Deliverable 10

“Actors of community conflicts: Camps, factions and discourses”

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I. Introduction

II. Communities, factions and discourses

A. Communities and factions

Within the framework of the Peace Com Project, we are analysing communities\(^1\) that are in conflict because they pursue incompatible objectives\(^2\). Therefore, any actors’ based analysis has to focus on actors’ positions in their community and their objectives.

We consider each community as basically a heterogeneous whole. Within each community, one can find a specific constellation of different sub-groups or “factions”, of which some form advocacy coalitions. This deliverable aims at identifying these main “factions”, (i.e. more or less organized and coherent large “tendencies”), which are usually small in number (two or three per community). For instance, in nearly every community, one finds a “radical” and a “moderates” faction (or realos vs. fundis).

Our mapping of community factions will draw on the existing available general knowledge of each case team of specialists, completed with information gathered through our actors’ survey, the expert interviews realized in each country, and last but not least a summary analysis of the mainstream discourse for each relevant faction in each community involved in the main community conflict studied in each case.

In order to understand the dynamics of a community conflict, we must map the constellation of the competing “camps” involved in a particular community conflict, the degree of discursive and organizational cohesion of a community in terms of factions and their objectives and perceptions of the conflict (their “frames” or “discourses”), the relative size of each faction, the different degree of their access to resources, etc.

\(^1\) The word “community” as it is used in PEACE-COM, presents a holistic dimension, in the sense that membership of the community transcends other possible memberships, and leaves its mark on most activities the individual may be engaged in. It may be possible to leave the community, but it is in any case very difficult, if not impossible, to join another one.

\(^2\) Conflict arises when different communities pursue different or even opposing, contradictory or apparently contradictory goals and aims.
In this sense, in the analysis of community conflict actors, these factions constitute our main unit of analysis, not the people we interviewed for the workpackage on “actors in community conflicts” or the specific organizations they represent. The features of each of these factions and their interactions are viewed to be central for the (de-)escalation of the conflict (and is used as explanatory variable in Deliverable 2 on ???). It is therefore equally central for the kind of accommodation solutions sought and eventually reached (or not reached, in case of escalation or status quo), and therefore vital for the analysis of the Deliverable 9 on accommodation policies.

Finally, at a later stage³, this conceptualization of community conflict in terms of communities, factions and their objectives and frames of perception of the conflict, will lead to the formulation of hypotheses regarding the impact of each type of constellation on the outcomes of the conflict, inspired by game theoretic approaches (“as used in ethnic bargaining” book ??? ), as well as ??.

B. Discourses and semiotics in community conflicts

In order to synthesize the discourse and frames communities and intracommunity factions use in the formulation of their objectives and their perceptions of the conflict, and therefore of the other community, the Peacecom project has drawn in several workpackages on the semiotic approach developed by our Estonian colleague, Ravio Vetik. The semiotic approach is based on the assumption that no ethnic conflict exists in pure ‘objective’ form, but is mediated by the ‘subjective’ perceptions of individuals, which form the basis for ethnic boundary construction between conflicting communities. This assumption is a fundamental feature of social constructivism which assumes that ‘if men perceive social situation as real, they are real in their consequences’. From this theoretical perspective, boundary construction between “self” and “other” does not merely reflect but also creates social reality, and allows for the fact that actors may accomplish this construction in various ways. Consequently, one must not only understand how ‘objective’ factors (language usage, political resources, socio-economic inequalities) affect the dynamics of ethnic conflict, but also understand how ‘subjective’ factors lead in one way or another to the drawing of boundaries between ethnic

³ See Dissemination plans???
groups. This way, research into the semiotic aspects of ethnic conflict contributes both to a
greater understanding of the socio-psychological environment in which ethnic conflict takes
place, as well as to how each group interprets and understands the issues involved.

The importance of the semiotic dimension of ethnic conflict stems from the fact that
ethnic identity is constructed within the symbolic relationship of a group with its environment,
and especially the universal oppositional relationship of ‘self’ and ‘other’. This opposition lays
a psychological foundation for the conflictual nature of ‘self-other’ relationships (Tajfel 1987).4
In the psychology of ethnic conflict, the systematic over-emphasis of in-group similarities and
intergroup differences plays an important role. Even when differences are small, there is a
tendency to perceive the outgroup as significantly different and ascribe to it negative
qualities.5

The semiotic approach to community conflicts developed by Vetik (2007) is based on
the socio-psychological assumptions summarised above. In inter-cultural relations ‘any culture
creates not only its own internal organization but also the form of its external disorganization’
(Lotman 1992). This means that the other is not simply an ‘objectively’ existing entity toward
who the self is opposed, but rather a social construction created by the self.

Incomplete communication constitutes a second fundamental feature of inter-group
referential relations, that equally influences the dynamics of ethnic conflict. It has been argued
in the literature that in substantially complex systems, complete communication is neither
possible nor needed (Lotman 1990). It can be assumed that inter-group communication falls
somewhere in the middle of the communication spectrum ranging from complete single-sense
information (as in artificial languages) to multi-sense and multilayered information (as in
artistic languages)6, at times moving towards one pole or the other (Lotman 1990).

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4 This notion is supported by Tajfel’s classical experiments with so-called ‘minimal groups’. Participants
in these experiments tend to treat in-group members better than out-group members, even when groups
are formed randomly. Tajfel’s findings suggest that favoritism and the potential for conflict exist even
in ‘minimal’ social situations.

5 Studies in attribution theory show that an outgroup’s positive qualities are ascribed to the external situation
(e.g., being helped, special circumstances) and negative qualities are ascribed to internal dispositions (e.g.,
laziness, criminal nature), (Pettigew 1979). In the reconstruction of the past as well, attributes that reinforce
existing stereotypes are selectively recalled. These are perceived as more common than they actually are, while
actions that do not fit the stereotype are viewed as ‘exceptions to the rule’ (Holsti 1967). A similar mechanism
operates when the future behavior of an outgroup is predicted. Prior judgments are made, and new information
is interpreted in ways that affirm these prior judgments.

6 The closest to this ideal is communication in artificial languages, such as system of traffic signs,
where a single understanding of what the symbols mean is a prerequisite for its normal functioning. At
the other extreme are artistic languages, such as poetry, which assume a multiplicity of interpretations.
This is why the same “objective events” are explained in such divergent ways by different ethnic groups. Ethnic relations represent a dynamic semiotic system where communication between the parties is oriented not toward primary, but toward secondary information (Lotman 1990). In other words, discourses of ethnic groups are not systems of unmediated pure observation data but symbolic self-referential systems. They belong not to the world of objective ‘truth’, which would represent reality as it is, but are situated within the continuum between pure data and artistic interpretation.

Different forms of self-referentiality will lead to different types of boundary construction in inter-group relations. Each ethnic boundary presents a particular structural constraints to mutual understanding of communities, which in turn affect the dynamics of ethnic conflict. In order to test this hypothesis, Vetik developed a typology of the construction of semiotic boundaries in inter-group relations, that serve as a filter between internal and external, between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (Lotman, 1992a??). According to Lotman, the boundary serves two basic functions: 1) it preserves internal uniqueness by blocking information coming from the other; and 2) it facilitates orientation in the external environment, which presumes communication between self and other.

Based on the first function, Vetik conceives the category of 'non-culture' of boundary construction, i.e. from the point of view of the “self”, the “other” symbolically does not exist. Communication between “culture” and “non-culture” is neither possible nor needed. Potential ethnic conflict between “culture” and “non-culture” will either not materialise or will be suppressed.

On the basis of the second function, Vetik introduces two other categories: ‘alien culture’ and ‘different culture’. In both cases, some communication between self and other takes place, however it takes different forms and therefore different consequences for the nature of intergroup relations.

In the 'alien culture' category, communication between the groups is dominated by the negative elements of identity. Interethnic relations emphasizing the negative aspects of the boundary between internal and external lead to ethnocentrism, in which the 'other's' behavior is perceived as a violation of the values and norms of one’s 'own culture'.

In the 'different culture' category of relationship, the “other” is longer 'non-existent' or 'an enemy,' but rather is viewed as a “partner”. Historically, this type of relationship has emerged on the basis of overcoming the 'alien culture’ or the 'non-culture' type of relations. In contrast to the ethnocentricity of the 'alien culture' relationship, the 'different culture’
relationship uses an ethnorelativist frame of reference that in principle allows for the viability of other frames of reference (Mayer 1984) and facilitates cooperation between communities.

Vetik’s typology combines the three basic categories of ‘self-other’ opposition in the model for a conflict between two communities, leading to nine different types from the crosstabulation of these two dimensions (Table 1):

Table 1: A Typology of Self-Other Relations (CM: reframe table!!??)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP A</th>
<th>non-culture B1</th>
<th>alien culture B2</th>
<th>different culture B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-culture A1</td>
<td>A1B1</td>
<td>A1B2</td>
<td>A1B3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alien culture A2</td>
<td>A2B1</td>
<td>A2B2</td>
<td>A2B3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>different culture A3</td>
<td>A3B1</td>
<td>A3B2</td>
<td>A3B3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This typology does has considerable heuristic value for analyzing the dynamics of ethnic conflict in the sense that the placement of concrete conflicts into various types, allows for the framing of hypotheses\(^7\) and for claiming that some phenomena are more likely than others to occur under a given set of circumstances (see the use of this typology in the analyses of Deliverable D2 “??”).

