SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME
PRIORITY 7

“Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge based Society”

Deliverable 3
“ACCOMODATION POLICIES IN EUROPEAN ETHNIC CONFLICTS
REVIEW OF CURRENT THEORIES”

Final Version

PEACE-COM

Peace Processes in Community Conflicts:
From Understanding the Roots of Conflicts
to Conflict Resolution
This paper [the first delivery of the WP] is an attempt to explore some of the critiques of conflict resolution that have appeared in the academic literature during the past few years. In essence the thrust of these criticisms amount to serious questions about the capability of outsiders (and especially those intervening on behalf of international organizations, as EU, UN, OSCE) to influence and secure peace processes by negotiation and agreement. Indeed, it has been argued that attempts at impartial intervention can actually fuel and prolong war and its miseries. Linked to this kind of criticism is the idea either that the Western model of conflict resolution (promoted through the UN, for example) is fundamentally flawed. This is so because it is inadequate in both its analysis of the causes and dynamics of contemporary armed conflict, and in the prescriptions that follow from this analysis.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION: TENSIONS, PROTEST AND VIOLENCE

An ethnic group may be defined as "a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients" (Levy, 1989). This definition includes two important characteristics of Gellner’s version (1983: 7): a shared culture and the recognition by self and others of belonging to the same group. Horowitz (1985:17-8) provides us with an inclusive concept of ethnicity: "Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicium is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof." Our definition is a combination of Gellner (1983) and Horowitz (1985): we define ethnic groups on the basis of ascriptive differences that the members of the group and others see as salient to their identity.

Among multiple identities possessed by people, ethnicity is one of the most salient. Ethnicity is a mid-level identity, representing a group small enough to mobilize, but large enough to lead to favorable results. It also provides a strong bond similar to the one of an extended family. This bond is created by early socialization processes and enforced by daily relationships between the members of the community.

Today, a large portion of the over 190 existing nation states consist of more than one ethnic group. Writing in the 1980s Connor (1994) found that only
fifteen of the world's states were homogenous nation states. That select
group included Iceland, the two Koreas, Portugal, and Japan. Perhaps
more importantly, back then the largest ethnic group was a majority in only
31 percent of the existing countries (Connor 1994).

It is also true that since the end of World War II, at least one half of the
world's states have experienced significant ethnic conflict and 80 percent of
deaths from political violence have been internal to nation states
(Waterman, 1998). Clearly every domestic political conflict is not caused by
ethnicity, but as Gurr (1993) reports, between 1950 and 1989 non-violent
protest by ethnic minorities went up by 230 percent; violent protest by
ethnic minority groups rose by 420 percent; and rebellion by ethnic
minority groups increased by 360 percent. Gurr (1993:93) defines protest
as acts aiming at "persuading or intimidating officials to change their
policies toward the group" by mobilizing support on behalf of reform. Any
violence used by protesters is sporadic and unplanned.

Ethnic conflict is usually a result of government-ethnic group interaction.
We submit that ethnic groups enjoy an advantage in mobilizing. Gils-
Rocamora, 1992) draws on Olson (1965), Tilly (1994) and Chan, 1997) to
explain ethnic groups' ability to mobilize more easily and effectively than
other societal actors. He begins with a collective action model that builds
on Olson's claim that collective action can come about when a group is
small and homogenous. He argues that since individuals are recognizable
inside the smallest units, free riding is more difficult among ethnic groups
than among other segments of society since sanctions are easier to
administer and psychological factors are more likely to come into play.
Thus, although ethnicity in itself does not lead to mobilization, there is a
link between ethnicity and the capacity to mobilize for conflict behavior
because of pre-existing networks among ethnic groups. Gurr (1993:93)
distinguishes rebellion from protest by its more fundamental goals, its
strategy of mobilization of coercive power, and its systematic and planned
use of violence.

data set [Minorities at Risk data set contains information on 233 ethnic, or
communal, groups that have at one time or another since 1945 showed
some signs of political activity] and finds support for the contention that
ethnicity is positively correlated with mobilization for conflict through the
concepts of homogeneity and pre-existence of group networks. Brubaker's
results provide evidence for the link between ethnicity and mobilization for
dissent.
We thus have some reason to anticipate that the ethnic composition of society may have an impact on the extent to which a society experiences protest: if grievances are relatively constant across many groups in a given society, then one would expect ethnic groups to more readily mobilize than other types of groups. Societies in transition, etc. will have fairly widespread discontent. And we suggest that societies experiencing such changes that also have ethnic minority groups are more likely to bear witness to protest and, perhaps, rebellion than societies that lack these conditions. To the extent that governments find that threatening, they can be expected to respond with coercion.

**STRUCTURE OF MULTIETHNIC STATES, CLEAVAGES**

Out of 132 states, Said and Simmons (1976 cited by nielsson,1985] noted that only 9.1 per cent could be considered "ethnic-free". A total of 18.9 per cent contain an ethnic group which represents more than 90 per cent of the population, and another 18.9 per cent with the largest ethnic group constituting 75-89 per cent of the population. However, in 23.5 per cent of the countries the largest ethnic group accounts for only 50-74 per cent of the population, and in 29.5 per cent of the states it does not constitute half the population. Moreover, in 40.2 per cent of the countries the population consists of five or more significant ethnic groups. According to what he calls "nation-group attributes", Nielsson (1985) classified the world's population into "single nation-group states", "one nation-group dominant states", "one nation-group dominant states with fragmented minorities", "bi-national states", and "multinational states", none of which, however, represents a total congruence of "nation-group" and "state". With the exception of rare cases like Iceland and the two Koreas, as well as some tiny island states, there is no country in the world that can claim to be ethnically homogeneous; even Nielsson's "single nation-group states" are defined as those in which the nation-group accounts for between 95 and 99.9 per cent of the population.

More significantly, Nielsson's taxonomy points out the importance of the numerical structure of multiethnic states. A distinction can be made between bi-ethnic states (with two major ethnic groups of significant proportions) and states with more than two major ethnic groups.

Lijphart (1977:56) remarked, "The notion of a multiple balance of power contains two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, among the segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segment." However, cooperation among groups becomes more difficult, as the number participating in negotiations increases beyond
three or four. On the other hand, a moderately multiple configuration is preferable to a dual segmentation as the latter entails a constant tension between "a [majority] hegemony or a precarious balance ... [and it leads] easily to an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game" (ibid.). Bi-ethnic states are thus a special, problematic type of multiethnic state. In a bi-ethnic state, a gain for one ethnic group could potentially be perceived as a loss for the other. By contrast, in societies with more than two major ethnic groups it may not be apparent who loses when one ethnic group improves its position. This can lead to a logrolling situation, in which each group cares primarily about its own gains and nobody is conscious of the possible costs of a policy decision. The scenario is outlined in Steiner's study on consociationalism in Switzerland. It also implies that ethnic tension could be more easily aroused by preferential policies in bi-ethnic states than in those with more than two ethnic groups.

Ethnic diversity is one of the determining factors of the size of the public sector. Public spending decisions reflect not only the conflict between classes and class-based political parties, but also ascriptive divisions that cut across class boundaries, such as racial, linguistic and religious cleavages. The higher the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the greater the difficulty of reaching collective decisions and therefore the smaller the expected size of government.

The WP3 sets out to test the following corollary hypotheses. The first is related to the effect of the economic environment on the relationship between public policy and ethnic conflict. That economic situations play an important role in interethnic conflict seems obvious. Collins (1975) believed that the more severe a (political/economic) crisis, the greater the tendency for groups to coalesce along the lines of collective interests and the society to polarize into two-sided conflicts. Van Evera (1994) claimed that public become receptive to scapegoat myths (which are more widely believed) when economic conditions deteriorate. Rex (1970) noted that scapegoating is a means to restore social equilibrium, a mechanism whereby resentment may be expressed and the existing power structure maintained. It is "the social process par excellence that literally fulfils Parsons' description of one of his functional subsystems as pattern maintenance and tension management". Baimbridge, Burkitt and Macey (1994) observed that the deflationary impact of the Maastricht Treaty may intensify nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism "as the economically insecure seek weaker scapegoats to blame for the economic problems confronting them". Hauser and Hauser (1972)
stated that scapegoats occur when there is an imbalance between power and citizens' rights and are "often an élite's safeguard in its dealings with a dissatisfied and potentially dangerous majority". In other words, the repressed, negative and hostile feelings of the majority vis-à-vis its own ruling élite are transferred on to the scapegoat. The term "free-floating aggression" has been used in this case while the more general concept of "scapegoating" is reserved for the transfer of hostility towards any object. The pattern of ethnic conflict caused by scapegoating may not be solely an ethnic problem, but may partly result from social class differential and the economic environment.

**Corollary hypothesis 1**

**The effect of ethnic diversity on the size of the public sector is more pronounced among the economically less affluent countries than among more affluent ones.**

The second corollary hypothesis concerns the distinction between transfer expenditure and non-transfer expenditure. According to our empirical observations in East European ethnic groups, since people tend not to help those whom they perceive as being different from themselves, voters in diverse populations may choose lower levels of public spending to avoid redistribution. While most government expenditure programmes redistribute income, this effect of ethnic diversity is likely to be more pronounced for programmes which primarily aim to redistribute income and those that are widely perceived as being redistributive (e.g. welfare) than for programmes that provide goods uniformly to residents (e.g. public infrastructure). This paper intends to test this assertion under the following corollary hypothesis:

**Corollary hypothesis 2: The effect of ethnic diversity on transfer expenditure is more pronounced than that on other, non-transfer, expenditure.**

Besides the numerical structure of ethnicity, other factors also act to influence ethnic intensity. Among them are whether the ethnic divisions are territorially based, the historical geography (homeland v immigrant) of the ethnic groups, and whether the ethnic cleavages are crosscutting or mutually reinforcing. The variables of territoriality and historical geography of ethnicity, though basically also related to ethnic intensity, can be seen from a different angle. Territorial division along ethnic lines
may put an upward pressure on public spending as central governments respond to ethnic demands via regional spending, which is not applicable in a country where ethnic groups are dispersed and intermingling in residence. A country where the population consists of both homeland and immigrant ethnic groups, due to the imbalance in ethnic intensity and legitimacy (claims to the land), is more conducive to the use of public spending to implement ethnic preferential policies, resulting in the expansion of the public sector.

Crosscutting or mutually reinforcing nature of cleavages can be seen in the same light as the historical geography of ethnicity. Lijphart (1968) proposed that if a society is too heterogenous or too homogeneous over racial, linguistic and religious cleavages, democratic political organization is not likely to be stable. A stable democracy must have both a minimum of ethnic homogeneity and a minimum of heterogeneity. While the extent of crosscutting may be important for the stability of a democracy, it can be equally important as a factor influencing public expenditure, since government spending can be seen to be a political process whereby the collective political action of groups furthers their own interests. Furthermore, the intensity of ethnic conflict depends on both the intensity of group membership ("ethnic intensity") and the degree of crosscutting.

In a society where fragmentation in all cleavages is high, the high intensity of conflict may lead to the adoption of preferential policies or similar measures, which implies a greater level of public spending. This is not inconsistent with the basic research hypothesis that higher ethnic diversity leads to smaller public sector although at first sight the low crosscutting nature of cleavages seems to compound the effect of ethnic fragmentation, for the issue of crosscutting involves the relationship between cleavages rather than the cleavages themselves.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES

The patterns of ethnic relations are most fluid, and often violent, in those new states which have recently gained their independence as a result of the break-up of former states and federations in Europe.
In those cases where the countries have experienced economic growth and development such as has occurred in the East European region, the additional labour market needs have been satisfied through a process involving contract labour or illegal migration rather than settler immigration. In these instances, immigrant ethnic group membership has become associated with dis-advantage since the new immigrant ethnic groups lack citizenship and other rights to full social participation usually associated with permanent residence and enjoyed by long-established ethnic minorities.

Nowhere is the range of variation in the co-existing patterns of ethnic relations more marked than in the European countries.

The diversity of multi-ethnic states in their institutional structures, patterns of ethnic relations and their constituent ethnic groupings ensures that the form of policy debates, and their outcomes, are highly varied. Nevertheless, certain themes are continually identified by those able to influence the formulation of policy as issues to be addressed and managed in contemporary multi-ethnic societies. Before examining these, there are certain policy issues which relate directly to the existing general patterns of institutional relations between the constituent ethnic groups.

The most urgent issue in states experiencing ongoing ethnically related political instability, or striving to re-establish a modus vivendi between ethnic groups in the wake of conflict involving physical violence, is the establishment of communication and contacts across ethnic boundaries which will allow for negotiations between groups and, for individuals, the regaining of a sense of personal security. When this is achieved the need then exists to address the causes which underlay the ethno-nationalist mobilisation.

Where states have long-term residents denied access to citizenship many of the same issues may apply to them and their family members, often including locally born children. The regularisation of resident status or opportunities to be naturalised become important issues. This is especially so where such changes remove ethnic minority members from a situation where they become caught in a web of exploitative labour and criminal activities contributing to the development of a disaffected and marginalised underclass.

States which have taken decisions in favour of regularisation and the further step of granting citizenship to resident ethnic minorities face issues similar to states which have long-established ethnic minorities who have legal citizenship. These concern the integration of the minority group
members and their relationship to the dominant ethnic group and other minorities. Policy issues which arise include opportunities to express, and to maintain distinctive elements of the ethnic culture, especially language and religion where these are associated with ethnic distinctiveness; the absence of ethnically linked social and economic disadvantage; opportunities to participate in political decision-making and the avoidance of racism and discrimination. An important symbolic issue is the involvement of minority groups in the formulation and expression of the national identity. Where a minority group has a distinctive territorial base the issue of the extent of its political independence may become an important issue.

A list of some common concerns from the perspective of the ethnic minorities are contained in Fig.1. The importance of these issues may vary between groups and also over time. While it is apparent that often the ethnic minority and the state may be concerned about the same issue, the nature of their concern may differ. In the area of housing, for example, the State may be concerned to avoid the development of segregated housing areas while for members of the ethnic minority their concern may be focused on the availability of adequate quality housing without discrimination.

The growing international recognition of the importance of ethnic diversity ensures that States have shared concerns about the need to address this diversity in their policies and programs. While all have the objective of preventing ethnically-based conflict becoming destabilising the policy models favoured to achieve this objective, often referred to as 'integration', may be diametrically opposed. The policy models discussed below are abstract, ideal types based on specific ideological-normative statements concerning the relationship between ethnic groups in a society. Later another level of policy will be identified - the programmatic-political-which involves actual policy initiatives and programs which have direct, and indirect, implications for ethnic relations. While there is the expectation of a close link between the ideological-normative and the programmatic-political levels of policy, the process of decision-making and implementation can result in a lack of congruence between the two levels.

First, policies based on an assimilationist model which envisages that ethnic minorities will be incorporated fully into the society and State through a process of individual change in which individuals abandon their distinctive linguistic, cultural and social characteristics and takes on those of the dominant group. In this model there is no place envisaged for the retention of distinctive cultural, linguistic or social practices. By being
completely absorbed into the mainstream society it is argued that the bases for ethnically based conflict cease to exist.

