SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME
PRIORITY 7
“Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge based Society”

Deliverable 12
“Accommodation Policies in Community Conflicts: Models and Areas of Intervention”

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PEACE-COM
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General Introduction

This part of the Peace-Com project is concerned with accommodation policies. This term refers to interventions of third parties in the conflict in the form of planned actions, regulations, programmes or initiatives. The term was deliberately chosen to encompass a broad variety of actors (e.g. political institutions, civil society, international community, conflicting parties) and policies (e.g. peace keeping, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution). Consequently, some of the initiatives might take a more structural form (long-term process – to be represented as a line); whereas others can be located at a precise point in time (to be represented as an arrow). Therefore, accommodation policy denotes “third party intervention in a conflict with the intention to appease demands made by one or the other side in a conflict and to resolve intractable or violent conflict”.

According to the Technical Annex of the project, this second deliverable of the Work Package 5 on Accommodation Policies should analyse the discourses of the actors implicated in management policies, and pay specific attention to the impact of Europeanisation on conflicts, and on accommodation policies set up at the European level in order to deal with these conflicts. This deliverable should also comprise a comparative report and a full length report with a data appendix to cover the country specific reports. While such data is provided in Annex, this deliverable also aims at meeting the other objectives defined for this deliverable, namely

- providing a detailed comparative presentation and critic of management policies undertaken so far in each of these conflicts,
- identifying areas of intervention where policy initiatives are lacking and necessary;
- provide an overall description of actors involved in management policies, and of their opinions, suggestions and claims;
- point to “good practices”, whether coming from the communities in conflict themselves, from national governments or from international and non-governmental organisations

For all these purposes, this report is divided in four main sections, based on several sources of data: first, the questionnaires administered to the main actors of each case study (on average 40 to 50 representative actors per case study), which comprised a section on accommodation policies; second, synthetic case descriptions of accommodation policies, prepared by each expert team (all descriptions and accompanying information are provided in annexes); third, interviews with experts (15 per case study); fourth, general and case-study focused literature on accommodation policies.

The first section of the report provides an overview of accommodation policies set up in the case studies covered by the project, through a topical but also style analysis. It subsequently identifies areas of intervention where policy initiatives are lacking and necessary, and scrutinizes the involvement of various local, regional and national actors.

The second section is specifically dedicated to the analysis of the role of international actors in the negotiation and implementation of accommodation policies. The assessment of their involvement in accommodation policies by conflict actors and experts is analysed. The European Union’s action and involvement is scrutinised separately.

The third section focuses on the achievements of those policies, and presents various cases of failure as well as cases of success. It gives hints as to why some policies have succeeded while others have failed. It also provides the assessment of accommodation policies given by local,
regional and national actors through questionnaires administered in each case, and of case study experts thanks to the interviews.

The fourth section of the report deals specifically with the impact of Europeanisation, and of initiatives and accommodation policies set up at the European level. As it has been demonstrated elsewhere (esp. in D8 and D13) that the impact of such a wide-scale process was case-specific, we have chosen in this section to put the focus on two case studies with different characteristics: on the one hand, the case of island of Cyprus, whose southern part has just entered the Union, and which is characterized by a physical separation of the two communities; on the other hand, the case of Northern Ireland, which has been part of the Union for approximately 25 years, and whose two communities inhabit the same territory.
1. An Overview of Accommodation Policies

This section intends on answering to a few key questions concerning the negotiation and implementation of accommodation policies set up in the case studies examined by the PEACE-COM project. It analyses the topics and areas of intervention concerned by these policies, and identifies the actors involved in their negotiation and implementation.

1.1. Implementation of Accommodation Policies

According to the questionnaire results, in the vast majority of the cases covered by the project, there were accommodation policies introduced in order to deal with the relevant conflict. As we will see, the term “accommodation policies” covers a whole range of diverging situations on the ground. It is however striking to see that approximately 10% of questionnaire respondents only think that no accommodation policy at all was set up in order to deal with the conflict since 1990.

The responses are somewhat more mitigated when it comes to assessing international peace efforts or settlement initiatives, thus indicating either a lower awareness of international policies and initiatives, or indeed a slightly lower involvement of international actors and agencies in the settlement of some conflicts, albeit still at a significant level.

When asked whether the conflict did attract international peace efforts or settlement initiatives since 2000, about three quarters of respondents agree:
This percentage is however higher than for earlier periods: 71% of respondents agree that there were international initiatives for the 1990-1999 period…

… in the period from 1990 to 1999?

… prior to 1990?

… a figure which falls to 55% when it comes to the period before 1990.
These figures show either an increasing awareness of international efforts, or a better diffusion of the information about international initiatives, or indeed a growing involvement of international actors, NGOs and organisations in the settlement of community conflicts in Europe. This finding is in line with the literature about accommodation policies in Europe, which shows that the international institutions, the European Union in particular, are increasingly involved in the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts on the European continent (Bussière, 2000; Benchiki, 2001).

1.2. Topical Range of Policies

Another part of the questionnaire dealt with the policy sectors concerned by the accommodation policies. On average, the most dealt with areas of intervention are language, education, cultural policy and local governance. These are classical areas of intervention, mainly linked to cultural matters. On the other hand, the least dealt with are property rights, regional autonomy, housing policy and signposts. These areas are more specific and often linked to local specificities, such as the question of signposts which concerns mainly the case of the Slovene minority in Austria, an, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland and Belgium.
According to the results of the questionnaires and of the systematic case descriptions prepared by the expert teams, we have further classified the cases according to the number of policy fields covered by the accommodation policies. The cases have been thus been divided in three categories:

- where policies concerned one to three areas of intervention, they were labelled as “specific”;
- where policies concerned four to seven areas of intervention, they were labelled as “middle-range”;
- where policies involved more than eight areas of intervention, they were labelled as “encompassing”.

This analysis reveals a fair distribution between specific, middle-range and encompassing policies.

Specific policies are implemented in Sandžak, in Estonia and in the case of the Slovene minority in Austria. In Sandžak the language & cultural issues are the most dealt with, even if, according to the expert interviews, they have often turned out to be a façade used to avoid the real questions and problems. According to our interviewees, more effort should be made with regards to “conditions of living, equal treatment in hiring” because they were not seriously considered by the government in order to solve the ethnic tensions in Sandžak.

In Estonia, many accommodation policies directed towards the situation of the Russian speaking minority are focused on language issues to the exclusion of other problems (e.g. socio-economic and political)

The case of the Slovene minority is detailed below.

**Specific Accommodation Initiatives: the case of the Slovene Minority in Austria**

The post-WWII period is classified as a “peaceful stable situation” with “high degree of political stability and regime legitimacy”, since the British troops stationed in Carinthia from 1945 – 55 established and ensured certain rights for the Slovenes. As of 1958, the conflict is again classified as a “political tension situation” due to the school strikes organized by German-speaking nationalists. The conflict has again flared up in the last years, with Slovenes (particularly the Rat der Kärntner Slowenen) more adamantly pushing for the implementation of their rights and applying more pressure on the provincial and federal governments through legal recourse.

Accommodation initiatives in Austria retain a highly controversial character. Whenever the Slovenes were successful in securing certain rights, in taking one step forward, the German-speaking Carinthians and in particular the Kärntner Heimatsdienst (Carinthian Homeland Service, i.e. the umbrella association of German-nationalists) ensured that the Slovenes had to take two steps back. This method has usually resulted in the retraction of the measure accommodating the Slovenes and has been replaced by a measure placating the German-speaking nationalist side. Thus, we do not speak of “conflict-increasing or –decreasing initiatives”, but of measures that accommodated either the Slovene or the German nationalist side. No conflict in the last few years has split the two groups to the extent that the issue of bilingual topographic signs has done. The Ortstafelgesetz (“town sign law”) of 1972 determined that bilingual topographical signs were to be set up in 205 bilingual towns (towns with a population of 20+ per cent Slovenes). The setting up of bilingual town posts resulted in the Ortstafelsturm (the “town sign storm”), which had been organized by the Kärntner Heimatsdienst and resulted in the dismantling of all signs by October 10, 1972. Giving in to pressure by the German-speaking nationalists, a new diluted law was passed in 1976 (Volksgruppengesetz – Law on Ethnic Groups) augmenting the percentage to 25+ per cent of Slovenes required for the setting-up of bilingual town signs. In Carinthia, this applied to 91 towns. The law was passed without the support or approval of the minority groups in Carinthia.
To date, only 73 of the originally 91 towns in Carinthia have bilingual topographical signs. An important advocate for the improvement of the Slovenes’ legal status in Austria has been the Constitutional Court, while the Austrian governments seem to silently accept the repressive policies of the Carinthian provincial government. In December 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that the threshold of 25 per cent of ethnic population for the setting up of bilingual topographical signs was not compatible with the Austrian Constitution and that henceforth, a 7 per cent threshold ought to apply. Carinthian provincial governor Jörg Haider immediately launched an anti-Slovene movement and announced that he would refuse to accept the ruling and that no new bilingual signs would be put up in Carinthia. In short, though the Slovenes may have the judiciary on their side, German-speaking nationalists continue to apply rigorous and permanent pressure on the Slovenes to assimilate. Several consensus conferences have taken place from 2000 onwards without leading to the desired compromise. Another contested issue is related to bilingual schools. In 1945 compulsory bilingual instruction in the first three school years for all pupils was introduced in Austria. However, in 1958, German-speaking nationalists organized school strikes to protest compulsory bilingual education which led to the passing of the “Minderheitenschulgesetz für Kärnten” (Minority School Regulation for Carinthia) in 1959, which abolished compulsory bilingual schooling and de facto required parents to explicitly register their children for Slovenian class. In 1988 the Austrian Parliament passed an amendment to the Carinthian Minority School Law. These laws diminished the accessibility of the Slovene language at schools. The effect of this was that many parents did not dare register their children for bilingual school instruction due to fear of being stigmatised and excluded. The censuses that have been carried out since 1880 reveal that the Slovene population in Carinthia is declining and that the language shift from Slovenian to German occurred with surprising speed in Carinthia.

In essence, the conflict has been marked by conflict settlement initiatives that addressed certain issues at hand, but ignoring some of the underlying issues. Since WWII several attempts have been made to find a compromise, with mixed success. However, no sincere attempts at conflict resolution have been undertaken to date, because there are a number of unresolved issues/trauma that have not been addressed by any proposals to resolve the conflict.

Middle-range policies are implemented in the Basque Country, in Kosovo, and in Vojvodina. In the Basque country, terrorism and political issues are at the centre of implemented policies. The interviews with experts reveal mixed opinions regarding these policies. Some interviewees think that there is too much focus on terrorism (antiterrorist polices): “police methods are not enough to solve the conflict. There is a need of dialogue and political endeavours”, “that terrorism is the excuse to avoid conflict resolution”. Some interviewees however consider them to be effective to prevent violence, to weaken the ETA, and to strengthen the rule of law and any legal / repressive resources to achieve the end of violence.

In Kosovo, the final status question turned out to be the issue from which everything else flows. This is why this political approach, rather than some specific approach to the problem, is preferred and is being discussed. Every initiative evolves around or depends on this question of the final status, a fact which leads to a polarisation of positions & style of policy-making. However, new fields of negotiations have been gradually introduced by international actors.

The case of Vojvodina is detailed below.

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1 It must be noted that the intense propaganda preceding the 1961 census most likely had an effect on many to not declare themselves Slovene. The 1972 census forms had to be filled in with pencil (with the results being easy to erase). Computers were used in Völkertmarkt where at least half the population is Slovene and showed that no Slovene speakers lived there.
Since the 18th century, Vojvodina has been populated by various ethnic groups, including Hungarians, Serbs, Germans, Romanians, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Jews, etc. After the conflict of high intensity in Vojvodina that lasted from 1941 until 1945 (it has been estimated that less than 10% of Vojvodina Jews survived the war), the Yugoslav partisans carried out retaliation over the Germans and Hungarians living in Vojvodina, accusing them of collaboration with the aggressor. First post-war years were characterized by political tension, mostly due to massive demographic changes in Vojvodina, with Germans moving away and Serbian and Montenegrin colonists from other parts of Yugoslavia moving in. The end of colonization marked the start of a rather long period of political stability. In 1974 the new SFRY Constitution was introduced, which granted Vojvodina a broad autonomy and several provisions for the protection of minorities. Although it formally kept the status of an autonomous province, Vojvodina was given the rights and obligations held by other Yugoslav federal units. The late 1980s and early 1990s were the time of deep political crisis and the state of ferment in the whole country, with the Serbian Communist party nationalists diminishing and practically removing the autonomy of Vojvodina in 1988. Ethnic relations in Vojvodina were also disturbed by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war which burst out in Croatia in 1991. Being close to the area of conflict, Vojvodina gave shelter to a large number of the Serbian refugees who sometimes came into conflict with the national minorities, while the Croatian minority was persecuted, and a considerable number of Hungarians moved away.

In 1994 Milošević changed his politics to a certain extent and started cooperating with international community with a view to ending wars in Bosnia and Croatia. The position of the national minorities in Vojvodina slightly improved. The violent aspects of political conflict were suppressed by the activity of the Serbian police, and ethnically motivated violence was reduced to individual incidents. Between 1994 and 2000, the conflict in Vojvodina did not go beyond political tensions.

In September 2000, a broad coalition of opposition parties, which members were also the parties of national minorities, defeated Milošević in the elections. This led to an improvement of the position of national minorities, which opened the way to reconciliation between ethnic communities. But since early parliamentary elections in December 2003, tensions in Vojvodina have increased, because due to a 5% nation-wide electoral threshold, minority parties and regional Vojvodina parties failed to enter the Serbian Parliament. This led to a rise in the number of ethnic incidents.

Upon the proposal of Hungary, incidents in Vojvodina were discussed in the Council of Europe and in relevant bodies of the European Union. Having realized that the situation is serious, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica promised that police would in future do everything to prevent ethnically motivated violence in Vojvodina. Besides the fact that another election cycle in Serbia ended at the end of September, this also affected tensions in Vojvodina to calm down. Current situation could be described as a situation of political tension with a tendency to calm down.

**Encompassing policies** are implemented in Northern Ireland and in Belgium; the Annan Plan in Cyprus can also be included in this category, but has not yet been implemented.

In Belgium, the successive agreements “only” consist in institutional reforms, but have wide-reaching consequences – actually on virtually all of the 13 policy topics, because the sequence of institutional reforms completely “re-shuffles” the prerogatives of the federal state, of the federated entities, etc. – and also translates into financial fluxes (North-South).
In Cyprus, the Annan Plan which dealt with many conflict issues (institutional reforms, property rights, language, education, economic measures, etc.) was rejected in April 2004 by the population of the southern part of the island. According to our interviewees, accommodation polices were considered as too partial, and most interviewees asked for more “holistic package of confidence building”, and insisted that an “integrative approach” is needed to solve the problem.

The case of Northern Ireland is detailed below.

### A Case of Encompassing Accommodation Policies: Northern Ireland

According to the PIOOM classification, between 1945 and 1968 Northern Ireland can be described as a “political tension situation”, where cleavages kept deepening along factional lines, but did not provoke major security incidents. In 1969 and 1970, the situation deteriorated, the level of violence began to increase, with respectively 14 and 25 deaths due to the security situation; Northern Ireland therefore entered the “violent political conflict” category. But it was between 1971 and 1977 that violence has been the highest, with an average of 250 people killed per year (of which a majority of civilians), and a peak of 470 people killed in 1972. During this period, Northern Ireland can be described as a “low intensity conflict” according to the PIOOM classification. Violence remained at a very high level till 1993, with between 61 to 113 people killed per year during this period. In 1994 the IRA, followed by its protestant counterparts, declared a ceasefire, a strategic move which finally allowed a peace process to be launched. As a consequence, the level of violence has considerably decreased, with usually less than 20 people killed per year since 1994. 2004 even saw the lowest level of violence since 1969, with “only” 4 people killed as a result of the conflict.

There were three major accommodation initiatives launched during that period, with uneven results. The first major one was the signing in December 1973 of the Sunningdale Agreement, under the impulse of the British and Irish governments. This agreement, which was the result of negotiations held between British and Irish governments, and representatives of moderate unionist and nationalist parties, was essentially of a political nature. It aimed at setting up a power-sharing government between nationalists and unionists, in order to break with the majoritarian government model followed by the old Stormont regime, and avoid a further escalation of the conflict. This power-sharing government was short-lived (it lasted from January to May 1974) because of loyalist (radical unionist) opposition. It therefore did not reach its main goal of conflict management. The second main accommodation initiative was the signing in 1985 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was signed by British and Irish governments, without any meaningful involvement of local political, social or economic actors. Its main objective was to foster peace by promoting co-operation between the Irish and British Governments in relation to security and legal affairs, cross-border co-operation, and political matters. It therefore had a somehow wider scope than the Sunningdale agreement, but it faced a strong local opposition and eventually failed to bring back peace in the province. The third major accommodation initiative however introduced a major change in the style of policy, but also in its goals and in the actors that it began to involve. After several years of negotiations lead mainly by the British and Irish governments, but also with the help of some American officials, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement was indeed signed in 1998, between all major political actors involved in the conflict (British and Irish governments, but also the main Northern Irish political parties, with the notable exception of the DUP). The 1998 Agreement has an encompassing scope, and deals with political as well as with social, economic and cultural matters. Contrary to previous initiatives, its eventual aim is not conflict management, but conflict settlement. It has partly achieved this goal, insofar as it has provoked a sharp decline in the level of violence, has helped changing to a certain extent confrontational attitudes into more collaborative patterns, and has designed new
institutional settings that, even if their implementation is still wanting, seem to pave the way for years to come.

The period between 1969 and 1998 can therefore be described rather in terms of conflict management than in terms of conflict resolution. The 1998 agreement however introduced a major shift in the sense that it aimed at dealing with the roots of the conflict, and at involving all major actors of the conflict, including political parties like Sinn Fein that are traditionally linked with paramilitary structures. Since 1998 the situation can therefore be analyzed in terms of conflict settlement, as the principle of cooperation between the political representatives of both communities has been agreed. Conflict resolution and reconciliation still seem quite far away, as hostility and mistrust between the two communities still prevail, and as the deep-rooted sources of the conflict have not been resolved (even though the 1998 Agreement clearly addresses them).

1.3. Styles of Policies

This section is concerned with the style of actors when introducing, negotiating or implementing policies. Were they generally confrontational in orientation or did they adopt a rather collaborative strategy? Starting from this basic distinction we have divided policy styles into three categories: confrontational, collaborative and neutral. These categories were used in the questionnaire survey and in the systematic case descriptions filled in by expert teams.

Surprisingly, it is the confrontational style of policies which prevails. This result can be explained by two main reasons: first, one has to recall that we have adopted a quite broad definition of the term “accommodation policies”, which encompasses highly confrontational measures such as internment, security measures, or intervention of the army. If this kind of measures can be effective in the sense of a decrease in the level of violence or a freezing of the conflict, it can nevertheless be the focus of strongly negative reactions. As we have tried to interview a panel of representative actors in each conflict, it is logical that some respondents might judge negatively these policies. Second, one has to recall that we are dealing here with sometimes highly entrenched situations, where opponents often determine their position in function of the other camp’s opinion and own opinion. In these situations, it is rather difficult to set up and implement policies with the approval of all sides.

Policies were judged as confrontational in the case of the Slovene minority in Austria, in the Basque country, in Cyprus, in Kosovo, in Sandžak and in Vojvodina.

In Austria, the current situation appears as confrontational, with a real difficulty to reach a compromise. According to our interviewees, policies are designed in order to accommodate one side or the other, but seldom both. All initiatives, for instance regional autonomy or topographic signposts, are extremely politicised or “hyped up” so that they are nearly always contested and difficult to implement. As stated by one interviewee, “Historical burdens are being instrumentalized by both sides and the signposts are one of the instruments being used for this purpose”. Contention remains however a widely symbolic one.

In the Basque Country, national policies set up in order to fight the ETA are highly contentious and judged as confrontational, even if sometimes effective. As mentioned by one interviewee, the “harassment attitude” has worked in favour of the decline of ETA. The “anti-terrorist agreement (on liberties and against terrorism) is mentioned as the most effective measure in order to overcome the “Basque conflict”, as it entails the weakening of ETA or the deactivation of kale borroka (street fighting).
In Cyprus between 1955 and 1960 accommodation policies were described both by interviewees and experts as confrontational, because the proposal prepared by the colonial government that aimed to grant Cyprus a kind of self-government was rejected by both sides which aired conflicting demands. In addition initiatives towards establishing an independent Cypriot state generated conflicts between the two sides. In 1960 Cyprus Republic was declared as a result of the involvement of Britain, Greece and Turkey which limited the degree of confrontation and intercommunal collaboration. Therefore the process could be defined as neutral. However confrontation came back to the fore between 1963 and 1974, where violent activities against Turkish Cypriots continued. The period 1974-2004, in spite of the negotiation of the Annan plan (which was mainly negotiated at the international level, and which generated strong oppositions at the local level) was also described as confrontational.

In Sandžak, according to our interviewees many contentious policies were implemented, such as the introduction of the new Serbian constitution in 2007: the provision that “Serbia is the state of the Serbian people and all the citizens” is regarded as inappropriate, and interviewees mentioned fraud during the referendum to assure its acceptance. Religious teaching is also pointed at as contentious: “Some think that it is deepening the differences even more”.

In Vojvodina, policies have evolved from a collaborative to a confrontational style. After WWII, most of the time interaction between Serbian and Vojvodina actors was collaborative. As opposed to Kosovo that enjoyed the same status under the 1963 and 1974 constituting, Vojvodina actors were satisfied with their status in former Yugoslavia. However, policies evolved towards a confrontational style in 1988 when the Serbian communist party stripped Vojvodina’s autonomy and after 2000, when the Milosevic regime was overthrown, when some Vojvodina actors requested substantial financial autonomy for Vojvodina.

The case of Kosovo is detailed below.