In this deliverable on the perceptions and discourse of actors in community conflicts, we will use the semiotic approach and Vetik’s typology as our main framework for analysing and synthesizing the discourses of communities and their factions.

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\(^7\) For example, it can be hypothesized that conflict management is most problematic in the case of the category A2B2. If both groups perceive each other as aliens, mutual hostilities will mostly likely lead to violence. On the other hand, the most likely scenario for conflict management is the category A3B3. If both groups perceive each other as partners, mutual tolerance and cooperation in their relationship is a likely outcome. These two categories of the typology represent ends of an opposition spectrum. All other categories fit somewhere within the bands of this spectrum of mutual relationships.
C. Data collection

1. Data on communities’ and factions’ perceptions of the dimensions of the conflict

For a first overview of how communities and factions perceive the conflict we used a question from the general questionnaire. In questions C101 to C117 respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they considered a series of factors as primary or secondary causes for the current (during the last five years) state of the community conflict.

In a qualitative questionnaires, we asked the participating teams to identify the different factions in each community (see annexe nr. ??) for identifying each faction and its strength (predominance) within its community over time.

2. Discourse data: semiotics of the perception of self/other

We sent to all participating teams a qualitative questionnaire asked to summarize the predominant paradigmatic frames of each (relevant) faction in the community conflict in a diachronic way, as well as operationalising the concepts of Vetik’s semiotic model (2007). (See annexe ??)

We first tried to identify the main paradigmatic frames of the conflict used by the different community factions through time, using the following coding:

- code “A” stands for : main framing in terms of the “cultural” dimensions (first cluster of dimensions)
- code “B” stands for : main framing in terms of the “socio-economic and geographic” dimensions (second cluster of dimensions)
- code “C” stands for : main framing in terms of the “political” dimensions (third cluster of dimensions)
- code “D” stands for : main framing in terms of the “external” dimensions (fourth cluster of dimensions).

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8 The main indicator to be used to identify the “main” perception of the “other camp” is the predominant discourse of “opinion leaders” of the community.
In order to grasp the semiotic meaning of the conflict for the conflicting parties, we operationalised Vetik’s typology of the perceptions in community conflict. Our operationalisation consists of three ideal-types of intergroup relationships, for each one of the two main “factions” in each community, i.e. how does this faction mainly conceives the “other” community (the out-group), through time:

- code “1”: “non-existence” (separation): perception of symbolic non-existence of the ‘other’ community (out-group), in the sense that the in-group represents a kind of ‘higher’ form of existence (culturally, politically etc.), which really exists and ‘ought to be’, while the ‘other’ is ‘non-cultural’, ‘non-legal’ etc., which ‘ought not to be’ and that this is why it ‘does not exist’.  
  
- code “2”: “alien other” (confrontation): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as an alien; domination of accusations, ethnocentrism and prejudices; perception of open conflict between the community groups and impossibility of compromises.

- code “3”: “different other” (integration): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as a possible partner; possibility of compromises in case of conflicts; orientation towards cooperation and inclusion; perception of joint interests and multiple identities.  

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9 Hence there is no “conflict” perceived: separation does not include perception of open conflict, as it does not make sense to conflict with a ‘non-existent’ other.

10 The main indicator to be used to identify the “main” perception of the “other camp” is the predominant discourse of “opinion leaders” of the community.
III. Perceptions and definitions of recent key features of community conflicts

I. Methodological considerations

In questions C101 to C117 respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they considered a series of factors as primary of secondary causes for the current (during the last five years) state of the community conflict. In questions C118 to C120 they could write in other causes in an open answer category. Following the methodology described below for coding the importance of the role of actors, we have weighted the answered by giving a value of 2 to the factors that are judged as principal cause, 1 to those judge as secondary cause, and 0 for those as judged irrelevant. This allows us to use means instead of ordinal measures (primary, secondary or no relevance) for crossing this variable with potential determinants and consequences.

Table 2 displays the most important factors (in recent years) that cause the community conflict, in decreasing order. The most important factor is national sovereignty, while also three other factors score in importance more than 1.00: ancient hatreds, contested territory and ethnic diversity. Three other factors score close to 1.00: linguistic diversity, security concerns and military intervention, followed by elite instrumentalisation, colonial history and socio-economic cleavages. The next group consists of foreign interference, demographic shifts (and other causes), followed by religious diversity and inadequate political institutions. Finally, we find three factors that score 0.5 or less: criminality, property rights and corruption.
Table 2: Importance of community conflict causes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Average importance</th>
<th>% judging primary cause</th>
<th>% judging secondary cause</th>
<th>% judging irrelevant</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National sovereignty</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient hatreds</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested territory</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic diversity</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security concerns</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite instrumentalisation</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial history</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic cleavages</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign interference</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic shifts</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cause1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious diversity</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate political institutions</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminality</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property rights</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>250</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 displays the importance of causal factors in the recent stage (last five years, i.e. 2000-2004) of the community conflict. National sovereignty is perceived most strongly relevant in the Northern Ireland case, Kosovo, Cyprus and Basque cases. Ancient hatreds are most relevant in the Sandzak, Northern Ireland, Vojvodina, and Slovene cases. Contested territory is most relevant in the Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Belgian and Cyprus cases. Ethnic diversity is most relevant in the Sandzak, Vojvodina, Cyprus, Estonian, Kosovo and Slovenes in Austria cases. Linguistic diversity scores highest in the Belgian, Estonian and Slovene case. Security concerns matter most in Sandzak, Cyprus, Kosovo and Northern Ireland cases. Military intervention is most relevant in the Kosovo, Sandzak, Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases. Elite instrumentalisation is mentioned most in the Kosovo, Estonian and Slovene cases. Colonial history is most relevant in the Northern Ireland, Estonian and Sandzak cases. Socio-economic cleavages concern most the Belgian, Estonian and the Northern Ireland cases. Foreign interference is most relevant in the Northern Ireland and Cyprus cases. Demographic shifts are mentioned most in Vojvodina, Kosovo, Sandzak and the Northern Ireland cases. Religious diversity is of most relevance in the Sandzak, Northern Ireland and Vojvodina cases. Inadequate political institutions are mentioned most in the Kosovo, Sandzak and the Northern Ireland cases. Criminality is mentioned especially in Kosovo; property rights in Cyprus; and corruption in Kosovo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>case nrs new</th>
<th>ethnic diversity</th>
<th>relig diversity</th>
<th>linguist diversity</th>
<th>ancien hatreds</th>
<th>colonial history</th>
<th>milit interve</th>
<th>foreign interference</th>
<th>contested territory</th>
<th>national sovereignty</th>
<th>security concerns</th>
<th>socio-ec cleavages</th>
<th>property rights</th>
<th>demogr shifts</th>
<th>elite instrumenalisation</th>
<th>corruption</th>
<th>inadeq pol institutio</th>
<th>crimina lity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td>Basque Cty</td>
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<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.71</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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</table>
REVIEW IN FUNCTION OF ELISE REDRAFTING OF HER D1 TABLE !!??

Most of the categories of causes were based on the theoretical paper (WP1: D1 “Community conflicts in Europe: A review of the literature”) regarding the dimensions of and approaches to community conflicts. If we compare the results between the perceptions of actors involved in the conflict and privileged witnesses with those of scholars identified by Elise Feron in D1 (see Figure 1, below), we find the following differences in terms of strong presence or irrelevance:

- religious differences are reported to be high in the Vojvodina contrary to the D1 coding;
- if the disputes over national sovereignty are a good indicator of the presence of identity claims, we find that they are overestimated in the scheme for Cyprus, and underestimated for Sandzak in comparison to respondents perceptions;
- linguistic diversity is perceived to be of little relevance in the Northern Ireland case, while the D1 scheme gives it only medium importance, but this may be due to the fact that in that scheme cultural differences are added to linguistic differences, the former being abundant in the Northern Ireland case;
- socio-economic cleavages are contrary to the scheme perceived as quite relevant for the Kosovo case, while Basque respondents tend to downplay this dimension which in the scheme occupies an intermediary value;
- in comparison to the respondents perceptions, population shifts are overestimated in the scheme for the Basque country, underestimated for the Northern Ireland case and especially for the Vojvodina case;
- conflicts over territory are overestimated in the scheme for the Basque and the Estonian cases;
- for the centre periphery cleavage, we find no appropriate corresponding factors used in the questionnaire, while also political access is difficult to grasp; SO DROP QUESTION MARKS IN ELISE’S TABLE !!??

- regarding elite manipulation/instrumentalisation, we find more misfits that fits. This may be due to the fact that many of the respondents belong to their community’s elites, and are weary to be seen manipulating or instrumentalising the conflict for their own objectives and interests;
- also for the last three dimensions (access to citizenship, decolonization/globalization/WWI & II, and neighbours/diasporas/border communities, we can find little content
correspondence with the factors used in the questionnaire. SO DROP QUESTION MARKS IN ELISE’S TABLE !??
FIGURE 1: A map of conflict dimensions (identified in D1) *(ASK EF FOR LATEST VERSION OF FIGURE???)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Sandžak</th>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
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<td>Religious differences</td>
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<td>OK</td>
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<td>1?</td>
<td>0?</td>
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<td>OK</td>
<td>2?</td>
</tr>
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<td>Identity Claims</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>2?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture / Language</td>
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<td>0?</td>
<td>1-2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>0-1?</td>
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<td>OK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>0-1?</td>
<td>1?</td>
<td>2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Shifts</td>
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<td>OK</td>
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<td>1?</td>
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<td>2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2?</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>2?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2?</td>
<td>0?</td>
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<td>0-1?</td>
<td>2?</td>
<td>1?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2?</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0-1?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Manipulation</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2?</td>
<td>1-2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Citizenship</td>
<td>1?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2?</td>
<td>1?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decol / Glob / WWI &amp; WWII</td>
<td>Not verifiable?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours, Diasp, border</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>1?</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
X. Actors, factions and discourses in community conflicts

A. Introduction

The main part of this deliverable aims at the identification of the factions active in the different communities involved in the community conflict, and the discourses they employ, from a semiotic conflict perspective (see above). For each case we will first recall the dimensions that according to actors and expert are characterizing this community conflict.