A second policy is based on a differentialist model whereby conflict is avoided through a process which eliminates or minimises contacts with ethnic minorities. Common forms of it however, are policies which substantially restrict the participation of ethnic minority members in the mainstream society. The institutions of the State are not required to accommodate members of the ethnic minorities. The State, in contrast with the assimilationist model, may however allow, or in some cases sponsor, the development of parallel institutions catering in a minimal fashion for the educational, or cultural needs of the ethnic minorities.

A third major approach to policies accepts the potential, and legitimacy, of ethnic minorities' cultural and social distinctiveness. The multiculturalism model envisages that individuals and groups can be fully incorporated into the society without either losing their distinctiveness or being denied full participation. In order to achieve this goal of full participation, the State institutions may need to be extensively modified so as to provide equally for those from different cultural and social backgrounds. In this process the State plays an active role of sponsoring institutional change which may extend from the restructuring of mainstream institutions to the support of parallel institutions.

Each of these three models of how states manage and organise their policy responses to ethnic diversity is abstract and contains little in the way of specific policy prescriptions or programs. This abstraction derives from the way they are actually ideological-normative statements with a moral and ethical force.

Citizenship in the assimilationist model is viewed as a contract between the individual and the State without the mediation of other entities. It is also based on the strict separation of the private from the public space (Birnbaum, 1995). Minority groups in France frequently use the Law of 1901 which approves associations (Giordan, 1992) as a vehicle permitting citizens (regardless of their origin) to organise the development of the minority cultures and languages to which they are attached. Yet the institutional frameworks guaranteeing the real practice of this recognised right are lacking.

The differentialist model of addressing ethnic diversity, leaving aside the extreme forms of ethnic cleansing, is associated especially with states where citizenship is based on principles of ius sanguinis. The effect of this is that native born members of ethnic minorities such as Turks in Germany
or Koreans in Japan do not enjoy a natural right to citizenship in their countries of birth. While provisions exist for naturalisation the procedures often make it extremely difficult, even for permanent residents and their locally born children, to apply successfully. The exclusion of such 'outsiders' is further reinforced by national mythologies which emphasise the cultural homogeneity of the nation.

The multi-cultural model is the most recent having been developed only within the last three decades. Australia, Canada and Sweden are the three States which have explicitly adopted a national multicultural model to guide them in managing ethnic diversity. Nationality in Canada and Australia is based primarily on ius solis and there is easy access to naturalisation procedures and citizenship for immigrants. While Sweden adheres to principles of ius sanguinis it too, in practice, has procedures which favour relatively easy naturalisation. In 1993, 8.5 per cent of the foreign population acquired Swedish citizenship, a rate which was far higher than in other European OECD countries with the Netherlands at 5.7 per cent having the second highest rate (OECD 1995, p.158).

Even when based on the criteria for citizenship, attempts to classify States according to particular models may give only a partial indication of their actual policy initiatives and programs. The reason is the need to translate the slogans and models into specific action and programs. It is through this process that the ideological-normative models acquire their programmatic-political reality. This process of translation is critical to appreciate in any discussion of both the reality and the potential for change in policy responses in multi-ethnic societies. To the extent that there is indeterminacy or slippage in the translation from model to practice, the potential for change is thereby increased.

As the end of the twentieth century approaches, there is an urgent need to find durable policy models for managing multi-ethnic societies so as to obviate ethnic conflict and violence in a manner acceptable within a democratic society. The political instability, economic changes and ever-increasing levels of international migration which have contributed to the increasing range and extent of inter-ethnic contacts show little sign of abating. Even were they to do so, the new ethnic diversity which they have introduced into States will not disappear overnight.

There is also a sense that existing policy models are failing. The assimilationist model is being questioned as it becomes increasingly evident that assimilation is not occurring as intended and that, indeed, there is a growing sense of alienation among many of those from ethnic
minority backgrounds. At the extreme, this is associated with a retreat into a fundamentalist reassertion of a culturally-based distinctiveness. From an individual perspective assimilation hence increasingly represents an unrealistic model even in those 'immigrant' societies which have used immigration as a means of nation-building. Where states have resorted to differentialist models as a way of managing ethnic diversity the difficulties of ensuring a 'separate but equal' outcome for ethnic minorities are all too evident. Failure to approach this objective generates increasingly pressing demands for social justice often associated with a strengthening of minority group solidarity.

Given the significance of minority groups in many multi-ethnic societies, multiculturalism has considerable potential as an alternative policy model. By comparison with the assimilationist and differentialist models it does, however, require and benefit from a much more interventionist role by the state, especially in the early phases when the struggle for legitimacy and resources are greatest. Such a tradition of State involvement and active engagement in policy making and implementation is, however, compatible with the political traditions in many European nations.

The adoption of multiculturalism as the replacement for an existing national model of integration involves difficulties. The financial constraints on State expenditure and the high levels of unemployment which have already exacerbated existing inter-ethnic relations cannot be ignored. There is also the need to identify the specific strategies to be followed in implementing the policy. As the case studies showed, a feature of the multicultural model is that, as a model which involves ultimately institutional and personal change, the strategies appropriate and feasible vary from one stage of implementation to the next. Hence, evaluation of the policy should ideally take a long term perspective. Such a luxury may not be possible in the present situation where policy makers seek urgent solutions.

The point was made in the context of the case studies that multiculturalism does not consist of one specific type of program or strategy. Instead, its effectiveness depends on the cumulative effect of various strategies which together ensure that cultural diversity is encouraged at the same time that its connection with disadvantage is severed and becomes seen by the entire population as a positive contribution to society, rather than merely something to be tolerated. This is not to imply that tolerance in some circumstances represents an advance on existing community attitudes. Rather it is to emphasise that the important contribution of a multicultural model lies not merely in the way it involves specific programs and practices. Instead, its significance is that it enjoins a re-conceptualisation of
how to manage integration by replacing the often paternalistic provision of services to minorities by a more participatory and consultative process. Such a shift represents a major advance in the democratic process in multi-ethnic societies.

Despite the way in which many of the existing ideological-normative models are already being bypassed in the search for programmatic-political policies to address integration, some States may feel that overt support for a multicultural model would be politically unacceptable. Experience has shown that this, while it deprives many local programs of legitimacy and resources, need not preclude the development at a lower policy level of programs with objectives compatible with a multicultural model. While such programs face difficulties in becoming institutionalised, their existence is valuable as a model for others involved in policy development and implementation.

In societies where sub-national regions have a considerable role in policy-making and implementation, multicultural initiatives at this level are of particular significance. Especially where minorities are concentrated in certain regions, local initiatives are extremely valuable as examples of what can be achieved through an explicitly multicultural policy.

So far this discussion has considered the relevance of multiculturalism as a policy model involving ethnic minority groups and predominantly in Europe. The growing importance of immigration elsewhere in the world raises the possibility of the model being applied in other regions. Certainly in many countries the existence of a strong State may be compatible with the introduction of multiculturalism but the term itself has so far gained little currency outside the industrialised countries. Many states have policies to manage ethnic diversity which resemble the differentialist or, less frequently, the assimilationist model.

The policy situation where doubt does exist concerning the utility of the multiculturalist model is where the ethnic minority group involved is what Kymlicka has termed a 'national minority' that is a previously self-governing, territorially concentrated culture. In contrast to 'ethnic groups' he argues that these national minorities typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct entities.

Ultimately, however, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are limits as to what a multiculturalist model can be expected to achieve. In situations characterised by extended and violent conflict any attempt at reconciliation
will inevitably be problematic. Similarly where there is a long history of inter ethnic hostility and a failure of alternative policy models to result in integration, the task facing a multiculturalist model in seeking to 'turn around' the existing situation is immense. While the absence of an alternative may recommend a multicultural policy, the expectations attached to its adoption should be realistic and acknowledge the difficulty of the task involved and the issues to be worked through. That said, a commitment to diversity carries a powerful positive message to minority groups which can counter their perceived need to argue in terms of broad ambit claims or to retreat into a fundamentalist isolation and resistance to integration.

One of the theoreticians of the concept of a multicultural society, John Rex (1997), posits a neoWeberian paradigm centered on the split between public and private domains. This split is analogous to the distinction made by German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies between Gemeinschaft (primary groups revolving around the family, kinship, ethical relations) and Gesellschaft ( impersonal bureaucratic and judicial processes in cities). Out reservation about this paradigm concerns its occlusion of unequal power/property relations.

Rex believes that the ideal of multiculturalism is consonant with equality of opportunity, a basic democratic principle, when a society is unified in the public domain (law, politics, economics) but at the same time encourages diversity in private or communal matters (domestic life, religion, morality). When, on the other hand, a society is unitary in the public realm and also enforces unity of cultural practices in the private realm, then we have an assimilationist polity.

In our view, Rex's argument hinges on the premise that the public domain defined by the formal equality of individuals (as proclaimed in a republican constitution and Bill of Rights) can coexist with an unconstrained diversity of private/communal groups with their ethnic particularities (morality, religion, kinship network of diasporic cohorts tied to various homelands). But surely European juridical regulations infringe on and delimit certain practices of marital arrangements and codes/mores of sexuality in ethnic communities. Brought to court, and the mass media have condemned the beating of children by immigrant parents with more authoritarian upbringing. Despite such incompatibilities in milieus regulated by the welfare-state, Rex insists that dialogue and tensions in the multicultural society are an integral part of the civic culture. I believe that such dialogue and the ostensible equilibrium of everyday life hides the sharp internal contradictions in the multicultural society in which the public domain
legitimizes the way one group exercises hegemony—in both coercive and consensual senses—over others. In this hegemony, the control of land and labor-power, its production and reproduction, is key.

In a famous exchange of views on multiculturalism, Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas and others rehearsed the pros and cons of the politics of recognition of group identities vis-à-vis the primacy of individual autonomy that informs the "common culture" of most Western nation-states. The editor of this volume of exchanges concluded that in spite of differences, the views all converged on the belief that "some form of constitutional democracy may offer such a politics, based not on class, race, ethnicity, gender, or nationality, but rather on a democratic citizenship of equal liberties, opportunities, and responsibilities for individuals" (Gutmann 1994). What is deeply problematic here, to my mind, is not the polarity of public and private domains posited by Rex mentioned earlier; rather, it is the use of the individual citizen as optic or measure of value, the valorization of the individual detached from the web of social relations that enable any subject to exercise transformative agency. It is here that we should heed this warning concerning the danger of Establishment multiculturalism: "Multiculturalism is based on a construction of community through a celebration and fossilization of differences" (Castles et al 1996). With the intensifying commodification of ethnic particularisms, the multicultural spectacle now operates as the authentic "cultural logic of multinational or global capitalism" (Zizek 1997).

When we talk of the ideal of multiculturalism in enabling social change, the question of leadership, of hegemony as a directive force uniting individuals as groups or collectivities, cannot be shirked, particularly if we assume that civil society in liberal democracies is the site where the power of capital is articulated with conscious effectivity, where cultural action or the production of meanings and affects takes place. In this context, the government or state can act as the organizer of consensus and also serve as the site where ideological struggle transpires. Bourgeois hegemony in civil society (that is, the ideological subordination of the masses to the bourgeoisie instead of simple coercive domination) enables the propertied class to control the state; "it is the cultural ascendancy of the ruling class that essentially ensures the stability of the capitalist order" (Anderson 1976/77, 26). And such cultural/ideological supremacy mediated by various compromises may be deemed equivalent to the consent of the ruled. Only when we factor in this historic process of the struggle for hegemony (and, by extension, for state power) among groups can we really begin a substantive discussion on the cognitive and pedagogical value of multiculturalism for "third world" societies where, in most cases, the
violence of the neocolonial state often supervenes over a polymorphous civil society characterized by ceaseless antagonisms across class, gender, nationality, religion, locality, kinship, and so on. Only then does culture acquire its proper valence and efficacy in the complex plots of historical transformation.

MODES OF INTER-COMMUNAL REGULATION

In most multi-ethnic states, the mode of regulating intercommunal differences and strife varies over time ranging from periods of oppression to moments of accommodation. Cultural pluralism of both ethno-national and minority-migrant types tends to throw up persistent problems in establishing stable inter-sectional coexistence. In contexts of deep divisions with ethno-national characteristics, peaceful accommodative practices appear to be rare events and when they do occur they tend to be of relatively short duration. Generally, from the evidence, it is clear that the most prevalent policies and practices that states apply in coping with ethno-nationalist challenges point to domination and repression. Sometimes drastic measures are employed to destroy "once and for all", deep ethno-cultural divisions through assimilation, genocide, population expulsion or partition. As a general rule, these modes of ethnic conflict management tend to be counter-productive. Multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity persist and rarely can they be entirely erased or suppressed. Instability is a chronic characteristic of culturally plural states so that each adaptation in managing inter-communal relations seems to be situated on shifting sands always under challenge.

The history of most deeply divided multi-ethnic states is a veritable repository of varied experiments and experiences in regulating inter-communal living. The solutions span a repertoire ranging from power-sharing and consociation on the conciliatory side of a continuum to communal oppression and exploitation on the domination side.

It is probably true that the typical polyethnic state has evolved a pattern of inter-sectional coexistence for which it is widely well reputed, constituting what may be called a "national style" such as the Millet system under the Ottoman Empire and the French policy of assimilation. Even so, national styles of interethnic regulation undergo periodic crises and breakdowns. For our purposes, it is important to underscore that in a single case history, various modes of ethnic conflict resolution including a wide range of contradictory and inconsistent modalities on the continuum from left to right can be discovered.
The importance of this point consists of the proposition that very often a multi-ethnic state which searches for a solution to its communal crisis may discover insights from its own experience and history rather than in alien imports. What I am also saying is that in the end whatever policy proposals are recommended to regulate and resolve an inter-ethnic crisis they should not be treated as the transfer of mere technical devices that can be conveniently and neutrally inserted in an ethnic conflict to provide a temporary solution. Whether situated in multiculturalism or territorial decentralization or practically any other mode, ethnic conflict resolution is not only culture specific to a substantial extent but it tends to embody a contest over cultural claims and the distribution of symbolic and material values. This is the fulcrum on which turns issues of equity in claims and counter claims among ethnic communities in conflict. This should point towards a critical process of formulating policy options that are at once cognizant of and sensitive to cultural contexts. Solutions must also be cognizant of and constructed on our understanding of the nature of ethnicity and identity processes derived from available empirical evidence. We turn to this next.