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**Overview – Accommodation Initiatives – Kosovo**

**Confrontational Policies in Kosovo**

According to the PIOOM classification, between 1945 and 1948 Kosovo can be characterised as a “low intensity conflict” with open hostility and armed conflict among the Albanian Ballist Movement and Yugoslav army and police. In a second phase, from 1948 to 1968, the situation calmed down into a “political tension situations” when the Yugoslav communist party regained full control over the conflict. In the period from 1968 to 1981 the conflict remained a “political tension situation”. However, the conflict became more violent with the first massive demonstrations organised by Albanians asking for increased autonomy of Kosovo. In 1981, after Tito’s death, Albanian mass demonstrations escalated into a situation of “low intensity conflict” that led to open hostility and armed conflict. This phase lasted until 1985. In the years between 1986 and 1989, the situation was marked by mass demonstration, strikes and boycotts escalating in “violent political conflict”. If the communist party was able to control the situation prior to 1989, the confrontation got out of control after the 1989 amendment to the Serbian constitution (cf. Box) leading to “violent political conflict”. Between 1998 and 1999 “high intensity conflict” broke out, leading to open warfare between KLA and FARK on the one side and the Yugoslav security forces on the other. Both sides committed numerous war crimes leading to mass destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population. In 1999 NATO forces
intervened and heavily shelled Serbian military targets on Kosovo and Serbia. From 1999 to date the conflict calmed down to a “political tension situation”. However, there were intervals (June-October 1999 and March 2004) during which ethnic violence and persecution of a portion of the Serbian community and non-Albanians took place. Most accommodation initiatives implemented during the communist regime in Kosovo (1945-1988) were encompassing. In the immediate post-war period the style of interaction between Serbs and Albanians was mainly confrontational and policies maintained a repressive character. An example is the suppression of the Albanian ballist movement led by Šaban Poluža that rose up in the region of Drenica by the Yugoslav army in 1945. The relations between the two groups normalised in the 1950’s and policies were elaborated in a rather collaborative way due to the establishment of the Communist party in Kosovo. This changed in 1968 with the first large street demonstrations organized by Kosovo Albanians. After the 1989 amendments to the Serbian constitution most policies were specific. This amendment stripped the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo of its state attributes that increased confrontation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (cf. Box). Prior to 1988, negotiation of policies was mainly carried out by political and institutionalized actors. After 1988 when communication between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs broke down, Albanians set up parallel organisations to provide basic social services. Policies were largely implemented by the incumbent government in Serbia with the exclusion of Albanian actors as civil society movements that represented a significant portion of the Albanian elite were not recognized by the communist party. The 1999 NATO peace-keeping mission with the aim to stop the fighting between the two groups in Kosovo had the immediate effect to increase violence and led to amplified repression against the Albanian population of Kosovo. Eventually, after three months, the NATO alliance forced Serbian military and police out of Kosovo, and imposed an international protectorate, the UNMIK, that is still present in Kosovo today. The ethnic violence that took place in March 2004 has demonstrated that military intervention is not enough to restore peace and that more effort is needed to resolve root causes of the conflict. However, up to now, most actors were concerned exclusively with the resolution of the final status of Kosovo and other policy domains are largely neglected. In 2006, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari to conduct negotiations between the Serbian and Albanian delegation for on the final status of Kosovo. The negotiations ended in March 2007 without leading to a compromise acceptable for both sides. Conflict settlement was the main goal of the communist party in the period 1945-1988. The communists did not want to go into the heart of the matter, meaning that conflict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions were not addressed. After 1988 the Serbian government tried to manage the conflict by taking measures in order to limit, mitigate or contain violent conflicts. The aim of the 1999 NATO intervention was peace-keeping. After the NATO bombing and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces from the province, NATO troops and UN administration re-launched conflict settlement in Kosovo, again without serious attempts to address root causes of the conflict.

Policies were judged as collaborative in the case of Belgium and of Northern Ireland.

In Northern Ireland, after a confrontational period the style of policies has evolved towards more collaborative and above all more inclusive schemes: between 1969 and 1985, accommodation policies can be described as mainly confrontational, as in official discourses the conflict was described as the consequence of the actions of some criminal and marginalized actors. There were no real and lasting efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict (apart from a short-lived experience in 1974), solutions were often imposed from ‘above’ (Great Britain and Ireland), and the army and the police were the central actors of a “peace-keeping” policy. Between 1985 and 1994, accommodation policies can be described as “neutral”, because following the failure of past
initiatives, the British and Irish governments began to negotiate, mostly secretly, with Northern Irish actors, taking their opinion into account but not really associating them to decisions and initiatives. Since 1994 however, accommodation policies can be described as “collaborative”, as there has been a real effort to involve all relevant actors in negotiations and peace initiatives, including those actors (i.e. paramilitaries) that were so far described as “criminal”.

In Belgium, the attitude of the elites has always been collaborative “behind the scenes”. However the outside discourse (in the media for instance) towards the respective constituencies has most often been “symbolically” confrontational. Only during the 60’s was the situation more tense, also in the actual strategies of the elites. However, from 1970 onwards, each big “package deal” including one further step of institutional reform (= compromise, by definition) was followed by a more moderate discourse by the elites.

This case is further described below.

| Overview – Accommodation Initiatives – Belgium  
| Collaborative Policies in Belgium |

The period following WWII (1945-1958) was an unusually quiet period in terms of community conflict as it was a period of union nationale to re-build the country after the war (cf. Marshall Plan, construction of the “Belgian model” of neo-corporatism). This period can be described as “peaceful and stable” with a “high degree of political stability and regime legitimacy” where two groups “whose cultural background and heritage differ largely” coexist peacefully according to the PLOOM classification. From the 1960’s onwards, the “community” issue has been on the agenda on a regular basis, every year (with further (verbal) escalation following the electoral cycle). As a consequence, this period is classified as “political tension situation” with “growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines” without entailing specific forms of physical violence.

The so-called linguistic laws of 1962 and 1963 were a first measure to ease community tensions. They definitely fixed the linguistic borders and created four linguistic regions and created “linguistically homogeneous territories” (i.e. Flanders and Wallonia) and bilingual Brussels. Once the linguistic border had been drawn these regions have become monolingual societies, also in sociological terms. On the one hand, the “linguistic border” pacified linguistic strife between the Flemish- and French-speakers. On the other hand, there are several zones where the formal division of territory into Dutch or French-speaking zones does not correspond to the sociological reality. In areas such as Fourons/Voeren, the Brussels periphery and Brussels the linguistic issue is not solved and therefore regularly (re-) introduced on the political agenda.

The federalisation of Belgium dates back to the 1970’s. Constitutional reform aimed to accommodate two contradictory concepts: The Flemish nationalists defended the idea of a federal structure based on the existence of two distinct cultures or even nations, whereas the Walloon movement supported the idea of delegating economic policy to three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels). These two trajectories towards two types of self-government led to several constitutional revisions (1970, 1980, 1988, and 2001). The 1993 constitutional revision virtually transformed Belgium into a federal country. In terms of results, survey data indicates that the federalisation process shifted citizens’ main concerns away from issues concerning the community conflict (whereas it used to be a top priority in the 1960’s and 1970’s). Furthermore, from the late 1970s onwards, there is virtually no collective mobilization around the community conflict. These conflicts are rather instrumentalized (i.e. regularly re-activated) by the political elites on both sides. Even though the successive agreements were “only” institutional reforms, these reforms have had wide-reaching consequences – on virtually all of the 13 policy topics, because the sequence of institutional reforms completely “re-shuffles” the prerogatives of the
federal state and the federated entities — and also translates into financial fluxes (North-South). Although these accommodation policies can be described as encompassing, they were largely initiated, negotiated and implemented by institutional actors (i.e. party leaders at the national/regional/community levels). Consequently, civil society and economic actors only played a very marginal and indirect role. However, it can be argued that “pillar organizations” (trade unions, cultural movements, etc.) contributed to the implementation of the successive institutional reforms. The political elites responsible for major accommodation policies have mainly adopted a collaborative style of policy-making. However, the public discourse (through media etc.) towards the respective constituencies has most often been “symbolically” confrontational (displaying the other “camp” as the “bad guys” etc.).

Altogether, accommodation policies have been implemented from the early 1960s on. It was only then that the francophones began to accept to discuss the core issues of the conflict and to negotiate the demands of the quickly strengthening Flemish side. The following years have seen a very pragmatic series of “temporary arrangements” to find a way out of inextricable problems. These arrangements can be characterised as initiatives of conflict management, due to the fact that root causes have not been addressed and each reform bears the fruit of additional problems and tensions. The temporary nature of accommodation policies accounts for the fact that every initiative paved a way or “pretext” for the following reform initiative. Consequently, conflict settlement or conflict resolution both seem to be beyond reach given the present state of affairs.

Policies were judged as neutral or as difficult to qualify in Estonia only. This case is described below.

### Overview – Accommodation Initiatives – Estonia

A more neutral style of policies in Estonia?

There were no community conflicts in Estonia in the sense used in this project up to the end of 1980s. However, it was not a ‘peaceful stable situation’ either, because the Soviet regime was not regarded as legitimate by the majority of ethnic Estonians. Stability was achieved by total state control and repression of civil society. The roots of current community conflict can be seen in the following major political and social changes in Estonia since 1940s - occupation of the Estonian Republic by the Soviet Union in June 1940, massive immigration of Russian speaking population to Estonia triggered by the authorities since the second half of 1940s, stalinist crimes and deportations of ethnic Estonians to Siberia in 1940s, policies of Russification throughout the period up to the end of 1980s. At the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, in an increasing “political tension situation”, there was a national and anti-Soviet mobilization among ethnic Estonians, with the emergence of civil society institutions and powerful social movements along linguistic and ethnic divisions. The Estonian Republic was created in August 1991, and declared of legal continuity to the Estonian Republic of 1940. The adoption of the Citizenship Act of 1992 meant that a large majority of the non-Estonian population was excluded from automatic citizenship. The law defined as citizens only those who possessed Estonian citizenship before June 16, 1940 and their descendants. In the Language Act of 1995 all other languages besides the Estonian were defined as foreign, that means, no special exception for the Russian language was made as was the case in the previous law of 1989.

During the 1980s, ethnic Estonians saw community conflict resolution in terms of nation building of the Estonian nation-state; the non-Estonians saw the conflict resolution in terms of creating a new multi-national state based on the ideals of equality, participation etc. On theoretical level the same difference can be expressed by the difference between the nation-building versus human rights discourses. Between 1991 and 1995, there were several important steps made by the Government in the field of citizenship application, language requirements, residence permits, etc., but these steps were strongly criticized by Russian-speaking minority
community representatives, despite mediation attempts by international organisations such as OSCE which tried to propose compromise solutions to these issues. Since the second half of 1990s, the system, dominated by ethnic Estonians, has stabilised, and a de-securitization of the ethnic issue in Estonia has taken place, along with the launching of social integration policies by the Estonian state, thanks to initiatives among the academic community, and also to the active mediating role of international community, esp. the European Commission in the framework of the EU Accession. Amongst these initiatives, the document *The integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society: setting the course*, compiled in 1997 on the initiative of the United Nations Development Programme, served as the basis for both the integration-related documents passed by the Government in 1998-1999 and also for the state programme “Integration in Estonian society 2000-2007”, which reflects a view of integration as a two-way process. It envisions allowing minorities to retain their distinct identity, while increasing their participation in and loyalty to the Estonian State, mainly through the medium of Estonian language instruction; a common linguistic sphere is viewed as both a means to enhance inclusion of minorities, and to reduce inequalities or tensions that may exist. Minority representatives have expressed concern that the emphasis on language does not take into account other barriers to integration, which the Integration Programme suggests should be addressed through complementary programmes.

On the whole, significant accommodation policies have been implemented since the independence of Estonia. Since that time, these policies have been primarily aiming at conflict management, with however a shift these last years towards more encompassing conflict resolution policies.

1.4. National Actors involved in Accommodation Policies

In this section several categories of actors are identified:

- the actors responsible for the initiation of a given policy;
- the actors actively involved in policy negotiations and given a say in the final decision
- the actors involved in the implementation of conflict management or conflict resolution policies, and whose involvement determines the successful implementation of the relevant policy.

We have used here various categories of actors, both in the questionnaire survey and in the synthetic case descriptions. It is important to note that the categories indicated are not mutually exclusive. The categories include:

- National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors (governments at all levels, administration, political parties, police and army, courts)
- Civil Society & Economic Actors (civil society, public opinion, trade unions, domestic NGOs, churches, media, social movements, intelligentsia, economic actors (e.g. business, industry, lobby …))
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors (European NGOs, European Union Institutions, OSCE, OECD, Council of Europe)
- Non-European international actors (International NGOs, NATO, UNO, etc.)

These three last categories (including « external actors ») will be dealt with in the third section of this deliverable.
The questionnaire survey as well as the expert interviews reveal that accommodation policies are in general very institutionalised processes, with a high involvement of national and regional authorities and governments, and of political parties, as in the cases of Belgium, the Basque Country or Northern Ireland. These actors are considered both by conflict actors and by experts as the most important actors regarding conflict management and conflict resolution issues.

However, national and regional governments, as well as political parties, are often seen as partial, and their initiatives are thus more likely to generate contention. Sometimes intervention of national actors has provoked further radicalisation and politicisation of local communities, as in the case of the Constitutional Court in Austria, which has ruled that the percentage of Slovene-speaking population for the setting up bilingual should be lowered, or in the case of the Cour d’Arbitrage in Belgium which has ruled that the current situation in the Halle-Vilvorde district was in contradiction with the constitution, and consequently that the district should be divided.

The case of Vojvodina is also interesting in that respect. According to interviewees there appears to be a lack of commitment of Serbian government to find solutions (“the state is not always serious in its accommodation initiatives”), “In order to start the “dialogue,” the Serbs should change their ‘monologue’”. The State is accused of having done next to nothing to curb hate speech and violence against the minorities. In addition, mayors of largest Vojvodinian cities (except the city of Subotica) come from the party that has not renounced violence and that is associated with (and proud of) massacres and atrocities against non-Serbs. Political actors in Vojvodina are therefore “associated with (and proud of) massacres and atrocities against non-Serbs. The state never distanced itself from this kind of past”.

![Graph showing involvement of generic actors: National Government](image)
Not surprisingly, for our case studies where the regional dimension is salient, regional authorities seem to often have a key role, such as in Austria, where the Provincial governor Haider has an crucial role. He is seen to have great influence on failure or success of negotiations and implementation: “If we had a different provincial governor, we would have a solution”

In spite of the fact that many policies are described as confrontational (see previous section), security actors such as the police and the army are not very often described as strong involvement in the setting up and implementation of policies, except in the case of the Basque country where the police is the main actor of antiterrorist policies, which were described by one interviewee as very effective “police force methods”.

The involvement of courts and judicial actors is very irregular across case studies, and receives contrasted assessments. In Sandzak for instance, courts are accused of being corrupt, whereas in Vojvodina, another region in Serbia, some interviewees state the fact that Serbia has “legislation that criminalizes ethnic discrimination and incitement of ethnic (religious, racial, etc.) hatred, but has not seriously dealt with hate speech and incitement against the ethnic minorities in Vojvodina”. In this perspective, courts are mentioned as a useful addition to accommodation initiatives, whose mission would be to “prosecute more vigorously the various hate crimes in Vojvodina” and to re-establish a “belief in the system”.

The involvement of churches and religious institutions also seems to vary a lot across case studies, and to have highly differentiated impact, as shown in D9. In Spain for instance, a nationalist deputy at parliament believes that the major efforts in order to reach a peace settlement have been developed by the catholic church, whereas in Estonia the church was accused by one interviewee to “emphasise difference and does not unite different ethnic groups”.

In spite of the commonly held assumption that the economic sector has a crucial role to play in the settlement of conflicts, economic actors do not seem to be highly involved in the cases covered by the project. Apart from the case of Austria where interviewees stated that the involvement of economic actors from the Carinthian economy could very beneficial in order to rationalize the whole issue, both conflict actors and experts do not seem to highly value their
contribution, either because, as in Sandzak, the economy is weak, or because, as in Estonia, there is a strong scepticism towards business people.

Generally speaking, the overall picture conveyed by the interviews is that civil society is not sufficiently involved and that its involvement would be beneficial (with some exceptions in each case). In Austria for instance, initiatives are seen both in questionnaires and interviews as too top-down, with a lack of inclusion of representatives of civil society, even if civil society is polarised. As stated by one interviewee, “Civil society in Carinthia ought to become more active”.

In the Basque country, there were only a few relevant citizenship peace-initiatives such as “Ekari” or “Gesto por la paz” (peace organizations). However, civil society actors are increasingly involved in the carrying out of linguistic policies since the language bill was passed in 1986, as well as in political agreements.

In Belgium, accommodation policies are mostly initiated and implemented by political actors, there is next to no involvement of civil society actors, apart from trade-unions and corporatist organisations during the implementation phase.

The same assessment than in Austria can be found in Cyprus, where accommodation policies are accused of being too elitist and top-down, and the “absence of civil society”, and the “lack of transparency and accountability” is stressed. Interviewees believe in positive effects of involvement of civil society but in the southern part of the island NGO’s are not considered as the optimal actors (problems of trust, responsibility, independence, accountability, transparency …). According to them, civil society in a broad sense can help to “create a positive atmosphere between people”, “a lot of confidence problems would have been solved if the civil society had been activated”, “they can definitely contribute in a very positive way”. In North Cyprus, there is a much more positive assessment of NGO’s, which, according to the interviews, are the “main elements of a coming solution”, they should play a “supplementary role to first track diplomacy“, under the condition that they are independent (“he who pays the piper calls the tune”) and act in the interest of the community (and not the motherland/fatherland) in a professional way (apparently there was bad experience in Cyprus). There is a widely-held belief that “people on the ground” have better grasp of problems and possible solutions.

In Estonia, there is also the belief that “All parties, above all those “who are affected” by these solutions should participate”, in order to stimulate dialogue. Since end of 1990s cultural organisations of minorities have been partners of the Government in launching the integration policies, and civil society organisations have been recipients of the funds targeted towards different kind of projects related to integration.
In Kosovo, many respondents and interviewees held the belief that “civil society actors could bring in something new”, and that good initiatives are “initiatives that involve the participation of civil actors form both sides; they appear to be less burdened with the current discourse that is entirely focused on the issue of independence, state- and nation-building” (e.g. RTV Mitrovica). Civil society should get more involved in status negotiations.

In Northern Ireland, civil society has hardly been involved in the negotiation process, but NGO activities are widely seen by interviewees as contributing very positively to the improvement of community relations, and to the implementation of peace initiatives and peace programmes at the local level.

In Sandzak, some policies, mainly related to cultural affairs and human rights protection, were implemented by local NGOs, and civil society actors also launched several peace initiatives that were rejected by central government.

In Vojvodina, NGOs are viewed positively as “NGO initiatives have a potential to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Vojvodina”, and help to create a “climate of trust among the people in Vojvodina”.

More precisely, cultural and educational actors are often quoted for their positive impact in the negotiation, but also implementation of policies. In Sandzak for instance, some interviewees believed that cultural and educational actors should be more active to establish ethnic dialogue, and that a specific effort should be made towards educational actors who “do not really embrace the European values such as tolerance and human rights”.

The same belief is held in Vojvodina, where cultural and educational actors could “potentially enhance interethnic dialogue” and “contribute to creating prerequisites for trust”.

Concerning the Slovene minority in Austria, even though media and cultural actors are sometimes contested (“The media has especially been reporting in a very one-sided way”), some respondents and interviewees think that they could contribute positively: “In most cases, actors from culture and media stand in the middle and promote dialogue. They contribute to the mitigation of the conflict”, “Cultural dialogue can be used as a “neutral ground” beyond the boundaries of the political-historical conflict to develop a dialogue”.

![E508: Involvement of generic actors: NON-ECONOMIC ACTORS](image-url)
We further describe below the accommodation initiatives undertaken in the Basque Country. They are characterized by a high involvement of political actors, a strong polarisation and a relatively low involvement of civil society actors.

Overview – Accommodation Initiatives – Basque Country
A Significant Involvement of Political Actors

The Franco regime (1939-1975) established a severe breakdown in the development of the conflict. Therefore, the nationalist demands (both moderate and radical) were silenced and, at least the great majority of them were included in the general anti-Franco opposition movement. Consequently, comments on accommodation policies are not applicable to this period. This period can be classified as “political tension situation” with ‘growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines’. However, aforementioned singularities of the Franco period have to be borne in mind. The period 1968-2004 is classified as “violent political conflict”, taking into account that – except in 1999 during the ETA truce - violent actions resulting in casualties have occurred every year. The peak of violence (measured in the number of violent actions and people killed) took place between 1978 and 1987.

Most of the accommodation initiatives are contested and often provoke diametrically opposed evaluations from Basque nationalists and non-nationalists. To begin, one has to mention
the Basque Autonomy Rule which was initiated in 1979 by the Basque Autonomy Charter (“Estatuto vasco de autonomía”). The period from 1977 to 1979, during which Basque political transition took place, was marked by an extremely high level of political violence. Furthermore, ETA’s terrorism played a central role in the Basque political life. One third of the casualties provoked by the actions of this organization took place during those years. The period from 1998 to 2004 was marked by new efforts in favour of pacification and political normalization that lead to a certain reduction of violence. In 1998, the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, has tried to strengthen its own position by adopting the “Lizarra Pact” (also referred to as “Pacto de Estella”) with the other Basque nationalist organizations. However, this pact was rejected by the main non-nationalist parties and organizations. Quickly after this incidence ETA unilaterally declared a truce which considerably decreased the level of violence. The truce declaration can probably be attributed to the fact that the terrorist organization was increasingly isolated - both politically and operatively. It has to be admitted that police and judicial pressure directed by the Partido Popular (PP) towards ETA and other nationalist radical groups was, in this sense, highly effective. In other aspects the so-called “Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo” initiated in 2000 by the two major Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) to collaborate in the fight against terrorism has not always led to the desired results. The so-called “Ibarrexte Plan” of 2003 proposed autonomy rule revision. The Basque prime minister suggested a public national debate on the revision of the Basque Autonomic Rule in order to work in favour of the end of violence. The formal proposal was rejected by the Spanish parliament in December 2004. Therefore, during the second PP government, there has been a considerable isolation of the Basque government. The electoral defeat of José María Aznar’s Partido Popular in the 2004 general elections, and the arrival of the new socialist government led by José Luiz Rodríguez Zapatero can be interpreted as a turning point to a more collaborative period. The new government has tried to re-open political dialogue with Basque nationalists (both moderate and radical). In March 2006 ETA declared a “permanent ceasefire”. However, the ceasefire came to an end in December 30, 2006 with the Madrid Barajas Airport bombing. In the aftermath of the bombing, Zapatero declared the political dialogue to be suspended. Even though most of the measures were contested, some conflict-decreasing initiatives have been initiated. A very important political agreement that has to be mentioned is the “Ajuria-Enea Pact” of 1988. This pact signed between the main Spanish and Basque political parties emphasised the rejection of violence as a means to achieve the independence of the Basque Country. Its impact was generally positive, however in 1998 it was ended which has had a conflict-increasing impact. The second initiative concerns language issues. Considering that the Basque language (Euskera) is a key element in the Basque conflict, the “Ley para la normalización del euskera” (Euskera Normalization Bill) of 1992 was an important step. Since then the Basque political government has constantly motivated the promotion of the Euskera, the creation of cultural and educational institutions and the implementation of policies to head its development both inside and outside the Basque territory. Due to repression exerted by the Franco regime, the language rights which the Basque community seeks have been guaranteed only since the 1978 Constitution. Today Euskera is one of the five official languages in Spain.