Then we will present in a schematic form the communities and their main factions, and -- where relevant -- the name of the main group representing each current.

Then we will describe more in detail the composition, origins, organization of these factions and (the evolution over time of) their “rapport de forces”.

Finally we will look at the (evolution of the) meanstream semiotic discourse different communities and factions use, following the typology of Vetik (2007).

The cases are present following a sequence from low to high degrees of violence. REORDER!! ??

B. Case studies

1. Ethnic Estonians vs. Russians in Estonia
   
a) Conflict dimensions

The conflict between Ethnic Estonians vs. Russians in Estonia has a strong cultural, linguistic and identity dimension (Estonian vs. the former colonial language Russian), is the product of major geopolitical shifts (annexation of Estonia into USSR after WWII and the independence of the country after the fall of the Berlin Wall), with strong population shifts given the influx of Russians into Estonia forming the new
Soviet socio-economic and political elite and afterwards the demotion to non-citizenship, and therefore strong reversal of access to the political system.

b) Communities and factions

Figure ??: Communities and factions in the conflict between Ethnic Estonians and Russians in Estonia

Ethnic Estonians

- Liberal and social democratic wings
- Ethno nationalist and corporatist wings
- Politically marginal non-ideological parties and coalitions

Russians/Russian speakers

- pro-Union Communist Party faction
- marginal parties and groupings both of liberal and social democratic orientation

Factions on the Ethnic Estonian side

1. liberal and social democratic wing, Popular Front and its successors; integration-oriented, at the same time holding a position that the special policy for protection of needs and interests of Estonian ethnic nation is necessary;
2. ethnonationalist and corporatist wing, mainly represented by Pro Patria and its forerunners from 1989-1992; the main position is protection of ethnic nation at expense of control over new minorities and stimulating of ‘decolonization’;
3. politically marginal non-ideological parties and coalitions, however following more or less the concept of protection the ethnic nation or taking measures to facilitate integration, often under pressure of international actors.

Factions on the Russian side

1. pro-Union Communist Party faction, all-Union enterprisers’ leaders, International Movement;
2. marginal parties and groupings both of liberal and social democratic orientation (Estonian United Peoples Party, Russian Party of Estonia).
c) Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Ethnic Estonians and Russians in Estonia

Within the Ethnic Estonian community, the liberal and social democratic wing rapidly lost its predominance to the second (and sometime third) faction.

Also amongst the Russian Community, the old pro-Union Communist faction of the ancient régime rapidly lost its grip on its community and the second, more liberal and social-democratic, current became the predominant faction on the Russian side.

In terms of perception of the self/other\textsuperscript{11} from the Estonian side, we find that from the end of WWII until 2000, the main faction of the ethnic Estonians perceived

\textsuperscript{11} Remember from above that for a faction’s conception of the “other” community (the out-group) through time, the following coding is applied:

- code “1”: “non-existence” (separation): perception of symbolic non-existence of the ‘other’ community (out-group), in the sense that the in-group represents a kind of ‘higher’ form of existence (culturally, politically etc.), which really exists and ‘ought to be’, while the ‘other’ is ‘non-cultural’, ‘non-legal’ etc., which ‘ought not to be’ and that this is why it ‘does not exist’.
Russians in Estonia as “alien other”, and only in 2000 the main discourse shifted to “different other”.

The main faction on the Russian side perceived the ethnic Estonians as ‘non-existing’ from the end of WWII until the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), shifted for a few year to an “alien other discourse” and since 1993 switched to the “different other” discourse.

d) Community and factional discourses of Russians in Estonia

Before the break-up of the USSR, for a long time ethnic Estonians were not perceived as a problem by the Russians in Estonia. During the Soviet era, when Russian language and culture formed the basis for creating the 'Soviet people', this attitude was reinforced by a new mix of colonial domination and humanist ideals. Within this new discourse, the 'other' was perceived as ideally no different from the 'self' because of the universal nature of human values it suggested. But it was only under the auspices of Russian control and ingenuity that these values could be properly applied. In this sense, the fact that Russian colonists tended not to learn local languages, which later became a political problem in the Baltic states at the end 1980s, was not so much due to a lack of respect, but rather a semiotically normal disposition in relation to the 'non-culture'. In a sense Ethnic Estonians were non-existing, because Russians did not perceive that they had migrated to Estonia, but to the western part of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet ideology, ethnicity was something backward, which would decrease over time, that is why there was a tendency not to ‘see’ Estonia and Estonians among migrants, but Soviet Union and working class

- code “2”: “alien other” (confrontation): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as an alien; domination of accusations, ethnocentrism and prejudices; perception of open conflict between the community groups and impossibility of compromises.
- code “3” : “different other” (integration): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as a possible partner; possibility of compromises in case of conflicts; orientation towards cooperation and inclusion; perception of joint interests and multiple identities.
people, peasants or intellectuals. Newcomers were waiting for gratitude from Estonian side for their ‘liberation’ and ‘building up of socialism’, and were unpleasantly surprised that “Estonians don’t like us” and expressed nationalism and closeness vis-à-vis the Russian immigrants. This was regarded as a sign of backwardness. Still, at the same time the Estonians were perceived as a ‘cultured’ people, their way of life was acknowledged as ‘Western-like’ and more advanced. So, there was a kind of contradictory perception of the “other”.

The arrival of perestroika activated the ‘alien culture’ type of relationship in several regions of the former Soviet Union. The weakening of political control within the system was immediately accompanied by the strengthening of ethnic demands and, as a result, previously ‘frozen’ ethnic conflicts developed rapidly into severe confrontation. The perception of the other underwent a radical change when Estonia declared its independence in 1988. On the Russian side, the ‘loosing of the homeland’, created tensions, feelings of insecurity and exclusion. The shocking experience of closed borders and seclusion from habitual contacts and relations with the former SU was very soon replaced by need to solve ambiguous legal relationships with the host country. This need and uncompromising politics of powers of the Ethnic Estonians brought closer different factions within Russian community and fostered their shift towards a nationalist discourse. This shift is not meeting any more the basic interests of the ordinary community members for whom the economic needs are of the highest priority. Yet, growing support of Russian electorate to mainstream Estonian political parties bear witness to the ongoing social and political differentiation within Russian community and potential for civic integration. At the same time one can foresee a strengthening tendency of local Russian cultural and linguistic identity.

e) Community and factional discourses amongst Ethnic Estonians

On the Estonian side, the main longlasting and unifying bases for ethnic tensions were the loss of national independence and the fear of loosing national identity and language caused by the impact of demographic de-ethnization caused by
massive influx of Russian-speaking population. The language issue became central in national mobilisation from the end of 1970s.

After regaining independence the language protection issue was widely used by all national forces as a tool for establishing political control over national territory and as a means limiting access of Russian-speakers to public services and political power. All political parties were in agreement with basics of citizenship, language and migration policies, therefore not minority policies but rather pragmatic interests caused their principal differences and contradictions.

For a whole period of Soviet domination the non-Estonian population has been perceived by Estonians as ‘strangers’ and ‘aliens’. Stereotypes like ‘they are not cultured and laborious enough’, ‘they are wanderers’, “they pose existential danger to Estonian ethnic group being ‘civil garrison’ of Russia” were widespread. Such attitudes did not exclude, of course, friendly relations at personal level on numerous occasions.

At the same time as Russians were moving beyond the period when boundary construction between themselves and locals was based on the model of 'non-existence,' the reverse was taking place for Estonians. The discourse regarding the legal continuity of the Estonian Republic, that emerged in this period and formed the ideological bases for the nationalist Estonian Citizens Committee movement, put into effect a new type of semiotic boundary (Vetik 1993). In literature it has been described as a power strategy that eliminated one third of the population from the political arena by rendering them legally 'non-existent' (Ruutsoo 1995). From the standpoint of ethnic Estonian discourse, the presence of immigrants who had entered Estonia during the Soviet era was illegal because the native population was not given an opportunity to express its views during Soviet occupation. It logically follows that only those who were Estonian citizens prior to Soviet occupation and their descendants could be granted Estonian citizenship. This meant that about 80% of Russians living in Estonia did not fit into this category and did not comprise even an ethnic minority, since international law defines minorities in terms of citizenship. Since most of them were not Russian citizens either, they became ‘non-existent’, in Vetic’s semiotic terminology.
f) Conclusions

Starting from the middle of the 1980s to end of the 1990s, ethnic differences and opposing interests and mutual accusations appeared in interethnic relations, in the Estonian as well as the Russian community. Along with the political and social stabilization since the mid-1990s, mutual exclusionary and antagonistic attitudes started to decrease. There are signs of emerging of mutual acceptance and respect towards ‘different other’.