MULTICULTURALISM POLICIES- TWO FACES

Multiculturalism may be analytically conceived as having two variants, one we shall call Type I or the full-fledged form and the other, Type II,(Premdas, 1997) the symbolic form. In turn, these types of multiculturalism tend to be related to three types of societies, namely, homogenous, diversified, and pluralized. The homogenous society is one in which fundamental institutions and values are shared by practically the entire society. The "pluralized state" is one in which separate groups with their own set of essential institutions exist almost autonomously as a subset in the state. They rival the state as entities capable of a sovereign existence. These sub-state units in a pluralized state are ethno-national groupings which may seek self-determination. The "diversified state" as defined here is one where citizens share a common set of integrative institutions and national values but retain collective sub-state cultural practices that do not compromise their loyalty to the unity of the state. The policy of multiculturalism is most frequently practiced in the diversified state under such slogans as "unity in diversity". Multiculturalism in this sense, as John Rex argued, is what the British Home Secretary, in 1968, called "integration" which would involve "not a flattening process of uniformity", but "cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of tolerance". This perspective is frequently referred to as "egalitarian multiculturalism" but in fact fails to address the mechanism by which powersharing, equality, and difference are accommodated.
1. Type I: The powersharing variant

In this category, multiculturalism is more than just concerned with the distribution of recognition in cultural symbols and goes to the more fundamental matter of allocating power, privileges and resources. MC, understood as only cultural concessions for holidays, festivals, and state subsidies granted to ethno-cultural associations, is merely decorative in effect and likely to be counter-productive in the long run instigating anger and alienation from disempowered and minority communities. This aspect of MC be contextualised within a larger scheme of power-sharing. Once so expressed, multicultural expressions assume meaning and not merely mock and parody oppression (Premdas, 1997).

Type I MC is typically found in deeply divided pluralised states with ethno-national groups seeking some sort of territorial autonomy. Type I MC is usually not applied to states which are diversified but integrated. Powersharing in Type I MC may assume many forms but fundamentally it refers to an accepted intersectional arrangement in which leadership, offices, public posts, resources, and space are equitably apportioned. There is no generally accepted a priori fixed formula that specifically describes the details of such a package of accommodation. It needs to be negotiated by the rival communities. In the end, it may be institutionalized in the political and administrative order (Premdas, 1997).

Type I MC tends to fit more appropriately in states which are populated by ethno-national communities with their own self-sufficient institutions called "plural societies"

2. Type II: The cultural variant

MC in this variant is typically located in diversified states with a formal policy of accommodating the claim of a group to maintain at least some of its distinctive cultural practices while simultaneously participating in the values and belief system of the larger national state. Through mass migration, these states had become culturally plural. Often, in this context, the state is dominated by a large cultural core community while the demands for recognition emanates from recent immigrant descended groups. Typically, in these states immigrant minorities seek equality in juridical rights and access to opportunities as they simultaneously participate in the ethos of the national community. To be sure, there is some controversy about this duality in loyalty

In the more common situation however in Type II MC, activism and mobilization by a minority are focused around the quest for policy
concessions for the recognition of the symbols of identity as well as access to economic and political opportunities. In this instance, cultural concessions are a form of collective therapy aimed at celebrating their identity publicly and also serve to salve slights from the dominant group. The political dimension of their demand is often not given special attention or concession compared with their cultural claims. It is frequently assimilated and aggregated in the wider political order and party system. With regard to their economic interests, as in the political sphere, the economic quest for equal access to opportunities often becomes subsumed and submerged in the wider grid of economic claims of the community as a whole.

The dynamics of identity formation shed some interesting light on Type II MC. In a diversified multicultural society, identity construction and preservation does not escape the depiction of rival communities, "the other", in terms of contrasting differences that can be benign but more often than not tend to be provocative and antagonistic. Deconstruction of some of the celebrations of the peripheral minority communities demonstrates that the cultural particularity of a group is often portrayed in a way that evokes negative stereotypes and memories held of rival, especially dominant communities.

In effect, type I MC may potentially keep alight underlying grievances, underscore the condition of ghettoization of peripheralised groups, invoke invidious comparisons, compound them in a new volatile mix, and in the end add fuel to the resentments which divide the society. Type II MC serves to patch up and provide a surrogate myth of the state for sharing a common space as well as recognition and resources. Especially where immigrant groups over several generations are not assimilable as is the case with Blacks many of whom are Caribbean peoples, Type II MC may serve as a trigger that ignites inter-ethnic malaise that may engulf the entire society in communal conflagration.

All of this runs counter to an old underlying theory of Type II MC, namely, the argument that inter-cultural exchanges will evolve into and spill over into the political arena thereby eliminating alienation and unifying the society. This "cultural functionalism" is an assimilationist ideology which glosses over and trivialises the forms of systematic oppression which are meted out to minorities. In a real sense, MC in this context can be conceived as a tool of control aimed at the excluded groups. "Ethno-cultural entrepreneurs" within the discriminated against communities may become witting or unwitting tools in maintaining a system of cultural apartheid which parades as a positive policy of MC.
Clearly, the positive features of cultural diversity and the policy of MC come in a mixed bag with some practices more easily digestible than others. Serious questions arise regarding the cohesion and unity of the state, about its defining and founding principles, about the obligations of guests and hosts, etc. A "soft" form of MC can be conceived as one which permits inoffensive cultural practices to be freely expressed. For many, this provides a wide enough ambit within which to find cultural autonomy and dignity. A "hard" form of MC may barely tolerate public expression of cultural differences requiring that overt cultural symbols be comprehensively stifled thereby guaranteeing a "sanitized" and standardized public arena. In effect, cultural particularity is too often consigned to the private domain.

Both "soft" and "hard" MC have their problems of tolerance. They both point to the underlying contestations even in the cultural arena.

DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS- THE ETHNIC DIMENSION

To statistically test the impact of the ethnic composition of a society on human rights violations, we must specify as many other relevant factors as we can and control for them (statistically) by measuring them and including them in the analysis. With that as background, we turn out attention to our argument.

The argument is similar to the one advanced by Holbrooke, 1999) in a study on refugee flows. Davenport, et al. contend that refugees respond to three major sources of threat in their environment: dissident violence, government coercion, and the violent interaction of dissidents and governments. Davenport et al, 2005, we argue that governments are more likely to engage in repression and violate the physical rights to integrity of the person when they perceive dissident activities as threatening.

Various authors (Tilly, 10994, 1997, Olson, 1993, 1965, Ottawa-Caroters, 2000, Pei-Adesnik, 2000) recognize a link between threat perception and the use of repression. Pion-Berlin (1989) discusses a basic assumption that connects threat perception to repression: regimes practice state terror because they feel threatened. He characterizes threat perception as "an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm - usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind to the state" (Pion-Berlin, 1999,7). The basic premise is that the use or attempted use of coercion shows that a regime anticipates danger, and that the greater the
magnitude of force used by dissidents, the higher the state's perception of threat.

Davenport (2005) also supports the idea that regimes respond to domestic threats with repression. His primary argument is that state repression is not merely a function of a unidimensional conception of domestic threat, where regimes consider only one attribute of political conflict, rather repression is a function of a multidimensional conception of domestic threats, meaning several attributes of political conflict are considered by regimes. Davenport’s multidimensional threat perception theory addresses four aspects of conflict: (1) frequency, (2) the presence of violence, (3) the variety of strategies used by dissidents and (4) deviations from culturally accepted levels of dissent. The results of his pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis support the idea that state repression is multidimensional in character and conditioned by several political-economic characteristics: democracy, economic development, coercive capacity, dependency, and the government's past repressive behavior. His findings indicate that three different aspects of political conflict (conflict frequency, strategic variety, and deviance from cultural norm) are statistically significant in their relationship to repression. Furthermore, he finds that the degree to which the government is democratic significantly changes the relationship patterns between political conflict and repressive behavior. To summarize, we contend that dissident protest activities and violence influence the state’s decision to engage in human rights violations.

The next concept that we anticipate to have an impact on the violation of human rights is international war. The argument is much the same here as it was for civil war: governments have a broad tendency to both restrict freedom and liberty and to expand the executive’s judicial power when mobilizing for war. Supporting our argument, Stohl (1975) and Rasler (1976) reports that in the United States the level of government coercion tended to rise during periods when the US was at war, and Poe and his colleagues (1994, 1999) shows that international wars increase the level of human rights violations throughout the world.

The above concepts are behavioral: they focus on the behavior of one or more groups in society. The main factor we examine in this study is structural: the ethnic composition of society. Yet, it is not the only structural factor that is likely to have an impact. In the next section we discuss democratization as a transition process that may well affect the extent to which a government observes human rights.
Transitions. Nordstrom, 2004, Davenport et al, 2005, Olson, 1993, Gerlach, 1987) Among others, finds that the extent to which a government's institutions are democratic influences the extent to which that government engages in repression or violates human rights. In her study of civil violence, Ellingsen (2000) reported that regime type had a larger effect on violence than did ethnic structure. These findings suggest that the institutional structure of the regime is an important characteristic to consider, so we turn our attention to the arguments one finds in the literature.

The conventional argument about the institutional structure of the regime is that democracies observe rights such as the integrity of the person at higher levels than autocracies. That is, constraints on executive authority and a commitment to judicial due process, which are common characteristics of democratic institutions, serve to limit government's abuse of those rights. We wish to expand this argument. We turn to Eckstein & Gurr (1995) who contend that the coherence of a regime's institutions will affect the behavior of governments. They argue that regimes with a coherent set of democratic or autocratic institutional characteristics will be able to govern effectively, but that regimes which mix some democratic with some autocratic institutional characteristics (i.e., anocracies) will tend to govern ineffectively.

As Arendt (1969) argued, power is negated by the use of violence: a truly powerful government is able to obtain the voluntary compliance of its citizenry. A threat of violence may underpin government authority, but governments that must regularly use (rather than threaten) violence are less powerful (or, to use Eckstein & Gurr's language, effective). Because anocratic regimes will find it more difficult to govern effectively, they will rely more heavily on human rights violations to retain power than will governments with autocratic regime characteristics.

In an established democracy the institutions arbitrate conflicts. With stable institutions in place, everybody knows the rules of the game and that those rules will be enforced. In an autocracy the compliance is caused by the threat of violence. Because the government is not bound by rules as a democracy is, its citizens know that the threat of violence is real. Thus, in both autocracies and democracies the actual use of power becomes unnecessary.

Democratizing countries, on the other hand, are not powerful states. The fact that the previous regime gave in to democratization demands is often viewed as a sign of weakness. According to Dah1(1998, 8) democratization
consists of two processes: liberalization and inclusiveness. Pridham (2000) defines liberalization as a "qualitative change in authoritarian rule, such as when restrictions on individual and group rights are lifted." Inclusiveness, on the other hand is the expansion of the number of people who can participate in the democratic process. As a result, because democratizing regimes are (1) bound by their emerging democratic institutions and (2) in the process of eliminating their repressive institutions, repression is not an appealing tool. Add to this observation that point that citizens who support parties that lose in elections have an incentive to protest and support non-institutional regime change (Przeworski 1991), and recent survey research which suggests that many people are willing to act on that incentive (Anderson & Mendes 2002) and one can see the difficulty that democratizing regimes face. As Dahl claims (1998, 37) "tolerance and mutual security are more likely to develop among a small elite sharing similar perspectives than among a large and heterogeneous collection of leaders representing social strata with widely varying goals, interests, and outlooks." Because it was spread over a long period of time and people were included in the political process gradually, this method produced stable democracies.

The alternative method is going through liberalization and inclusiveness simultaneously. This is the most common path in more recent democratizations. Because these transitions take place in a short period of time, the political system is not well established and groups are uncertain about both their role in the system and their power vis-à-vis other groups.

Looking at recent transitions to democracy, Turan (2002) describes two parallel processes taking place. On the one hand, opposition groups compete with the former regime in forming the new institutional framework of the new system. During this bargaining process the state will face a dilemma: accommodation or repression. With repression the democratization attempt comes to an end and is likely to be followed by violence when ethnic groups refuse to surrender the rights they have already obtained.

Accommodation creates an equally problematic situation. When the first wave of demands is accommodated, a second and more extreme wave is likely to follow. As the second process, Turan (2002) argues that ethnic groups and their leaders compete with each other for better positioning in the new system. With new institutions shaping up, they want to maximize their power or, at the very least, they try not to fall too far behind other groups. This security dilemma is explained by Saideman et al (2002:106) "the ethnic security dilemma starts with the idea that the government of
any state is the greatest potential threat to any group inside its boundaries... Groups may fear that others control the government and may use its resources... against them."

Contrary to these arguments, Cingranelli & Richards (1999), Davenport (1999), Scarritt & McMillan (2000), and Zanger (2001) have found that democratization has a positive impact on governments' human rights behavior. This is likely to be due to the government's limited ability to repress once democratic rules are adopted. Yet, Turan (2002) found that democratizations are followed by increasing levels of protest and rebellion by ethnic groups. Because ethnic violence is a result of the state and the ethnic group responding to each other's actions, these results imply that post-democratization violence is initiated by group policies, in which case a democratizing government's human rights violations are due to a lack of better methods to deal with the crisis. Further, following the combined arguments of Lee (2001), and Turan (2002), this relationship should be stronger in countries with ethnic divisions than in more homogenous countries: governments respond to threats; countries with ethnic divisions are more likely to experience mobilization than those without, and that probability rises with more groups who might mobilize; and democratization processes raise the likelihood that all groups—including ethnic minorities—will engage in protest and rebellion. The arguments raised above suggest that dissident violence, government coercion, the violent interaction of governments and dissidents, international war, regime type, democratization, and the ethnic composition of society will each have an independent impact on, and ethnic composition and democratization will have a joint impact on, the extent to which a government respects the physical integrity rights of its citizens.

The first concept we need to measure is the right to physical integrity of the person. The Political Terror Scale (PTS) project provides a useful indicator and is available for the years 1976-96. The PTS is a standard based measure of the extent to which annual reports produced by Amnesty International and the United States Department of State identify violations of the integrity of the person (i.e., imprisonment without due process, disappearances, beatings, torture, and killings). Coders read the report entry for each country and then assign a value between 1 (for few violations) to 5 (for extensive violations) for a given country and a given year. The PTS has been used extensively to study human rights violations cross-nationally.
Measures of the ethnic composition of society have only recently become widely available. Ellingsen has collected cross-national data on the size of the largest and second largest ethnic groups in society, as well as the number of ethnic groups in society. She collects the data for ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups using three sources: Handbook of Nations, Britannica Book of the Year, and the Demographic Yearbook.

Following Ellingsen (2000), we use her data to measure the ethnic composition of society in three ways. First, the size of the largest group (measured as a percentage of the total population) taps one dimension of ethnic composition. The larger this value, the less likely the government is to be threatened by minorities (holding all other factors constant), and thus we expect it to violate rights at a lower level. Second, the size of the second largest group (i.e., the largest minority, measured as a percentage of the total population) taps a second dimension of ethnic structure. The larger this value, the more likely the state is to be threatened by minorities (holding all other factors constant), and thus we expect it to violate rights at a higher level. Finally, the number of groups in society is used as a third dimension of ethnic composition. The larger this value, the more likely the state is to be threatened by minorities (holding all other factors constant), and thus we expect it to violate rights at a higher level.

To measure dissident violence we adopt four measures used by Davenport (1996) in his study of government repression. His variables record (1) the number of dissident protests and acts of violence in each country in each year; (2) the absence/presence of at least one act of dissident violence in each country in each year; (3) the number of different types of violence protest/violence (across four categories) in each country in each year; and (4) whether the level of dissident protest/violence was greater than 'normal' for each country in each year. As noted above, Davenport found that each of the four variables affected repression, though studies by King (1998) and Lee (2001) found that many, but not all, of the variables had an impact. We used all of the variables in our analysis, but similar to the King and Lee studies, we do not find that all of the variables have an impact on human rights violations.