During the whole democratic period (1979-2006) there have been several attempts for peace keeping through diverse means and strategies developed by the different governments. The period 1989-1998 witnessed initiatives that can be characterised as conflict settlement (i.e. Ajuria Enea Pact and Lizarra Pact). Finally, the autonomy rule and its development process (1979-1985) can be described as conflict resolution insofar as its intention was to approach the roots of the conflict.
2. The specific involvement of international actors

2.1. Various Patterns of Internationalisation

The involvement of international actors varies a lot across case studies, with highly internationalised cases such as Cyprus or Kosovo, and cases where internationalisation is much more discrete (Basque Country, Slovene Minority in Austria, Belgium). On average, the involvement of international actors is not very high, a finding which is not surprising considering the fact that most of our case studies are located inside the European Union, and that international organisations are much more interventionist in Africa, Asia or Southern America.

As shown in D9, there are several possible patterns of internationalisation. For instance, internationalisation can be sought by local actors who are trying to break a deadlock. It is obviously opposed by those in power, who often see internationalisation as an unacceptable interference. In the case studies covered by the PEACE-Com project, we have observed two kinds of configurations:

- when internationalisation derives from an initiative taken by international organisations or institutions, or foreign actors and states. This can be labelled “internationalisation from above”. International institutions and/or external actors tend to intervene mostly in unstable situations, when a conflict is about to erupt or in an escalation phase. Such has been the case in Kosovo (UN), Cyprus (UN), Sandzak (EU) and in Vojvodina (EU and Council of Europe, under the pressure of Hungary). But they can also provide financial support in more stable zones, or in countries where states are very reluctant towards external interference (e.g. EU funding in Northern Ireland or in the Basque country). Financial support in this case is meant to help “peace initiatives” mainly undertaken by local “grassroots” actors. This type of “top down” internationalisation presents the risk of further escalating the conflict in unstable zones or when the situation is already quite tense.

- when internationalisation is the result of the initiatives of local actors, who are looking for outside help, or who think that external pressure will help breaking the deadlock or avoiding further escalation. Internationalisation can be part of a strategy of local actors or opponents who are trying to put pressure on the state or on other local actors. It concerns mainly small-scale conflicts, and most of the time linguistic issues. Such was the
case in Estonia (intervention of the OSCE), in Belgium (intervention of the Council of Europe), and, to a lesser extent, in Austria (intervention of the European Parliament, though at a very low level). In these cases, the external actors mostly exert a political and moral pressure on local actors.

In some cases the involvement of international organisations is very low, or concerns only the funding of peace activities and programmes (Northern Ireland, Basque Country).

We detail below two cases of internationalisation “from above”, or “from the outside”, the cases of Sandžak and of Cyprus.

| Overview – Accommodation Initiatives – Sandžak |
| Internationalisation from the outside – Case 1 |

The conflict in Sandžak takes its origins in the interwar period, during which several laws and discriminatory policies were passed against the Bosniaks. These oppositions were reinforced during WWII, when Sandžak was occupied by Germans, and when intercommunal conflict between Bosniaks, Serbs and Albanians reached a peak (low intensity conflict). The period between 1945 and 1990 was marked by peaceful stable situation, with a high degree of political stability and institutional legitimacy of the Socialist Yugoslavia. The period of Milošević’s rule (1990-2000) was marked by strong political tensions which sometimes turned to violent political conflict, with Serbian paramilitary formations attacking Bosniaks’ private property. According to the data of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 60 to 80 thousands of the Bosniaks left Sandžak between 1992 and 1996, 34 civilians were killed, 130 kidnapped and 29 wounded; 18 attacks on villages were registered and 1,299 Bosniak settlements were destroyed. The increasing political mobilization on the Bosniak side, with Bosniak parties winning the municipal assemblies of Novi Pazar, led in 1997 the Serbian authorities to send strong police forces to Novi Pazar, to dissolve Municipal Assembly, to introduce forced administration, and to put a ban on public gatherings. At the 2000 elections, when the Milošević regime was overthrown, the coalition of Bosniak parties, called the List for Sandžak, came to power in the municipality of Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin. The 2000 regime change in Serbia brought about somewhat different policy toward the national minorities. However, open intolerance was present in all areas of public life, the decentralization of power has not taken place yet, and the Sandžak of Novi Pazar is still administratively divided. Only recently (December 2004) the Bosniak language is allowed as an optional course in elementary schools. Bosniak language is not recognized by the 1990 constitution of Serbia. In all phases of the conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks throughout the 20th century, the conflict has never been resolved in the way that its causes were removed. In the communist Yugoslavia (1945-1991), the communist were successful in managing the conflict. Therefore, this period is characterized with conflict settlement. The conflict broke out after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 and it was practically open (without attempts to being managed, settled or resolved) until the regime change in 2000. After 2000, mainly under the pressure of European Union and other European organizations (Council of Europe, OSCE etc), the conflict seems to be in decline and is moving again toward conflict settlement. It is worth noting that one part of Bosniak population led by the party headed by Rasim Ljljic is more open toward cooperation with Serbs and does not accept radical methods of achieving autonomy for Sandzak. This fact along with the prospect of European integration could open the possibility for conflict resolution and reconciliation between the two communities in the future.
Since the escalation of the conflict at the end of the 1950s, accommodation policies implemented in Cyprus can be described as confrontational. The first meaningful initiative prepared by the colonial government that aimed to grant Cyprus a kind of self government was rejected by both sides which aired conflicting demands. In addition initiatives towards establishing an independent Cypriot state generated conflicts between the two sides. In 1960 Cyprus Republic was declared as a result of the involvement of Britain, Greece and Turkey which limited the degree of confrontation and intercommunal collaboration. Between 1960 and 1963, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were governing the Republic of Cyprus together in peaceful stable situation, and accommodation policies were aiming at conflict resolution. In 1963, with the disagreement between the two communities, political tension had arisen and at the end of 1963, it turned to a violent political conflict. Between 1964 and 1968, there was a low intensity conflict in which 350-450 Turkish Cypriots and 100-150 Greek Cypriots were killed. In 1974, the situation turned into a high intensity conflict in which both communities were fighting warfare. In the period 1963-1974 violent activities against Turkish Cypriots continued, and accommodation policies, which can be described as confrontational, were primarily concerned with peace keeping and conflict management. After the 1974 war, the clashes between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have ended with an open cease-fire that has been continuing for the last 30 years. In addition, since 1974 in the Turkish part of the island the various political parties have been sustaining different views on conflict resolution. For instance, the Republican Turkish Party has long been favouring the signing of a peace agreement with the southern part of the island, in opposition with the other right wing parties such as the National Union Party. Claims concerning the shape of the political system have also evolved amongst Turkish Cypriot parties, with a stress on a confederal solution since the 1990s, when a federation had been favoured up to then. Within these 30 years, there were several attempts to settle the conflict in Cyprus, like in 1977-1979 the initiative between Makarious and Denktas aiming at achieving conflict settlement. Several other attempts were tried between 1986 and 1989, and again in 1998 and 2002. However, none of these attempts led to a lasting agreement between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Most of these initiatives were led by national actors, with a growing involvement of international actors since the end of the sixties. It is also remarkable that negotiations led between 2002 and 2004 were a lot more substantial in terms of scope and involvement of various actors (national, bit also motherland/ fatherland, United Nations, European Union…). Despite these various attempts and growing encompassing scope, the period 1974-2004 can be described as confrontational, as far as accommodation policies are concerned. The most important of these initiatives is known as the Annan Plan. On 12 December 2002, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, initiated a comprehensive plan, under the aegis of Western powers, which proposed a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation which shall have single international personality and parallel to its basic premise divided political powers between the two layers of authority, namely the central-federal government and the constituent units. Aiming to break the ongoing stalemate in the Cyprus dispute, the Secretary-General urged the leaderships of the two Cypriot communities to discuss and finalize political and constitutional issues on the basis of his plan. Both sides expressed widespread discontents on particular aspects of the Annan Plan except the frenetic support of Turkish Cypriot leftist opposition and the civil society. People in both sides were asked to express their opinion about the Plan in referenda on 24 April 2004. While 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriot electorate gave support to the Plan, 75 per cent of Greek Cypriot electorate rejected it. Since it was not approved by the two sides at separate simultaneous referenda, the Plan did not enter into force and Greek Cypriot- led ‘Republic of Cyprus’ joined the EU on 1 May 2004.
Concerning the possible impact of international involvement, interviewees’ opinions about the involvement of international actors is nearly evenly split between two positions:

- International actors can mainly contribute to find solutions through their capacity "to step back", see the situation in a more “neutral” way, consider solutions without all the historical complexities linked to it, and bring about a triangulation of the conflict.

- International actors are not able to understand the complexities of the respective situation and therefore should not get involved/cannot find a feasible solution/cannot propose good accommodation initiatives. Many interviewees underlined that an outsider “cannot do the job for us”, even if they can create a momentum for solution the country concerned has to take the necessary measures on its own.

In addition, most respondents to the questionnaire, as well as most interviewees stated that international intervention should always be accompanied by follow-up measures to ensure its success (acceptance by the population etc.).

If international intervention is conducted by single countries instead of international organisations, the interviewees feared that these countries follow their own interests or a “hidden agenda”, which does not necessarily coincide with the will to find a solution (e.g. in the case of Cyprus which bears a strategic and geopolitical importance).

In addition, we should further differentiate between different types of international actors. The involvement of motherland/fatherland and border states, for instance, gives birth to contrasted views.

In Cyprus particularly, opinions are split between the position that motherlands have to get more involved and get less involved: “We must leave all external actors aside”, or “We must have a kind of equal relationship with all of them but this shouldn’t be a victim-savior kind of relationship or mother and child kind of relationship”. But on the other hand some interviewees thought that “You cannot take away the motherlands”, “this is not a problem that is between the GCs and TCs only. That dimension of the problem is simply a small section of a much bigger picture”, “So, one can never say, in an island located where Cyprus is, let’s leave them alone, because no one will leave us alone”.

In Kosovo, some interviewees thought that they should be less involved to enable a solution, whereas in the Basque country many respondents and interviewees assessed positively the involvement of France with regards to police cooperation.
Diasporas, which are often quoted as major actors of current conflicts, appear largely absent, as far as accommodation policies are concerned. This result is in line with contemporary literature with stresses the impact of Diasporas in “soft politics” rather than in the setting up and implementation of policies.

2.2. Effectiveness of International Intervention

As far as effectiveness is concerned, according to the questionnaire results, the international actors which are judged as the most effective are the EU, the Council of Europe and the international NGOs. On the contrary, the involvement of NATO and motherland/fatherland is often described as non effective or even counterproductive.

For instance in the case of Estonia the interviewees think that the international actors’ involvement has been overall positive (triangulation “outside historical reality”) but that is has failed to promote dialogue between “majority and minority” (“international actors cannot do the job for us”).

The Council of Europe, through its framework convention for the protection of national minorities, was quoted several times, in Estonia and in Belgium, has having a significant impact. In Estonia interviewees think that it brings about an “outside view”, “establishes good
standards”, a “systematic supervision”, and “creates attitudes towards national minorities of the ‘old Europe’”. In Belgium, opinions are more contrasted between Walloons and Flemish, Walloons giving an overall positive assessment while Flemish think it has been used by “especially by francophones as it fits better with their logic of protection of individual rights”.

The United Nations also receives a mixed assessment, especially in Kosovo and in Cyprus. In Kosovo, the UN mission is accused by interviewees of not being “capable of ensuring safety for all. The tragedy that took place on March 17, 2004 indicates the limits and the failure of this peace mission”. The UN also failed to build “a viable state and market economy on Kosovo”; “Unemployment is the highest in Europe, administration is slow and inefficient, grey economy account for over 50% of the GDP, mafia and organized crime has been thriving”. Moreover, the UN is often perceived as a partial actor, a trend which creates frustration: “The negotiations about the future status of Kosovo that lasted for over a year were conducted by a man who was openly partial”.

In Cyprus, the UN is held responsible for the setting up of the Annan plan, which is considered as a “total failure”, because of the absence of “Cyprus people” in its negotiation, and because it is considered as a “neo-colonial imposition”. A lot of interviewees however still consider that UN has role to play in the resolution of the conflict.

The assessment of the involvement of international actors also varies a lot from case to case. In the Basque Country for instance, some interviewees think that international intervention, when present, is not effective at all. Moreover, the international actors suggested are defined as “not effective” or just “not implicated”. Only international NGO’s are mentioned to be somewhat effective.

However, many interviewees pleaded for an increased of international implication. Specifically, UN, Council of Europe and EU are perceived as guarantees for the process and international NGOs are claimed to be “oxygen givers” in terms of information. One interviewee suggested for instance that the UN should have an “operative” role linked to the “demilitarization” dimension of this problem or to the “process of handling back the weapons”. The implication of
international actors is evaluated as an appropriate way to reach a final settlement. Their implication would be very helpful in order to facilitate a peace process.

In Cyprus on the contrary, international intervention is in general assessed rather negatively. One interviewee stated: “The biggest mistake of the international actors was that they tried to impose the solution. Countries like Russia, France, China have a positive role to play, while countries like USA and UK a negative one because they aim at serving their interests”.

Responses to questionnaires as well as interviews thus show that international involvement often receives mitigated assessments. However, in many cases international actors are not totally rejected, but rather invited to pay an increased attention to the specificities of local situations, and to supervise peace processes instead of being their main instigators and managers.

2.3. The assessment of EU’s involvement

In order to complement the results gathered thanks to the questionnaire survey, specific interview grids were designed for experts to be interviewed on each case study. These grids included questions about the impact of EU involvement, about the policies set up at European level, and about the initiatives that the EU could take in order to solve the relevant conflict. The table below summarises the assessment and opinions of our interviewees on the involvement of European institutions on the cases covered by our project:

| Slovenia Minority in Austria | General agreement that the EU should not get too much involved. “The EU does not have any reason to get involved in this issue”, “The EU should be engaged in the legal protection of national minorities”, “A solution proposed by the EU makes no sense. The problem has to be resolved within the country jointly with the population and the federation”, “the EU ought to provide some proposals for the resolution of the conflict. The conflict in Carinthia has to however be dealt with and resolved locally” (opposition among German-speakers, avoid internationalization, and Slovenes in favour) |
| Belgium | No real involvement of EU, but indirect influence through the EU’s federal project. EU has more and more competences. EU does not show much of interest, and should be at least more involved in Brussels’ regional governance given presence of EU in Brussels EU frame has changed classical notions of sovereignty and autonomy, making splitting of Belgium less dramatic, less costly On the other hand the end of Belgium would be a major failure for European idea of multicultural polity, but there is no real pressure of EU on Belgian actors against splitting. |
| Basque Country | EU involvement seen as positive, “EU should imply itself as mediator and guarantor”, Declares “very effective” the implication of EU, specifically, due to the initiative of considering ETA as a terrorist organization rather than a “national-liberation movement”, police cooperation against terrorism, The role of EU as guarantee of the “nations without state” rights, „guarantee of human rights and liberties”, „protect the plurality of cultural nations“ EU’s input to final settlement: “A potential implication of EU would be accepted“ |
| Cyprus | Involvement of the EU is evaluated positively, “the involvement of international actors has been positive and instrumental” but also some critiques, EU should “upgrade its role”, “a lot depends of EU’s actions”, EU provides important “framework” which people can use as guideline (but underline that |
Cyprus population has to get involved in order for policies to work), “the EU should put more effort towards finding a solution to the Cyprus problem”, “the EU can help and has a lot of room to do it”
- Some are optimistic about the impact of EU accession on the likeliness of reunification: “European integration will lead to the gradual reunification of Cyprus”

**North Cyprus**
- “EU can positively contribute” / „should be more and more involved“ / „It is also their problem: imported this issue into the EU“, „EU is the magical formula“ (If all of the interested parties were admitted to the EU)
- EU accession will be a „curse for them“
- EU cannot solve the Cyprus problem. UN can solve it, „It’s not an honest broker because EU is not neutral“, „they don’t really have these tools at the moment at their disposal as they are not very used to having these kinds of problems in their territory but they should get more involved“, „The EU should stay out of Cyprus“

**Estonia**
- EU accession has had positive effects („Estonian society is gradually becoming more open, cosmopolitan, tolerant, bit by bit frees itself from xenophobic complexes“), in the economic domain (economic growth, free movement of people etc.), language problem might disappear since many will switch to English (but some fear the loss of culture/language)
- Indirect role of the EU during the enlargement phase (Copenhagen criteria)

**Kosovo**
- Trust in EU and positive impact of EU accession: “In 25 years most likely Kosovo and the region will be less stable than the rest of Europe, but will be integrated into the EU” / “the situation will cool off since the EU will have to show resoluteness”
- The perspective of EU accession is considered as possible positive impact on status negotiations (experts consider that EU “has to offer something in return to “the losers”), EU should support a “solution based on compromise”, “Once both Serbia and Kosovo are in the EU, Serbs would take it as a less of a catastrophe that Kosovo is fully independent”
- Important issues that EU could help solving: return of refugees, property rights issues

**Northern Ireland**
- Positive role of the EU which funds local projects for peace and reconciliation. Financial intervention should be maintained
- Has provided a political platform for nationalist claims (at the European Parliament through the election of John Hume in 1979) and has raised awareness about the situation in the province in the 80s.
- No direct intervention required

**Sandžak**
- “relentless pressure of the EU could move Serbian government to act even more positively with respect to consolidation of democracy and economic development, which would make Serbia better place for the Bosniaks to live”
- “role of the EU is positive: State and local administration act responsibly and in agreement with the law only if they are under the surveillance of the European Union”, “Bosniaks will be able to exercise their rights only if the EU is present in Serbia as a tutor”
- “The surveillance and control role of the European institutions in Sandžak positively affects the behaviour of the political and administrative actors in Sandžak and Serbia. Some think that without the presence of the EU in Serbia (and in the region), ethnic conflict could have escalated again after 2000”, The EU can play a substantial role in helping Serbia “strengthen independent institutions, and build itself as the state of all its citizens”
**Vojvodina**

- The majority of the respondents believe that Serbia and Vojvodina will be integrated successfully into the European Union in the future and that this will lead to “stability in the future”
- pressure on the Serbian state’s institutions (link EU accession negotiations with the final settlement of the situation in Vojvodina)
- EU should insist more on applying and respecting collective rights of minorities

This overview shows that with the exception of North Cyprus, where the EU’s role is not seen very positively since the rejection of the Annan Plan, and of Belgium and Austria where interviewees are sceptical vis-à-vis the EU’s involvement, there is an overall positive assessment of the EU’s role in conflict management and settlement. In most cases, even if no direct intervention is called for, there is an agreement that the EU can impact positively, in an indirect manner, on the evolution of the conflicts (this finding will be further analysed and tested in the fourth section of this report).

These answers also the variety of paths through which the EU impacts on conflict situations, a finding which we will scrutinise in more details in the last section of this deliverable, with the contrasted cases of Cyprus and of Northern Ireland. This impact can be exercised through legal, economical and political means, but also often takes the path of cultural and philosophical influence. The main paths of influence mentioned by our interviewees can be summarised as follows:

- Accession process, Copenhagen criteria, legal documents and protection of minorities
- Financial tool and economic integration
- Intervention in mediation processes, launching of political initiatives, role as a guarantor and as an external monitor
- Indirect political and philosophical influence, change in the notions of sovereignty for instance
- Cultural influence through the promotion of multiculturalism

These findings are in line with the literature about the impact of Europeanisation on conflicts (see for instance Coppieters and al., 2004; Diez, Stetter, Albert, 2004). They also reveal that many conflict actors are actually calling for an increased EU intervention, either because they believe it can be an effective mediator and break a deadlock, or because of its capacity in state- and civil society-building.
3. Achievements and Assessments

Conflict resolution has been a major field of research in the post-Cold War area. Numerous theoretical approaches in peace and conflict studies, as well as accounts for various experiences in the prevention, management or resolution of interstate and intrastate crises have been discussed and published over the past decades. These tremendous developments have been accompanied by new institutional settings designed to provide appropriate answers and frameworks for dealing with contemporary conflicts. Developing tools for the prevention, management and resolution of intrastate or internationalized conflicts has also become the focus of policy debates in Europe and the rest of the world during the 1990s. However, the achievements and results of these initiatives are rather mitigated; according to various surveys and databases such as The Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan, or the Uppsala Database, the number and lethality of conflicts has not been steadily diminishing, and governments as well as international institutions face considerable difficulties in dealing with the so-called “new wars”, which present diverging characteristics from those of intrastate or strictly internal wars (Kaldor, 2001). Several other problems, like the overinvestment of some geographic zones, to the detriment of others, or the lack of coordination between peace initiatives in a specific area, significantly hinder progress.

Besides being a highly dynamic research field, peace and conflict studies have a direct strategic and policy relevance. However, if the link between research progress and the setting up of new policies designed to prevent, manage or settle conflicts, seems well developed and relatively efficient, there are obvious shortcomings, limitations and untackled aspects in the way science contributes to the necessary evaluation and adjustments that should take place during the implementation phase. Prevention, peace-keeping and peace-making missions and activities are more and more often designed jointly by policy-makers and experts in peace and conflict studies, but this close collaboration tends to fade away during the implementation phase, and hardly exists when it comes to setting up on-going evaluation procedures. In the academic field, there have been some recent attempts to tackle this problem (see Paffenholz, Reychler, 2007), but there have so far remained the exception.