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the Estonians as A and the Russians as B, it can be argued that the pre-perestroika situation in Estonia is represented by the type A2B1, and after adopting the new citizenship law in 1992 the situation is better represented by the type A1B2. The most important feature of the development of Estonia, from the conflict management perspective, is the fact that the strengthening of the second type paralleled the weakening of the first. As a result, the most dangerous type A2B2 (with most violence potential) was avoided. Hence, the process of giving Estonia independent statehood has been referred to as a 'laboratory of peaceful methods of political struggle' (Taagepera 1993).

Another lesson might be that the 'non-culture' model contains mechanisms that might ‘freeze’ conflict in place. From a long term perspective, this can be viewed as a possible strategy for successful management of ethnic conflict.

2. The community conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland

The conflict between “Catholics and Protestants” has often been described by observers as religious conflict, but it counts much more dimensions, some even more important than religion (Feron, 2005). It is true that nationalist and republican

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12 It is difficult to map the main paradigms in each camp, because some explanations have been coexisting, without necessarily being in opposition (for instance, for Catholics, the socio-economic factors were very important until the eighties, but they were linked to
parties derive their support almost exclusively from Catholics, while unionist and loyalist parties are overwhelmingly supported by Protestants. Yet, while religion is the key ethnic marker, facilitating the residential, marital and educational segregation which helps reproduce the two communities, the conflict is NOT about religion. Each community thinks its cultural identity is at threat because of the existence of the other, and stresses its own specificities.

The socio-economic dimension also used to be a dominant dimension, as Catholics / Nationalists were discriminated against, but the issue has lost part of its saliency in the eighties. The territorial dimension is clearly at the core of the conflict, both at the level of the province (stay inside the UK or re-unite with the Irish Republic?) and at the local level, with an increased segregation between communities, which also coincides with an East (mainly protestant)-West (mainly catholic) territorial division. Access of Catholics to the political system has been difficult under the Stormont administration. Until the British Government decided in 1972 to rule the province directly, the Catholic / Nationalist community clearly did not trust the Unionist administration. The implementation of Direct Rule helped reducing this estrangement, though it did not succeed in fostering a genuine sense of belonging to Northern Ireland amongst Nationalists. Catholics / Nationalists’ access to citizenship was hampered by various legislations until the end of the sixties, and their political representation was biased by gerrymandering. Finally, the Republic’s influence and involvement in Northern affairs has been quite constant since the partition of the island, even if during several decades (especially from the 1940s until the end of the 1960s) it has mainly exerted its influence through informal / unofficial channels. However, with the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985, the Republic gained an official say in Northern Ireland’s internal affairs, a concession which led to Protestant discontent. Hence, we find a strong example of a community conflict with overlapping cleavages, which certainly contributes to the explosive character of the conflict. (sources???: see case study EF??)

political explanations and claims). However, generally speaking, we can say that Catholics have always depicted the conflict as mainly political (a consequence of decolonisation and partition of Ireland), whereas Protestants have first favoured a cultural framing (esp. a religious one), which has been replaced by a political one when the British government decided to implement direct rule, and to push forward accommodation initiatives including elements of power-sharing.
b) Communities and factions

*Figure 2*: Communities and factions in the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland

Protestant side

- Radical unionists/loyalists (DUP)
- Pragmatic unionists (UUP)

Catholic side

- Republicans (Sinn Fein)
- Constitutional nationalists (SLDP)

**Factions on the Protestant side**

1. Radical unionists / loyalists: they dream to return to a Stormont-like administration, are opposed to power-sharing and to any form of association with the Republic. Main representative: DUP

2. “Pragmatic” unionists: they accept the power-sharing principle but are opposed to an increased participation of the Republic in Northern Ireland’s affairs, and of course to reunification. Main representative: UUP

**Factions on the Catholic side**

1. Republicans: their first objective is the reunification of Ireland. Have long supported the recourse to violence to achieve this aim. The have developed in the nineties a more pragmatic approach, and now favour a completely peaceful and political
approach. They believe the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement will be a first step towards the reunification of the island. Main representative: Sinn Fein

2. Constitutional Nationalists: they have always condemned violence, and favoured a power-sharing approach. They believe the protestants can be convinced of the benefits of reunification. Main representative: SDLP

d) Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

**Figure ???: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>proVVWI</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>65</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. ISSUES AND FRAMING

1. **Within-camp fact. Dominance Protestants**

2. **Main paradigm Protestants**

3. **Perception of self-faction Protestants**

On the Protestant side, for a long period, the "non-existence" of the Catholics was the predominant perception: their culture, religion and political claims were considered as totally illegitimate, while the Protestant cultural traditions were the only meaningful, decent and respectable ones. When forced at the beginning of the seventies to reconsider their attitudes towards the Catholic minority, most Protestants
have begun to see them as political opponents, towards which they still hold a great number of prejudices.

More recently we find on the Protestant side the general perception of a “decline”, of irremediable changes that undermine their dominance in the Northern Irish society.

**Faction 1A: The radical Unionist/loyalists**

In the radical unionist faction, this perception is accompanied by the feeling of being a “besieged garrison” in an inhospitable land, of being surrounded by enemies (Catholics) and undermined by traitors (pragmatic unionists). The overall strategy for radical unionists is “not an inch” or “no surrender” attitude. Up until recently they tried to keep as much power as possible by avoiding power-sharing by all means. The Radical unionists have also been highly involved in electoral politics, but they have sometimes used other non conventional means of action like strikes and demonstrations as main type of actions. The main leader of this faction, Ian Paisley, uses a discourse that is a mixture of politics and religion, and who derives parts of his legitimacy from its position as leader and founder of the Free Presbyterian Church.

**Faction 1B: The pragmatic unionists**

The pragmatic unionists accept the power-sharing principle but are opposed to an increased participation of the Republic in Northern Ireland’s affairs, and of course to reunification. The main representatives are UUP and an increasing share of the DUP. The overall strategy for pragmatic unionists is to maintain and strengthen the union with Great Britain, by forging alliances with British political parties and electoral politics.
f) **Community and factional discourses on the Catholic side**

Up until very recently, most Catholics used to consider Protestants as enemies with whom they were in conflict, and whose political aspirations had to be fought. Since the beginning of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, a majority of Catholics has come to accept that compromises were necessary, and that, should the reunification of Ireland ever happen, Protestants had also to be seen as partners – although not always reliable ones.

Opposite to the Protestant, Catholics have the growing perception of their own community of being on the rise, of reaching little by little their political objectives, of having successfully fought discrimination and segregation that they were facing during the past decades.

*Faction 2A: Republicans*

The first objective of the Republicans is the reunification of Ireland. They have long supported the recourse to violence to achieve this aim. They have developed in the nineties a more pragmatic approach and discourse, and now favor a completely peaceful and political approach. They believe the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement will be a first step towards the reunification of the island.

The overall strategy for Republicans, up until recently, is to force the British army out, try to mobilize support inside and outside Northern Ireland for the organization of a referendum about the reunification of the island. For a long period the Republicans were favoring a military strategy for reaching their aim of unifying the island, but since the beginning of the eighties they have coupled it with electoral politics, and nowadays they seem to have completely abandoned the armed struggle. Their main strategy is therefore to increase their share of the vote, and to maintain their strong influence at the local level in Catholic areas.
Faction 2B: Constitutional Nationalists

The Constitutional Nationalists have always condemned violence, and favoured a power-sharing approach. They believe the Protestants can be convinced of the benefits of reunification. Their influence is declining in face of the rise of Sinn Féin since the end of the 1990s.

The overall strategy for the constitutional nationalists is electoral politics and attempts to convince unionists to join a united Ireland. As main type of action, the constitutional nationalists have always favored constitutional politics, as well as dialogue with unionists.

g) Conclusions

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2???. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??

2. The conflict between Flemish vs. Francophones in Belgium

1. Conflict dimensions

13 At the local level where no such fine-tuned deals are possible, leaders are much more likely to utter polarizing discourses. The main moderating initiatives usually come from civil society actors such as Churches or community workers.
The conflict between Flemish and Francophones clearly started out as a cultural/identity centre-periphery conflict, whereby the newly formed state (1830) adopted French as the official state language, while Flanders was also economically peripheral given its slow industrialisation.

By the 1960s, this centre-periphery opposition had become more balanced, and even inverted in many sectors. Long-lasting, reformist protest led to a very slow but real improvement to a position of near equality of both languages, although there are still some linguistic issues unsettled regarding the use of Dutch in the Brussels region and the influx of frenchspeakers in the communes around Brussels, formally belonging to the unilingual Flemish region. While the territorial boundaries of the Flemish, Brussels and Walloon regions have been fixed since 1963, there is still disagreement on the compromise regarding Brussels and its periphery, whereby francophones would like to see the bilingual regime be expanded into the Flemish hinterland around Brussels. Universal suffrage with PR also gave the Flemish a political majority position since the end of World War I, but since the constitutional reforms starting in 1970, several veto powers have been given to the francophone minority. In the 1960s, Flanders became the most prosperous region based on small and medium sized enterprises, multinationals, working ethics and “entrepreneurship, while Wallonia’s economy declined being too much based on coal and steel industry.

As the most prosperous region, Flanders contributes now more to the federal budget, and also to the interpersonal redistribution through welfare expenditures, hence supporting a greater part of the global revenues in relation to its population. This North-South solidarity has become the main issue in the community conflict, as a part of the Flemish political and economic elite believe that these transfers jeopardize the further expansion of Flemish economy and welfare state. Hence, the Flemish, or rather the Flemish elites, calls for economic autonomy.