Recent research makes it possible to blend our ethnic composition of society concept with our civil war concept as he has developed a list of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. The former are civil wars in societies that have an ethnically divided population and the latter are civil wars in relatively ethnically homogenous societies. We show again in this study,
civil wars increase the violation of integrity of the person rights. But, following Sambanis, one might argue that governments in ethnically divided countries that are fighting civil wars will violate human rights at a higher rate than governments in relatively ethnically homogenous countries that are fighting civil wars (holding all other factors constant). In other words, Sambanis' work implies that governments fighting ethnic civil wars will violate human rights at higher levels than governments fighting non-ethnic civil wars. Because we suspect the coherence of government institutions-in addition to the extent to which they are democratic-will affect the extent of human rights violations, we eschew the most widely used Polity measure which is a scale running from the most autocratic form of government to the most democratic form of government. Instead we develop a three point scale where democracies are assigned a value of 1, autocracies are assigned a value of 2, and anocracies are assigned a value of 3. The Polity data are available from 1800-2000.

Our measure of democratization is also based on the Polity data. In order to capture the full effect of a democratization process we use three different variables. The first is a dummy variable coded one when a country's democratization score improves four points or more, on the Polity scale, over the course of a year and stays one until the democracy score decreases. The four-point mark is chosen because it represents a significant change in the country's regime. Any smaller threshold would likely capture minor regime adjustments in a given country. A second variable measures the change in democracy score during the lant democratization. We use it to distinguish the intensity level of the transition the country most recently went through. Finally, a counter variable is used to measure the maturity of institutions. It turns one when democratization takes place and counts until an "autocratization" or the next democratization.

We argue above that democratization is likely to have a different impact on ethnically heterogeneous societies than homogeneous ones. To capture that relationship, we multiply two variables to create a set of interaction terms that measure the intensity of change in democracy score and the number of ethnic/religious/linguistic groups in a country.

One final argument is important. Gurr (1988) argued that governments establish standard operating procedures for resolving violent challenges to their authority. More specifically, governments that successfully employ violence to defeat an insurgency (or a foreign country) create bureaucracies that specialize in violence (and investigation).
Once the threat has been eliminated, the bureaucracies usually demobilize to some extent, but they are rarely dismantled. As such, both the memory of using violence and the means to deploy it are available to future governments. This implies that governments will tend to do what they have done in the past.

EARLY WARNING

Before proceeding to the scenarios, it will be useful to situate the approach vis-à-vis other forms of conflict analysis. Much conflict analysis is undertaken for the purpose of developing early warning mechanisms. Several organizations have developed methodologies for evaluating what countries are most at risk for conflict in the near future. Examples include:

Swisspeace: The FAST program monitors every country in the world with the goal of, “early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action and prevention of violent conflict.”

International Crisis Group: ICG, though its CrisisWatch program is currently monitoring roughly 70 current or potential conflict situations.

CIDCM: Peace and Conflict, a biannual report, assesses the ability of 158 countries worldwide to, “build peace and avoid destabilizing conflict.”

There are other early warning systems as well, but almost by definition, all of these systems are based on a binary distinction, conflict/no-conflict. As a result, they provide little guidance for the analyst in regard to how to respond to a situation the data has identified as high-risk. Nor should it, as this is not the role of early warning risk assessments.

A New approach (BLENSI, 1998) provides a method of moving beyond risk assessment. Although the approach is rooted in the same (or similar) data as that used for early warning, the method allows the analyst to devise peacebuilding strategies by evaluating the various trajectories that a conflict in a high-risk country may follow.

A second set of conflict analysis strategies has been developed by international development organizations. In the past five to ten years, the international development community has become more aware of the
importance of understanding what effect development programming has on conflict. Early efforts focused on ensuring that development programming did not exacerbate conflict. In recent years, this “Do No Harm” approach has given way to the goal of “conflict-sensitive development” (CSD). In brief, CSD refers to the idea that in conflict-affected societies development programs in all sectors should also be conflict management programs to the extent this is feasible. This idea has led to the development of several conflict analysis frameworks. (The most prominent are those of The World Bank, USAID, The Department for International Development-UK (DfID) and the consortium of the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response(FEWER), Saferworld, and International Alert.)

The debate regarding these models usually centers on the pros and cons of creating a generalized framework versus conducting context-specific analysis. The World Bank, for instance, has developed a set of indicators designed to be used for every country in which an analysis is to be done. (BLENISI, 1998, Matrix 1,2,3)

Clearly, there are pros and cons to each approach depending on the purposes of the analysis. However, there is an often-unrecognized problem with both approaches. While clearly the design of the conflict analysis frameworks are informed by the study of other cases, none of these mentioned above has a mechanism for identifying similar conflicts in other parts of the world and then understanding what lessons those cases could impart as part of the analysis process itself.

Nor is systematic comparison with other similar cases a part of traditional interactive conflict resolution (ICR) or problem-solving workshops. While the lessons learned from other cases are often brought into the dialogue process as the result of the facilitator’s interventions, only cases with which the facilitators are familiar can be used in this way. Even with the most experienced facilitation team, this is a limited number of cases.

This desire for information about other conflicts should not be surprising. Conflict creates vicious circles that at times make resolution seem impossible. The classic example is: “no peace without development, no development without peace.” Conflict managers often feel hemmed in by these vicious circles to the point where it becomes difficult to develop peacebuilding strategies. In these situations, it is natural to want to know how others have dealt with similar dilemmas.

The demonstrated approach is inspired by strategic planning approach known in the business world as scenario planning. Scenario planning is a
discipline for rediscovering the original entrepreneurial power of creative foresight in contexts of accelerated change, greater complexity, and genuine uncertainty.

In a scenario planning exercise, senior managers of a corporation are asked to develop 3-5 scenarios, each of which represents a possible future. The scenarios are designed to provide a learning environment in which managers can explore these forces, better understand the dynamics shaping the future and thus, assess strategic options and prepare to take strategic decisions.

Although this approach has been used primarily in the business world and to a lesser extent as a tool for municipal planners, scenario planning has also been used as a peacebuilding tool (most prominently in South Africa).

In this from 1991-1992, the Global Business Network facilitated a scenario planning exercise in South Africa. The Mont Fleur Project, as it came to be known tried to develop and disseminate a set of stories about what might happen in South Africa 1992-2002. In total four stories, or scenarios, were developed:

Ostrich: no settlement to the crisis. The government continues to be non-representative.

Lame duck: settlement is achieved, but implementation is slow and indecisive.

Icarus: settlement is achieved, but government’s pursues unsustainable, populist policies.

Flight of the Flamingoes: settlement is achieved and the government adopts sustainable policies, thereby moving the country toward inclusive growth and democracy.

These four scenarios were turned into brief narratives and distributed throughout South Africa, both by way of the mass media and through presentations with over fifty organizations in the public and private sectors.

As should be clear, the overviewed approach is quite similar to the scenario planning approach used in South Africa. The key difference is that the presented approach uses scenarios based on other similar cases of conflict. Why this different strategy? First, as people in a society experiencing violent conflict become focused on the day-to-day survival of
themselves and their families, their horizons narrow. Moreover, the self-perpetuating nature of violence, and the vicious circles it creates, often makes it difficult for people to simply create alternative visions of society. It is partly for this reason that local conflict managers are so eager for information about other conflicts. They understand the insularity that violent conflict creates.

Second, conflict-affected societies are almost by definition highly-polarized. This means that there is little room for neutrality or objectivity. In many interactions, the messenger becomes more important than the message. The use of narratives based on actual cases helps refocus the discussion on the content of the narratives as opposed to the speaker, primarily because the scenario is not created entirely by the speaker. Of course, case-based scenarios remain open to interpretation; they do not completely solve this problem. Nonetheless, we would argue that real cases of conflict provide a more compelling vision of the future, either a desired future or a future to be avoided, then scenarios developed entirely by the workshop participants.

A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT-REGULATING PRACTICES [Sisk,1996]

The consociational and integrative approaches can be fruitfully viewed as conceptual poles in a spectrum of specific conflict-regulating institutions and practices that promote power sharing. Which approach and which practices are best is highly contingent upon the patterns and dynamics of a particular conflict. Indeed, a given political system may fruitfully incorporate aspects of both approaches simultaneously. It is useful to consider the practices in terms of three sets of variables that apply to both approaches: territorial division of power, decision rules, and public policies (for example, on language, education, and resource distribution) that define relations between the state and ethnic groups.

Five consociational conflict-regulating practices are

- Granting territorial autonomy and creating confederal arrangements
- Creating a polycommunal, or ethnic, federation
- Adopting group proportional representation in administration appointments, including consensus decision rules in the executive
Adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary framework

Acknowledging group rights or corporate (nonterritorial) federalism

Five integrative conflict-regulating practices are

- Creating a mixed, or nonethnic, federal structure
- Establishing an inclusive, centralized unitary state
- Adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral, or nonethnic, executive, legislative, and administrative decision-making bodies
- Adopting a semimajoritarian or semiproportional electoral system that encourages the formation of preelection coalitions (vote pooling) across ethnic divides
- Devising ethnicity-blind public policies

INTERVENTION, THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPATION

Mediation may be the most common form of third-party intervention, but it is in theory and practice usually augmented by a number of other methods. Some of these roles involve interveners in their official capacity, while others are performed in a more informal manner. Some interventions operate at the highest levels of decision-making (macro), while others depend on influence given at the middle (meso) ranges of society, while yet others typically work at the community or grassroots (micro) level.

In the global domain, third-party activities can be included in a wider conception of multi-track diplomacy. This work builds on Joseph Montville’s original distinction between Track I and Track II diplomacy, with the former defined as traditional diplomatic activities and the latter described as unofficial, unstructured interactions between adversarial groups or nations directed toward conflict resolution. Diamond and McDonald (1996) propose nine tracks of peacemaking and peacebuilding, starting with Tracks I and II as proposed by Montville. To these they add several further tracks that work within various sectors of global society to promote peace. Track IV, for example, describes the efforts of private
citizens in unofficial capacities as they engage in mediation activities such as informal mediation, exchange programs, and work for non-governmental organizations. Track VII outlines the role of religion in peacemaking on the part of religious communities and movements such as pacifism and non-violence. Most of these broad tracks will involve a variety of unofficial actors as they engage in intermediary activities of various kinds.

Fisher and Keashly’s [1991] goal was to bring some clarity to the confused state in which the same term had been used to mean very different things, while at the same time different terms were employed to describe what was basically the same activity. They also sought to react to the blurring of the lines in the literature between traditional mediation and the newer forms of third-party intervention, which focused more on the subjective elements of conflict (misperceptions, basic needs) and on the quality of the relationship between the antagonists. This work produced a six-fold typology of pacific interventions, geared mainly to the international level, but appropriate at other levels as well:

1. **Conciliation**, in which a trusted third-party provides an informal communicative link between the antagonists for the purposes of identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually in the form of negotiation.

2. **Consultation**, in which the third-party works to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis, making use of human relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.

3. **Pure Mediation**, in which the third-party works to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information, and the suggestion of alternatives.

4. **Power Mediation**, which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments, and may also involve the third-party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement.

5. **Arbitration**, wherein the third-party renders a binding judgment arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing
positions and then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just.

6. Peacekeeping, in which the third-party provides military personnel in order to monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between antagonists, and may also engage in humanitarian activities designed to restore normalcy in concert with civilian personnel, who may also assist in the management of political decision making processes such as elections.

In this taxonomy, consultation is roughly equivalent to Track II in Diamond and McDonald’s model, wherein a skilled professional operates in an unofficial capacity to analyze, prevent, and resolve conflicts.

At the domestic level, some forms of relationship-orientated mediation provide for this type of focus and interaction, especially as compared to a settlement-oriented approach. At the international level, as well as in some inter-group work, such as in the labour-management arena, mediation has all too often been characterized by a general neglect of emotional and attitudinal factors, viewing these only as difficulties to be worked around. It seems clear, then, that some combination of consultation and mediation may be the most effective way of implementing a more comprehensive process of conflict resolution.

Conflict rarely involves only two sides. Often, conflicting parties receive direct or indirect support from third parties, which, in turn, have their direct or indirect interest in the conflict. Moreover, the majority, if not all conflicts, is settled or can be settled only through the involvement of third parties. This is particularly true in case of interstate conflicts but can be useful in the case of civil ones. Therefore, the study of the third-party involvement in the conflict management is both of theoretical and practical importance.

It should be noted in the very beginning that the literature on the third-party mediation is still scarce. Many scholars of conflict studies agree that there is no single and unified theory of third-party mediation. Therefore, this part draws on only some works on this field, especially those, which concentrate on the issues central to this research, i.e. identity and power
of third-party mediators, the presence of power and bias, and their effectiveness.

Third-party involvement in the conflict management has a long history. It also has different forms, dimensions and purposes. Probably, the main necessity in third party mediation is connected with the low level of trust between conflicting parties as well as the positions and strategies they chose and which have already brought to the state of conflict. Scholars, advocating the necessity of third-party mediation often point out the power-balancing role of third parties, which should facilitate the negotiation process. Conflicting attitudes, distrust, and power imbalance make the third-party involvement relevant and necessary.

There are a number of definitions of mediation process. However, they may be integrated if the similarity of some of their common assumptions is considered. Mediation is a process of intervention by a third party or intermediary to facilitate or enforce a mutually acceptable settlement between the two conflicting parties. It is assumed that third-party involvement or intervention is a form of conflict management with the purpose of finding, proposing, negotiating or enforcing a settlement to a conflict. Mediation, thus, is regarded as a strategy to facilitate or impose a settlement even when the parties to a conflict are unable to do so on their own. However, the second strategy attracts a lot of criticism as any third-party mediation without the willingness of conflicting parties is doomed to failure or may cause prolongation of the conflict.

Every conflict is inherently different, arises in a specific setting and in a particular time, and becomes a particular mixture of objective and subjective elements. Shortly put, every conflict has more unique elements than general ones. Therefore, the application of a certain method of intervention should depend on many factors, and first of all, the context and the stage of conflict. In his influential work Zartman [1996] develops the concept of a 'ripe moment' which implies that third parties can intervene only at a certain point of the conflict. This point, Zartman argues, usually occurs when there is a "mutually hurting stalemate", i.e. when parties to a conflict realise that there are no resources left to continue the military actions and to win, when continuing violence will bring more damage to all sides, and first of all, to themselves. This is the
very moment when the third-party mediators should come into play and employ their strategies to bring the conflicting parties to negotiation table and to reach or to enforce an acceptable settlement.

What is not less important in Zartman’s concept of the "hurting stalemate" is the notion that third-party mediators can also induce the "ripe moment" or create it. They can imply a variety of strategies to achieve this in order to reduce the likelihood of intransigence by a conflicting party or even prevent a stronger party from imposing its unilateral solution. The most important point is that any attempt of mediation before this objective or constructed 'ripe moment' is not likely to bring to satisfactory results.