In PEACE-COM, we have tried to put the stress on the question of evaluation of accommodation policies, both past and on-going, in order to learn more about the reasons for success and of failure of implemented policies, and to be able to be policy relevant. Questions about the assessment of the various accommodation policies implemented policies have been asked both in the questionnaire survey and during the interviews with the case study experts.

The first thing to note is that if accommodation policies are no exception in the tendency of conflict actors to polarising issues and problems (in many cases, when one “camp” sees an initiative as positive, then the other is likely to view it negatively), some accommodation initiatives also generate strongly negative assessments in all concerned camps. In other words, most accommodation policies are either the focus of contradictory assessments, depending on the “camp” who is talking, or they are rejected by all sides. In Cyprus for instance, many questionnaire respondents on both sides (North and South) mentioned the Annan Plan as a “bad case” of accommodation policies. In the same manner, in Austria questionnaire respondents very often mentioned the setting up of bilingual signposts as a bad case, either because they were simply against it, or because they thought that this incompletely implemented initiative was a failure.

One of the main problems of accommodation initiatives and policies thus seems to be the lack of domestic support they manage to convey. This lack of domestic support can often be explained
by the difficulties encountered during the implementation phase of these policies, and by the
disappointment these difficulties generate among those who had hoped for a quick change. This
kind of disenchantment process is obvious in many cases covered by our project: obviously in
Cyprus, where Northern Cypriots resent the non implementation of the Annan Plan; in Austria
regarding the setting up of bilingual signposts, as mentioned above; to a certain extent in
Northern Ireland, where the difficulties of the implementation of the 1998 agreements, and in
particular of decommissioning have encouraged pessimism among the Protestant/loyalist
population; in Vojvodina, where the setting up of National Councils for Ethnic Minorities was
welcomed by most, but later generated disappointment because they do not function properly,
etc.

Experts also identified problems in the setting up or implementation of accommodation policies
that are actually encountered in many cases. The five most-often quoted problems are:

- that Civil Society is excluded from accommodation initiatives in most cases (and most
  interviewees agree that their involvement would be beneficial); in other words,
  accommodation policies are very “political” and institutional (as described in the first
  section of this deliverable), mainly “top-down”, as if conflicts were the results of the actions
  of political leaders only. This goes against most conflict analysis work that has been done so far
on the causes of conflicts (see D1 in that respect);

- that politicians are not the ideal actors to carry out accommodation initiatives (because they
  often follow a “hidden agenda”, and hold a short term vision of the problem, etc.), but it is
  mostly them who are in charge of their negotiation and implementation;

- that international attention is very often short-lived, and corresponds to strong escalatory
  phases or outbursts of violence of a given conflict, when what is needed is a more long-term
  commitment so as to 1) put adequate and renewed pressure on conflict actors, and 2)
  guarantee and ensure the implementation of accommodation policies;

- that in many cases “quick-fix” solutions (like the sending of peace-keeping forces, security
  measures, financial endowments, etc.) are preferred to long-term efforts (working on the root
  causes, structural prevention of conflict, etc.). Initiatives are not coherent in time and
  randomly carried out consistently to the end (very few insistence on conflict resolution);

- Finally, and this problem is related to the previous, many experts interviewed stressed the fact
  that accommodation initiatives should always be accompanied by follow up measures in
  order to succeed (e.g. to create a genuine dialogue between the two communities in Estonia
after the OSCE intervention, or to establish contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots after the opening of the borders). This is especially true for international
intervention with regard to which most interviewees agreed that “others cannot do the job
for us”.

Further to this general assessment, we have examined case by case examples of “good” and
“bad” practices in accommodation policies. This in-depth analysis reveals that if there is no
ready-made recipe for success, there are patterns or configurations in which a given
accommodation policy is more likely to succeed. On other hand there are obviously, if not recipe
for disaster, at least measures that should be avoided if further tension or escalation of the
conflict wants to be avoided.
3.1. Cases of Success: Key Configurations

According to our findings, there are three main cases in which accommodation initiatives or policies have been judged as successful by most conflict actors and experts:

- when small scale measures are implemented, which are not costly for the given society, which benefit to all sides of the conflict, and which are not seen as major endeavours towards one side or another. The use of the term “small scale” is not to be equated here with unimportant. In fact, most of these “small scale” successes are highly politically significant, because they show that accommodation and compromise are possible, and that accommodation initiatives and policies do not necessarily benefit to one side only, namely, that one can move from a “zero sum game” to a “win-win” situation. Two examples stemming from our questionnaire survey particularly stand out: on the one hand, the bilingual Kindergarten in Austria, and on the other hand the opening of checkpoints in Cyprus. Those two cases will be presented and discussed in details below.

- the second instance of success is when the accommodation initiative or policy is able to bring about a triangularisation of the conflict, in other words when an action or a policy is initiated from the outside, by an external actor which can pose itself, it not as neutral, at least as external to the conflict. One case particularly drew our attention, the case of the OSCE intervention in Estonia. This case is also detailed below.

- the third instance of success is when there is a strong effort to include all relevant actors in the negotiation and implementation process, even the most violent ones, and when there is no taboo as to the policy sectors and issues that the accommodation policy can address. Examples of these successes are not very numerous, even if there is a tendency in policy-making cycles to accept the necessary multilevel and encompassing nature of peace agreements. As far as our case studies are concerned, the Northern Ireland 1998 Agreements are a good example of such an encompassing initiative; it is also the case of Zoran Djindjic’s policy in Sandžak, and of the “affirmation of multicultural and ethnical tolerance” project in Vojvodina. The case of the Northern Ireland 1998 Agreements has been described in the first session of this deliverable (see pp.11-12).

As far as small-scale measures are concerned, the first chosen example is the one of the opening of checkpoints in Cyprus. They are the result of a bilateral low-scale initiative, as just a few gates have been opened so far, but which corresponds to material needs and requests on both sides of the border. In other words, this initiative could build on the complementarity of needs on both sides. As stated by one of our interviewee: “It is considered as a positive development, it creates a friendly environment and helps towards the creation of networks.” However, the positive reactions were not completely unanimous. Another interviewee stated: “It already had a negative effect on most of the Greek-Cypriots who crossed the barricades to see their houses because they faced a disappointing situation. The crossing of the barricades does not contribute towards the reunification of the island because people do not actually communicate, they just go shopping or visit their other side for touristic purposes.”

This assessment is very telling, because it stresses the “disenchantment” factor mentioned above, and underlines the fact that each time an accommodation initiative is taken, hopes are running high, even in cases of protracted conflict.

A case of policy success: Small Measure I
The opening of crossing points between North and South Cyprus

In April 23 2003, Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed restricted freedom of movement across the green line. In the Cyprus context, the movement between North and South was remarkable. The
reaction of the people of the two communities was above expectations. Between 23/04/04 and 17/10/04 2,063,335 GCs and 3,006,762 TCs crossed the Green line. With this development, intercommunal relations entered a new track. It extends the size and dimension of the relations. Before the freedom of movement was allowed, other than the 2,000 daily TC workers who were working in the South, Intercommunal relations were either political or social group activities which were well organized, framed and most of the time sponsored by international actors, and which took place either in another country or in the buffer zone. There were think tank groups, businessperson groups, women groups, schoolchildren groups, youth groups etc. The main aim of the groups was to push the two communities to become closer to each other.

After 23rd of April 2003, unorganized individual contacts also began in all dimensions, economic, social, political, and cultural. However, the social and economic impact of the free movement is controversial. Besides positive economic implications on both economies, especially on the economy of North and decreasing economic disparities, and positive social implications like closer relations between communities, it has negative implications like diverging trade from North to the South and transforming conflict from community conflict to individual property conflict. The number of TCs working in the South, with a conservative estimation, is increased to 5,000, of which 3,642 with social security. Unofficial statistics estimated US$75-90 million annual factor income from 5000 T/C workers in the South, and US$12,229,500 from trade. Since total export earnings of North Cyprus is about US$50 million, income generated from the free movement triple the foreign exchange earnings of the North.

The decision, early 2007, taken by the Greek Cypriot government to allow for the opening of a new crossing point right in the middle of Nicosia, after months of controversies with the Turkish Cypriot authorities, shows that the opening of the border is seen by both sides as a positive and necessary development, and hopefully will allow for more exchanges between the two sides of the green line.

The second chosen example of a “small-scale” measure is the opening of bilingual Kindergartens in Austria. This measure had a very limited impact in political terms, but it bears a symbolic importance. It is however less politicized than the sign posts one, and has lesser financial implications, because kindergarten teachers are paid by the Federal Government, which means the municipalities have fewer costs. This of course plays a role, “it is not about symbolic politics, but about a practical issue”. Moreover, some interviewees stated the fact that the bilingual kindergartens are not contentious because these are private kindergartens, and that it is more complicated when it comes to public kindergartens. In addition, the opening of these Kindergartens has also benefited from extensive scientific and didactic support, and from the fact that a whole part of the population was in favour of this initiative. As stated by one interviewee: “demand for bilingual kindergartens determines the supply” (as multi-lingualism is seen as an advantage by many Austrians). This example further underlines the importance of raising domestic support for the launching of peace initiatives.

A case of policy success: Small Measure II
The bilingual kindergartens in Carinthia

Today, contested issues in the conflict between German-speaking nationalists in Carinthia and the Slovene-speaking Austrians partly revolve around the educational system and financial assistance for the preservation of language and culture. Austrian minority policy is based on Article 7 of the State Treaty of 1955. According to Article 7, the Austrian government is required to guarantee the acknowledgement of Slovenian as an official language and the possibility of school instruction in the native language. In 1988, an amendment to the Education Act was
passed (Minderheitenschulgesetz Novelle), which provided for separate bilingual and monolingual schools at the primary level. As a consequence, five municipal kindergartens in Carinthia are bilingual, two of them having been established in Klagenfurt by Slovenian organizations. The kindergartens are subsidized by the state with the funds being drawn from a special budget for minorities.

The interviews conducted with key actors of the conflict (WP 2) revealed that most (Slovene) actors agreed on the success of this accommodation policy as it constituted a “conflict reduction measure beginning in early childhood”. Interestingly, no opposition was voiced against this measure. This of course, stands in stark contrast to the issue of bilingual topographical signposts which has been the major source of conflict between the two groups in the last few years.

As far as triangularisation of conflict is concerned, the chosen example is the OSCE intervention on the case of the referendum on local autonomy of Ida-Virumaa county in Estonia. This external intervention, lead by an organisation which enjoys a strong legitimacy in both parts of the population, has allowed for de-escalation of the conflict. Still nowadays, the activities of the OSCE mission are seen as positive, both by questionnaire respondents and by case study experts: “its presence appeased the situation, and developed a dialogue and mutual trust to a certain extent. With the support of the European Union, the mission [of the OSCE] had an impact on different formulations of legislation, which has made it acceptable to international law”.

This example clearly shows the positive impact that some external actors and international organisations like the EU can have in terms of conflict de-escalation.

A case of policy success through triangularisation: The OSCE intervention regarding the referendum in Narva and Sillamäe in Estonia

At the end of June and the beginning of July 1993, tensions in Estonia increased because of uncertainties around the legal status of persons with undetermined citizenship. The adoption by the Estonian parliament of Aliens Act led to fears among the non-citizen population of Estonia that they might even be threatened with expulsion from Estonia. Some provisions of the Aliens Act gave a basis for an interpretation that the Government of Estonia wanted to start a policy of expulsion from Estonia of Russian-speaking non-citizens-residents. Partly in response to that Act, calls for a referendum on local autonomy in the mostly Russian-inhabited Estonian cities of Narva and Sillamäe gained strength. The non-citizens announced strikes in the North-East of Estonia and prepared for a referendum on territorial autonomy in the cities of Narva and Sillamäe. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced measures in protest of the Act which it characterised as a grave violation of human rights, and an escalating stream of accusations ensued from Moscow. Coincidentally, natural gas deliveries from Russia were cut off to all Baltic States but in the case of Estonia implicitly linked to Estonia’s domestic policies. Deeply concerned about the rapid escalation of events but not wishing to give in to the Russians’ demands, even threatening armed measures, the Estonian Government confidentially asked the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Sweden, for urgent assistance. As a result of consultations with the HCNM (High Commissioner for National Minorities), on 25 June President Lennart Meri of Estonia issued a communiqué in which he announced that he had requested an expert opinion from the OSCE on the Aliens Act and furthermore that he had decided to establish a roundtable on minority issues. After a period of intense “shuttle diplomacy”, including further consultations with President Meri, on 12 July the HCNM was able to secure a compromise which was reflected in a statement he issued on assurances received from the Estonian Government and from representatives of the Russian community in Estonia. HCNM proposed that the Government will change the corresponding provisions of the Aliens Act in order to avoid such interpretation. Also, HCNM was able to convince the leaders of the predominantly Russian-populated towns of
Narva and Sillamäe to respect the territorial integrity of Estonia and to abide by a forthcoming ruling by the National Court on the legality of the referenda. Subsequently, the Act was amended by Parliament, and the representatives of the Russian minority were in turn persuaded by the HCNM, with the help of the OSCE Mission in Tallinn and its two offices in Narva and Jõhvi, to abstain from escalating action. The Russian community accepted the following decision by the National Court that the referendum was against the Estonian Constitution. As generally expected, the referendum was ruled illegal and did not take place.

3.2. Cases of Failure

Besides these examples of success, numerous examples of failures were given by our interviewees and by respondents to the questionnaire survey. If we except cases of biased accommodation policies (favouring only one side of the conflict, or perceived as such by a significant number of actors), there are two main instances in which accommodation policies seem to be doomed to failure:

- first, when the answer given to the crisis seems unsuited to the stakes and issues, more particularly when it is too radical and excessive, for instance when central power reacts to peaceful demonstrations by sending the army; two examples often quoted by our interviews as well as by experts are particularly representative of such policies: on the one hand the criminalisation policy that was implemented in Northern Ireland between 1974 and the end of the eighties; on the other hand, the 1989 amendments to the Serbian Constitution which led to the radicalisation of the Kosovo Albanians. These two cases will be presented and discussed in details below.

- Second, when stakes and issues of the conflict are so intertwined that it is next to impossible to deal with one specific issue without generating a general uproar. In such a situation, political imagination is required, and accommodation policies have to be carefully tailored to the specificities of each conflict, even when they deal with an issue until then considered as of secondary importance. One case particularly drew our attention, the case of the split of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde district in Belgium. This case is also detailed below.

As far as unsuited policies are concerned, the first chosen example is the “criminalisation”, or “normalisation”, or “ulsterisation” policy implemented by the British government in Northern Ireland after the failure of a significant peace initiative in 1974. As explained elsewhere (see case study on Northern Ireland prepared in the framework of WP1), in Northern Ireland during the 1960s a civil rights movement began to campaign for a more equitable access to political power, social provision and cultural recognition. It met with resistance and divisions within unionism. This hardening of the conflict led the London government to deploy in 1969 the British army, and also provoked the re-emergence of the so-far moribund Irish Republican Army. In an attempt to stop this renewal and to put an end to the conflict, the British government first tried to set up power-sharing structures, but they were refused by the unionist. After this failure, the British government decided to try to solve the problem by implementing a “criminalisation” policy, whereby the IRA and other paramilitary groups had to be treated as ordinary criminals. This policy was perceived by the Catholic community as unjust and inappropiate, and provoked a radicalisation of the nationalist community.
A case of policy failure: Unsuit Answer 1
The “criminalisation” or “Ulsterisation” security policy in Northern Ireland

After the failure in 1974 of the Sunningdale Agreements that had tried to set up a power-sharing government, the British government introduced a new security policy, which has been called “Ulsterisation”, “Normalisation”, or “Criminalisation” policy. Its basic rationale was that the IRA and other paramilitary groups had to be treated as ordinary criminals, and all terrorist-type cases had to be dealt with by the courts. The so-called Special Category Status, which recognized the political status of Republican and Loyalist prisoners convicted for terrorist acts, was suppressed. Counter-terrorist activities that were so far under the main responsibility of the British Army were taken over by local security forces, the overwhelmingly protestant Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

This change impacted on many aspects of the conflict. It further alienated the Catholic / Nationalist community who condemned the interrogation methods used by local security forces, and accused them of the use of torture. In prisons the attempt to criminalise prisoners through the abolition of the Special Category Status led to the mobilisation of Republican prisoners, who first refused to wear prison uniforms, and, confronted to authorities’ intransigence, began a series of deadly hunger strikes that eventually lead Sinn Fein to enter successfully the field of electoral politics at the beginning of the eighties. Another effect was to raise the cost of the conflict for the protestant community. So far, the British Army had been the first target of Republican groups attacks, but as the local police forces had now taken up the lead of the anti-terrorist policies, they had to face an increased level of casualties. This undoubtedly deepened and further entrenched the division between both communities, by largely transforming the triadic opposition to a dyadic one.

The second chosen example of an unsuit and radical answer is the one of the policy implemented by the Serbian central power in Kosovo in front of a growing pressure for more autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia. Instead of discussing with Kosovo Albanians the central power in Belgrade chose to suppress the state character of Kosovo. In addition, the Serbian government instrumentalized the Kosovo issue in order to reinforce its own internal power in Serbia. Its repressive answer to the crisis in Kosovo provoked a radicalisation of the Albanian community which no longer trusted the central power for ensuring its physical security (security dilemma) and which had the feeling that its concerns and claims were not adequately addressed.

A case of policy failure: Unsuit Answer 2
The 1989 amendments to the Serbian Constitution

Under the Yugoslav constitutions of 1963 and 1974, Kosovo gained the status of an autonomous province within Serbia (i.e. a sub-unit of the federal units). Although it actually had all the prerogatives of a republic (i.e. a federal unit), there were still some Kosovo Albanians who sought a formal promotion of Kosovo into a federal unit. This wish came to the fore in the late 1960’s when Kosovo Albanian students organised large street demonstrations. The slogan “Kosovo-Republic” was for the first time widely and publicly expressed. Following Tito’s death in 1980, large street public protests of Kosovo Albanians took place. The rallies were broken up by the massive use of police forces during which several people were killed. Meanwhile, there was growing protest among the Kosovo Serbians who claimed protection from the Albanian majority. Slobodan Milošević was able to seize on this issue as a means to strengthen his hold on the Serbian Communist Party. When he came to power in 1989, his government voted an amendment (IX-XLIX) to the 1974 Serbian Constitution which changed the political character.
and constitutional status of the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo by stripping it of its state attributes and powers. These were transferred to the government and parliament of Serbia. Furthermore, Kosovo’s political institutions were dissolved and nearly all Kosovo Albanians were dismissed from positions in the public sector and state-owned businesses. As a reaction to this in the early 1990s, the majority of the political intellectual elite in Pristina opted for a strategy of non-violent Gandhian resistance under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova at the head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). They built up parallel institutions that provided basic social services (e.g. schooling, hospitals) for Kosovo Albanians. However, after several years of passive resistance, the military wing of Kosovo Albanians gained the upper hand and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Kosovo Republic Armed Forces (FARK) were formed, launching attacks against the Serbian military forces. The Serbian police forces responded with excessive use of force, leading to the armed conflict that solicited NATO intervention in 1999. Today it is widely accepted that a major reason for Albanian frustration was the definition of Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia in the 1974 constitution and the consequent inability to declare independence from Serbia. The suspense of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the adoption of the Serbian constitution in 1990 can be considered to have triggered the armed confrontation between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.

As far as policy failures due to intertwined issues are concerned, the chosen example is the case of the split of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde district in Belgium. This district is composed of municipalities of Brussels’ periphery. Large numbers of Francophone Bruxellois (as well as Flemish) have abandoned the city, to live in the greener Flemish countryside around Brussels. This suburbanisation process started long before the linguistic arrangements of 1963, which acknowledged this situation by granting the Francophones special minority rights (“facilities”) in six Flemish communes. In addition, the Francophisation is not limited to the six communes granted facilities in 1963, but by now in many other Flemish communes in the Brussels periphery the number of Francophones (and other linguistic minorities) has become substantial, while they are not given any special linguistic privileges at all, and are expected to adapt to the officially monolingual Flemish environment. At the same time, there is the question of the protection of the rights of the small Flemish minority within the Brussels bilingual region. The split of the district comprising these various municipalities has been decided by the Belgian Arbitration Court in 2003, but has still not been implemented. The reasons for this non implementation can be found in the confrontational style of the whole process, in the fact that only political and institutional actors have been involve, and above all in the impossibility to deal with this question without putting into question the future of Belgium itself. It therefore induces strong reactions and opinions.

A case of policy failure: Intertwined Issues
Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde

Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde constitutes an electoral constituency in the heart of Belgium. It is composed of the 19 municipalities of bilingual Brussels and the unilingual Dutch-speaking area of Halle-Vilvoorde. This district is the only one in Belgium which allows Flemish voters to choose a French-speaking candidate and vice-versa. Around 2000 Flemish parties brought the issue of splitting the district into debate. Furthermore, the Belgian Arbitration Court declared the current state of affairs as unconstitutional and prohibited its maintenance in 2003. The issue became particularly salient in 2004 when mayors from Flemish Brabant menaced to boycott regional and European elections if the district was not split. French-speaking politicians are opposed to the split and ask for an enlargement of Brussels (i.e. add the six Flemish communes with special language facilities of the Brussels periphery to Brussels) instead. The question remained high on the agenda for some months and was discussed in several forums by leading politicians.
Nevertheless, given the extremely opposed demands made on both sides, no commonly accepted solution could be found. The absence of decision put the Flemish government under strain since it had explicitly promised the split in 2004. The francophone parties, however, considered the outcome as a success.

The “BHV” issue demonstrated very clearly that community issues can broil up at any moment and are difficult to accommodate. In spite of successive institutional arrangements, the linguistic dimension of the conflict regularly comes back to the fore. Even though, the matter was put on hold temporarily after 2004, it has flared up again during and after the general elections in June 2007, and is still at the core of political debates at the time of writing.

In addition to these two specific cases of failure, there were also numerous examples quoted by our interviewees and questionnaires respondents where policies failed because of local opposition: for instance in Austria, where the policy concerning the setting up of bilingual signposts is not implemented because of the opposition of the German speaking community, in Cyprus where the Annan Plan failed because of the opposition of a part of the Greek Cypriot Community, in Sandžak where religious teaching, perceived as undermining the communities’ identities, has seemingly led to a further radicalisation of the communities, etc.