In fact, one the Belgian state was transformed in a federal state and cultural autonomy was granted to the communities, public opinion has lost interest in much of the remaining non-cultural sources of conflicts. These conflicts are instrumentalized by political elites on both sides, by the political parties that have been fully split along linguistic lines and therefore do not compete anymore across community borders, and the elites manning the new regional political institutions (regional parliament, executives and civil services). Note also that since the 1960s, there are no more
“national” mass-media that aim to address the publics at both sides of the linguistic border, and therefore there is no more single state-wide “public sphere” anymore in the country.

b) Communities and factions

Figure 7: Communities and factions in the conflict between Flemish and Francophones in Belgium

- Flemish community
  - Regionalists
  - Independists (N-VA, VB)
  - Loyalists
- Francophone community
  - Unitarists
  - Regionalists
  - Rattachistes (RWF)

c) Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Flemish and Francophones in Belgium

<table>
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<th>proVW/Vo</th>
<th>60</th>
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3. The Flemish community

In spite of the fact that many compromises have been reached (between the political elites of the two communities), the predominant perception (amplified via the Flemish mass media especially) still conveys many prejudices and stereotypes (Waloons are “lazy” and “profiteurs”, and there elites “corrupt”). These prejudices have increased from the 1980s onwards, as the socio-economic dimensions have become more salient.

**Faction 1A: “Regionalists”**

The main objective for the Regionalists is to enhance autonomy of the Flemish community, mainly in socio-economic terms. This faction is the predominant one. Indeed, this option is the position of almost all the democratic political parties (that in 1999 all endorsed in the Flemish Parliament a list of Flemish Demands), but also by the media and most employers in Flanders.

As a faction in most mainstream parties, the regionalists are very influential and quite legitimate within own community. The public political declarations often ask before elections or even during the legislature more autonomy for the Flemish community. They are willing to bargain with the Francophones over these demands, for instance by giving financial compensations to the Francophone community. The actors of this faction perceive Flanders as an historic, cultural, social and economic specific community that requires a larger degree of autonomy. They see Waloons / Francophones as different in historic, cultural, social and economic regards, that want
stick to institutional status quo mainly because they profit from it and it allows them to maintain a decent standard of living in spite of declining economic fortune. The prosperous Flanders region is presented as being structurally very different from the Walloon economy and society. This difference requires specific regional policies to enhance its economic wealth and degree of social welfare provisions.

Faction 1B: “Independists”

This faction is the most radical one and is composed by the extreme right “Vlaams Belang” (former “Vlaams Blok”), the democratic N-VA, some old fashioned Flemish think-thanks and part of Flemish movement, minority factions in some traditional parties, and a small minority of Flemish entrepreneurs. They constitute a legitimate minority opinion, especially the N-VA that has concluded an electoral cartel with the main Flemish governing party, the Christian-democrats CD-V, ex-CVP). The Vlaams Belang remains a pariah party due to its racist positions (cfr. cordon sanitaire around the Vlaams Belang).

The main discourse is that a prosperous Flanders is structurally very different from the Walloon economy and requires specific regional policies to enhance its economic wealth and degree of social welfare provisions. It is also a “nation” that has the right to become a state. Therefore independence is necessary and legitimate. As overall strategies, they promote separatism by putting electoral pressure on mainstream parties, and promote the idea on an independent Flanders in the media.

Faction 1C: “Loyalists”

The actors in this faction comprise the Flemish (but also Francophone wings of) trade unions and their adjacent organisations, some entrepreneurs, small think-thanks of intellectuals, old fashioned belgicists and minority opinion in traditional parties in Flanders. For these actors, the current federalisation process has gone far enough to satisfy the legitimate claims of regions and communities; further
disintegration would be a loose/loose strategy; if Belgian model of solidarity fails, so will the idea of European Union. They claims that differences between Flemings and Walloons are exaggerated by the other factions and the media, and are shifting over time. The loyalist faction is the mainstream among the citizens but NOT among the political elites.

4. The Francophone community

Note that on the French side, for more than a century, the “non-existence” of the Flemish was the predominant perception: Flemish was not recognized as a “language” (rather seen as a bunch of “dialects”), and a specific Flemish culture or “people” was not recognized either.

In spite of the fact that many compromises have been reached (between the political elites of the two communities), the predominant perception (amplified via the mass media) still conveys many prejudices and stereotypes, (Flemings being “rich and arrogant” and “extremist/racist”, “can’t do anything else but work”, etc.). These prejudices have increased from the 1980s onwards, as the socio-economic dimensions have become more salient.

Faction 2A: “Unitarists”

Contrary to a large part of the Flemish community, the main francophone political parties, intellectuals, media, a large majority of the socio-economic decision-makers want to maintain an unitary Belgium. As spokespersons of this mainstream opinion within the Francophone community, political elites are very influential and legitimate within own community. For the unitarists, the current federalisation process has gone far enough to satisfy the legitimate claims of regions and communities; further disintegration would create the end of the Belgian state. Their strategy is forming party coalitions favoring institutional status-quo through negotiations; rejecting further defederalisation of policy sectors, renationalizing certain policy sectors, and vetoing any Flemish proposal with centrifugal potential.
**Faction 2B: “Regionalists”**

The objective of the Regionalist is to enhance autonomy, mainly in socio-economic terms. They constitute a small minority factions in most traditional parties (like the FDF in federation with the francophone liberal party, MR) and a minority of French-speaking entrepreneurs. Their main discourse is French-speaking Belgium is different from Flanders; the Walloon economy requires specific regional policies to enhance is economic recovery; the interests of Frenchspeaking minority in Flanders (mainly around Brussels) has to be protected. If Belgium would disappear, French-speaking Belgium should be “prepared”, having a fall-back strategy to secure at best the region’s interest.

**Faction 2C: “Rattachistes”**

The objective of this faction is to merge with France. It is a very tiny minority in the Francophone community. It is defended by a mini-party that never managed to gain parliamentary representation (Rassemblement Wallonie France, RWF). Their main discourse is that the Flemish will inevitably gain their independence eventually. Therefore, as Belgium is bound to disappear, the only viable solution for the Frenchspeaking population is to join France.

**Conclusion**

REDRAFT??

In spite of the peak conflictual period of the 1960s and early 1970s, it may be argued that the “pragmatic” factions have always stayed predominant, on both sides. This being said:

- in the 1960s and 1970s, the more radical factions (on both sides) were quite strong (also electorally and in terms of impact on the agenda of mainstream parties), especially through the three ethno-regionalist parties (VU, RW & FDF);
from the early 1990s onwards, on the Flemish side alone, the radical nationalists are gaining momentum, not only through the Vlaams Blok, but also increasingly through most of the mainstream parties.

Note that we do not cover the period of recent radicalisation between the two communities, or at least between their political and media elites, due to the problematic government formation after the June 10, 2007 general elections, which still has not lead to a final government.

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2??. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??

1. The conflict between Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus

a) Conflict dimensions

The Cyprus conflict between Greek and Turkish speaking communities is perceived by actors as well as experts clearly as a cultural conflict, with two communities that also speak different languages (spoken in a large neighbouring fatherland) and mostly adhere to different religions. The 1974 crisis turned it also clearly in a conflict over territory (with demands varying from enosis, partition, centralised state, federation or confederation), with traditionally strong impact from outside actors, as a British colony, and both communities special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively and repeated attempts for international guided settlement (UN and EU). Before the physical separation of the two communities in 1974, the Turkish minority called for better representation the within the Greek Cypriot dominated state. After 1974 emerged the demographic dimension, as result of the massive population transfer from Turkey into north Cyprus.
b) Communities and factions

Figure ?: Communities and factions in the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Factions in the Turkish Cypriot Community

1. “Separatist/nationalists”: they demand the partition of the island into two separate/independent states or joined into a confederation.

2. “Integrationists/federalists”: they always condemned the use of violence as a means of struggle. They aimed at maintaining a bi-communitarian Cypriot state on the basis of a loose functional or territorial federation.

Factions in the Greek Cypriot Community

1. “Extreme nationalists”: they were the most powerful groups in 1950s and demanded enosis.

2. “Centrists”: they demand a unitary state with minority rights. Most nationalists became centrists under Makarios’ leadership who declared that enosis was an ideal but not an achievable goal in 1960s.

3. “centralist federalists”: they demanded a “centralized federalism”. ?? CHECK CASE STUDY
4. “bicommunal-bizonal federalists”: demand for establishing a bi-communal federal system.

B. Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes

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Interpretation: to be done!! ??

d) Factions and discourses in the Greek Cypriote camp

Until late 1950 Greek Cypriot side saw colonialism as the main source of conflict. Until the mid-1950s Greek Cypriot leadership on the other hand perceived Turkish Cypriot side as an ‘unimportant minority’.

Between late 1950s and 1974 Greek Cypriot side perceived the conflict as a result of separatist demands of the Turkish Cypriot side. Intercommunal fights beginning in the second part of 1950s created a process of political exclusion and alienation between the two communities. The first three years of peaceful coexistence in post-independence period was followed by inter-communal alienation
based on violence and ethnocentrism which prevailed until 1967. The Turkish Cypriot side was perceived as a strategic minority used by external powers against the Greek Cypriot community.

Turkey’s military intervention in 1974 has changed the main paradigm in the Greek Cypriot side. Since 1974 Greek Cypriots’ discourse focused on denouncing ‘Turkish expansionism and invasion’ of a part of Cyprus territory.