Holding the same logic, Dixon and others employ phase-based approaches to show that the effectiveness of third party mediation may vary at different stages of conflict. In other word, any intervention by third-party mediators should be measured and matched to the particular stage of the conflict. Using Zartman's concepts of "ripeness" and "hurting stalemate," they make obvious that interventions are likely to take place when conflicting parties have already experienced violence, often in large scale. It also becomes evident that it is useless to wait that a single strategy may have the same effect or may bring to the same results if applied during different stages of the conflict or if is the only strategy used during the whole process of the conflict.

The position of a third-party mediator vis-á-vis the conflicting parties is also of crucial importance. More and more the third-party mediators act as if pursuing some interests in the conflict or in its outcome. Zartman argues that the interests and motives of mediators can be described in the context of power politics: mediators are rarely "truly indifferent to the issues and terms being negotiated." Mediators may choose a certain strategy, depending on the degree of influence they enjoy over conflicting parties or one of them: if their influence is low they usually opt for consultation and pure mediation, whereas they tend to choose the power mediation if their influence is high.

Although third-party mediation is applied in the majority of conflicts, the degree of their success varies tremendously. Fisher offers a number of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of third-party mediation. These indicators are, *inter alia*, the rate of settlement (peace or no peace), satisfaction of parties, change in relationship between the conflicting parties, and, compliance with agreement. The degree of success is
correlated with the form of third-party mediation and strategies that mediators use. Consultation, one of the three forms of third-party mediation mentioned above, is not expected to produce any agreement.

The other element critical to persuasion is the perception of a way out, a realization -necessarily bilateral -- that the other party is willing to join in the search for a negotiated solution and that such a solution does exist in principle. The perception of a way out need not identify a specific agreement, but rather merely the belief that an agreement can be found. It is as much a perception of the other party's willingness to bargain as it is of a bargaining range. In its absence, a third party or internal faction is needed to encourage that perception, but also to encourage thinking about possible solutions. Third parties may also need to be involved much more directly, serving as a go-between to carry each party's perception of a possible agreement to the other.

RECONCILIATION

In the not too distant past, reconciliation was something that mostly occupied the minds of theologians, political philosophers and trauma counsellors. However, in the 1990s, reconciliation increasingly attracted interest also from a more political viewpoint. The challenges confronted were how to transform a society 'from a war economy, war polity, and war society to institutions, a society and an economy based upon and furthering the premises of peace' (Doyle, 2001). Interest in reconciliation also followed from attention increasingly being directed at the root causes of conflict, and the perceived need in the aftermath of violent ethnic conflicts and collapse of authoritarian regimes. Along with democratisation, reconciliation came to be seen as a key element of the postconflict reconstruction process, part of a wider process of social and political change aiming at the transformation of conflictual social relationships ('social reconstruction') and the promotion of a 'culture of peace and non-violence' and development of institutions and norms for the mutually regulation of conflict.

Existing reconciliation theories, however, were only partly able to meet the new demands.

Also scholars who turned to the topic found that the foundation on which to build a solid body of knowledge was rather weak. The relevance of theological and philosophical treaties on the concept of reconciliation itself; theories on prejudice reduction in inter-group relations; and the
experiences gained from research into individual's psycho-social recovery
after experiences of loss and trauma that dominated existing discourses,
were not immediately useful for social scientists and policymakers
interested in reconciliation as a policy objective applicable to situations of
violent intra-state conflicts.

Also social science approaches to reconciliation have in general emerged
from research focusing on settings with little resemblance to today's war-
torn or post-conflict societies. For example, most of what social psychology
has to offer on the topic of reconciliation and inter-group relations have
emerged from purely experimental studies. The lack of empirical research
in 'real life settings' is particularly problematic. As a result, questions such
as how conflictual or damaged relationships can be 'improved' or healed,
and a reconciliation process set in motion - or to put it simply, what works,
when and how? - or even what reconciliation means, still find only vague
and frequently conflicting answers in existing literatures. Actually, recent
developments have spurred a renewed academic interest in reconciliation
research. New themes, emanating from peacebuilding experiences of the
1990s, have entered the social science reconciliation research agenda.

The state-of-the-art in reconciliation research is reflected in the eclectic
approach of the theoretical framework outlined below. The purpose here, it
should be remembered, is not to engage in theory building per se. In the
absence of an elaborate theory, the examination proceeds on the basis of
theoretical framework that integrates proposed elements of reconciliation,
and related mechanisms, of diverse theoretical origin.

Before that, however, 'the problem' that reconciliation is intended to
address, needs to be identified and further specified. This is the purpose of
the next section which locates the focus of our interest to dimensions of
post-conflict inter-group relations.

In general, contemporary conflicts occur between groups who live in close
proximity of each other. The degree to which the structure of pre-conflict
inter-group relations were characterised by integration (or separation)
varies, however. Some groups may have co-existed peacefully as more or
less self contained communities. Others may have enjoyed a close
relationship with group boundaries playing only a negligible social role.
Inter-group relations prior to the conflict may also have differed in relation to the degree of equality/inequality that characterised the relationship. The 'quality' of relationship prior to violent conflict needs to be considered also in the post-conflict reconciliation process (but is too often overlooked in the reconciliation literature). The pre-conflict structure of inter-group relations influences considerations as to what a reconciliation process should aim at in order to reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict: notably whether it should seek to restore pre-conflict relations or instead seek to put them on a different footing (and reduce potentially conflictual asymmetry, for example). It also influences the boundaries of what reconciliation realistically can seek to achieve: communities who kept themselves to themselves prior to the conflict can hardly be expected to embrace the idea of closer relations with out-groups after a conflict, at least not in the short run.

Although reconciliation frequently is associated with the post-conflict restoration of relationships ruptured by violence - implicating a return to preconflict conditions - this conceptualisation may only be appropriate in cases where close ties existed between the parties prior to the conflict. The concept of re-conciliation, which through its prefix includes a reference to the past, may be a less appropriate term in circumstances where there hardly existed a relationship prior to the conflict. Moreover, to strive for a 'return' to pre-conflict relations in the name of reconciliation in situations where pre-conflict relationships were conflictual and characterised by asymmetry - manifested, for example, in discrimination, exploitation, exclusion or the dominance of one community over the other - will most likely to prove counterproductive. Rather in these situations reconciliation efforts, if they are to promote the prevention of future conflict, need to address the challenge of transforming inter-group relationship so as to make them inherently less conflictual. The objective of post-conflict reconciliation efforts is thus partially contingent on the characteristics of pre-conflict relationships. A more important consideration than intimacy, and associated idealised notion of pre-conflict inter-group relations, however, is the extent to which the structure in which of inter-group relations are embedded enables the peaceful regulation of conflict (as opposed not only to conflict regulation through destructive means but also to the suppression of conflict). To develop this ability, it is proposed here, is a sine qua non for reconciliation.

The psychological effects are of course particularly serious for persons who themselves have suffered violent attacks. Survivors may be left with an enduring fear of their trauma re-occurring: a fear which undermines the possibility of developing renewed trust and inhibits any (re)integration or
even association with 'them'. Intergenerational transmission of trauma and grievances may entrap inter-group relations in 'vicious cycles' of violence and revenge (Montville, 1993). Protracted inter-group conflicts may also lock the parties into a relation of negative interdependence such that assertion of each group's identity is seen to require the negation of the other group's identity (Kelman, 1987). In Cyprus, for example, Greek Cypriots in the past justified aspirations for the island's unification with Greece with references to the 'fact' that the Turkish Cypriots on the island were in reality Greeks, who in the past had been 'Islamicized'. Turkish Cypriots, for their part, used blood sample studies to 'prove' that Greek Cypriots were not Greeks at all, as they themselves believed, but in reality of Anatolian descent - and hence 'Turks'. Once these delusions were shed, and the 'other' had been made to realise that they were not a distinct people, the conflict would hence cease to exist.

Violence leaves a legacy of polarisation: social relations across group boundaries are loosened or severed: in interpersonal relations; in organizational affiliation, and in the diverging of opinions, beliefs, and ways of thinking (Oberschall, 2001). The weakening of social bonds and bond networks not only reinforces group boundaries but removes inhibitions that serve to prevent or limit destructive behaviour in competition or conflict (Scheff, 1994).

In general, the severing of social relations and increased social distancing are accompanied by a process towards physical separation of the communities, resulting in (reinforced) territorial segregation which further reduce opportunities for inter-group contact. Segregation may be the aggregate effect of numerous decisions taken over a period of time by individuals seeking to distance themselves from the perceived threat coming from 'the other side'. It may also be a result of collective displacement resulting from turf wars between combatants or deliberate attempts at 'ethnic cleansing'. Whatever the reasons, efforts to counter the effects of violence by swiftly seeking to reintegrate communities after the formal ending of the conflict are likely to meet with resistance both from returnees themselves (who may fear for their safety) and from those who expelled them or have taken their place (who may themselves also be refugees). However unpalatable the option of alternative courses may seem (frequently phrased in terms of 'rewarding ethnic cleansing') reconciliation efforts that proceeds on notions of 'doing away with the past' or on idealised visions of the future may not survive the confrontation with the present and may even themselves spark renewed conflict. To consider the compatibility of what seems a rational course of action for the individual,
the aggregate effects of such multiple individual decisions, and collective visions for the future is only one of the challenges for reconciliation.

Finally, violent conflict is also associated with human rights violations, either committed by the state (and its security forces) or by 'irregulars' (non-state armed groupings) and in this respect the relationship between justice and reconciliation, and the potential conflicts that exist between policies prioritising the one over the other, have also been highlighted.

The impact on inter-group relations and the social fabric of society of these effects of violence thus have a lasting effect on inter-group relations. It is thus by partly confronting the effects of the legacy of violence on inter-group relations, it is proposed here, that reconciliation can be conceived of as a mechanism for conflict prevention.

Dimensions of reconciliation. The previous section linked reconciliation to the 'quality' of inter-group relations and identified a reconciliation process as a strategy for overcoming the destructive effects of violent conflict on these relations so as to prevent a relapse in the future. Now overall, the reconciliation literature tends to focus on what can be called the subjective elements of the conflict situation.

To Kriesberg (1998) reconciliation refers both to a quality inherent in a relationship - 'a relatively amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in the relationship involving one-sided or mutual infliction of extreme injury' (p. 184) - and to a process - 'the process of developing a mutually conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups' (ibid). Elsewhere, he associates reconciliation with accommodative ways where members of adversary entities 'have somehow become able to put aside feelings of hate, fear and loathing, to discard views of the other as dangerous and subhuman, and to abandon the desire for revenge and retribution' (Kriesberg, 1998, p. 184).

Lerche and Jeong (2002) propose that the main focus of reconciliation is 'to create new perceptions and explore new shared experiences, thereby changing key relationship dynamics in the conflict system' (p. 103). Lerche (2000) adds a consideration for the past, emphasising the need to assist 'antagonists to put their pasts acts of violence and estrangement behind them' (p.61).

Fisher's (1994) definition reflects a more far-reaching change. To him 'reconciliation involves re-establishing harmony and cooperation between
antagonists who have inflicted harm in either a one-sided or reciprocal manner' (p.47). Lederach (1997) focuses attention on the dynamics of relationship in what he calls the conflict system: the goal of reconciliation is to enable the creation of new perceptions on inter-group relations.

More or less implicit in the different understandings of reconciliation outlined above, is an assumption pertaining to the nature of conflict as an interactive process and the assumption that key to addressing the problem of violent conflict behaviour is to change perceptions, attitudes and emotions. To many reconciliation theorists, relationship building is thus an important (perhaps even the most important) element of reconciliation.

In order to better understand the diverse meanings attributed to reconciliation it is helpful to distinguish between some dimensions. One such dimension relates to time. Reconciliation, it is sometimes proposed, is (also) about reconciling oneself to a particular point in time - one's relationship not to 'the enemy' but to the past itself - and the events that then took place. Here reconciliation carries the connotation of 'acceptance', or perhaps 'resignation'. Hayner (1999) even suggests that reconciliation can be 'measured' by the answer to three basic questions that all relate to the past (and the extent to which the conflictual past continues to cast its shadow over the present): How is the past dealt with in the public sphere? Are relationships between former opponents based on the present or the past?

Is there one version of the past or many? An answer to the question when a reconciliation process should concern itself with the past can be deduced: it should do so when (and perhaps only when) the conflicted past remains a major reference point in the future: and when (former) conflicting groupings continue to define their relationship in terms of the past.

Reconciliation, the authors of a reconciliation handbook propose, concerns both the past and the future: it has both a backward-looking and a forward looking dimension (Bloomfield, Barnes et al., 2003). Looking into the past, it is suggested, is important 'because it creates objective opportunities for people to see the past in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility' (p. 21). Reconciliation may thus require the building of a bridge between the past and the future. Colson (2000) proposes that it is at this 'critical juncture' that reconciliation is located: the junction between the ending of a war and the establishment of peace. At the same time, reconciliation is often expected to enable the severing of the link between the past and future: to put an end to the 'vicious cycles' mentioned above, and thus prevent re-occurrence of violence.
Time is also a dimension of the reconciliation process itself, implied, for example, in Kriesberg's (1998) distinction between co-existence, peaceful co-existence and reconciliation. All three refer to aspects of a relationship between antagonistic (or formerly antagonistic) persons or groups. As one moves from one to other however, there is a gradual improvement of the relationship. Coexistence refers to relationships 'in which none of the parties is trying to destroy the other'. 'Peaceful coexistence' conveys a 'sense of mutual acceptance and equality' while 'reconciliation' - meaning 'a relatively amicable relationship' - takes the relationship one step further. Together the three concepts suggest a sequential reconciliation model: beginning with the minimal but far from trivial objective of removing the threat of violence from intergroup relations and progressing towards association and (re-)engagement.

Weiner (1998) likewise makes a case for co-existence - 'a situation of minimalist coexistence, where antagonists 'simply' allow others...to live' - as a prudent first step to reconciliation. '[Aiming high and failing' he cautions, 'can (and frequently does) lead to disenchantment, discouragement, cynicism, and helplessness, which can the contribute to the re-escalation of conflict'.

Starting from the sobering premise that reconciliation will take generations, Lederach (1997) has proposed a sequential, multi-phase framework for 'designing' a reconciliation process.

Another dimension that merits consideration are the different social levels at which reconciliation can occur. Until recently, reconciliation theory has primarily focused on reconciliation within and between individuals, sometimes (but not necessarily) with consideration also for its effects on inter-group relations. Kelman (1978; 1987; 1999), for example argues that there are psychological prerequisites for reconciliation ('mutual acceptance' and 'tolerance'). Reconciliation in the context of protracted inter-group conflicts accordingly requires intra-psychic changes, he argues, notably the development on both sides of a larger, transcendent identity.