Overall, it is the lack of bottom-up measures and the lack or insufficient inclusion of local actors in the negotiation and implementation of accommodation policies which is the most often quoted when trying to explain policy failures. Local actors have to be included and “empowered” in order to be convinced of the righteousness of a given policy.

The non-inclusion of civil society actors in discussions, and the top-down style of peace negotiations and processes seem to be one of the main explanations for the failure to reach an agreement, or for the difficulties in implementing it. In Cyprus for instance, one interviewee deplored the absence of the “Cyprus people” in the negotiation process: “The problem of the Annan Plan starts at the negotiations, which took place between the political elites of the two communities, the USA, the UK and Turkey with the coordination of the United Nations. The Cyprus’ people were absent”. Another one stressed the positive impact a more bottom-up negotiation process could have: “Local actors cannot get more involved in peace negotiations and they do not have such a role/responsibility, but they can contribute towards creating a positive atmosphere between people”. One interviewee even went further: “It is time for Cyprus to abandon its postcolonial status and follow a real bottom-up procedure, set up a Constitutional Assembly of all the communities of Cyprus for the enactment of a new Constitution with referendum approval”.

The same kind of phenomena seems to be taking place in Kosovo, at least in the eyes of the Serbian minority. One interviewee explains: “One of the major problems for the Kosovo Serbs is that they do not participate in the negotiation process. They surrendered all their rights to the Serbian government that usurped the process. We know a lot about what the Serbian government wants to do with Kosovo, but we do not know much under what arrangements the Kosovo Serbs would like to live on Kosovo”. Even if there is much scepticism at the extent to which actors from the civil society can emancipate themselves from political discourses, “[civil actors from both sides] appear to be less burdened with the current discourse that is entirely focused on the issue of independence, state- and nation-building.”

A similar position is held as far as the implementation of policies is concerned. In the eyes of many interviewees as well as of conflict actors, the implementation phase, just as the negotiation phase, should rely more on local and civil society actors, instead of sticking to a top-down style of policy, and of treating local actors as pure underlings. In the case of Northern Ireland for
instance, one expert stressed the fact that now that “peace” has been agreed at the highest level, accommodation policies have to be implemented by local actors: “The most important part of accommodation work has to be done at the local level, in most deprived areas. It is local actors who should have the main responsibility for peace programmes. International actors and states like Britain and the Republic can initiate processes and give funding, not implement programmes on an everyday basis”.
4. An Evaluation of the Impact of Europeanisation

4.1. General Overview

In order to understand what kind of impact the process of European integration is having on current national conflicts in Europe, we have to put together two series of questions:

- On the one hand, the first series of questions deals with the shape and nature of current conflicts. It is indeed doubtful that Europeanisation might have a similar impact on very different types of conflicts. Therefore, in order to answer the question of the influence of the process of European integration on conflicts, we are facing a first task which is to disaggregate those conflicts in order to better understand them, and more specifically to understand on which of those characteristics Europeanisation might have an impact;

- On the second hand, we have a second task which is to understand what kind of mechanisms are implied through the process of Europeanisation, and how these processes might impact positively or negatively on national conflicts taking place in Europe and its vicinity.

It is only through the confrontation of these two series of questions that we will reach a better understanding of how and to which extent Europeanisation is influencing the shape, the intensity and maybe also the outcomes of those national conflicts.

D1 highlighted several important facts regarding conflict dimensions: first, the fact that several conflict dimensions appear to be more salient than others: such is the case of cultural and linguistic differences which appear in all cases covered by the project, of identity questions, of territory, of socio-economic issues, or of neighbouring states and bordering communities. This of course does not tell us anything really new about national conflicts in Europe, apart from the fact that none of these dimensions seems enough in itself to explain either the emergence or the persistence of conflicts. Second, in all cases studied here, several dimensions interact and have to be taken into account in order to understand what is really going on. Third, these various dimensions have very different implications and meanings on the ground, both for the actors and in terms of conflict resolution. It is also worth remembering that the level of conflict, or of violence, does not necessarily increase with the number of dimensions that are at stake.

This means that there can be no uniform impact of Europeanisation on those conflicts, because these conflicts are extremely complex social constructs that react variously to the process of Europeanisation, which is nearly as complex and multiform. In other words, it is only by pointing at these different characteristics, and by adopting a case by case approach, that we will be able to assess the impact of Europeanisation on them.

Where do we start from?

Stetter, Albert and Diez (2004) have identified four main paths through which the EU can impact on conflicts, depending on whether the perturbation is driven by concrete interventions of EU actors, or through the discursive, legal and institutional framework of the EU: Path 1 (compulsory impact) refers to a direct approach of “carrots” and “sticks” used by the EU in order to solve a conflict; Path 2 (enabling impact) relates to the more indirect influence of the institutional and discursive framework of the EU, through the acquis communautaire and the socialization of policy-makers into a European discourse; Path 3 (connective impact) refers to financial or organizational support for peace-building related activities; Path 4 (constructive impact) relates to the more long-term change of conflict identities enabled by the introduction, under he impulsion of European integration, of new discursive frameworks. This detailed
approach of the various levers the EU can use in order to impact positively on conflicts is useful for our purposes, even though those levers are mainly “top-down” instruments (apart from Path 4), and “work” obviously better on territories and populations which are already integrated in the Union, or are likely to be so in the near future – a perspective which is far from given as far as several of our examples are concerned, like Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina of the northern part of Cyprus. These various paths suggest that European integration should help pacifying conflicts characterized first and foremost by political and socio-economic dimensions, and that it should impact positively in the long-term on other dimensions.

As far as direct instruments and concrete schemes are concerned, Coppieters et al. (2004) distinguish two types of actions the EU can undertake in order to settle a conflict: first providing a framework for resolving constitutional issues, and second acting as a mediator or supporting mediation efforts between conflict parties. They then distinguish between three levels of impact of EU institutions and policies: first, at the level of legal and administrative structures of domestic institutions; second, at the level of domestic economic, social or security policies; third, at the level of societal changes in general. It is quite obvious that in cases of protracted and complex conflicts such as some of the cases that have been included in our sample, say the Cyprus or the Northern Irish case studies, no sustainable peace can be envisaged without changes affecting all these three levels. In the case of Cyprus, it is even disputable whether the EU can effectively provide a framework for the resolution of the conflict, especially since it has allowed the accession of the southern part of the island, and therefore cannot use its multi-level system of governance as a pattern for a solution on the island. In other words, proposing a joint sovereignty over the island can no longer be an option, and the two community’s mutually exclusive conceptions of statehood have been reinforced rather than undermined. In other cases such as the Northern Irish or the case of South Tyrol, the impact has been much more positive, as Europeanisation has allowed for an increased economic integration of all parties concerned, and as facilitated contacts between conflicting parties.

On which conflict dimensions does European integration impact the most?

If we go back to the 12 conflict dimensions identified in D1, we can have a better idea of how European integration can impact positively on a conflict, starting this time not from EU’s policy instruments, but from conflict characteristics themselves. I will take my examples mainly from three case studies which present different characteristics vis-à-vis the process of Europeanisation: the first example of conflict I will use is the Northern Irish one, as it takes place in a country which has long been an EU member, but which can also be called a border conflict between two European Union countries, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland; the second example is the Cyprus one, which presents different characteristics, as formally only one part of Cyprus is now included in the EU, while the other remains in limbo; finally, I will also talk about the case of Kosovo, which is likely to remain outside the EU for quite some time, but which is largely affected by the process of Europeanisation, especially as the European Union has been largely involved in negotiations concerning the future of this region.

The first dimensions we have identified are cultural dimensions, encompassing religious differences, identity questions, linguistic and cultural differences. Because the EU is both a framework and an actor, it can certainly positively impact on cultural dimensions, but only in the long term. This means that Europeanisation might impact on conflict identities, first by changing the attitudes of the conflicting elites by socializing them into a European discourse (Path 2), for instance by modifying their scale of priority, and by putting Europeanisation at the top of their priorities, instead of pursuing their national conflicting aims. It might also impact on conflict identities at the grass root level, by introducing new discursive framework, favouring discussion and negotiation instead of confrontation (Path 4).
However, the more entrenched conflicting identities are, the longer these transformations are likely to take. And because identities are not frozen, and are on the contrary influenced by the evolution of the context, it is unclear whether European integration might in fact not lead to further identity withdrawals. Many advocates of European integration present the nation state as an outdated reference, and invite EU (future) members to overcome their divisions, and collaborate. As such, a whole part of pro-integration discourses are in total contradiction with the classical political identities of many communities in conflict, as in Cyprus, the Basque Country, Northern Ireland or Kosovo, to take only a few examples. Moreover, there is a possibility that disagreement on the EU’s role in these conflicts might in effect reinforce divisions and tensions which already exist between communities, because there is a portion of these populations that believes that its identity is threatened by the blurring of sovereignty caused by European integration, and by the setting up of cross-border institutions. More often than not, it is the general support of one community for the EU’s involvement (as the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, or the nationalist community in Northern Ireland), and the sometimes extreme scepticism on the part of the other community which creates the possibility that this involvement will only make divisions greater, and reinforce the old cleavages. What is more, European integration is sometimes perceived as threatening the community’s perceived specificities, by including them in a wider political space, where small communities only play a minor role. As a consequence, the impact of European integration on these cultural dimensions can be extremely ambiguous, and in any case very long to come about.

Second, we have identified socio-economic and geographical dimensions of national conflicts (including socio-economic differentials, population shifts, territorial and land issues): European integration can certainly impact positively on socio-economic differentials, through the granting of various economic aids, as stressed by Coppieters and al. (2004). For instance, the European Union actively underpins and monitors the peace process in Northern Ireland; in order to support it, it has raised its subvention through the Structural Funds and, to a lesser extent, to the International Fund for Ireland, and has led since 1994 other initiatives such as the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Hayward, 2004). However, these efforts have not always been successful, as for example the funds available through the Peace Programme have not yet been completely taken up by local organisations. What is more, it is also important to recall that the socio-economic impact of European integration can only be called ‘positive’ if, and only if, both sides of the conflict benefit from integration. So far, in the case of Cyprus for instance, it is rather the reverse that is happening, with a deepening of the cleavage between the two parts of the island. The isolation of the Northern Cypriot economy widens the social, economic and cultural divide between the two communities, and thus reinforces the importance and meaning of the border. In this perspective, the accession of Southern Cyprus in the EU ‘creates’ a new difficulty, because it makes the reunification of the island even less desirable for Greek Cypriots. This problem does not appear in other cases of ‘border’ conflicts such as in Northern Ireland, where both sides of the border are integrated – and were integrated at the same time – in the European Union. The case of Kosovo displays here again radically different features, as the prospect of benefiting from economic dividends are rather bleak and far distant in time.

As far as territorial issues are concerned, the European Union can provide an incentive for the settlement of territory-related conflicts – as long as communities in conflict give a predominantly material meaning to “territory”, rather than a symbolic and emotional one – and it possibly can help managing the cultural diversity resulting from demographic shifts. But the EU cannot always hamper these demographic shifts and cannot resolve territorial conflicts if territory is first and foremost given a symbolic rather than a material value.

As far as borders are concerned, it is common to read that Europeanization is provoking the blurring of territorial boundaries by the increase in cross-border co-operation and in migrations. Moreover, the nation-states are supposed to loose part of their relevance by the persistence of a
European integrationist dynamic. For instance, in the Northern Irish case, it is obvious that, from a European standpoint, it is the whole ‘island of Ireland’, and not the South or the North taken separately, that has a real viability as an economic region. It is also possible to observe an increase in the exchanges between the Northern and the Southern part of the island. But is it enough to say that the border between the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom has lost its relevance? (Féron, 2002) It is worth keeping in mind that this territorial blurring primarily applies to institutionalised and well established nation-states. But most of the national conflicts taking place in Europe are not primarily conflicts about borders, but rather about the cohabitation between rival communities or groups that inhabit the same territory. In other words, the European construction may have some influence on the states’ boundaries, but it is less likely to do so on local territories.

On those economic and territorial dimensions, we can thus say that even though the financial power of the European Union is great, it cannot solve all the problems involved in national conflicts, and it can even sometimes reinforce some of them, for instance by creating frustration and resentment on the part of those who cannot benefit from these funds, like in Northern Cyprus, or in former Yougoslavia.

Political dimensions (including centre-periphery cleavage, political access and security dilemma, elite manipulation and access to citizenship) make up a third cluster of conflict dimensions: European integration can certainly impact positively on most of them, especially because Europeanisation has a direct effect on access to citizenship, on political opportunities and rights offered to minorities (esp. through the Copenhagen criteria). European integration also has a great influence on political and cultural elite’s priorities and ideologies. However, this political and ideological impact is much less obvious on the greatest part of the population, and it is worth remembering here that those who have suffered the most from the conflicts we are talking about, and who have been its main actors, are the same people that have a very vague experience of what Europe could be. The question therefore remains of how much of these changes in the elite co-operation will find an echo in the “masses”, and whether European integration will effectively compensate the vested interest that some elites have in the perpetuation of the conflict. On the other hand, from a political philosophy standpoint, European construction has obviously helped to disqualify violence, terrorism and other violent methods traditionally used in community conflicts, and democracy and dialogue have become the only legitimate means to resolve them. The development of the European Union has thus initiated changes not only in the terminology of conflicts, but also in political concepts and substantive priorities.

A last cluster of conflict dimensions deals with so-called external dimensions of conflicts (consequences of decolonization, globalization, aftermath of WWI and WWII, as well as involvement of neighboring countries, diasporas and border communities). Here again, the impact of European integration is difficult to assess. Even if EU officials tend to favor the freezing of current borders, and seem rather reluctant towards the creation of new states (as shows the Kosovo and Montenegro’s cases), it certainly can help manage (de)colonization and neighboring factors, through mechanisms such as joint sovereignty. But here again, the ‘joint sovereignty’ model can only work if the two sides of the border are part of the Union. In the current configuration, a joint sovereignty scheme in Cyprus seems very unlikely.

Similarly, European integration can help reducing the influence of diasporas, and can help defusing problems created by the existence of border communities, through the opening of borders, and the free movement of persons. But again, this can only work if borders are really open, and if people are really free to settle wherever they wish. This cannot happen if all sides to the conflict we are dealing with are not part of the EU.
Out of this general overview, it seems that European integration can above all have a positive impact on conflicts characterized primarily by the salience of the following dimensions:

- socio economic and geographic dimensions, esp. socio-economic differentials (provided that it doesn’t deepen them in the case of an existing border, if both sides are not at the same stage of integration vis-à-vis the Union), and territory (esp. when it is given a material rather than symbolic value, and when communities in conflict inhabit different parts of this territory);

- political dimensions (esp. citizenship and political access, centre/ periphery cleavage and security dilemma);

- external factors: decolonization, neighboring factors, diasporas and border communities, provided that both sides of the border are integrated, so that joint sovereignty schemes and free movement of people’s principles can apply.

On the contrary, its impact should be rather blurred or slow to come about on conflicts where cultural dimensions are salient.

Let’s examine now in more details how Europeanisation impacts on two very specific and relatively diverging case studies: Cyprus and Northern Ireland.

4.2. Two Case Studies: Cyprus and Northern Ireland

4.2.1. Cyprus

Main characteristics of Cyprus Conflict

Two distinct communities: The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as a state without a nation (Kızılyürek, 2005: 16). Its population was divided in two distinct communities, Turkish and Greek Cypriots with different languages, religions, identities, socio economic statuses and feelings of belonging. The fact that neither of these communities used this state as a space to define its own identity is the most important distinguishing feature of the Cyprus conflict, that it only shares, amongst cases covered by PEACE-COM, with the Northern Irish conflict. This situation derives from the influence of two strong nationalisms (Turkish and Hellenic) which were othering each other during their nation-building processes, thus leaving Cyprus as a “substitute” home against their “essential” homes (motherlands). Although de facto partition of the island in 1974 and the new political, cultural, international context of the period caused to re-definitions of Turkish and Greek (Cypriot) identities, distinctions between two identities have not diminished. Due to the replacement of the once “internal” others (GC for TC and vice versa) by new ones (i.e. Turkish settlers for the TC, immigrant workers from third world countries for the GC), the two communities have become so to say “external” others for each other. At the beginning, Greek Cypriots used Greece as a space to define their identity, while Turkish Cypriots used Turkey as a space to define their identity (Kızılyürek, 2005; Lisaniler, Rodriguez, 2002). Subsequent redefinitions of these identities have not diminished the distinctions between those two groups: indeed, after 1974, Greek Cypriots developed a more independent identity, differentiated themselves from mainland Greeks and began to ground their identity primarily on Cyprus. Cyprus thus became a primary spatial reference for the re-construction of Greek Cypriots identity; however, this identity retains its exclusiveness, as a majority of them still sees (whole) Cyprus as a homeland for Greek Cypriots only. On the other hand, after 1974, in the northern part of Cyprus the ‘Cypriotness’ of Turkish Cypriots, which used to be mostly challenged by Greek (Cypriots), began to face the challenge of their new “internal” others who

3 And in fact, one of the reasons for Greece coup d’etat in 1974, was the argued distanciation of the Greek Cypriots from mainland Greeks.
were Turkish settlers, illegal immigrant workers, Turkish army, and Turkey’s political and cultural elites. In other words, many Turkish (Cypriots) discovered their Cyprianness or the Cypriot part of their identity, when they had to directly face their “distant relatives” (“mainland Turks”). Nowadays Greek Cypriots use the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus as a whole) as their mainland and as the space to define their identity, whereas Turkish Cypriots use the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (northern part of the island) as their baby land (still not their mainland) and the place to define their identity.

**Geographical division:** The two communities are now living in different parts of the island, a feature which distinguishes the situation in Cyprus from most other contemporary conflicts taking place in Europe – apart from Belgium, with the exception of Brussels – and which renders it similar to an inter-state conflict. From 1974 (defacto division of the island) till 23 April 2003 (reopening of the check-points dividing North and South Cyprus), there were no (peaceful or violent, social, cultural or economic) contact between the two communities. This detached life resulted in the erosion and denying of common pains and joys (traditional Cypriot foods, music, folk dances, folk poems, become either Turkish or Greek Cypriots’), which in turn have made the two communities even more detached and ignorant of the feelings of ‘others’. Each community lives with its fears and painful memories, and reproduces its one sided history (Broome, 2005). Greek Cypriots celebrate the memories of old good days when there was no conflict or confrontation between the two communities, and ignore the violence of 1963-65 and 67, while Turkish Cypriots perpetuate the memories of 1963-65 and 67, celebrate 1974, and ignore Greek Cypriots’ pains. Imagination of the future also follows two distinct paths: while Turkish Cypriot imagine an independent and internationally recognized Turkish Cypriot state, or a loose federal state with Greek Cypriots, Greek Cypriots imagine a unitary Greek Cypriot state with its minorities, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians, and Latins. The border therefore not only marks a geographical division, it also represents the division of memories and imagination of the future.

**Interferences of motherland/fatherland:** The conflict in Cyprus is also characterized by a vast interference of motherlands/fatherlands, namely of Greece and Turkey. In particular, the relations (conflicts) between Greece and Turkey have always been a determining factor of the degree of intensity of the Cyprus conflict. Greek-Turkish rivalry hinders the creation of shared or coexisting identities in Cyprus. Despite EU membership candidacy of Turkey, Cyprus, like other conflicting issues between Turkey and Greece such as Eagan islands, resembles a confrontation play ground, an extension of their rivalry. A full settlement of other existing conflicts between Greece and Turkey, and an enhanced cooperation between them, seem as a necessity for the settlement of Cyprus conflict. Thus, besides conflicting communities, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, Turkey’s and Greece’s concerns need to be addressed in any settlement initiative.

**Interference of international actors:** The geographical location of Cyprus has always been another determining factor of the Cyprus conflict. The interest of international actors has resulted in a set of solutions attempts (in 1977, 1979, 1983, 1989, and 2004), of which none has led to a sustainable agreement (for further reading about settlement initiatives see for instance Tocci and Kovziridze in Coppieters et al., 2004: 63-106).

**Common features with other conflicts**

Apart from all these characteristics, the Cyprus conflict has much in common with other conflicts covered by PEACE-COM. If we refer to conflict dimensions identified in the literature, salient dimensions of the Cyprus conflict seem to be: religious differences, identity claims, culture

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4 Except limited inter-communal relations of political or social groups which were organized and framed and sponsored by international actors, and which took place either in another country or in a buffer zone, and informal relations through the initiatives of organizations such as unions. For further reading see Benjamin J. Broome (2005).
and language differences, socioeconomic differences, population shifts, territory claims, decolonization/globalization process, and neighbour/borders claims. Amongst these salient dimensions, culture and language, territory, decolonization and border issues seem to be the most salient ones (see Table 1 below). Like in other cases of conflict, these conflict dimensions can sometimes be understood as features of the conflict, or as issues explaining the emergence or persistence of conflict, or even as its causes.

Table 1. The most salient dimensions of conflict in Cyprus, compared to other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project$^5$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Sandzak</th>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
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According to our typology of conflict dimensions, the Cyprus conflict presents radically different characteristics than other situations such as the Roma in Central Europe, the conflict in Corsica, or the situation in Vojvodina. It however presents similarities with the Kosovo case, as well as with the 7 other conflicts covered by the project, with which it shares two salient dimensions.

Culture and Language differences: The situation in Cyprus shares this characteristic with the situations in the Basque Country, Belgium, Estonia, Kosovo, Sandzak, South Tyrol, Vojvodina and the Slovene minority in Austria. As we have seen before, it is a very common feature of contemporary conflicts in Europe.

Socio-economic dimensions: Socio-economic differentials are important in Cyprus, as they are in explaining the situation in Belgium, Estonia, Northern Ireland, as well as for Roma in Central Europe. Turkish Cypriots think Greek Cypriots are responsible for their poor socio-economic situation. According to Turkish Cypriots their low socio-economic level results from 1963-74 period when Turkish Cypriots were expelled (or left) from the public positions of the Republic of Cyprus and were forced to live in enclaves till 1974; since 1974, economic embargoes on Turkish Cypriots’ activities, exercised by Greek Cypriot authorities, have further impeded the economic development of the northern part of the island. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots consider the economic difficulties faced by the north as a significant obstacle on the road to reunification or even enhanced co-operation.

Territory: Territory claims can be considered as the most salient dimension and current conflict issue of the situation in Cyprus. It is also the case in the Basque country, in Belgium, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Sandzak, and South Tyrol. It must be noted that in the Cyprus case, territory bears both a symbolic and a material meaning, a feature which means that a part of the conflict’s intractability derives from the fact that the territory is considered as indivisible by a significant part of both communities.

