suggests that other processes (e.g., religious submission), stronger than simply the need for positive social perception, are influential and seem to be real. Also, the results
concern young adults from a population of average religiosity and thus may not necessarily generalize to members of fundamentalist groups. Nevertheless, if such results are obtained even with this kind of participant, one cannot see a reason why similar results (i.e., prosocial or antisocial consequences of fundamentalists’ submission to religious authority) would not apply, perhaps even to a greater degree, to “real-life” fundamentalists. Finally, measuring religiosity, fundamentalism, and authoritarianism at the end of the experiment was not optimal: One could suspect effects of the experimental conditions on these measures. However, measuring religious constructs prior to the experiment has been proved to function as priming religion (e.g., Ginges et al., 2009). Moreover, if the experimental conditions had altered participants’ scores on these measures, a minimal expected change would be that religious texts, compared to the neutral condition, change participants’ scores on religiosity. This was not the case in any of the three studies.

To conclude, the present work suggests that fundamentalism should not be seen as simple authoritarianism leading to outgroup prejudice. The religious component of fundamentalism that is joined to authoritarianism also seems to be responsible for prosocial attitudes toward outgroup members, at least under contextual conditions that make some authoritative religious ideas salient. We do not assume that such an effect is unique to religious ideas (secular ideas promoting prosocial values could also have an impact) but what seems to be unique for religious compared to nonreligious authoritarians (i.e., for fundamentalists) is the sensitivity to authoritative religious messages that can change attitudes from antisocial to prosocial (and vice versa). Beyond their theoretical implications for a personality and social psychological approach to religion and ideologies, the present findings may be of interest for intervention with fundamentalist people and social regulation of fundamentalist groups.

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1. Antisocial biblical text of Study 1: Now the son of an Israelite mother and an Egyptian father went out among the Israelites, and a fight broke out in the camp between him and an Israelite. The son of the Israelite woman blasphemed the Name with a curse. (...) They put him in custody until the will of the Lord should be made clear to them. Then the Lord said to Moses: “Take the blasphemer outside the camp. All those who heard him are to lay their hands on his head, and the entire assembly is to stone him. Anyone who curses their God will be held responsible; anyone who blasphemes the name of the Lord is to be put to death. The entire assembly must stone them” (Leviticus 24:10–16, NIV).

2. Prosocial biblical text of Study 2: “Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful. Do not judge, and you will not be judged. Do not condemn, and you will not be condemned. Forgive, and you will be forgiven. Give, and it will be given to you” (Luke 6:36–38, NIV).

3.1. Antisocial biblical excerpts of Study 3: Anyone who injures their neighbor is to be injured in the same manner: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The one who has inflicted the injury must suffer the same injury (Leviticus 24:19–20); and You will pursue your enemies, and they will fall by the sword before you. Five of you will chase a hundred, and a hundred of you will chase ten thousand, and your enemies will fall by the sword before you (Leviticus 26:7–8, NIV).

3.2. Prosocial biblical excerpts of Study 3: Do good (…), and lend (…) without expecting to get anything back. Then your reward will be great, and you will be children of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked (Luke 6:35); and Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful. Do not judge, and you will not be judged. Do not condemn, and you will not be condemned. Forgive, and you will be forgiven. Give, and it will be given to you (Luke 6:36–38, NIV).

3.3. Neutral, secular excerpts of Study 3: The day promised to be sunny, clouds huddled together in long strips to the west but the east remained clean. Kmicic woke up the people, and went their way (The Deluge by Henryk Sienkiewicz, authors’ translation); and Moving right along the sidewalk, Wokulski saw on the left, about half-way down the street, the house of a very yellow color. (…). Indeed, it was the house of Lecki (The Doll by Boleslaw Prus, authors’ translation).