To Montville (1993) reconciliation is foremost about effecting personal (psychological) healing in victims. A healing process, Montville contends, can only come about as a sequence of three steps: acknowledgement; contrition and forgiveness. Acknowledgement and contrition by the perpetrator assure the victim that the past will not repeat itself. They prepare the ground for the final psychological step: the victim's voluntary forgiveness for past injuries. Montville's emphasis on acknowledgement is disputed by Welch (1993). Acknowledgement requires an action by the
perpetrator, and may therefore reinforce victimization, he argues. He distinguishes between healing of the harmed individual and healing of the relationship between victim and perpetrator. While the latter requires reciprocity, the former does not. Willems also draws attention to the need to address the effects on harm-doing on the perpetrator. A 'successful apology' (that is, one that leads to forgiveness), Scheff (1994) proposes, repairs the breach in the social bond between the injured and the injurer by allowing both parties 'to acknowledge and discharge the shame evoked by the injury'.

Research into the many truth (and reconciliation) commissions that were established in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly in Latin America has brought attention to the issue of such transfer effects - that is, how or if, reconciliation if effected at the interpersonal level (between victim and perpetrator) can be transferred to the societal or national level. The result is inconclusive: 'it is precisely in trying to apply what may be therapeutically effective at the interpersonal level to the collective level that reconciliation often seems to lose clarity and become more ambiguous as an approach to peacebuilding' Avruch and Vejarano (2002) conclude their review of the literature.

Yet, what is required psychologically for an individual to recover from trauma and be reconciled with the past (or with the perpetrator) need bear no resemblance to what might be required for a society to do so: 'the problems of war-torn societies cannot be reduced to the conflict interface between "victims and perpetrators"' (Lerche, 2000, p. 71). As one move from the interpersonal to inter-group or societal level, efforts to heal relationship has an inevitable political dimension that is absent, from much of the reconciliation literature. Also the most challenging relationship to reconcile, that between victims and perpetrators, has both a psychosocial / interpersonal and a political / societal dimension.

Lerche and Jeong (2002) are clear about their priorities: 'Reconciliation should foremost accommodate the need of the victimised communities to reaffirm their sense of identity which has been threatened and denied. Such people can, and perhaps should, be encouraged to forgive; but they must also feel free to express their sorrow, anger and resentment in other ways meaningful to them. Above all, reconciliation cannot, in the name of 'national unity' impose closure on those not ready to forgive' (p. 109. emphasis added).

It is important to remember that reconciliation at the national or societal level may have other goals besides improved inter-group relations.
National reconciliation in post-conflict societies, Lerche and Jeong (2002) suggests, is 'part of a broader agenda of political change intended to promote good governance...and enhance thereby the new regimes' internal and external credibility' (p. 67). The absence of a reconciliation process establishing at least a minimal consensus as to the composition of the demos and of the boundaries of a political community are likely to hamper democratisation efforts.

In a similar conclusion reached by Skaar (1999) the political forces taken into consideration are demands from the public for disclosure and prosecution on the one hand, and demands for the outgoing regime (for impunity in a transitional context, on the other.

Reconciliation strategies. Building on the different proposals for mechanisms conducive to reconciliation outlined above, a number of reconciliation strategies can be identified. However, as stated earlier, there is very little that can be said with any certainty as to 'what works, when and how'. This state-of-the-art is reflected in the (critical) discussion of the different approaches below. The approaches should be considered as tentative proposals advanced in the reconciliation literature for what may work. Few of the proposals have as of yet been subjected to systematic empirical examination, and the evidence for those who have rarely relied on research in 'real life settings'.

In situations of violent, the general tendency to avoid contacts with an outgroup (Smock, 1998), is compounded by the effects of conflict: social distancing, interethnic segregation, etc. Unless deliberate efforts are made to create opportunities for contact, the likelihood is that it will be avoided altogether. The absence of contact, in turn, is likely to maintain or reinforce group boundaries; negative attitudes and stereotypes, and reduce the likelihood of future contact (Hewstone and Cairns, 2001). Conflict groupings in the meantime remain locked into a relation of negative interdependence, with polarised images of each other. Territorial separation further reinforces group boundaries. The absence of contact may thus contribute to the 'freezing' of conflictual inter-group relationships.

Whether contact and interaction between members of conflicting groupings may help 'de-frost' or even improve relationship - the so-called contact hypothesis - has been focus of much research in social psychology. At its most basic, the contact hypothesis proposes that more contact between individuals belonging to antagonistic social groups tends to
undermine negative stereotypes and thus to reduce prejudice and improve inter-group relations.

The evidence in support of the hypothesis that contact under appropriate conditions can indeed improve inter-group relations is rather extensive (Cook, 1978; Pettigrew, 1998) although far from conclusive (Forbes, 1997). The appropriate conditions include cooperative contact between equal-status members of the two groups, in a situation that allows individuals to get to know each other on more than a superficial bases, and - importantly - with the (normative) support of relevant social groups and authorities. It is important to note that the contact hypothesis is thus not an unqualified prescription for more contact: rather it suggests that contact should be encouraged when it can be expected to have 'good' effects but minimized where it is likely to have 'bad' effects; or alternatively that situations of contact to the extent possible should be changed into situations in which contact is assumed to have good effects.

There are also practical limitations in bringing about optimal contact on a large scale, particularly so in conflicted or postconflict societies. Overcoming resistance and opposition to contacts across conflict divides and enlisting the institutional support, which is key for the contact to have the intended positive effect, is particularly challenging. As Forbes (1997) observes, 'friendship with outsiders will generally mean defection from the beliefs and practices of the in-group - or at least a more sceptical conformity with the demands of the group' (p. 167). This is likely to provoke negative reactions or sanctions against transgressors ('traitors') in an attempt to discourage further contact with out-group members.

In research on the contact, inter-group cooperation in pursuit of superordinate goals - also with functionally distinct roles - was identified as important for effecting the intended attitudinal change (Irwin, 2002). In a series of experiments, Sherif (1966) found that repeated inter-group cooperation in pursuit superordinate goals - that is, goals that have 'a compelling appeal for members of each group, but that neither group can achieve without participation of the other' - did have a significant influence on inter-group attitudes. Sherif's results have since been supported by others which has lead to suggestions that the contact hypothesis be renamed the cooperation hypothesis (van Oudenhoven, 1989).

'Cooperation theory' thus suggests that inter-group behaviour is not mainly determined by those social psychological elements of inter-group relations (attitudes, stereotypes, etc.) as emphasised by contact theory. A reverse relationship is assumed: namely that hostility and negative attitudes etc. do
not condition but results from the existence of 'real' (objective) conflict of interest (it is therefore called realistic conflict theory) (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Intergroup behaviour, as Sherif set out to demonstrate, is mainly determined by the compatibility or incompatibility of group goals.

When it comes to explaining how cooperation helps to overcome intergroup conflict, what mechanisms are involved, researchers have advanced different views. Turner (1982) has questioned the assumption that the key element consists of the introduction of superordinate goals. Instead he proposes that it is the formation of a superordinate group, encompassing the original groupings, that promotes cooperation and improve relations.

Along similar lines, focusing on changes in the group structure Brewer and Miller (1984) have suggested that mutual interdependence associated with intergroup cooperation is the vital element.

The 'reconciliation through cooperation' approach has also been advanced within international integration theory (see, e.g., Kaldor, 1990, 1991). Neofunctionalism, posits that economic cooperation between states leads to increased interdependence and a mutual interest in also political cooperation. Cooperation on 'politically neutral' matters, it is assumed, will have a 'spillover effect' enabling also political cooperation. Much as social psychology has proposed that cooperation erode group boundaries, integration theory assume that cooperation and increasing transactions will promote the development of shared identities, mutual sympathies and trust, resulting eventually in 'the erosion of state boundaries'.

In addition to contact theory, social psychology has proposed that intergroup conflict may be reduced - and reconciliation promoted - through changes in the structure of social categorisation. Rather than the absence of contact, this approach takes as point of departure the finding that the mere process of social categorisation (that is, the creation of groups, however arbitrary and artificial) has been found to engender we-feeling and ingroup preference (and concomitant distancing from and negative bias against out-groups) as well as to evoke both perceptual distortions and evaluative biases. An improvement inter-group relations therefore, it is suggested, requires reducing the salience of existing social categories (Brewer and Miller, 1984). This, it has been proposed, can occur through a number of mechanisms: a) de-categorisation b) recategorisation; and c) crossed categorisation.
The de-categorisation ('personalisation) model (Brewer and Miller, 1984) suggest that the contact situation should be differentiated to allow for distinctions to be made among out-group members and for perceptions of the uniqueness of out-group members. De-categorisation thus challenges conceptions of 'them' as a monolith.

The mechanisms of re-categorisation and crossed categorisation, identified within social identity theory (Tajfel, 1971; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1986) are both based on the premise that individuals belong to several social categories and therefore have a multiple social identifications, the salience of which varies across time and space (as different contexts evoke different identifications). The more salient identity also determines how one relates to others: who is perceived as member of the in-group and out-group respectively.

Applied to a post-conflict context, the above propositions translate into recommendations for efforts to forge a shared 'national' identity that transcends (conflict) group identities. Such an identity can be based either on civic (non-ethnic) or multi-ethnic principles.

It should, however, be remembered that the creation a common or superordinate group representation does not necessarily require that subgroups forsake their earlier identities (Gaertner, Dovidio et al., 1999). The optimal solution, Van Oudenhoven and Willemsen (1989) propose, is to '[maintain] cultural diversity in combination with mutual respect between the different groups'. This is, however, rarely achieved, they note. A second best alternative therefore is to develop a 'cultura franca': 'a common body of culture which does not belong to the cultural heritage of either group or which is a transformation of an aspect of the culture of one of the groups' (ibid.). The point they make is that the cohesion need not come at the expense of diversity. Simply the idea of former enemies sharing an identity in the aftermath of armed conflict may be too unpalatable to contemplate, particularly for victims of violence. Attempts at forging a shared identity, prior to reconciliation or as an element of a reconciliation process, may thus encounter resistance irrespectively on whether it is based on civic or multi-ethnic principles.

Recently reconciliation has become closely associated with truth seeking processes and truth (and reconciliation) commissions. Until recently, the interest in truth commissions more than on reconciliation focused on their human rights dimension: notably the issue of accountability for past human rights abuses and violations of international law and their role in the prevention of such abuses in the future. However, since the early 1990s
truth commissions have featured as elements in a number of peace agreements, frequently but not invariably with the purported aim of contributing to reconciliation and conflict prevention. Hayner (2000) identifies three ways in which a truth commission can contribute to conflict resolution and conflict prevention: 1) constituting an alternative to prosecution, a truth commission it may be act as an incentive for elites for agreeing to a peace accord; 2) it may prevent the return of violence by confronting and defusing tensions around past conflict; and it may help 'outline the needed reforms of state institutions so that conflicts can be mediated non-violently and disenfranchised groups might be better represented in the political sphere' (pp. 361-362). The relationship between truth and reconciliation - or truth and peace - is far from unequivocal, however. 'Claims about the peace-promoting effects of formal truth-telling mechanisms rest far more on faith than on sound logic or empirical evidence', Mendeloff (2004) concludes after a thorough examination of both popular and scholarly claims.

The risk for such 'unintended effects' of the truth seeking process may be particularly great, as Hayner (2000) proposes, 'when there is intense frustration with the lack of justice, little outlook for change, and no sign or remorse, apology, or even symbolic reparation from former perpetrators and beneficiaries of the abusive rule.

At the same time, the potentially therapeutic effects of truth seeking and truth telling should not be neglected. To Archbishop Desmund Tutu, who chaired the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the purpose of finding out the truth is not prosecution but rather societal healing (Tutu, 1999). More than fact-finding (forensic truth), the truth that is being sought is a collective narrative of past events based on validation of personal experiences. 'The truth sought by a truth commission', Minow (1998) writes, 'includes not just who did what but also asks, for the nation, What was done in our name, our nationhood?'

A truth seeking process may and may not be followed by justice seeking. To many reconciliation theorists, justice and truth are both necessary elements for reconciliation (see, e.g., Lederach, 1999; Kriesberg, 2000; see, e.g., Bloomfield, Barnes et al., 2003).

Pankhurst (1999) observes an increasing tendency to prioritise punishment in the name of doing justice whether or not reconciliation of any sorts takes place. Concerns for moral and legal obligations under international law to bring to justice perpetrators of human right violations; for creating and upholding human rights regime; and for securing democratic transitions
are some additional arguments that have been advanced for opting for full accountability. It has also been proposed, however, that truth commissions merely by acknowledging a silenced past may have a 'cathartic' effect at a societal level conducive for reconciliation also in the absence of a justice seeking process (Colson, 2000).

Bell (2000) identifies a number of arguments in favour of pursuing accountability through prosecution and punishment.

Through scapegoating or social shaming, whereby blame is attributed to a limited number of individuals (in leadership position) thereby relieving the collective of responsibility, it is possible that reconciliation may be aided, at least on a theoretical level. A trial 'transfers the individual's desires for revenge to the state or official bodies. The transfer cools vengeance into retribution, slows judgment with procedure, and interrupt...the vicious cycle of blame and feud' (Minow, 1998). The literature review has suggested a number of causal mechanisms whereby reconciliation can promote conflict prevention (that is, enable the peaceful regulation of conflict) and thus serve as a peacebuilding tool. In essence, the diverse contributions and arguments can be reduced to two basic assumptions pertaining to the possible links between reconciliation and post-conflict peacebuilding.

1. Reconciliation can promote peacebuilding by addressing potential causes of (renewed) conflict notably, the legacy of violence (lack of trust, hostility, victimization, pre-occupation with the conflicted past, etc).

2. Reconciliation can promote peacebuilding by influencing processes of identity formation. Identity, in turn, is closely linked both to interest formation, pattern of social interaction and to the development of norms regulating conflict behaviour.

The literature review has suggested a number of mechanisms likely to have a conducive - and conversely, adverse - effect on the prospects for inter-group reconciliation. Many of these mechanisms, it should be noted, address intergroup relations indirectly, rather than directly, seeking to create a fertile context for reconciliation.

The proposed mechanisms are summarised in Table 1 below under two headings: 'peace mechanisms' and 'violence mechanisms'. 'Peace mechanisms' are those that on theoretical grounds have identified as
conducive for reconciliation, and thus for conflict prevention. 'Violence mechanisms' are those that also on theoretical grounds can be expected to adversely effect reconciliation, and thus increase the risk of violence. International interventions, it is thus proposed, can contribute to reconciliation a) by creating or strengthening 'peace mechanisms', and b) by preventing or weakening 'violence mechanisms'. 
Table 1. Peace and violence mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace mechanisms</th>
<th>Violence mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on political framework for inter-group relations group violence</td>
<td>No agreement on political framework for inter-group relations group violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ethnic association and cooperation</td>
<td>No inter-ethnic association/cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance and appreciation of Common / inclusive (superordinate) identity of responsibility for conflict</td>
<td>Appreciation of ethnic ‘purity’ • Polarised / exclusive identities Denial of responsibility for conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PEACEBUILDING-MODELS

Any exploration of academic definitions of post-conflict peacebuilding necessarily draws from a variety of fields, including economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, peace and conflict research, reflecting and contributing to the multi-disciplinary nature of both the theory and practice of peacebuilding.