$^5$ Simplified and shortened version of the table provided in Annex. For a full overview and comparison of all case studies covered by PEACE-COM, including Cyprus, please consult the table provided in annex.
Concerns over physical security and economic viability are also intimately tied to the questions of property reinstatement and the freedoms of movement and residence in a Turkish Cypriot State. The unrestricted reinstatement of all property to pre-1963 (or pre-1974) owners would severely reduce the meaning of bi-zonality as well as displace a significant number of Turkish Cypriots and the vast majority of post-1974 Turkish settlers. Turkish Cypriots fear that the widespread hemorrhage of property back to the original Greek Cypriot owners would place them in a position of economic subordination. The restoration of full freedoms of movement and residence also cause alarm. The fear is that a massive resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot territory could result in threats to the physical security of the Turkish Cypriot community as well as its economic domination. Many fear becoming a minority population in their own state.

**Globalization and decolonization processes:** Amongst cases covered by PEACE-COM, Cyprus currently shares this dimension with Estonia only (though it admittedely has been present in the past in other cases, such as in Northern Ireland). The colonization period, and the decolonization process, as well as globalization and transition to market economy in the Estonian case, provide explanations for the emergence of conflict.

**Neighbouring countries/borders:** Finally, as mentioned before, the involvement of motherlands/ fatherlands has been central to the emergence and endurance of the conflict in Cyprus, a characteristic it shares with Kosovo and Northern Ireland, where communities have been constantly influenced by actions and political schemes of their “mother” countries, or by the existence of powerful diasporas in the Kosovo case. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots’ claims about the border reflect their concern about the economic viability of the Turkish Cypriot State. Although the need for a territorial adjustment is widely accepted as a necessary concession in a resolution scheme, Turkish Cypriots want to ensure that the extent and the quality of territory retained by the Turkish Cypriot State will be large enough to support a thriving economy.

The situation in Cyprus therefore seems to be characterized by an enduring significance of external factors, such as motherland/ fatherland’s involvement, and by colonization/ decolonization processes, which cannot be found at such a level of salience in any other conflict covered by the PEACE-COM project. It is also characterized by a low importance of political factors such as centre-periphery cleavage, political access and security dilemma, elite manipulation or access to citizenship – even though these dimensions might have been decisive in the past, such as the security dilemma in the Turkish Cypriot case. That does not mean that these factors explain by themselves the difficulty in resolving the conflict, but that, together with its other main characteristics such as territorial claims, socio-economic differentials, and cultural and linguistic differences, they create a specific conflict scheme that must be taken into account when assessing the impact of European integration.

**Impact of Europeanisation**

The Cyprus situation is characterized by a low importance of political issues, a high relevance of external factors, of territory / land issues, seen as having both a symbolic and a material value, of socio-economic differentials, and of cultural and linguistic issues. Some of these dimensions might be positively affected by Europeanisation, but most of the time (esp. culture) only in the middle or long term. If we accept that the hypotheses developed in the above paragraph are correct or at least plausible, then European integration would definitely have a very positive impact in the short or middle term on the situation in Cyprus, if both sides were integrated, possibly meaning by this not only the northern part of Cyprus, but also Turkey which would be part of a joint sovereignty scheme that could be set up. In a scenario where Northern Cyprus, but not Turkey, would be included, a positive impact would still be possible (esp. on socio-economic and territorial dimensions of the conflict), but it would be limited, as long as the process of identity redefinition has not led both communities to put the stress first and foremost on their
‘Cypriotness’ – an evolution which also supposes deep cultural evolutions. But, far more important, is that our research suggests that the current situation (integration of one side, without the other), may indeed lead to a deepening of divisions between the two communities, and to a perpetuation of the conflict. This does not necessarily mean that it is likely that Cyprus will witness further outbursts of violence, but simply that the reunification of the island becomes less plausible, at least in the middle term, and that the conflict might become even more entrenched.

4.2.2. Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland has a particular position inside the European Union, because of its unique status; still part of the United Kingdom, generally characterised by its scepticism towards the European process, Northern Ireland is also linked to the Republic of Ireland, which has strongly benefited from its EU membership. Britain has never regarded the EU as an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, whereas the Republic of Ireland has always adopted a more favourable attitude towards Europe and its initiatives to solve this conflict. Moreover, the Northern Irish situation is particularly interesting because this province never had a consensual national identity, as the two communities, Catholics and Protestants, never agreed on a common range of national references.

Europeanisation: the blurring of territorial boundaries?

In the Northern Irish case, it is obvious that, from a European standpoint, it is the whole ‘island of Ireland’, and not the South or the North taken separately, that has a real viability as an economic region. It is also possible to observe an increase in the exchanges between the Northern and the Southern part of the island. But is it enough to say that the border between the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom has lost its relevance?

First, it is worth keeping in mind that, as stated before, this territorial blurring primarily applies to institutionalised and well established nation-states. But the conflict in Northern Ireland is not primarily a conflict about the current borders of the province. As the recent events, like the endemic riots between Catholics and Protestants have shown, what is at stake in this conflict is also the cohabitation between rival communities or groups that inhabit the same territory. In other words, the European construction may have some influence on the states’ boundaries, but it is less likely to do so on local territories. As far as the local communities and working-class people are concerned, the behaviours, especially in the biggest cities like Belfast or Derry, haven’t changed a lot. Networks of sociability are still organised inside the traditional territory of the community. It is also worth noting that for many observers, the EU is more likely to bring the unity of the “British Isles” than Irish unity, given the dependence on the UK of the whole Irish economy, North and South. And for the time being, what is described as cross-border co-operation mainly concerns economic activities, and movements of people, goods and capital, but hardly any political co-operation. And the North-South body whose creation has been decided in the 1998 Peace Agreement is again mainly concerned with economic matters, and moreover its existence is perpetually threatened by tensions inside the power-sharing government inside the province. The border between North and South of Ireland may therefore have already lost its economic significance, it has nevertheless kept its whole political meaning.

In a sense, Europeanisation certainly has a direct effect on economic, political and cultural elite, but very much less so on the greatest part of the population. And it is worth remembering here that those who have suffered the most from the conflict, and who have been its main actors, are the same people that have a very vague experience of what Europe could be. Now the question remains of how much of these changes in the elite co-operation will find an echo in the “masses”.
The disqualification of violence and the support for peace

On the other hand, from a philosophical standpoint, European construction has obviously helped to disqualify violence, terrorism and other violent methods traditionally used in Northern Ireland. Democracy and dialogue have become the only legitimate means to resolve the conflict. The development of the European Union has indeed initiated changes not only in the terminology of the Northern Irish conflict, but also in political concepts and substantive priorities. It is obvious when one looks at the evolution of the language of the conflict itself; it is now common to talk about dialogue, consent, accommodation or even reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Only ten years ago, such a discourse was hardly possible, and one talked rather about pacification or cohabitation. Such an evolution was not only allowed by the cease-fires of the paramilitary groups, but also by the recognition of the fact that, in a European context, consent and cohabitation were hardly avoidable. For some people like John Hume, one of the actors of the Peace Agreement that was signed in 1998, Europe has shown that peace was possible even between rival countries like Germany and France. To quote him on this subject: "I am very encouraged (...) by my European experience of conflict resolution. When you consider that the peoples of Europe slaughtered one and other by the million for centuries, and in this century alone, in the Second World War, millions of people died, yet fifty years later we have a united Europe. The Germans are still German, and the French are still French. How did they do it? They did it by building institutions which respected their differences, but allowed them to work together in the common economic interest. We must do the same on the island of Ireland" (Hume in Kerr, 1996: 62-63).

What can also be observed is that Europe actively underpins and monitors the peace process in Northern Ireland; in order to support it, the European Union has raised its subvention through the Structural Funds and, to a lesser extent, to the International Fund for Ireland, and has led since 1994 other initiatives such as the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. These efforts have not always been successful, as for example the funds available through the Peace Programme have not yet been completely taken up by local organisations.

Some EU institutions are also seen as means to solve the conflict, such as the Committee of the Regions, which may foster a common identity within the province, or the European Court of Justice, which is seen as an impartial court whose decisions are less questionable than those of a British or an Irish court. More generally, it can be argued that the day-to-day work inside the EU helps traditional enemies (such as Germany and France, to take John Hume’s example, but also Sweden and Finland, or Italy and Austria) to find ways of dealing with their differences.

But here again, one can remain sceptical about the ability of these institutions or funds to really promote reconciliation between local communities which, in their every day life, don’t even talk to each other.

The perceived threat on collective identities

It has also been often said that a European identity could maybe be put forward, in order to transcend the catholic or protestant identities in Northern Ireland. But it seems difficult to replace the Irish or British identities by a European one, which hardly exists, and which in any case will be hard to develop.

The European Union presents the nation state as an outdated reference, and it invites its members to overcome their divisions, and collaborate. As such, the European Union is in total contradiction with the classical political identities of both Catholic and Protestant communities of Northern Ireland. It has therefore had a strong impact on the political debates and ideologies in Northern Ireland, with each community mirroring either Britain or Ireland’s position towards
Europe, namely either extreme scepticism, if not hostility on the protestant side, and pro-European feelings on the Catholic side.

To be more precise, Catholics / Nationalists have taken up two conflicting positions: Even if their positions have evolved this last decade, the Republicans, and especially the Sinn Féin, still look at Europe suspiciously, and many accuse it of diluting the conflict, by blurring its issues. In other words, Europe has to be considered as an outcome, not as a prerequisite for peace. On the other hand, the constitutional nationalists, as the SDLP of John Hume, tend to consider Europe as an opportunity to find a way out of the conflict, by getting conflicting parties to co-operate. The SDLP has used the EU to broaden the territorial context of the Northern Ireland conflict. The SDLP claims that the conflict is irrelevant in that context. This party anticipates the emergence of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ that will eventually dislodge nation-states as the pre-eminent political actors in the European Union. The enthusiasm of the SDLP for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ is largely predicated on the notion that integration will diminish nation-state loyalties and deliver a highly decentralised regime that will facilitate a reconciliation within the North, but also between North and South, and between Britain and Ireland. In sum, despite the reluctance of a small minority, a majority of Northern Irish Catholics are pro-European.

But Protestants / Unionists express much more scepticism about Europe: Moderate Unionists are opposed to Euro as well as to political integration, but favour a pragmatic vision of the Union, as long as the future of Northern Ireland remains in the hands of United Kingdom. Hard-line Protestants strongly oppose any European process: the European Union is more and more viewed as a threat, destroying political as well as cultural identities. For unionists, the fear is that the European Union’s incremental integrationist dynamic will be complemented by a North-South integration process aimed at gradually integrating the two parts of the island of Ireland. In other words, the European Union is a danger in itself, because it threatens the modern boundary of Northern Ireland.

There is therefore a possibility that disagreement on Europe’s role in Northern Ireland affairs might in effect reinforce divisions and tensions which already exist between the two communities, because there is a portion of the population, in particular inside the protestant community, which believes their British identity is threatened by the evolution of cross-border institutions. It is the general support of the nationalist community for the EU, and the sometimes extreme scepticism on the part of the unionist community which creates the possibility that EU involvement in Northern Ireland affairs will only make division greater, and reinforce the old cleavages. The EU may indeed destroy what Northern Irish Protestants think is the most important for them, namely the border between the North and the South of the island; it may also dilute the strength and meaning of the tie between Northern Ireland and Great Britain; finally, it may also threaten their perceived specificity, by including them in a wider political space, where small communities only play a minor role.

Concluding remarks

In sum, the European construction has had two contradictory impacts on the political identities in Northern Ireland: on one hand, it has helped some Northern Irish to abandon their sectarian identities and references, by embracing other political issues and objectives, and by promoting an alternative answer to the conflict. But on the other hand, it has caused a return and reinvestment in distinctive identities, especially on the Protestant side. Some hopes can still be placed on the perspective that dynamics of economic integration will induce political co-operation, by promoting the belief that “prospects for wealth are more important in forming political loyalties than cultural identities” (Butenschon in Lydersen, Skar, 1993: 68).
General Conclusion

This deliverable provides conclusions or new insights on six issues:

First, on the issue of the content and style of accommodation policies implemented in the case studies covered by the project. Our results show that the most dealt with areas of intervention are language, education, cultural policy and local governance, while the least dealt with are property rights, regional autonomy, housing policy and signposts. The analysis also reveals a fair distribution between specific, middle-range and encompassing policies, and that it is a confrontational style of policies which prevails, where policies are implemented without the approval of all sides.

Second, on the question of the actors involved in the negotiation and implementation of policies. The questionnaire survey as well as the expert interviews reveal that accommodation policies are in general very institutionalised processes, with a high involvement of national and regional authorities and governments, and of political parties, even if they are often seen as partial.

Third, on the issue of international initiatives. There is an increased awareness of international efforts among the concerned populations, but the involvement of international actors varies a lot across case studies, with highly internationalised cases such as Cyprus or Kosovo, and cases where internationalisation is much more discrete (Basque Country, Slovene Minority in Austria, Belgium). In addition, there are various paths of internationalisation, depending on whether internationalisation derives from an initiative taken by international organisations or actors themselves, or from the initiatives of local actors, who are looking for outside help, or who think that external pressure will help breaking the deadlock or avoiding further escalation. International actors can contribute to find solutions through their capacity "to step back", see the situation in a more "neutral" way, consider solutions without all the historical complexities linked to it, and bring about a triangulation of the conflict. However for many conflict actors international actors are not able to understand the complexities of the local situation and therefore cannot propose good accommodation initiatives Many interviewees underlined that an outsider "cannot do the job for us", even if they can create a momentum for solution the country concerned has to take the necessary measures on its own. In addition, most respondents to the questionnaire, as well as most interviewees stated that international intervention should always be accompanied by follow-up measures to ensure its success (acceptance by the population etc.).

Fourth, on the problems encountered during the negotiation and implementation of policies. One of the main problems of accommodation initiatives and policies seems to be the lack of domestic support they manage to convey. This lack of domestic support can often be explained by the difficulties encountered during the implementation phase of these policies, and by the disappointment these difficulties generate among those who had hoped for a quick change. Experts also identified problems in the setting up or implementation of accommodation policies that are actually encountered in many cases. The five most-often quoted problems are:

- That Civil Society is excluded from accommodation initiatives in most cases; in other words, accommodation policies are too "top-down"; this absence of civil society from initiation, negotiation and implementation of accommodation policies partly explains policies are not accepted or understood 'on the ground', which leads to failure.

- That politicians, who are not the ideal actors to carry out accommodation initiatives, are often in charge of their negotiation and implementation.
- That international attention is very often short-lived, and corresponds to strong escalatory phases or outbursts of violence of a given conflict, when what is needed is a more long-term commitment so as to 1) put adequate and renewed pressure on conflict actors, and 2) guarantee and ensure the implementation of accommodation policies.

- That in many cases “quick-fix” solutions are preferred to long-term efforts. Initiatives are not coherent in time and randomly carried out consistently to the end.

- That accommodation initiatives should always be accompanied by follow up measures in order to succeed.

- That solutions are often imposed from the “outside” (international actors) which do not necessarily match the conditions in the country (lack of understanding).

Fifth, on the configurations explaining success or failure. There are three main cases in which accommodation initiatives or policies have been judged as successful by most conflict actors and experts: 1) when small scale measures are implemented, which are not costly for the given society, which benefit to all sides of the conflict, and which are not seen as major endeavours towards one side or another; 2) when the accommodation initiative or policy is able to bring about a triangularisation of the conflict, in other words when an action or a policy is initiated from the outside, by an external actor which can pose itself, it not as neutral, at least as external to the conflict; 3) when there is a strong effort to include all relevant actors in the negotiation and implementation process, even the most violent ones, and when there is no taboo as to the policy sectors and issues that the accommodation policy can address.

On the contrary, policies are more likely to “fail” (i.e. are not implemented or fail to produce a significant de-escalation of the conflict) when they are biased or perceived as such by a significant number of actors, but also when the answer given to the crisis seems unsuited to the stakes and issues, more particularly when it is too radical and excessive, and finally when stakes and issues of the conflict are so intertwined that it is next to impossible to deal with one specific issue without generating a general uproar. Overall, it is the lack of bottom-up measures and the lack or insufficient inclusion of local actors in the negotiation and implementation of accommodation policies which is the most often quoted when trying to explain policy failures. Local actors have to be included and “empowered” in order to be convinced of the righteousness of a given policy.

Finally, on the issue of the impact of Europeanisation and accommodation policies initiated at the European level. It seems that European integration can above all have a positive impact on conflicts characterized primarily by the salience of socio economic and geographic dimensions, esp. socio-economic differentials (provided that it doesn’t deepen them in the case of an existing border, if both sides are not at the same stage of integration vis-à-vis the Union), and territory (esp. when it is given a material rather than symbolic value, and when communities in conflict inhabit different parts of this territory); political dimensions (esp. citizenship and political access, centre/ periphery cleavage and security dilemma); and external factors: decolonization, neighboring factors, diasporas and border communities, provided that both sides of the border are integrated, so that joint sovereignty schemes and free movement of people’s principles can apply. On the contrary, its impact should be rather blurred or slow to come about on conflicts where cultural dimensions are salient.

With the exception of North Cyprus, where the EU’s role is not seen very positively since the rejection of the Annan Plan, and of Belgium and Austria where interviewees are sceptical vis-à-vis the EU’s involvement, there is an overall positive assessment of the EU’s role in conflict management and settlement. In most cases, even if no direct intervention is called for, there is an agreement that the EU can impact positively, in an indirect manner, on the evolution of the conflicts. The main paths of influence are:

- Accession process, Copenhagen criteria, legal documents and protection of minorities
- Financial tool and economic integration
- Intervention in mediation processes, launching of political initiatives, role as a guarantor and as an external monitor
- Indirect political and philosophical influence, change in the notions of sovereignty for instance
- Cultural influence through the promotion of multiculturalism

Our research also reveals that many conflict actors are actually calling for an increased EU intervention, either because they believe it can be an effective mediator and break a deadlock, or because of its capacity in state- and civil society-building, and its legal instruments for the protection of minorities.
Indicative Bibliography

Annexes – Systematic Case Descriptions (SCD) on accommodation policies and complementary information for each case

Case Study 1 – The Slovene Minority in Austria

A. TIME FRAME
• Stage of conflict: 1
• Accommodation initiatives: 2
• PreWWII: 3

B. STYLE
• Collaborative
• Neutral
• Confrontational

C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION
• National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
• Civil Society
• Motherland/Fatherland
• European international actors
• Non-European international actors

D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION
• National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
• Civil Society
• Motherland/Fatherland
• European international actors
• Non-European international actors

E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
• National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
• Civil Society
• Motherland/Fatherland
• European international actors
• Non-European international actors

F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY
• Specific (1-3)
• Middle Range (4-7)
• Encompassing (8+)

G. MAIN GOALS
• Peace Keeping
• Conflict Management
• Conflict Settlement
• Conflict Resolution

H. ACHIEVEMENTS
• Conventional institutional actions
• Conventional non-institutional actions
• Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons
• Non-convent. – violence v/s persons
• Perception of Self/Other Camp 1
• Perception of Self/Other Camp 2

Austria, *Date*
Explanation of the Categories

A: Time Frame
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.

B: Style
B1. Collaborative
The relationship between the Slovene and German-speaking Slovenes can be described as “collaborative” following WWII, when the Carinthian government undertook numerous efforts to accommodate the Slovenes to make certain that they did not support an annexation of southern Carinthia to Yugoslavia (= the accommodating measures had a conflict-decreasing effect). However, as soon as the State Treaty was signed (1950) and it became evident that southern Carinthia would remain part of Austria, the German-speaking Carinthians became less collaborative.
In 1972, provincial governor Sima submitted a legislative proposal to the national parliament to set up 205 bilingual signs in towns across southern Carinthia. When the signs were set up (a collaborative measure), German-speaking nationalists tore them down (“town sign storm”), i.e. this collaborative measure had a conflict-increasing influence. As a consequence, Sima resigned and the relationship became more confrontational again.

B2. Neutral
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, relations between the two groups were rather neutral, with no major confrontations but also no substantial collaboration marking this period. Ethnic Minority Committees were established in 1977 but were boycotted until 1989 by the Slovene minority. In 1990, Haider established the Ethnic Group Office to facilitate the communication between the Slovene minority and the provincial government, but the Office does not seem to have had any major impact, nor really improved the situation of the Slovenes in Carinthia.

B3. Confrontational
Relations between the German and Slovene-speaking Carinthians became more confrontational after 1958, when school strikes were organized by the nationalists to protest against compulsory bilingual education. Under pressure from the nationalists, the provincial government changed the bilingual school law, requiring parents to specifically register their children for Slovene classes after 1959. There were several incidences in the 1960s of Slovenes smearing German town signs and German nationalists smearing bilingual town signs, i.e. the relationship prior to the town sign storm in 1972 was already confrontational.
Relations between the German and Slovene-speakers remained confrontational following the “town sign storm”, with provincial governor Sima’s forced resignation and increasing rhetoric on both sides. In 1975, the Slovene political party fell short of securing a seat in the provincial government in Carinthia, the result being that the electoral law was amended by the provincial government to prevent the Slovene party from winning a mandate in the future (conflict-increasing measure). In 1976, the Law on Ethnic Groups was passed by the federal government increasing the required threshold for setting up bilingual signs (from 10% Slovene population in a specific town to 25%). This modification accommodated the German-speaking majority and was passed without the support of the Slovene minority.
In 2001, the Slovene Carinthian lawyer Rudolf Vouk was able to achieve a revision of the ruling requiring a 25% threshold for the setting up of bilingual signs in Carinthia through the Constitutional Court. He is blamed by the nationalists for “destroying 30 years of social peace in Carinthia” between the German- and Slovene-speaking groups. Since 2001, the relationship has
been confrontational, with pressure by the Slovenes increasing to have Article 7 of the State Treaty enforced, the Constitutional Court becoming more involved and Haider’s resistance increasing to these demands/pressures as well. The ruling by the Constitutional Court has still not been implemented, i.e. an accommodating measure has again led to more confrontation (please note that “confrontation” in the Slovene case does not refer to or involve violence, but mainly rhetoric and threats).