**Factions and discourses in the Turkish Cypriote camp**

Although cultural dimension has been a salient element used by Turkish Cypriot side in framing the conflict, territorial dimension has been the most crucial element. The Turkish-Cypriot community used to consider either the demand for enosis or the demand of Greek Cypriot side for absolute control on the island as the main issue creating conflict.

Until the mid 1950s, the Turkish Cypriot leadership supported the colonial regime and perceived the demands (self-determination, enosis) and actions (EOKA’s violence and mass demonstrations) of the Greek Cypriot side as illegal. The Greek Cypriot side was perceived as a tyrannical majority. Hence, the Turkish Cypriot leadership always demanded both ‘separate representation’ in the Cypriote political institutions and ‘veto rights’ so as to protect ‘Turkish existence’ in the island.

**QUID Turkish discourse post 1974??**

**Conclusion**

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2???. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??
2. The Slovenes in the Austrian Carinthia Land

a) Conflict dimensions

The conflict between the Slovene speaking minority in the Austrian Carinthia Land and the Germanspeaking majority is certainly less dramatic and less complex than some of the other cases studied within the Peace-Com project. The cultural/linguistic dimension is central to the current phase of the conflict. The Slovenes are fighting to preserve their language and culture and the German-speaking nationalists continue to place stumbling blocks into the Slovenes’ path, pressuring them to assimilate. Other dimensions have been also relevant, but mainly in a distant past, until the end of WWII.14

b) Communities and factions

Figure ?: Factions in the Slovene and Germanspeaking communities in the Austrian Carinthia Land

German

Ultra-nationalists:

Moderates:

Slovene-speaking

Nationalists

Zentralverband slowenischer Organisationen

Rat der Kärntner Slowenen

14 Clashes between Slovenes and Germanspeakers in the period since WWI until the end of WWII were more serious and violent. The 1920 referendum (should southern Carinthia belong to Austria or to the Yugoslav Kingdom) and the NS regime raised the issue of Slovene identity. Following the 1920 plebiscite, the Carinthian provincial government did not heed its promise to grant the Slovenes additional rights (the Slovenes had a political party and cultural organizations). Resettlement of Slovenes took place to some extent as of 1914, when the German population actively engaged in altering the ethnic composition of the Carinthian population. Under the nazi regime (use of Slovenian in public prohibited, their cultural associations dissolved, Slovenes were deported and German-speakers settled on their lands (the Slovenes were able to return after the war ended). Slovenes still feel that the German-speakers are trying to force them to become German-Austrians. After Yugoslavia acknowledged and accepted the 1955 State Treaty, the territorial dimension no longer played a role (though the ultra-nationalists (Kärntner Abwehrkämpferbund, Kärntner Heimatdienst) fear that the Slovenes’ allegiance is with the Slavs (formerly with Yugoslavia, today with Slovenia) and continue to play on fears of annexation of southern Carinthia by Slovenia.
Factions on the ‘German’ side

1. Nationalists: they are mainly found in the FPÖ (the political party that has dominated politics in Carinthia since 1989), but are also found in parts of the ÖVP (Conservatives) and the SPÖ (Social Democrats);

2. Ultra-nationalists: they including members from the Kärntner Heimatdienst and Kärntner Abwehrkämpferbund who feel the majority population is being repressed by favoritism toward Slovenes. They have often been successful in lobbying Jörg Haider to accommodate their interests;

3. Moderates: they who seek to find a compromise solution to the conflict and are found predominantly in the ranks of the ÖVP and SPÖ.\textsuperscript{15}

Factions on the Slovene-speaking side

1. Rat der Kärntner Slowenen (Council of the Carinthian Slovenes) with a Christian conservative orientation (established in 1948), supporting an independist Slovene political party (Enotna Lista).

2. Zentralverband slowenischer Organisationen (Umbrella Organization of Slovene Associations) with a more liberal and compromising orientation (established in 1949 as the “Democratic Front”).

C. Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

\textsuperscript{15} The Greens, who have not been very strong in Carinthia, are more liberal-minded and generally advocate a solution in favor of the Slovene minority, i.e. they represent a separate group.
Factions and discourses in German speaking community

The German-speaking majority generally pursued a policy of subordinating the Slovenes. However, not until the nazi-regime were efforts made to eradicate the Slovene population: their (undesired) existence was acknowledged and therefore the solution was to “get rid of them”. After WWII, the German-speaking majority did not have much choice but to acknowledge that the Slovene minority had to be accepted, but they continued to be viewed with suspicion. Once the British troops left, the German-speaking side began to again intensify its policy of forced assimilation. The relationship has worsened at times, but tensions subsequently subsided again. Tensions have increased when Provincial Governor Haider took office again in 1999. He continues to use the conflict to incite fear/unease among the German-speaking population and continually promises his electorate that no additional bilingual topographical signs will be set up, in spite of the 2001 Constitutional ruling.

Also, although the acceptance of the 1955 State Treaty by Yugoslavia the territorial dimension no longer played a role, the ultra-nationalists (Kärntner Abwehrkämpferbund, Kärntner Heimatkabine) fear that the Slovenes’ allegiance is still

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CM: Add Austria in Table en tête ??!!

Interpretation: still to be done! ??
with the “Slavs” (formerly with Yugoslavia, today with Slovenia) and continue to play on fears of annexation of southern Carinthia by Slovenia.

Factions and discourses in Slovene speaking Community

The Rat der Kärntner Slowenen (Council of the Carinthian Slovenes) with a Christian conservative orientation, was established 1948. The Rat has advocated a more ethno-centrist agenda, showing less willingness than the Zentralverband to compromise on certain issues. In the 1970s, the Rat pursued a policy of “relying on our own forces” and was able to score with the Slovene population through it affiliate political party, the independist Enotna Lista, arguing that independence is essential for the survival of the minority.16

The Zentralverband has been more willing to compromise with the provincial government (on the number of topographical signs, etc.), and advocates the integration of Slovenes in the major (German-speaking) parties. The organization feels that pushing for individual Slovene political rights is a nationalistic approach. In general, they support the SPÖ.

???? CHECK CASE STUDY

Conclusion

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2???. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??

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D. The Basque Country case

a) Conflict dimensions

16 Enotna Lista nearly received enough votes for a mandate in the 1975 provincial election, but since then Enotna Lista has only been successful at local level (city council elections, etc.).
The Basque conflict is a successful case of the resistance of the periphery against the homogenisation policies of the centre of the Spanish state. From the beginning is has been a matter of recognition of the Basque identity, language and culture, by granting a large degree of autonomy to Basque institutions. Since the democratisation, most of these demands have been gradually met. One of the remaining issues are the territorial borders of the Basque community. Basque nationalists claim for a broader territory that would also include the northern part of Navarra and French Basque Country. In addition, radical nationalists call for a fully independent Basque state.

b) Communities and factions

**Figure ?**: Communities and factions in the conflict between Basque nationalists and non-nationalists

Factions on the Basque nationalist side:

1. Moderate nationalists: the right to the auto-determination of the Basque Country continues to appear as their ultimate objective, but at the same time participating in the new political organization of the Spanish democratic state, namely through the construction of the “Estado de las autonomías” (Autonomous State). Their most relevant political organization is the PNV (Nationalist Basque Party).

2. Radical nationalists (“abertzales”): they aim at attain a totally independent Basque Country, although defending different paths and means to obtain their objectives.
Basically, the main difference that could be established is between those groups and organisations that defend the legitimacy of employing violent actions and those who accept—at least partially—the State and Basque political institutions as the “locus” to pursue their political fight. The radical nationalist organisations form a very complex world that constitutes the “abertzale” Left.\(^{17}\)

**Factions on the Non-nationalist side**

1. Moderate (or pragmatic) non-nationalists: while still defending the unity of the Spanish State, they accept the existence of the heterogeneity of Spain from an historical, linguistic and cultural basis. Therefore, they have always worked in favour of the construction of the Autonomous State and adopt a rather pragmatic view on the negotiations regarding the competences accorded to the regions. PSOE and IU constitute the core of this faction, together with some minor forces of the conservative party (PP).

2. Radical non-nationalist: they defend not only the unity of Spain as a State but also as a nation. Therefore, they only accept a rather limited Autonomous State and resist any extension of the Basque political competences. Basically, they are opposed to any kind of Basque nationalist claim that they interpret as a danger of “breaking the unity of Spain”.