The abundant definitions of post-conflict peacebuilding offered by the relevant literature are characterised by an attempt in each case to answer questions such as: What kind of peace should be built? What sources of conflict should the intervention address? Who should guide the peacebuilding intervention? What level of the intervention should drive the peacebuilding process? What activities constitute peacebuilding?
When and for how long should peacebuilding happen? These questions will offer the framework for discussion below.

An important departure point for most debates is the differentiation between negative and positive peace introduced by Johan Galtung (1971), which still underpins the distinction between narrow and broad approaches to peacebuilding. Furthermore, the often-tense relationship between negative peace promoting activities, and those undertaken to promote a positive peace has shaped many debates around what constitutes 'good peace-building practice'.

Galtung (1998) defined peacebuilding as encompassing the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development. In his latest contribution peacebuilding is re-defined as part of 'third generation' of peace approaches evident after the Cold War, when a reaction against simplistic approaches to building peace finally recognised the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its links to development. Galtung argues that issues of culture, human needs, and 'fault-lines of the human condition such as gender' have now entered the peace debate and are recognised as crucial (Galtung, 1996).

The concept of positive peace is closely linked to that of justice. Despite the consensus in the literature about the welcome move from 'negative' to 'positive' peacebuilding approaches, some authors still position themselves differently within peace justice debate.

Kriesberg, (1998) identifies two 'peacemaker profiles' and attributes distinct approaches to both. For instance, whereas 'conflict managers' promote an inclusive approach, aim at reconciliation, employ a pragmatic focus, emphasise the process, engage local cultures and norms, presume the moral equivalence of the parties and assume a neutral role; `democratisers' adhere to universal norms and values, employ an exclusive approach, aim for justice, emphasise the outcome, insist on moral accountability, believe justice to be non-negotiable, and relinquish their neutrality in favour of a principled stance. Baker places a current post-war intervention such as Kosovo firmly within the former, while Clark blames the same approach as having precipitated the genocide in post-settlement Rwanda (1997).
Clark further criticises this increasingly conflict resolution influenced approach being employed by international peace-building interveners, as they bring conflict parties into precarious power-sharing agreements that ignore the power imbalances and thus become hard to sustain. Kriesberg (1998) agrees that such power-sharing arrangements fail to reflect the power leverage brought by each of the conflict parties. Furthermore, it also fails to reflect responsibility for human right abuses and war crimes committed by the very leaders that sign up to the precarious peace that often follows civil wars.

Moore (2002) refers to peace without justice as "pacification" a situation where an unjust society is perpetuated through the suppression of violence. Mason-Crane (1989) approaches the issue more flexibly admitting that in the initial phase of a peace settlement the prime commitment should be to broaden and deepen the peace, before justice can be pursued. This does bring the peace process into tension with the very foundations of long-term reconciliation, namely truth, justice and ultimately forgiveness. However, the threat of recurring violence may force peacebuilders to pursue these values in sequential phases during a longer period of time that may be desirable. Sabibanis (2001) also responds to the critics of conflict resolution approaches to peacebuilding with an overview of voices (Hirschleiler, 1987, Collier-Hoeffler, 2004, De Soysa, 2002) that champion third party intervention as facilitating what must essentially be a 'peacebuilding from below' effort to chart more sustainable and locally owned paths to peace and justice.

Critticism of international post-conflict peacebuilding from research and academia offer more or less supportive appraisals of current efforts, although few reject the premise of international engagement in post-war rehabilitation outright. The critiques are often recommendations to shift emphasis from one aspect of the intervention to another, in order to overcome identified postconflict 'deficits' (for example military/security, political/institutional capacity, economic/social debilitation, and psycho/social trauma) closely linked to 'root causes' of that conflict (Minow, 1998). These 'deficits' offer the framework for the following literature overview.
Massey (1993, MacMillan, 1996) points to the need to address insecurity as key to successful post-war peace-building, as it is vital that freedom of movement, absence of personal or group threats, and safe access to resources is achieved for all in the post-war netting to even hint at a movement towards healing and reconciliation. Schnabel (2002) believes that the core principles of conflict prevention must inform post-settlement peacebuilding to effectively avoid a re-lapse into war and make it sustainable thus emphasizing the military/security deficit.

Staniszkis (1984) highlights the importance of keeping 'peace spoilers' in check through better intelligence and increased capabilities of deterrence in the military component of peacebuilding missions. He prioritises the demobilisation of armies, reintegration of soldiers to civilian life, and the successful transformation of armies into political actors. Spencer (1997) also believes that the reform of the security sector in support of good governance and equitable socio-economic development is key to the sustainability of peace-building efforts.

Pugh (2002) leads the school of 'developmentalist' approaches to post-war peacebuilding, which point to poverty as the main source of conflict. He views socio-economic vulnerability as the main hindrance to local capacities to withstand political complex emergencies. He commends the UN for leading the way in expanding the conceptualisation of peacebuilding as a developmental approach to conflict management. Muscat (2002) also value the contribution of integrated social development approaches to post-war peacebuilding, and view the combination of 'good governance, physical reconstruction, and economic and social development' as a winning formula against the recurrence of violence in post-war settings.

Hegre et al (2001) acknowledges that international post-settlement reconstruction is embracing conflict resolution and that there is a move towards more comprehensive approaches to building peace, but faults this approach for overlooking issues of 'inequality, economic growth and resource distribution'. Hegre believes that peacebuilding normalises
unjust situations by merely helping people to cope with the consequences of globalisation and 'war economies' (Hegre et al, 2001).

Judah (2000) share Hegre’s concerns and believe that the political economy of civil wars, which they consider to be a key source of 'protractedness' in many of today’s conflicts, remains unchallenged by current peace-building approaches. Collier (2000, p.91, 105) supports the economic agendas of war as key sources of conflict in his "greed over grievance" debate, and suggests that good peacebuilding must reduce incentives for those benefiting from war in order to reduce their influence over the process.

Hayner (1999) warns of the need to acknowledge the underlying economic conditions that create the risk of violent conflict, and highlights the sometimes-worsening impact of peacebuilding interventions. He criticises the practice of conditioning economic assistance to governance, and the undue pressure that restructuring measures place on post-war societies.

Other authors emphasize the political and institutional deficit as being the key for post-conflict interventions. Muscat (2002) believe the 'fragility or collapse of political processes and institutions' to be the main catalyst for war, while (Kellman, 1999) argues that post-conflict elections would restore the loss of legitimacy of political institutions and processes, thus institutionalising a conflict resolution mechanism into the body politic. Their point is reinforced by Gurr (1993) who perceives a greater threat to peace from the political manipulation of, say, economic or social cleavages, than the cleavages themselves. However, the consensus is that a political intervention alone could not deliver peace and that a long-term process of rehabilitation in all spheres of society is necessary (Kellman, 1999).

In the debate of what sources of conflict must be prioritised in post-war peacebuilding interventions, ranging from material resource competition to perception and belief clashes, the conclusion must be that multiple causation calls for multi-dimensional interventions. The linkage
between ‘peace-building deficits’ (Mondtalvo, 2005) is shared amongst most authors and point to comprehensive and integrated approaches to building peace that tackle both the symptoms and root causation of conflict. None advocate the tackling of their chosen area of intervention to the exclusion of all others. Most authors conclude their arguments with a call for 'complementarity', coordination between agencies to achieve it and the need to tackle both symptoms and root causes to build a sustainable peace. All agree to improve rather than abandon the international assistance to war-torn societies.

An important aspect of the debate about what constitutes good peacebuilding is that over who should lead the efforts to rebuild societies after the conflict. The international community is taking its commitment to 'exporting' peace very seriously, but do those who 'pay' have the ultimate 'say'?

In a study of peace settlements, (Kamarotos, 1995) assessed the factors that made them succeed or fail and found that third party intervention contributed greatly to successful post-settlement peacebuilding. Kamarotos studied the four factors determining success or failure of peace settlement implementation - 3rd party role, structural characteristics of the conflict itself, regional/systemic dynamics, and the settlement's 'ingredients, concluding that the greater resources and staying power a 3rd party could muster, the greater the chances of a peace agreement to deliver sustainable peace.

Others place more emphasis in the ownership of the process by local constituencies to ensure sustainability. Hegre (2001) believes that the unique resources that local actors bring to the process makes it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. A successful peacebuilding intervention should enable "indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either expectations or packaged solutions". Dessler (1994) also believes that peace must be built "from the inside out" and that interventions may only hope to catalyse change that must be brought about by local peacebuilders. Finally (Fearon-Laitin, 2003) advocates local ownership that goes beyond participation to transfer control from donors to recipients as local solutions tend to be "more effective, cheaper and more sustainable".
This 'peacebuilding from below' has been criticised as being blind to social justice, when local 'unjust' power structures are strengthened through the engagement of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Amongst this view the gender critique exposes the term 'local actors' as highly problematic in masquerading inequalities between men and women that are obscured by such homogenising labels. Thus to the question of whether international or local actors should lead the post-war peacebuilding process, the gender dimension must be mainstreamed if a positive peace is to be built (Riches, 1986).

The structures set up to implement post-war peace-building processes are often top-heavy, namely they concentrate both efforts and resources at the top level. Moreover, as has been identified by Montalvo, 2005, the trend towards greater coherence and coordination amongst international peacebuilding agencies further challenges the ownership of the process by local actors.

A further layer of debate in the choice of peace-building approaches and one closely linked to the previous debate about local participation is determined by the preferred level of intervention: Track One, Two or Three.

Track One is the domain of official international diplomacy and government agencies, where political and military leaders operate. Helman-Ratner (1992) praises the ability of official diplomacy to mobilise huge resources to entice or coerce, with 'carrots' or 'sticks', the warring parties to negotiation. He points to the advantage of Track One over other channels due to the access by diplomats to the 'most important players in a conflict'. Bercovitch (1989), in his study of mediation in international conflict, found that "the leader of a government, possessing rank and prestige and having some 'leverage', has a better chance of mediating successfully than any other actor".

Lederach (1997, pp.41-2) similarly proposes a multi-level approach to peacebuilding that increases inter-connectedness between levels of intervention and co-operation between actors involved. However, he points to Track Two leaders as key actors by virtue of their distance from the confrontational politics dominating top echelons of conflict-ridden
societies. They have the potential to act as intermediaries between the top and grassroots levels. The involvement of all sectors of society in peace-building is also highlighted by Galama-van Tongeren (2002) as a key aspect often overlooked by interveners. However, he identifies Track One and Track Two as the key levels whose linkage will increase the success of a peace process.

Grassroots approaches include Muller-Seligson (1987) who acknowledges the potential role of the population as 'peacemakers', or in this case 'peace-builders', without whose "knowledge, participation and support", institutions "cannot attain a strong and lasting peace". Keck-Sikkink (1998) highlights the potential for transformation by 'critical social movements' that challenge authority and power from marginalized standpoints, including gender.

Kelman (1999) suggest 'multi-track' diplomacy as an effective way to tackle 'ethnic and regional conflict' whose complexity requires a 'systems approach' and the premise that change at the grassroots cannot be imposed from above. Similarly (Notter-Magdonald, 1998) suggest a 'multi-modal, multi-level approach' in which different but complimentary activities are employed to tackle the multiple causation of 'inter-communal conflict' at every level of the intervention.

Those advocating the primacy of Track One actors favour a top-down approach to peacebuilding where official diplomacy leads the peace process. Those highlighting the importance of Track Two actors would champion a more inclusive mid-up and mid-down approach, where middle range leadership links top leadership efforts and the population. The sponsors of Track Three peacebuilding would emphasize the role of grassroots leadership in nurturing peace constituencies necessary to sustain the process, thus advocating a bottom-up approach. But just as the debate around root causes and appropriate actions, the ultimate conclusion is that whatever level is emphasized it should be complemented by action at all levels for a 'holistic' approach to building-peace where all levels are integrated in a complementary and mutually reinforcing process.
This overview of what activities are identified by authors as constituting peacebuilding is necessarily finite.

Collier (2000) complete their 'deficit' approach with a set of activities to address each. The political-constitutional deficit during the initial phase is addressed by transitional governing measures, in the medium term by the organising of a crucial second election, and finally the consolidation of good governance and civil society. The socio-economic deficit is first tackled with humanitarian relief, then a period of rehabilitation of infrastructure, and finally stable long-term economic policies are implemented. The psycho-social deficit must first address the parties' mistrust, then balance the priorities of peace and justice with long-term measures such as the healing of psychological wounds and reconciliation.

Lederach (1997) proposes an intervention structure as a pyramid with the apex representing the top military, political and/or religious leadership; the middle level representing a mid-range leadership including sector, professional, ethnic or INGO leaders; and the grassroots leadership placed at the pyramid's base. Each of the three 'spaces' contains activities to further the peacebuilding process. For example at the top, high-level negotiations, cease-fire agreements and highly visible mediation would be used. Whereas at the middle level problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and peace commissions would be better suited. Finally, a grassroots intervention may include local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction activities, and psychosocial work in post-war trauma recovery.

Peacekeeping within the problem solving paradigm addresses the peaceful transformation of conflict through societal accountability of power holders (processes of democratisation, self-determination, human rights monitoring, truth commissions) and reconciliation of divided communities.

Therefore, there are two approaches to peacekeeping practice: During the Cold War peacekeeping was used by the great powers to stabilise conflicts fuelled by superpower rivalries and to protect Western economic interests. Cold War de-escalation provided an opportunity
for the problem solving model to be applied in many protracted conflicts throughout the continents.

Closing this section we examine the analytical potential of using Foucault's concept of power in conflict resolution and peacekeeping theory. This approach draws on the ideas elaborated by Betts Fetherston in the section 'Conflict Resolution/Peacekeeping as Discursive Practice: Power' in her journal article *Theoretical Frameworks for Peacekeeping* (Fetherston 2000).

Foucault understood power as a force that "transverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse". Foucault also refers to power as a juridical concept "carrying the force of a prohibition" that is related to the notion of repression. Foucault rejects a purely negative nature of power: "if power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?" (Foucault 1991).

Nevertheless, some authors have argued that repression is also an integral element of the production of power/knowledge in contemporary societies. From Foucault's assumption that "each society has its regime of truth...that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault 1991), some authors have asserted that these discourses are sustained by coercive mechanisms. In this context violence is understood as a deterrent through which power structures and dominant discourses (a regime of truth) are generated at a societal level. The fundamental question is whether the production of power/knowledge can function independently from coercive mechanisms. This is particularly relevant in war zones, where parties use violence against those who challenge their regime of truth.

Most peace research is based on Galtung's ideas on peace and violence. Galtung defines three different types of violence: direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence is visible physical and/or verbal behaviour, cultural violence is related to the promotion of heroic, patriotic, or patriarchal values, which seek to justify violence, and structural violence is caused by socio-economic structures which are repressive, exploitative or alienating (Galtung 1996). In turn, Galtung defines negative peace as the absence of
direct violence and positive peace as the removal of cultural and structural violence.