C. Initiative of Negotiation

C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors

The provincial and federal government have played the most important role in the conflict and since 2001, the Constitutional Court has also gotten involved. Several consensus conferences have taken place (increasing in frequency since 2000, with no result/compromise, therefore the “neutral” arrow). It seemed that the conflict could be resolved in the summer of 2006, but due to a number of last minute changes and retractions to the original agreement. The down-pointing arrow in the 1950s illustrates that the provincial government made some concessions to the Slovenes (to secure the Carinthian Slovenes’ loyalty in the referendum whether southern Carinthia should be annexed to Yugoslavia). The downward pointing arrow from 1972 portrays the decree passed by the Austrian Parliament for the fulfilment of the State Treaty to set up 205 bilingual town signposts in Carinthia. The upward pointing arrow of 2001 illustrates that the involvement of the Constitutional Court has had a conflict-increasing effect, because the nationalists are resisting more adamantly to have any additional signs set up. Haider has had one of the most dominating roles in this conflict, by postponing and ignoring all Constitutional Court orders and blatantly disregarding the rule of law.

C2. Civil Society & Economic Actors

No economic actors have really gotten involved in the conflict, while civil society organizations (in particular those representing the Slovene minority) have played an important role in pressuring the provincial and national government to fulfil their obligations as stated in Article 7 of the State Treaty. Pressure has been increasing since 2001, when Rudi Vouk achieved a revision of the 25% threshold required for the setting up of bilingual signs (reduced to 10%). The involvement of the Constitutional Court has had a conflict-increasing effect, since the German nationalists feel that the “social peace” in Carinthia has been destroyed. The Slovene organizations have taken a much more active role (it is difficult to determine whether it is because they are being more frequently invited to negotiations with the government or because they are more determined today to fight for their rights using peaceful means).

C3. Motherland/Fatherland

Until the State Treaty was signed in 1955, Yugoslavia made territorial claims on southern Carinthia (Yugoslav troops entered southern Carinthia in 1945 and the fighting continued for a week after the armistice was signed by Germany). After 1955, due to the Cold War, the “Motherland” played no role in the conflict. Only after 1991 did ties between Slovenes living in Carinthia and Slovenia begin to form again, mainly with regard to culture. However, the bilingual town sign issue is being monitored and often, the government or opposition in Slovenia comment on the developments (any comment is heavily criticized by the nationalists who believe that Slovenia has a territorial interest in southern Carinthia). The opposition in Slovenia has called for EU sanctions against Austria until the town sign conflict is resolved. Nonetheless, I would say that Slovenia has played a secondary role only (though a nationalist would say that Slovenia is too involved in the issue). The entry of Yugoslav troops in southern Carinthia in 1945 surely had a conflict increasing effect, the repercussions of which are still used today to incite fear and hatred against the Slovene minority.
C4. European international actors have only recently begun to play a role – the Council of Carinthian Slovenes visited the EU Parliament’s Social Democratic faction in April 2006, and in May and June of 2006, a fact-finding mission visited Carinthia to get an impression of the situation and speak to Haider, Slovene representatives, mayors, etc. A delegation of the Council of Carinthian Slovenes met with EU Commissioner Franco Frattini to discuss the problem in July 2006. It is not clear whether the involvement of European actors is having any effect (to date, there has been no progress that can relate back to EU involvement). The Slovene representatives, Haider and the nationalist Carinthian Defence Association have threatened to submit a complaint to the European Court of Justice (the Slovenes to the Court of Human Rights, Haider to complain about the Austrian Constitutional Court and the Defence Association to complain about additional bilingual signs). I am however not aware of any complaints being filed to date with the European Court.

C5. Non-European international actors have not played a role in this conflict.

D. Scope of Negotiation
D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
National and provincial actors have had the last say to this day, in particular the provincial government in Carinthia. In 1955, the State Treaty was signed, providing specific rights to minorities (conflict-decreasing impact), in 1972, the Austrian Parliament passed a decree for the setting up of 205 bilingual signposts in Carinthia (conflict-decreasing impact), in 1976, the Law on Ethnic Groups was passed (which was not approved by the ethnic minorities). The upward pointing arrow of 2001 illustrates the Constitutional Court’s decision to lower the threshold of 25% to 10% of Slovene population for the setting up of bilingual signs (which increased the conflict, because of Haider’s resistance to carry out the Court’s decision). In summer 2006, the federal and provincial governments offered a resolution to the bilingual signpost conflict, which was not accepted by the Social Democrats (due to the Slovene minority’s disapproval). The refusal by the Slovenes to accept the proposal has led to an increase in the conflict, with the provincial government claiming that the Slovenes will never be satisfied, regardless what they are offered.

D2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:
Slovene representatives were involved in negotiations following WWII, but later took a more secondary role. They were invited to consensus conferences (all taking place in the last 5 years) which have failed because the Slovene representatives have refused to accept the terms of the government (both the federal and provincial governments’ proposals). The Slovenes have had the possibility to make proposals (which in turn are unacceptable for Haider and the federal government). In essence, the Slovenes have been able to veto certain proposals by the provincial and federal government and have done so much more actively since 2001.

D3. Motherland/Fatherland have not been involved in policy negotiations.

D4. European international actors have not been involved in policy negotiations.

D5. Non-European international actors have not been involved in policy negotiations.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy
E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
The provincial government is by and large responsible for implementing policies at provincial level, but has (since Haider came to office in the mid-1980s) refused to do so… that is, Constitutional Court orders are being ignored and the first tangible attempt to resolve the
bilingual sign issue involving the provincial and federal government, as well as the Slovene representatives failed this past summer (it is questionable whether the law would have actually been implemented..... considering that Article 7 from 1955 has yet to be fully implemented!!). In other words, the provincial government is the main actor involved in implementation, but is not implementing (and also seems to not get into any trouble for not implementing the law).

E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors: Slovene representatives are secondary actors, since they are not actively involved in implementation. They can protest or submit complaints to the Constitutional Court (sue Haider, etc.), but as such are not actively involved in implementation.

E3. Motherland/Fatherland No involvement

E4. European international actors No involvement

E5. Non-European international actors No involvement

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3) In 1958, a new school law was passed to abandon obligatory bilingual education (it is not clear whether this had a conflict-increasing or decreasing effect, since the nationalists were accommodated, while the Slovenes were still able to attend bilingual schools. The decree of 1972 passed by the Austrian Parliament targeted the bilingual signposts. The proposal by the provincial and federal government in summer 2006 related specifically to the town sign posts.

F2. Middle Range (4-7) The Law on Ethnic Groups of 1976 touched on several policies (signposts, language policy, cultural policy, etc).

F3. Encompassing (8+) The State Treaty touched upon a number of policies (education, language, compensation payments, cultural policy, electoral rules, etc).

G. Main Goals

G1. Peace Keeping Since there was no violence between the two groups, no peace-keeping intervention has taken place.

G2. Conflict Management Since there is no threat of violence breaking out between the two groups, conflict management also does not apply to this case.

G3. Conflict Settlement Several attempts have been made since WWII to find a compromise (some being successful, others like the attempt in summer 2006 to settle the signpost aspect of the conflict was not successful). In essence, the conflict has been marked by conflict settlement (addressing certain issues at hand, but ignoring some of the underlying issues).

G4. Conflict Resolution No sincere attempts at conflict resolution have been undertaken to date, because there are a number of unresolved issues/trauma that have not been addressed by any proposals to resolve the conflict (most proposals for settlement involve the signposts, but there are issues that go deeper than that).

H. Achievements

This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.
Case Study 2 – Basque Country

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| **B. STYLE** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
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| • Neutral |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Confrontational |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Civil Society |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Motherland/Fatherland |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Non-European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Civil Society |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Motherland/Fatherland |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Non-European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Civil Society |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Motherland/Fatherland |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Non-European international actors |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Specific (1-3) |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Middle Range (4-7) |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Encompassing (8+) |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **G. MAIN GOALS** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Peace Keeping |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Conflict Management |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Conflict Settlement |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Conflict Resolution |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| **H. ACHIEVEMENTS** |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Conventional institutional actions |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Conventional non-institutional actions |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Non-convent. – violence v/s persons |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Perception of Self/Other Camp 1 |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| • Perception of Self/Other Camp 2 |          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

*Date*
Complementary information/comments on Accommodation policies for the Basque Country case

Overall comments:
The francoist regime (1939-1975) established a severe breakdown in the development of the conflict. During nearly four decades every single political right or freedom was banished, including every expression of the cultural identities of the different Spanish regions. Therefore, the nationalist demands (both moderate and radical) were silenced and, at least the great majority of them were included in the more general antifrancoist opposition movement. In consequence, it is extremely difficult to establish common trends of development of the conflict during this period, comparing with the pre-francoist period and the post-francoist one. Therefore, comments on accommodation policies are not applicable to this period.

A1: Stage of the conflict --

A2: Accommodation Initiatives
Main conflict-increasing events:
-October 1979: Basque Autonomic Referendum
-1998: End of the Ajuria-Enea pact between the main Spanish and Basque political parties.

Main conflict-decreasing events:
-Ajuria-Enea pact (12/01/1988): signed by every party with parliamentarian representation in the Spanish parliament or in the Basque parliament (except by HB).
-September 1998: ETA declared unilaterally a truce that gave place to the beginning of conversations with the Spanish government. The truce ended in December 1999.
-The socialist (PSOE) victory in the 2004 general elections. The new government has tried since then to re-open the political dialogue with the Basque nationalists.

Events that can be perceived in contrasted ways:
-1982: An important faction of ETA, ETA pm, quitted the organization and formed a non-violent, legal party. As a result, approximately 150 members of the organization returned from exile or were free from jail.
-1998: Lizarra pact: established by the Basque nationalist organizations and rejected by the main non-nationalist parties and organizations.
-“Acuerdo por las libertades” (8/12/2000): agreement signed by the two major Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) in order to collaborate in the fight against Basque terrorism.
-2003-2004: The Basque “lehendakari” (prime minister) proposed to open a public national debate on the revision of the Basque Autonomic Rule in order to work in favour of the end of violence. The formal proposal was rejected by the Spanish parliament in December 2004.

B. STYLE
79/95 During this period, the style for accommodation policy was collaborative and intended to include a broad range of actors. Nevertheless, strategies regarding the problem of terrorism were guided in different ways.
-October 1979: Basque Autonomic Referendum
-Ajuria-Enea pact (12/01/1988): signed by every party with parliamentarian representation in the Spanish parliament or in the Basque parliament (except by HB).
1995/2004: This period is characterized by its confrontationally spirit. The repressive strategies of the PP government against terrorism as well as its attempt to isolate nationalist political forces, lead almost to a denial of the conflict.

2004-2006: There was a return to a collaborative period since the socialist (PSOE) victory in the 2004 general elections. The new government has tried ever since to re-open the political dialogue with Basque nationalists (both moderate and radical).

In March 2006 ETA declared an indefinite truce which ended in December the 30th 2006.

Main events or initiatives that affect the initiatives of handling the conflict:

- Decreasing effect:
  - The establishment of the Basque Autonomic Rule (1979)
  - The Ajuria Enea Pact (1988)

- Increasing effect:
  - End of the Ajuria Enea Pact (1998)

C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION

1979-2006: During this period of time, the initiatives for negotiation of accommodation policies were always focused on institutional actors.

1995/2006: In this phase, civil society became a relevant actor, playing a significative role in the request for accommodation policies and agenda setting. This change took place mainly after some conflict increasing events such as the assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco (PP town councillor in Ermua, Vizcaya) in 1997. During this period several civil- pacifist organizations against terrorism (Foro de Ermua, 1998 or Basta Ya, 1999) were created, subsequently acquiring a substantial importance.

Main events that refer to actors which initiatives seem to have raised the level of the conflict:

- The position and initiatives carried out by one of the most important Associations of Terrorism Victims (“Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo) /2004-2006).

Main events that refer to actors which initiatives seem to have decreased the level of the conflict:

- The socialist (PSOE) victory in the 2004 general elections. The new government has tried since then to re-open the political dialogue with the Basque nationalists (both moderate and radical), but including only institutional actors.

D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION

Negotiation has always included only political and institutional actors. Civil society or European and International Actors have never been included in any kind of talks or negotiations.

Arrows included refer to events already described in section B and C above.

- Decreasing effect:
  - Ajuria Enea Pact (1988)
  - Truces of 1998 and 2006

E. INVOLVEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES

Accommodation policies in Basque country are characterized by the fact that only institutional actors have been involved in its design and implementation. Only since the middle of the nineties, civil society actors have acquired more significance in this issue. Nevertheless, we should outlined the implication of civil society actors in the carrying out of linguistic policies since the language bill (already mentioned on previous section) was passed in 1986, as well as its increasing involvement in political agreements since this same period of time.

Arrows refer to events and policies above mentioned.
-a) Increasing effect: 
-End of the Ajuria Enea Pact (1998) 
-Assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco (1997) 
-Lizarra Pact (1998) 
-b) Decreasing effect: 
- Basque Autonomic Rule (1979) 
- Ajuria Enea Pact (1988) 

F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY

1979/1985. The implementation of the Basque Autonomy Rule since 1979 has to be considered as the most outstanding accommodation policy in so far as it has affected directly or indirectly the whole development of the Basque autonomy. This period was characterized by its encompassing extent as broad political and economical transferences took place. 
1985/1996 Concerning accommodation policies, middle range scope seems to be its scope during this period. Those years meant the conclusion of the de-centralization process. Only specific issues, programmes, and unresolved or pending matters were addressed. 
1996/2006. During this period only very specific initiatives have been developed. Only events with decreasing effects have been included in the template: 
- Basque Autonomic Rule (1979) 

G. MAIN GOALS

1979-2006: During the whole democratic period there have been several attempts for peace keeping through different means and strategies developed by the different governments. Arrows point to an increase of repressive policies during the last eighties (from 1985 onwards), and, again, during the second legislature of the PP-Aznar government (1998-2004). 
The period 1989/1998 underwent through a conflict settlement phase that may be pointed out referring to the abovementioned Ajuria Enea Pact (1989), which finished with its ending and with the subsequent establishment of the Lizarra Pact (1998) 
Finally, concerning the main calculated goals, a conflict resolution line should be drawn referring to the Autonomic Rule and its development process (1979/1985) insofar as its intention was to approach the roots of the conflict. Besides, we have also included the failed initiative for the Autonomic Rule revision, better known as the Ibarretxe Plan (2003).
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Belgium, *Date*
Complementary Information

Additional overall remarks (important):
altogether, most (if not all) accommodation policies in the Belgian case do not meet the definition of “interventions of third parties (…)”. Indeed, all accommodation policies have rather been “endogenous”, i.e. conducted by the elites of both “camps” (consociational democracy, elite accommodation; see Lijphart, etc.). So I would argue that the Belgian case should be considered as a case apart (not within the same “population” of cases with regards to this research question, because there is a key empirical difference here). Of course, if you also include “conflicting parties” themselves in the definition, then it's OK. (but then : you should make this more obvious in your definition, conceptually & empirically : does it encompass situations in which the policy is initiated/conducted by the conflicting parties themselves ? There seems to be some sort of paradox, or antithesis(?), in your initial definition).
altogether, the “real” accommodation policies really begin in the early 1960s (when the francophones only begin to accept to discuss about the core issues and about the demands of the quickly strengthening Flemish side). However, accommodation policies have always existed, albeit in a less continuous way, since the 1920s (the first “trains de lois linguistiques”).

Explanation of the Categories
A: Time Frame
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.

B: Style

B1. Collaborative
The attitude of the elites have always been collaborative “behind the scenes”. However the outside discourse (thru media etc.) towards the respective constituencies has most often been “symbolically” confrontational (displaying the other “camp” as the “bad guys” etc.).
Only during the 60’s was the situation more tense, also in the actual strategies of the elites. However, from 1970 onwards, each big “package deal” including one further step of institutional reform (= compromise, by definition) was followed by a more moderate discourse by the elites.
[Overall suggestion, Elise : draw a distinction between elites and activists (activists are much more radical than leaders, not only in discourse but also in action – see May’s “curvilinear law of disparity”) – see also “les cercles concentriques” de Duverger]

B2. Neutral

B3. Confrontational
Only during the “affaire royale” (almost a “short civil war”), then during the more mass mobilization period of the mid & late 70s was the style more confrontational.

C. Initiative of Negotiation

C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
It’s always been, 99.9%, an initiative of institutional actors, namely the party leaders at the national (& regional/community) levels, as Belgium is clearly a “partitocracy” (the real locus of political power lies in the hands of the party presidents and the “super-ministres”, i.e. the members of the kerncabinet).
Of course, the king & his entourage (“le Palais”) also push for negotiation & arrangements, but its influence is rather modest (indirect, at best).
C.2. Civil Society & Economic Actors

There are some initiatives, but really they are marginal. The only one worth mentioning is the “Groupe Coudenberg” (group of intellectuals), in the 1980s & early 1990s. Trade Unions & employer’s associations also push for moderation & arrangements, but their direct influence is really limited (they have more of a “blackmail potential” vis-à-vis the party leaders).

C3. Motherland/Fatherland

[not relevant]

C4. European international actors

[The Council of Europe has intervened 2-3 times with reports etc, but upon request of Belgian “players”, not on its own initiative]

C5. Non-European international actors

[not relevant, apart from very indirect pressures from e.g. NATO officials]

D. Scope of Negotiation

[same remarks as section C]

D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors

D2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:

D3. Motherland/Fatherland

D4. European international actors

D5. Non-European international actors

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy

E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors

It’s mainly a question of political parties (& party leaders, their ministers etc.).

E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors

To a certain extent, one could say that all “pillar organizations” (trade unions, “le monde associatif”, cultural movements, mutualist organizations, health system, educational organizations etc etc) also contribute to the implementation of the successive institutional reforms (these reforms re-shape the system, & the intermediate organizations simply adapt to the new contexts, e.g. “communautarisation” of the education sector, etc.).

E3. Motherland/Fatherland
E4. European international actors

E5. Non-European international actors

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3)

F2. Middle Range (4-7)

F3. Encompassing (8+)

Even though the successive agreements of “le grand poto-poto communautaire” which has never stopped till the 1960s “only” consist in institutional reforms, these reforms have wide-reaching consequences – actually on virtually all of the 13 policy topics, because the sequence of institutional reforms completely “re-shuffles” the prerogatives of the federal state, of the federated entities, etc. – and also translates into financial fluxes (North-South). So, actually, it’s much more than “institutional engineering”.

G. Main Goals

G1. Peace Keeping

It’s clearly a very pragmatic series of “temporary arrangements” (“muddling through”), to find a way out of inextricable problems (made more complicated because there are only 2 main players). Not at all conflict settlement or conflict resolution, because each reform bears the fruit of additional problems/tensions/difficulties (and “pretexts” for the next reform).

G3. Conflict Settlement

G4. Conflict Resolution

H. Achievements

This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.
Case Study 4 – Russian Speaking Minority in Estonia

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Estonia,
25.01.2007
Complementary Information
Estonia, 25 January 2007

Explanation of the Categories
A: Time Frame
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.

B: Style
B1. Collaborative
B2. Neutral
B3. Confrontational
Already in 1990, still under Soviet regime, limitations to immigration were envisaged and some measures to promote ethnic nationalism were undertaken (Language Act to regulate usage of Estonian; residence threshold for candidates in local elections; restoring national symbols etc)
In the period 1992 – 1996, directly after regaining independence, the style of policies was confrontational, driven by ethnically-minded political actors to enforce ethno-centric policies and subsequent massive emigration of Soviet-time settlers.
In summer 1993, reactions of the non-Estonians to the ‘Aliens’ Act’ led local authorities in Narva to preparations for referendum to vote on regional autonomy. International organisations such as OSCE proposed compromise solutions to the state and the separation activists, also the Roundtable of National Minorities under the auspices of the President of Estonia was involved in the process.
‘Language Act’ and ‘Citizenship Act’ (1995) both increased tensions in society as the laws imposed stronger demands on minorities.
Among the non-Estonians, the ‘compatriots’ in Estonia, consisting of organisations of veterans originating from the Soviet time and radical leaders of Russian citizens organised themselves following relevant decisions by the government of Russia in 1994.

Period 1996 – 1999 the style shifted to neutral based on several factors. The state was not able enforce the radical policies stipulated in legislation. For example, the administration could not issue or renew residence permits to more than 400 000 persons with undetermined citizenship. Likewise, validity of language certificates was prolonged and reform of Russian-medium school system was postponed.
In 1996, initiative to test candidates’ language skills in election process failed.
In 1997, post of Minister for Ethnic Affairs was re-founded.
Initiatives of international actors, both European and non-European, has had positive effect on inter-ethnic relations during this period. In 1997, proposals for conflict resolution took a form of a governmental basis-laying document, The integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society, which later evolved into state programme “Integration in Estonian society 2000-2007”.
The state programme marks advancement towards collaborative style and inclusion of minority representatives in policy design and implementation. However, the majority among the minorities themselves have been quite critical regarding the programme as it was perceived in terms of assimilation .

C. Initiative of Negotiation
C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors

Political parties and government have had the key role. Separatist/autonomous movement emerged in the beginning of 1990ies as a response to the adoption of several Acts. Government
settled the tensions with the active mediating role of OSCE and Western countries. At the end 1990s the government launch the integration policies

C2. Civil Society & (Economic Actors)
1990 – 1991 in the height of independence movement, the Estonian Popular Front took initiative towards including Russian-speaking democratic groupings.
1991 Russian Democratic Movement was founded, but it was not successful in the political landscape of Estonia.
1993 President’s Roundtable on Minorities convened on the initiative of High Commissioner of National Minorities of the OSCE.
Since end of 1990s cultural organisations of minorities have been partners of the Government in launching the integration policies.

C3. Motherland/Fatherland
Russian troops left Estonia in Summer 1994, this has played an important role for the starting of collaborationist phase in the approach of the Estonian authorities.
Russia as homeland of Soviet-time settlers has not had a direct role for negotiation/conflict settlement. Regular accusations of Russia towards Estonia regarding human rights etc have had negative role in respect of negotiation.

C4. European international actors
These actors have played very active role in initiating negotiations throughout 1990s. The OSCE and especially the High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) initiated several accommodation policies and acted for early warning of conflicts.

C5. Non-European international actors
United Nations Development Programme initiated discussion on integration, which later lead to the state programme “Integration in Estonian society 2000-2007”. Financing from a number of non-European actors has played important role in financing programmes and projects related to integration.