**c) Evolution of predominance of factions over time**

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

**Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Basque nationalists and non-nationalists**

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\(^{17}\) ETA defines itself as the armed organisation of this movement.
In spite of the peaks of the conflict, specially regarding to the increase of political violence, it could be said that the moderate factions have been predominant on the nationalist side. The PNV controlled the Basque government since the first autonomous elections (1983) and – although it has maintained rather ambiguous positions towards the most radical and violent nationalist organisations -- has always tried to solve the Basque conflict in a rather pragmatic way. On the non-nationalist side, the UCD and PSOE governments (1977-1996) also maintained pragmatic positions towards the Basque conflict. This being said, it must no be forgotten that during the PP governments (1996-2004), and especially after the end of the truce established by ETA (1998-99), there was a short period (2000-2004) in which the radical non-nationalist faction was dominant. This was due to the radicalization of the “Spanish-nationalist” positions in the PP. The increases of the political confrontation also lead – in spite of the PNV continuity in the Basque government -- to a radicalization in the moderate nationalist positions that can be interpreted as a dominance of a quite more radical faction during these years.

\[\textbf{d) Factions and discourses in Basque nationalist and non-nationalist camp}\]

The identity dimension is one of the main contested issues since the unveiling of this conflict in XIX century. Basque nationalism has constantly stressed the recognition of its community specificities as tool for conflict decreasing. The Spanish
democratic constitution (1978) and their own Basque statute of autonomy (1979) consider this as historical specificities. Besides, the Basque Country Autonomous government has developed and promoted Basque culture and identity through its own institutions along the democratic period. Recently, in 2004, The Basque “lehendakari” (prime minister) proposed to open a public national debate on the revision of the Basque Autonomic Rule in order to work in favour of broader identity recognition for Basque community.\textsuperscript{18}

Culture and language are key elements in Basque identity construction discourse. Since the “Ley para la normalización del euskera” (Euskera Normalization Bill) was passed in 1992, Basque political government has constantly motivated the promotion of the Basque Language, the launch and support of cultural and educational institutions and of Euskera (the Basque language) and the implementation of policies to head the development and spread it both inside and outside the Basque territory. It is one of the five official languages in the Spanish state. Nevertheless, the language rights which the Basque community seeks have been guaranteed only since the 1978 Constitution.

Territorial issues are one of the main elements of the nationalist discourse. Basque nationalists claim a broader territory, or what they call “historical territories”, being called Euskal Herria. They include the three constitutional provinces,\textsuperscript{19} the northern part of Navarra Nafarroa -- and what is called the “French Basque Country” - - Lapurdi, Zuberoa and Benafarroa).

The 1977-79 period is characterised by the common effort in the building of the Basque political autonomy. Therefore, the conflict was defined in political terms by both sides (nationalist and non-nationalists). Both sides perceived each other as “different others”, as during those years the common work in building the new Basque political autonomy generated a strong confidence on the possibility of solving the “historical Basque problem”. There was an orientation towards cooperation.

During the 1984-1986 period, the increase of the political confrontation lead to an “alien other” perception of the other in both sides. During those years the possibility of compromise between both groups decreased and the perception of

\textsuperscript{18} The formal proposal was rejected by the Spanish parliament in December 2004.

\textsuperscript{19} The provinces constitutionally structured of the CAV (Basque Autonomous Community) are: Álava, Vizcaya and Gipúzcoa. 1978 Constitution recognizes a new territorial structure of the state by which some kind of autonomous government is guaranteed.
open conflict between groups spread. Also, in the years 1984-1986 period, a crisis within the nationalist camp triggered a certain shift to a more culturalist/identitarian interpretation of the Basque conflict. Nevertheless, in the non-nationalist side its interpretation in strictly political terms persisted.

Then, at least until the 1996 general elections (won by the PP) there was a certain evolution in both sides toward the perception of the other in terms of the possibility of cooperation in order to solve the conflict. In the most recent period (1998-2004) one finds amongst the nationalist factions a clear increase of the confrontational perception of the other. Besides, the radicalizations of dominant non-nationalist positions lead to a brief period of denial of the other. Specifically, there was a clear attempt from the PP government to present the most radical nationalist demands and their violent means of action in terms of “mere common criminality”. In spite of the increase in the cultural/identitarian interpretation of the conflict in the nationalist side, the main discourse still saw the causes of the conflict to be essentially political. Also in the non-nationalist side, the interpretation of the conflict – although radicalized -- continued being formulated in strictly political terms.

e) Conclusion

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2??, Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??
E. The Kosovo case

a) Conflict dimensions

The Kosovo case consists a strong conflict over territory linked with ancient identities, a conflict overlapping with other dimensions as well. Each community thinks its identity is at threat because of the existence of the other, and stresses its own specificities. Both communities are quite homogenous and defend diametrically opposed objectives. Serbs see Kosovo as their cradle. It has a mythical status to them. Albanians see Serbs as the enemy who lost the entitlements over the Kosovo territory. They think that the joint life with Serbs is impossible. Albanians complained that they are not free to use their language and exercise their culture during the Milosevic rule. After 1999, the claim was reversed: the Serbian minority that still lives on Kosovo claims they are denied basic cultural and collective rights. Kosovo Albanians have pursued the policy of forcing Serbs out of Kosovo by resorting to various types of pressures since the end of 1940s until now. Hence, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, Albanian Kosovars’ policy has been to break away from Serbia. These tensions led to the abolishment of the Kosovo assembly in 1990, and Albanians claimed they were denied basic political and human rights. Hence, the Albanian community of Kosovo distrusted state structures and apparatus. They created parallel political, health, and educational institutions that were abolished only after 1999 when Serb police forces moved out of Kosovo. After 1999, the Kosovo Serbs are putting forward the same claims with respect to human rights. Finally, there is the influence of the neighbouring fatherland, the Albanian state, since the mid 1970s.20

b) Communities and factions

Figure ?: Communities and factions in the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo

Unionists (Serbian)

20 In 1992, the first independent Kosovo government in exile was elected.
Separatists (Albanian)

Factions on the Unionist side

Most Serbian actors have always had a unified attitude as regards Kosovo. The only time when the Serbian side had two camps was in the period between 1985 and 1987 when the Serbian resistance movement (composed of Kosovo Serbs) was active on Kosovo. In this period, the Communist party refused to acknowledge the conflict over Kosovo. After the Communist Party led by Slobodan Milosevic in 1987 adopted the Movement’s program, the Serbian side has been unified to date.

Factions on the Separatists side

All actors that make up the Albanian side have always had one single goal: they wanted sovereign Kosovo, independent of Serbia. There were several factions within the camp, but they only differed as regards the methods to achieve that goal.

BUT THAT IS IMPORTANT!!! CHECK CASE WP1 ??

F. Evolution of predominance of factions over time

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo

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<td>1994</td>
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*Basque Country *April 1st
Factions and discourses in “Unionist” Camp

Serbs ignored the existence of Albanians in the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After 1945, the Serbian Communist Party saw Albanians as their partners and became after 1966 very concessive to them, which resulted in two constitutions that granted Albanians more and more of the sought-for political autonomy. During Milosevic’s rule (1987-1999), Albanians were again ignored by the Serbs authorities and regarded as deadly enemies. After 1999, Albanian side was by Serbs perceived as different other ‘with whom it is necessary to talk.’

Factions and discourses in “Separatists” Camp

The Albanian side on the other hand has always perceived the Serbs as “alien others”, as the people who should leave the territory of Kosovo because they do not belong there.

Conclusion

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2??%. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??

Interpretation: still to be done!! ??
8. The Vojvodina case

Conflict dimensions

Identity, culture and language are the major dimensions of this conflict, but only since 1988. Similarly to the Kosovo case, the Serbian communist in mid-1960 became increasingly lenient to the Vojvodina autonomist’s demands. As a result, a new Constitution was adopted in 1974, giving large political autonomy to Vojvodina. Yet, the Vojvodinian communist elite insisted on total separation from Serbia. Although a province within Serbia, in 1974-1988 Vojvodina enjoyed the representation in the federal parliament and presidency, had its own judiciary, parliament, government, even its own constitution. However, during the Milosevic rule ethnic minorities were accused of not being committed citizens and of wanting to undermine Serbian unity in Vojvodina, even to secede to their mother-states. As a result, largest ethnic minorities, Hungarians and Croats, were under the pressure of majority Serbs. All constitutional and economic privileges given to minorities were withdrawn or downgraded in 1988-1992. Hence, some Vojvodina actors contest the strongly centralised nature of the political system, and keep demanding fiscal autonomy, independent judiciary, and reintroduction of the Vojvodina constitution.

But also socio-economic factors play a role: the Communists carried out brutal redistribution of property after WW2, seizing land and houses of rich inhabitants and giving it to the poor settlers who came in from Bosnia and Montenegro, which also triggered demographic changes. The conflict between the old inhabitants and new settlers has been arguably had bearing on the development of the conflict during the communist era. It has been the most dominant aspect of the conflict because it has been carried over to the next (today’s) generation. Besides, in 1991-1995, Vojvodina was a home for less than 500,000 refugees from Bosnia and Croatia, where war was

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21 Serbia, as a whole, has over 20 ethnic minorities that account for 14.7% of the population. There are five big ethnic minorities: Hungarians (3.91%), Bosniacs / Moslems (2%), Albanians (0.82%), Croats (0.94%), and Roma, scattered all over the country, accounting for 1.44%. There are 15 other ethnic minorities, accounting for between 0.03% and 0.79%. The bulk of the of minorities are located in Vojvodina.
waged. This again changed the ethnic structure and intensified tensions between old inhabitants and new settlers.  

Finally, since 2004, Hungary started to interfere with the Vojvodina affairs, claiming that Hungarian minority does not enjoy full collective rights protection.

b) Communities and factions

**Figure 1:** Communities and factions in the conflict between Decentralisers and Autonomists in Vojvodina

- **Decentralisers**
  - Some Serbian oppositional parties
  - The main part of the Yugoslav and Serbian communists

- **Autonomists**
  - Hungarian ethnic parties
  - Serbian regional parties

**Factions on the Decentralisers’ side**

Until 1974, the Yugoslav and Serbian Communist League was unified in approaching the issue of autonomy of Vojvodina. After 1996, some Serbian oppositional parties started to view Vojvodina as deserving higher autonomy within Serbia.