The role of international actors (OSCE, Council of Europe, UNDP, IOM) was significant in the 1990ies in settling the tensions; currently the role of these organisations has decreased significantly, as the OSCE Mission to Estonia was closed in 2001; UNDP representation was closed in 2000.

D. Scope of Negotiation
D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
- in the first half of 1990s the Estonian authorities have been reluctant to negotiate, the policies were carried out in top-down style. At the end of 1990s the scope of negotiations expanded, but still there seems to exist a general consensus among the major political parties that basics of the ethopolicy (citizenship, language) will not be changed.

D2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:

D4. European international actors

D5. Non-European international actors

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy
E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
The position of Minister of Population Affairs was introduced in 1997, in 1999 Foundation of Integration was launched – these two institutions have played central role in policy implementation. In 2006, in the process of preparation of the next stage of integration policy and the new Integration Programme for 2008-2013, new ideas regarding involvement of a number of other ministries to the integration policies has been discussed. The model of mainstreaming of integration policies is under discussion right now.

E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:
Civil society organisations have been recipients of the funds targeted towards different kind of projects related to integration.

E4. European international actors
EU has contributed in the form of pre-accession pressure on legislative amendments and financing aid programmes.

E5. Non-European international actors
Bilateral agreements with U.S. and Canada supported policy areas strategically (exchanging know-how) and financially.

F. Topical Range of Policy
F2. Middle Range (4-7)
Key policy areas important in Estonia
Language policy
Education policy
Social welfare policy
Labour market measures
Cultural policy for national minorities

In 1990s the range of policies was narrow – only language was important. In the integration programme of 2000 a number of new policy areas was included. The range of policies in Estonia is currently expanding in the sense that the mainstreaming approach is under discussion for the new integration programme.

G. Main Goals
G2. Conflict Management

The goal of policies is conflict management due to the low level of conflict.

H. Achievements
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.
### Case Study 5 – Kosovo

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### B. STYLE
- Collaborative
- Neutral
- Confrontational

### C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

### D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

### E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

### F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY
- Specific (1-3)
- Middle Range (4-7)
- Encompassing (8+)

### G. MAIN GOALS
- Peace Keeping
- Conflict Management
- Conflict Settlement
- Conflict Resolution

### H. ACHIEVEMENTS
- Conventional institutional actions
- Conventional non-institutional actions
- Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons
- Non-convent. – violence v/s persons
- Perception of Self/Other Unionists
- Perception of Self/Other Separatists

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**Kosovo, January 12, 2007**
Complementary information
Kosovo (March 18, 2007)

A: Time Frame
Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Kosovo.

B: Style

B1. Collaborative
B3. Confrontational
The style of interaction between Serbs and Albanians was shortly after the WW2 mainly confrontational. In 1945, the Albanian ballist movement led by Šaban Poluža rose up in the region of Drenica. The uprising was suppressed by the Yugoslav army. The ballist movement was defeated in 1947.
Around 1950, interaction was collaborative (due to the establishment of the Communist party on Kosovo), until 1968 when the first large street demonstrations organized by Kosovo Albanians took place. Such interaction between Serbs and Albanians remained until the present day.

Meaning of arrows:
1968: The first large street demonstrations organized by Kosovo Albanians took place.
1981: The largest street public protest of Kosovo Albanians took place.
March 1999: NATO intervenes into the conflict; armed fights increase.
March 2004: Massive ethnic cleansing, ethnic violence and expulsion of a portion of the Serbian community and non-Albanians took place.

C. Initiative of Negotiation

C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
C2. Civil Society
The communication between Albanians and Serbs was carried out in the Communist party. A significant portion of Albanian elite was represented by the civil society movements that was not recognized by the communist party. Albanian civil society was transformed into political parties after 1990, so they became then the major leaders for negotiations on the Albanian side. After 1990, the US administration became a significant factor to initiate negotiations on Kosovo. Albanian mother land and the EU had somewhat less influence. NATO and UN also play a major role after 1999.
1988: The Serbian communist party strips the autonomy of the province of Kosovo.
March 1999: NATO steps into the conflict.

D. Scope of Negotiation

D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
D2. Civil Society
Negotiation prior to 1988 included only political and institutionalized actors—namely, Serbian and Kosovo communist party and incumbents. After 1988, when the Kosovo autonomy was stripped, the communication broke down for a while. Albanian civil society actors emerged and soon after 1990 they are transformed into political parties. After 2000, negotiations began to include to a lesser degree EU officials and to a substantial degree US and OUN officials.
Meaning of arrows: Same as in C.
In 2006, UN secretary general appoints his special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari to conduct negotiation between the Serbiana and Albanian delegation for the final status of Kosovo; the negotiations ended in March 2007.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy

E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:
E4. European international actors
E5. Non European international actors

Most implementation of policies prior to 1999 was done by the Serbian incumbents. Albanians largely had no saying in it. After 1999, implementation was transferred to NATO, UN and EU forces who basically run the whole administration on Kosovo after 1999. Some part of implementation of policies, but not related to the status issues, is given to the Kosovo civil society actors.

Meaning of arrows: Same as in C and D.

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3)
F2. Middle Range (4-7)
F3. Encompassing (8+)

Most encompassing policies were implemented during the communist regime on Kosovo (1945-1988). After 1988, most policies were specific. In 1988-1999 Serbs tried to maintain the authoritarian rule on Kosovo. After 1999, most actors were concerned exclusively with the resolution of the final status of the province. Other policies were largely neglected.

Meaning of arrows: Same as in C.

G. Main Goals

G2. Conflict Management
G3. Conflict Settlement

Conflict settlement was the main goal of the communist party in the period 1945-1988. The communists did not want to go into the heart of the matter, meaning that conflict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions were not addressed. After 1988, the conflict escalates, and the Serbian incumbents try to manage the conflict by taking measures in order to limit, mitigate or contain violent conflicts. After 1999 NATO bombing and the withdrawal of the Serbia forces from the province, NATO troops and UN administration relaunches conflict settlement in Kosovo, again without attempts to go into the heart of the matter.

Meaning of arrows: Same as in C, D, E and F.

H. Achievements
Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Kosovo.
## Case Study 6 – North Cyprus

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| B. STYLE                      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Collaborative                 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Neutral                       |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Confrontational               |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Civil Society                 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Motherland/Fatherland        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Non-European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Civil Society                 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Motherland/Fatherland        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Non-European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Civil Society                 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Motherland/Fatherland        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Non-European international actors |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Specific (1-3)               |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Middle Range (4-7)          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Encompassing (8+)           |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| G. MAIN GOALS                |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Peace Keeping                |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Conflict Management          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Conflict Settlement          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Conflict Resolution          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

| H. ACHIEVEMENTS              |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Conventional institutional actions |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Conventional non-institutional actions |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Non-convent. – violence v/s persons |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Perception of Self/Other T Cypriot |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Perception of Self/Other G Cypriot |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

Cyprus, *Date*
Complementary Information
- North Cyprus - 11/01/01 -

Explanation of the Categories

A: Time Frame
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.

B: Style

B1. Collaborative

B2. Neutral

B3. Confrontational

Between 1955-1960 accommodation policies can be described as confrontational, because the proposal prepared by the colonial government that aimed to grand Cyprus a kind of self government was rejected by both sides which aired conflicting demands. In addition initiatives towards establishing an independent Cypriot state generated conflicts between the two sides. In 1960 Cyprus Republic was declared as a result of the involvement of Britain, Greece and Turkey which limited the degree of confrontation and intercommunal collaboration. Therefore the process could be defined as neutral. In the period 1963-1974 violent activities against Turkish Cypriots continued. So in terms of the accommodation policies this period can be described as confrontational. The period 1974-2004 can be described as confrontational. Arrows refer to 1963 and 2003

C. Initiative of Negotiation

C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
C2. Civil Society & Economic Actors
C3. Motherland/Fatherland
C4. European international actors
C5. Non-European international actors


D. Scope of Negotiation

D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
D2. Civil Society & Economic Actors
D3. Motherland/Fatherland
D4. European international actors
D5. Non-European international actors
Political and Institutional actors have in general been the actors conducting and supporting negotiations in different periods. In 1977 and 1979 and between 2002-2004 however there has been substantial negotiation. 2002-2004 is the period in which the political actors, motherland/fatherland and EU are involved in supporting the negotiations. Arrows refer to 1958, 1960 and 2003.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy

E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors.
E3. Motherland/Fatherland
E4. European international actors
E5. Non-European international actors

Implementations of the accommodation policies are only seen in the period of 2004-2006. Civil society, European international actors and regional and local actors have been the most influential
Arrow refers to 2003

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3)
F2. Middle Range (4-7)
F3. Encompassing (8+)

Regarding the topical range, the accommodation policies were mainly “encompassing” in periods 1960, 67-74, 77-79, 90-92, 2002. During 2003-2006 however they can be described as “specific”. Arrows refer to 2002 and 2003.

G. Main Goals

G1. Peace Keeping
G2. Conflict Management
G3. Conflict Settlement
G4. Conflict Resolution


H. Achievements
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case.
# Case Study 7 – Northern Ireland

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<th>G. MAIN GOALS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>• Conflict Management</td>
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<td>• Conflict Resolution</td>
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Complementary information
- Northern Ireland – 15/11/07 -

Explanation of the Categories

A: Time Frame
This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case, so I did not modify it.

B: Style

B1. Collaborative
B2. Neutral
B3. Confrontational

Between 1969 and 1985, accommodation policies can be described as mainly confrontational, as in official discourses the conflict was described as the consequence of the actions of some criminal and marginalized actors. There were no real and lasting efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict (apart from a short-lived experience in 1974), solutions were often imposed from ‘above’ (Great Britain and Ireland), and the army and the police were the central actors of a “peace-keeping” policy.

Between 1985 and 1994, accommodation policies can be described as “neutral”, because following the failure of past initiatives, the British and Irish governments began to negotiate, mostly secretly, with Northern Irish actors, taking their opinion into account but not really associating them to decisions and initiatives.

Since 1994, accommodation policies can be described as “collaborative”, as there has been a real effort to involve all relevant actors in negotiations and peace initiatives, including those actors (i.e. paramilitaries) that were so far described as “criminal”.

Meaning of arrows:
- 31.01.72: Bloody Sunday, 13 people shot by British army during a peaceful demonstration
- 28.03.72: End of Stormont and imposition of British Direct Rule on the province: growing anger amongst unionists, and increasing unrest in nationalist ranks
- 1974: Sunningdale agreements, that were the first attempt to impose power-sharing in the province. Failed in front of unionist opposition.
- 1985: Hillsborough agreement, signed between Britain and Ireland
- 1994: Downing Street Declaration, launching the peace process that has led to the signing of:
- 1998: Belfast/ Good Friday Agreements, signed by main Northern Irish political actors (except DUP)

C. Initiative of Negotiation

C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
C3. Motherland/Fatherland

Negotiations, understood in a broad sense, began in the early 70s, when the British government imposed some changes on the Unionist administration that had so far ruled the province. New electoral rules were introduced, and the first bills fighting discrimination against the Catholic community were passed. Since then, Great Britain has retained the initiative of negotiation, even if the Northern Irish political have stepped in since the mid-nineties, and have launched some initiatives of their own (like the Hume-Adams talks, between moderate and radical nationalists, which became public in 1993).
D. Scope of Negotiation

D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
D3. Motherland/Fatherland

Negotiation has always included only political and institutionalized actors, from the national (British), regional (Northern Irish) and Irish scenes. Civil society or European and International Actors have never been included in the negotiation, even though some American actors have been involved in “behind the scenes” moves. Arrows mentioned refer to events already described in section B above.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy

E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors
E3. Motherland/Fatherland
E4. European international actors

Accommodation policies in Northern Ireland are characterized by the fact that more and more actors have been involved in their implementation. Since the beginning of the 70’s, Great Britain and Ireland have been the main actors involved in their implementation (especially since Great Britain has almost always had direct rule over Northern Ireland since 1972), but local political actors have also been associated to this implementation, mainly the unionist local government at the beginning of the 1970s, and the moderate political parties up to the signing of the Sunningdale agreement in 1974. The negotiations that have led to the 1998 agreements, and that guide its implementation, have also involved, since their beginning in 1994, the main political parties of Northern Ireland. To a lesser extent, civil society and the European Union have also participated in the implementation of the 1998 agreements, the latter acting mainly as a funding agency for peace programmes.

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3)
F2. Middle Range (4-7)
F3. Encompassing (8+)

As far as the topical range of policies are concerned, the trend in Northern Ireland is a very clear move towards more encompassing policies: before the Sunningdale agreement, accommodation policies were very specific, and concerned mainly political representation and electoral rules. After 1974, and up to the signing of the 1998 agreements, policies can be described as middle-range, as their scope having extended to other policy sectors such as employment policy, housing, or economic measures. But it is only with the 1998 agreements that the policies can be described as truly encompassing, as they now deal with almost all policy sectors mentioned in the guidelines, except maybe property rights.

G. Main Goals

G1. Peace Keeping
G2. Conflict Management
G3. Conflict Settlement
**G4. Conflict Resolution**

The same kind of trend can be found with the policy goals: while the peace keeping goal (aiming at keeping the level of violence as low as possible, with a significant presence of soldiers and policemen in the streets) has been constant since the end of the sixties, it has been accompanied since 1974 by a conflict management goal, embodied in the first attempt in 1974 to set up a power-sharing government (though without any meaningful attempt to foster reconciliation between the two communities). The 1998 agreements have added to these goals those of conflict settlement and conflict resolution, as their main aim is to put an end to the conflict, and to find a solution to its root causes, and possibly even to enable reconciliation.

**H. Achievements**

This section is already filled out and has been taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for each case, so I did not change anything.
Case Study 8 – Sandzak

A. TIME FRAME

- Stage of conflict
- Accommodation initiatives

B. STYLE

- Collaborative
- Neutral
- Confrontational

C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION

- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION

- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY

- Specific (1-3)
- Middle Range (4-7)
- Encompassing (8+)

G. MAIN GOALS

- Peace Keeping
- Conflict Management
- Conflict Settlement
- Conflict Resolution

H. ACHIEVEMENTS

- Conventional institutional actions
- Conventional non-institutional actions
- Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons
- Non-convent. – violence v/s persons
- Perception of Self/Other State Authorities
- Perception of Self/Other Bosniaks

Sandzak, January 15, 2007
Complementary information
Sandzak (March 18, 2007)

A: Time Frame
Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Vojvodina.

B: Style
B1. Collaborative
B3. Confrontational
The genuine Sandzak actors basically did not exist until after 1990 when the multiparty system in Serbia was introduced. As opposed to Kosovo and Vojvodina that enjoyed substantial autonomy prior to 1988, the Sandzak area was not even an administrative region. After 1990, genuine Bosniak ethnic parties emerged and they took confrontational course to the Serbian government, demanding autonomy that existed for Vojvodina and Kosovo under the 1974 constitution. After 2000, when Milosevic regime was brought down, the politics became more collaborative and the key Bosniak actors started to cooperate and became the part of the regime. The demands for provincial autonomy that would match that of Vojvodina waned after 2000.

Meaning of arrows:
1988: Coming of Slobodan Milosevic to power.
2000: The fall of Slobodan Milosevic.

C. Initiative of Negotiation
C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
C2. Civil Society
C3. Motherland/Fatherland
The Bosniak was not recognized as a separate ethnic minority until the early 1990s. There was basically no initiative for any kind of policies prior to 1990. Only after 1990, when new ethnic political parties started to emerge in Sandzak, local actors – NGOs and political parties – started to initiate policies that were flatly rejected by the Serbian government. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the mother state of Bosniaks, also got involved into supporting the local actors especially after the mid-1990.

Arrows: Same as in B.

D. Scope of Negotiation
D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
The negotiations about the accommodative policies in Sandzak started to include the actors other than the Serbian communist party or the Serbian government only after 2000. Yet, mainly Serbian and local institutional and political actors were the key negotiator about accommodative policies.

Arrows: Same as in B and C.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy
E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors

E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:

National and local political and institutional actors have been the key actors in implementing the accommodation policies in Sandzak. Some policies, mainly related to cultural affairs and human rights protection, were implemented by local NGOs. The Moslem religious bodies started to play increasingly important role after 2000. New local actors, ethnic council, emerged after 2000 as a significant player.

Arrows:

2000. The fall of Slobodan Milosevic.
2002: The parliament adopts the law on ethnic minority councils. (Bosniak formed their council.)

F. Topical Range of Policy

F1. Specific (1-3)
F2. Middle Range (4-7)

Prior to 1990, Serbian communist party had no policy toward the Sandzak area. After 1990, the municipalities were given some limited prerogatives, which made the policies specific. They were expanded after 2000 when the Milosevic regime was brought down but still remained largely middle range in nature.

Arrows:
1988: Coming of Slobodan Milosevic to power.
2000. The fall of Slobodan Milosevic.
2002: The parliament adopts the law on ethnic minority councils. (Bosniak formed their council.)

G. Main Goals

G2. Conflict Management
G3. Conflict Settlement

No conflict existed prior to 1990. After the emergence of the ethnic political parties, the conflict escalated, and the Serbian government tried to manage the conflict. After 2000, the Bosniak seems to have accepted to cooperate with the Serbian government and give up their demands on the transforming Sandzak into a political unit.

Meaning of arrows:

1988: Coming of Slobodan Milosevic to power.
2000: the downfall of the Milosevic regime

H. Achievements

Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Vojvodina.
Case Study 9 – Vojvodina

A. TIME FRAME
- Stage of conflict
- Accommodation initiatives

B. STYLE
- Collaborative
- Neutral
- Confrontational

C. INITIATIVE OF NEGOTIATION
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

D. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

E. INVOLVEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
- National/Regional/Local Pol & Inst Actors
- Civil Society
- Motherland/Fatherland
- European international actors
- Non-European international actors

F. TOPICAL RANGE OF POLICY
- Specific (1-3)
- Middle Range (4-7)
- Encompassing (8+)

G. MAIN GOALS
- Peace Keeping
- Conflict Management
- Conflict Settlement
- Conflict Resolution

H. ACHIEVEMENTS
- Conventional institutional actions
- Conventional non-institutional actions
- Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons
- Non-convent. – violence v/s persons
- Perception of Self/Other Decentralizers
- Perception of Self/Other Autonomists

Vojvodina, Jan 15, 2007
Complementary information

Vojvodina (March 18, 2007)

A: Time Frame
Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Vojvodina.

B: Style
B1. Collaborative
B3. Confrontational
Most of the time interaction between Serbian and Vojvodina actors was collaborative. As opposed to Kosovo that enjoyed the same status under the 1963 and 1974 constituting, Vojvodina actors were satisfied with their status in former Yugoslavia. The style was confrontational in 1988 when the Serbian communist party stripped Vojvodina’s autonomy and after 2000, when the Milosevic regime was overthrown, when some Vojvodina actors requested substantial financial autonomy for Vojvodina.

Meaning of arrows:
1988: After Slobodan Milosevic has strengthened his grip in the Serbian Communist League, he removed the autonomist Vojvodina leadership and installed his henchmen. In the same year, the Serbian parliament scrapped Vojvodina autonomy granted by the 1974 Constitution.
September 2000: Milosevic stepped down in Serbia. The alliance of democratic parties won in Vojvodina. A number of provincial and ethnic minority leaders become a part of the governing coalition in Serbia and Vojvodina.

C. Initiative of Negotiation
C1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
C2. Civil Society
The initiative for negotiation have always come from the communist incumbents (1945-1988) and from the political parties (both regional and national). Civil society actors played minor role after 2000. The mother state of Hungary tried at some point (2004) to initiate discussion on the state of minority rights in Vojvodina.

Arrows: Same as in B.
2004. Hungarian government started an initiative at the European parliament, claiming that Hungarian minority does not enjoy full collective rights protection.

D. Scope of Negotiation
D1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
The negotiations about the accommodative policies in Vojvodina have always included national and regional political and institutional actors. Prior to 1988, when the autonomy of the province was stripped, all the accommodation policies were debated within the Serbian and Vojvodina communist party. After 1990, new political parties emerge, but also several political parties that represented ethnic minorities. Civil society as well as international actors stayed out of the negotiations.

Arrows: Same as in B.

E. Involvement in Implementation of Policy
E1. National/Regional/Local Political and Institutional Actors
E2. Civil Society & Economic Actors:
Again, national and regional political and institutional actors have been the key actors in implementing the accommodation policies in Vojvodina. After 2000, Somewhat larger role was given to regional actors (assembly and executive council of Vojvodina, as well as ethnic council that were established in 2002). Some civil society actors also played a role, but mainly in the affairs related to cultural matters.

Arrows: Same as in B.

2002: The parliament adopts the law on ethnic minority councils. (More than 10 ethnic councils were set up in 2003 and 2004 by Vojvodina ethnic minorities. These are meant to give opportunity to ethnic minorities to independently formulate their cultural policies.)

F. Topical Range of Policy
F3. Encompassing (8+)
The accommodation polices have always been encompassing, and rarely specific. According to its 1963, Vojvodina was entitled to deal with the full scope of its own affairs. This autonomy was strengthen under the 1974 constitution. This autonomy was stripped in 1988, but the Serbian government that had more influence again wanted to regulate entirely the province’s political, economic and cultural affairs. The only thing that changed was who will implement the policies, not their character.

Arrows:
1963. The adoption of the Vojvodina constitution
1974. The adoption of the Vojvodina constitution

G. Main Goals
G2. Conflict Management
G3. Conflict Settlement
Conflict settlement was the main goal of the communist party in the period 1945-1988. The communists did not want to go into the heart of the matter, meaning that conflict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions were not addressed. After 1988, the conflict did not escalate because the Serbian politicians managed to tame the Vojvodina actors. Still, some resistance to the dictate from Belgrade existed and after 1990, the Serbian incumbents tried to manage the conflict. After the downfall of the Milosevic regime in 2000, Vojvodina was given back some autonomy but the structural conditions of the conflict (notably fiscal autonomy) was not resolved.

Meaning of arrows:
1988: After Slobodan Milosevic has strengthened his grip in the Serbian Communist League, he removed the autonomist Vojvodina leadership and installed his henchmen. In the same year, the Serbian parliament scrapped Vojvodina autonomy granted by the 1974 Constitution.
2000: the downfall of the Milosevic regime

H. Achievements

Taken from the “synthetic case descriptions” for Vojvodina.