**Factions on the Autonomists side**

During 1950s and 1960s the communist league of Vojvodina unanimously insisted on the autonomy for Vojvodina, which they got in 1974. After Serbian government scrapped the autonomy, the autonomists forces fought to get it back. Only after 2000, another short wave of terrorizing the population of Vojvodina by some Serbian far right wing political parties occurred in 1991. As a result, some Croats and other minorities left Vojvodina.

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22 Another short wave of terrorizing the population of Vojvodina by some Serbian far right wing political parties occurred in 1991. As a result, some Croats and other minorities left Vojvodina.
one can see two dominant camps in Vojvodina: one led by Hungarian ethnic parties, the other by Serbian regional parties.

**G. Evolution of predominance of factions over time**

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

**Figure ??: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Decentralisers and Autonomists in Vojvodina**

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>05</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>White camp: dominance Decentralizers</td>
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</table>

Interpretation: still to be done!! ??

**Factions and discourses in the “Decentralisers Camp”**

The decentralization camp perceived after the WW2 the conflict as a socio-economic matter. After 1988, the conflict was perceived by the Serbian side as a matter of ethnic identity.

Since the end of WW2, the Communist League did not admit there was another party to the conflict until the mid-1950s. By the end of 1950s, the Serbian Communist Party became extremely tolerant towards the two provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo), giving them more and more concessions. That lasted until 1988, when Communist Part led by Slobodan Milosevic annulled the autonomy of Vojvodina. The Belgrade centralist parties saw the other side as ‘alien others’, accusing them of treachery and attempt to break up Serbia’s unity.
Factions and discourses in “autonomist camp”

The Autonomists from the Vojvodina Communist League were forced to see the Serbian communist as their partners after 1945 hoping this would result in the province’s autonomy. Especially after the 1974 constitution, the Vojvodinian autonomists elite came to believe that they lived in the best of the worlds and that ‘the enemy’ was defeated, acknowledging no “other side” in conflict. It changed after 1988, when Vojvodinian parties again admitted that the conflict exists and saw centralist government from Belgrade as an enemy. After the 2000 regime change, most (but not all) of the parties see the other side as a partner.

The autonomist camp saw the conflict as having a socio-economic dimension in the 1945-1988 period. Between 1988 and 2000, it was forced to perceive it as cultural due to the accusations coming from the Serbian side. After 2000 socio-economic aspects become again prevalent for the autonomists.

Conclusion

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2???. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND???

9. The Sandzak case

Conflict dimensions

Contrary to the other to cases in ex-Yugoslavia included in our project, in the Sandzak case religion is a dimension present since the beginning, and has been
overlapping with the ethnic identity dimension. Serbs are Orthodox and Bosniaks are Moslem. Religious dimension is critical for the Bosniak side because Bosniaks have for a long time been deriving their ethnic identity from their religious identity. Until the beginning of the 1990s, Bosniaks called themselves Moslems, which signified both religious and ethnic identity. The main reason for mutual ethnic intolerance, that dominated the conflict since 1945, is grounded in the official state policy between 1945 and 1963 and between 1990 and 2000. Serbs claimed that the Bosniaks are not a separate ethnic group, but rather Serbs who, by force, were forced to become Muslem during the domination of Turks in the middle ages. Only in 1963, when the new communist constitution was adopted, Bosniaks were granted an opportunity to declare ethnically as Moslems. Bosniaks saw Serbian policy as an attempt to neglect their cultural identity and assimilate Bosniaks into Serbs. The distinctions between Moslem (religious identity) / Bosniak (ethnic identity) was made only after 1990.

Although the Bosniaks and the Serbs speak the same language, language is also a community marker! Bosniaks speak jekavian dialect and use Latin alphabet, calling their language “Bosnian”, while the Serbs speak ekavian dialect and use Cyrillic alphabet, calling their language “Serbian”. While the Bosnian language was officially recognized in 2000, the effective exercise of this right by allowing them to teach Bosniak in schools, was only granted in 2005.

Population shifts between Moslems/Bosniaks and Serbians were frequent in the post-war area, for a variety of reasons. Expulsed from the Sandžak area and re-immigrating. Emigration of Bosniaks stopped after the 1963 constitution recognised Moslems as a separate cultural and ethnical identity. Between 1990 and 2000, the Bosniaks refused to participate in political institutions. Sandžak Bosniaks boycotted elections twice (1992 and 1993). The local Novi Pazar Assembly was abolished in 1996 when the Bosniak parties had the majority. Only after 2000, the Moslems returned to the institutions. Today, the Bosniaks have two seats in the Ethnic Assembly of Serbia and, at the level of the State Union, a Minister for Ethnic Minorities.

b) Communities and factions
Figure 2: Communities and factions in the conflict between Bosniaks and Serbians in Sandžak since 1990

Bosniaks/Moslems of Sandžak

Radical wing is represented by Democratic Action of Sandžak, Democratic Party

Serbian state authorities

Factions on the Bosniak side of Sandžak after 1990

The radical wing is represented by Democratic Action of Sandžak, headed by Sulejman Ugljanin (president of the Novi Pazar municipality and president of the Bosniak Ethnic Council for Serbia & Montenegro). This wing calls for some more radical methods in insuring the autonomy for Sandžak. Most of its claims come down to political autonomy for Sandžak. Such demand was expressed in the 1993 Declaration on the status of Sandžak in which special status for Sandžak was called for.

The moderate wing is represented by Sandžak Democratic Party headed by Rasim Ljajic (Federal Minister for Human Rights and Ethnic Minorities since 2000), Ugljanin’s former ally. He has been since 2000 supported by Serbian parties as a democrat and compromise-oriented politician mainly because his policy is to ensure cultural autonomy for Sandžak. In addition, Ljajic, as opposed to Ugljanin, is committed to the Serbian state and has never challenged its legitimacy.

Factions on the State authorities side after 1990

23 The period between 1945 and 1990 was marked by communist control of all spheres of public and private life. There were no free political parties and no free elections. It was a period of high degree of political stability and institutional legitimacy of the Socialist Yugoslavia. There were no factions during this period in either side.
Serbs have always spoken with one language as regards the Sandžak issue. However, their attitude to the Sandžak question has changed. In the 1945-1990 period, the Serbian authorities did not acknowledge the conflict in Sandžak. In the 1990-2000 period, Moslems were seen as enemies that challenge the legitimacy of the Serbian state. After 2000, the Serbian side sees Bosniaks as partners.

**H. Evolution of predominance of factions over time**

Figure ?? present the evolution of the predominance of the factions mentioned above over time, as well as the evolution of their main paradigm in terms of conflict dimensions and of the predominant perception of the other community.

**Figure ???: Evolution of discourse of the main factions of the community conflict between Bosniaks and Serbians in Sandžak since 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>preWWII</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>55</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

**C. ISSUES AND FRAMING**

1. Within-community State authorities
   Within-community Moslem

2. Main paradigm State authorities
   Main paradigm Bosniak/Muslim

3. Perception of deterrent State authorities
   Perception of deterrent Bosniaks

**Interpretation: still to be done!! ??**

**Factions and discourses in Camp 1**

The Serbian state authorities consider the conflict as dominantly having cultural dimension. Each more radical proposal (e.g. for higher autonomy), they see as something that leads to the secession of Sandžak. State authorities saw Moslems until 1963 as Serbs. Moslems were forced to declare themselves as Serbs. Only after 1963, Serbs recognized the separate identity of Moslems but saw them as an out-

**Factions and discourses in Camp 2**

Bosniaks see the issue dominantly as cultural. They used to perceive the Serbian policy as an attempt either to expel from Sandžak or to assimilate them culturally by transforming them into Serbs. After 1990, Bosniak’s leadership requested political autonomy for Sandžak. Until 1963, Moslem saw Serbs as enemies who want to assimilate them. This changed after the 1963 constitution, when separate ethnic identity was recognized. In 1990-2000, the old animosities resumed but they stopped in 2000, when Serbs and Bosniaks see each other as partners again.

**Conclusion**

In the semiotic typology of Vetik, if one signifies the ??? as A and the ??? as B, it can be argued that the situation in ??? in the period 19??-19?? is represented by the type A2B1??, and after ?? the situation is better represented by the type A1B2???. Hence, once shifted from the most conflict-potential??? combination to ??? EXPAND??

**General conclusion**

**TO BE DRAFTED !!??**

In terms of perception of the most important factors (in recent years) that cause the community conflict, we find national sovereignty as the most important factor, while also ancient hatreds, contested territory and ethnic diversity score high. Then we fin linguistic diversity, security concerns and military intervention, followed by elite instrumentalisation, colonial history and socio-economic cleavages. The next group consists of foreign interference, demographic shifts (and other causes), followed by religious diversity and inadequate political institutions. The least important factors are criminality, property rights and corruption.
II. References

TO COMPLETED AND SELECTED !?!


Buldakov, V.P., 'Imperskaia Psihologia v SSSR i eio Posledstvia', a paper presented at the ICEES World Congress, August 5-10, 1995, Warsaw, Poland.

Feron, E., working paper of the Peace-Com project, 2006.


### III. Annexes

**C1.** In the opinion of your organisation, which of the following factors is associated with the current state (about the last 5 years) of X? Please distinguish between primary and secondary factors.

*Explanatory note: ‘Primary causes’ are factors that ‘explain’ X; these are frequently to be found in the past and change slowly. ‘Secondary causes’ are factors that accentuate or make more severe the underlying causes of X thus creating the conditions for deterioration of relations or even the eruption of violence.*

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<th>Secondary cause</th>
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<td>Demographic shifts</td>
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