In this regard, repressive power aims at imposing a societal regime of truth through the use of direct violence. The Foucaultian concept of power as a positive force which produces knowledge (disciplines) and "normalises" (Foucault 2003) social life can be related to Galtung's concept of cultural violence. In particular, the production of discourses of violence and militarism are inextricably linked to the process of disciplinarisation of society. The production of power/knowledge and regimes of truth can also be associated to the normalisation of structural violence. In this sense, positive forms of power are related to the production and socialisation of cultural practices and socio-economic structures.

Fetherston has underlined the possibilities of using Foucault's genealogical approach to power/knowledge for examining issues related to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Foucault described the extent to which the introduction of a 'scientific' epistemology to study society in the Modern Era, which was based on the Natural Science model (the emergence of a Social Science), has subjugated a whole range of specific (a-scientific) 'knowledges'. Foucault explained that this process of scientific normalisation of social life is related to the emergence of new technologies of power and the enactment of the discourse of modernity, which stands for a regime of scientific truths. This discourse is mainly enacted by a new flourishing socio-economic class, the bourgeoisie, which has grown alongside industrial development and the formation of the Nation/States since the 17th century. In short, the emergence of the Social Sciences and the production of objectified forms of knowledge have led to attempts to rationalise social life. In turn, this rationalisation has produced a hierarchy of forms of knowledge, marginalizing non-scientific forms of knowledge.

In this regard, the production of power/knowledge by a third party - i.e. peacekeeping - is related to an attempt to normalise international social life. Brown stressed that peacekeeping involves the institutionalisation of conflict (Brown, 1991). Galtung related peacekeeping practice to his concept of negative peace (Galtung 1971). In this sense, most studies on peacekeeping point out its efficiency in terms of reducing the level of conflict violence in missions which have some degree of operational consent. These studies also report that most operations fail to bring parties together in a negotiation process focused on resolving the
underlying issues that led them to war. It can be argued that peacekeeping is very successful at promoting negative peace but fails at promoting positive peace. The aim of this critical assessment of peacekeeping practice is to look at whether peacekeeping can promote specific forms of power/knowledge which can, in turn, promote positive peace.

Some Scholars within the field of Conflict Resolution have found problems with the "scientific" assumptions underpinning Conflict Resolution theory (Spencer, 1997). Fetherston draws her criticism of Conflict Resolution from Foucault's ideas on power and truth:

"Delivering rational understandings and practices through conflict resolution methodologies - including peacekeeping - is part of rendering a social body ready to accept, for example, neoliberal forms of social/economic/political organisation (Foucault, 2003)."

However, the idea of peace with justice is common in the political discourse of many populations targeted by cultural and structural violence.

**SYSTEMATIC CRITICS: THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH**

Our critique raises serious issues about the nature of conflict resolution. Firstly, the dominant opinions tend to imply that force becomes the arbiter of change. Secondly, they may also encourage inactivity and paralysis in the face of what are perceived to be overwhelmingly powerful forces of global structural change, on which we can have no influence. Thirdly, they make very little reference to the literature on conflict resolution and, therefore, dismiss or are ignorant of perspectives coming from this literature. Fourthly, there has been a proliferation of 'non-official' conflict resolution organisations in the last ten years or so whose work in areas of conflict throughout the world has been built upon principles of non-violent peacemaking originally outside Europe, but from the 90ies step-by-step implemented in peripheric European conflicts as well. This practice of non-violent conflict resolution provides the basis for an international, or even global 'peace praxis', that is the development of skills, processes and resources necessary to sustain and develop cultures of peace. Its important to understand how minority movements and national governments start to learn that language int he european ethnic community interactions, as well.
In the first section of this paper we will consider traditional critics of conflict resolution in respect of the actual European inter-community crises and, in the middle section, argue that they have inaccurately or superficially represented the significance of conflict resolution theory and practice. This is so firstly in relation to lessons learned about the use of force and the relationship between national frames of conflict resolution; secondly in relation to the supposed assumptions of the conflict resolution field about the nature of conflict; and thirdly in relation to the nature of third party roles, and the dynamics of consensus-building from below. The response to critics comes on the use of force and the development of non-traditional forms of compromise-building; then discussing restoring harmony or negotiating change? the role of third parties; and at the very end restoring order with justice, participation from below. In conclusion it is argued that conflict resolution has moved beyond reliance on a Western model and starts to become an European practice. Difficult judgements remain to be made about the low intensity conflicts about the relationship between conflict resolution and the use of force, and about the relationships between outsiders and local peacemakers, or mediators. Many analysts [f.e. Rosenau, 1997] argue that attempts to resolve conflicts in the 1990s are based on different assumptions than those that dominated the Cold War era. Now the stress is on promoting multi-track efforts to reach agreements in civil conflicts by negotiation, consensus and compromise, whereas conventionally, international policy was targeted at promoting victory by one side or another in militant conflicts. Naturally, we can question whether the consensus promoting strategy, based on impartial mediation and negotiation by the international community, is appropriate in all cases.

The implications of these and similar arguments can be seen as a direct challenge to some of the core assumptions and approaches of conflict resolution, which in this analytical perspective are perceived to be ineffective, lacking in prescriptive guidelines for policy-makers, and even positively harmful. This is so because the pursuit of mediated settlements can have the unintended effect of prolonging the conflict, with civilian populations suffering most, while concentrated action might have the effect of foreshortening the conflict by persuading those losing ground to accept a settlement. Many analysts observe that in civil wars, in general, most settlements followed a military victory rather than political negotiations or mediated interventions. We are not advocating those action rather than consent based conflict resolution, but rather pointing to the need to examine carefully and to understand more about the limits of consent-based
strategies. This is given further urgency at a time when there may be an implicit move by states in the direction of preferring conflict settlement by force.

Collier (2001), [based on an examination of the conflict in Rwanda] suggests that in recent years the international community has been actively involved in intervening in violent local conflicts and has, in the process of this intervention, articulated a standardised conflict resolution mechanism that has been universally applied. The processes and rules of the post-Cold War approach are quite different from those that guided Cold War policy which gave a privileged place in conflict resolution to sovereign states, and to the territorial integrity and the non-intervention norms that are associated with them. State structures were to be kept intact, and the only movements that challenged existing state structures with some legitimacy were those involved in liberation struggles against colonial regimes. In the Post-Cold War, the special status of states was diluted. All parties to a conflict were accorded a ‘standing’, and the break up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Chechoslovakia meant that secession and independence from existing states became a recognised form of conflict resolution. The inviolability of state sovereignty was challenged, as democratic values and respect for human rights became part of the international humanitarian value system, and opposition groups, claiming to be victims of state repression, could be admitted to peacemaking processes on terms broadly equal to state authorities. Following this change in standing of conflict parties, a new model of conflict resolution was indicated. Temporary solutions [mini cease-fires?] were negotiated to provide space and time for an agreed peace settlement; the peace agreement was in turn tied to a process of third party mediation, which itself carried the values of the international community.

The basic model of conflict resolution to emerge from this had two variants or mechanisms through which the new stable order was to be fashioned. In one variant of the model the parties negotiated an agreed constitution (based on multi-party democracy and respect for human rights) followed by elections under international supervision. In the second variant a provisional coalition government is formed to introduce a series of confidence building measures, which would make it possible to agree a new constitution, and then to have multi-party elections. In most cases- almost everywhere outside of Europe, where variants one and
two of the model have been used, international peacekeeping forces were used to supervise the peace process. In advancing this argument, we do not claim that we are offering a general critique of conflict resolution, nor do we offer at this point guidelines for policy in general. We simple suggest that, based on what happened outside Europe, we might be wise to exercise much more caution in our use of intervention strategies in sharply confrontative ethnic conflicts. His fundamental point is that the conflict resolution model may be inherently flawed, its rules and prescriptions taken for granted. Reflecting on the summarized non-European experience, what were the flaws in the peacemaking strategy? The approach did not recognise the need for the resolution of the deep-seated differences that caused the conflict. In this respect a profound question about the ‘Western’ assumptions built into the model emerges, principally in the idea that the viability of negotiated solutions to civil wars rests on the assumption that conflict parties share a common value framework, within which differences can be negotiated. However even in Western culture it is a relatively new assumption historically, with most major conflicts from the 16th century onwards fought to a conclusion, either with a victor emerging or with mutual exhaustion resulting in a compromise settlement. At this level also, therefore, ‘the application to East European conflicts of the values of classical Western civil societies’ gave rise to problems, adding further force to the idea that the appropriateness of the traditional conflict resolution model needs to be more extensively examined.

Investigating the acute ethnic conflicts on the European [semi]peripheries, we think that they may represent to a certain degree ‘the emergence of entirely new types of social formation adapted for survival on the margins of the global economy’ (Fetherston, 1994), and they aren’t from this perspective an aberrant, irrational and nonproductive phenomenon [rebel groups have often effectively set up parallel economies].

Conflict resolution projects in this critique can be seen as part of a ‘delegitimising discourse’ which has enabled Western regulation of third world politics. (Fetherston, 1997). Inequality, economic growth and resource distribution are issues that have been sidelined in favour of the ‘human development’ paradigm in the 1990s. Thus underdevelopment, and more recently transitions to democracy, have been ‘internalised’, that is seen as issues of the internal, domestic relations of the countries.

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1 The timescale for effecting the peace process was short. The approach was mechanistic, and ignored the need to fashion a basic political agreement that rested on the support of key actors who shared at least some commitment to ideological norms, necessary to underpin the peace process.
concerned. The process of change then becomes one of supporting behavioural change in civil society in conflict afflicted countries. In pursuit of this goal NGOs have become the main agents of change, and conflict resolution `represents an extreme form of this paradigm.' (Duffield, 1998)

Further criticisms with the model may be summarised as follows. The way in which conflict resolution training provides 'concentrated immersion within the socio-psychological model of conflict', can look more like indoctrination than training. The concentration on communications breakdowns and individual failings means that all people in conflict situations are as bad as each other. This means that, in effect, the perpetrators of political violence are absolved from blame (peace is placed above justice in this model). Conflict resolution training in this respect perhaps presenting 'little threat to those in power'; providing foreign donors and international mediators with a cheap means of 'doing something' in conflict situations; and even because it may be conducted by 'people who are without professional qualifications' (Duffield, 1998).

In certain environments intervention might prolong the misery by unintentionally prolonging the conflict. However, the costs of victory by one side over another may be as high, or higher, than political intervention. There is in short no such thing as a 'quick fix' by force. The need to apply internationally agreed humanitarian standards compels that serious and sustained attention be given to understanding the processes and circumstances by which the conclusions of conflict resolution approaches can be operationalised. Thus robust involvement into even the most confrontative conflict (with a capacity to enforce international agreements, and to apply human rights standards), linked to conflict resolution mechanisms, is a clear policy option for everybody in the European conflicts.

In recent years we can observe a tendency by experienced actors to call for the integration of conflict resolution mechanisms in their policy-making and operational practices.

For operations outside Europe it is noticeable, how much of the peacekeeping doctrine of the British Army, is suffused with the language of conflict resolution. The same approach is taken in American doctrine covering peace support operations (Chandler, 2004). The development of such an approach to conflict resolution provides some prospect for developing intervention strategies which do attempt to address the deeper causes of conflicts, and this is a clear and preferable alternative for the European scene than the role of passive observer. There are many useful case studies and an extensive literature on the effects of third party
intervention, by both official and unofficial actors. A recent work by Harbom (2004) looks at the roles of a variety of third parties and the way in which they inter-relate to re-enforce each other in a sustained effort not only to make peace agreements but equally important to sustain them in the long run. In essence, Hampson’s conclusion is that peace settlements are not self executing, but that they are sustained best by the work of third parties, external actors who use combined mediation, problem-solving and peacebuilding strategies. These third parties are crucial, providing the cement to hold things together and providing the creativity, incentives and pressure needed to prevent the parties in conflict from running aground.

While we can point to a literature which allows us to draw perhaps more optimistic conclusions about the nature and effectiveness of third party intervention, we are still faced with serious problems of the model. Some times these problems lie in the assumptions built into it, its mechanistic application and short time scale, and its failure to recognise the deep seated differences which led to the conflict.

At the same time Mark Duffield’s claim that conflict resolution is based on a socio-psychological model which assumes an underlying functional harmony as a natural state is not an accurate characterisation (Williams, 1994). For us power imbalances in socio-economic structures are very much part of conflict resolution analysis. We all remember, that thirty years ago Johan Galtung (1996, 72) proposed an influential model of conflict, suggesting that it be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or ‘structural’) conflict. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation as parties’ interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. And so the conflict formation starts to grow and develop. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen, and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the tank of addressing the original, core conflict. [Galtung,1996] Eventually, however, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that involve de-esclation of conflict behaviour, change in attitudes, and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure. Neither does conflict resolution regard
harmony and order as a natural or even desirable state. Rather, conflict is seen as a necessary and inevitable component of social change. Galtung (1988) also draws the distinction between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct violence by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes.

In the past few years the field of conflict resolution has come under scrutiny from ideas generated by the literature of critical social theory, and from more pragmatic policy based concerns coming from field workers in both the UN system and in humanitarian agencies of various kinds. In particular exponents working within the tradition of conflict resolution wished, as practitioner-scholars, to strengthen its concepts and practices, and learned from experiences and perspectives coming from diverse fields such as participatory community development, non-violent peace advocacy groups and grass roots peace action campaigns. There has also been an enriching discourse with academic fields such as anthropology and development analysis.

The revision of thinking resulting from this has led to clearer understanding in three areas.

In the recognition that embedded cultures and economies of violence provide more formidable barriers to constructive intervention than originally assumed by the earlier research of conflict theory. In these conflicts `simple' one dimensional interventions, whether by traditional mediators aiming at formal peace agreements, or by peacekeepers placed to supervise cease-fires or oversee elections, are unlikely to produce comprehensive or lasting resolution.

in the specification of the significance of post-conflict peacebuilding and of the idea that formal agreements need to be underpinned by understandings, structures and long-term development frameworks that will erode cultures of violence and sustain peace processes on the ground.

Thirdly, in the related idea of the significance of local actors and of the importance of local knowledge and wisdom.
These shifts in thinking, which have given greater recognition to peacebuilding from below, can be illustrated in the work of several scholar-practitioners. Their major approach, Lederach calls indigenous empowerment.

The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily 'see' the netting and the people in it as the 'problem' and the outsider as the 'answer'. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting. (Lederach 1995 p. 212)

The approach also suggests that it is important to identify the "cultural modalities and resources" within the setting of the conflict in order to evolve a comprehensive framework which embodies both short-term and long-term perspectives for conflict transformation. The importance of cultural relevance and sensitivity within conflict resolution theory has emerged partly in response to learning from case experience, and partly as an explicit critique of earlier forms of conflict resolution theory where local culture was given marginal significance. In the case of critiques of John Burton's universal theory, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, drawing on perspectives from anthropology, have argued for greater recognition of the issue of culture in the theory and practice of conflict resolution. They suggest that ethnoconflict theories (derived from locally constructed common sense views of conflict) and ethnopraxis (techniques and customs for dealing with conflict derived from these understandings) need to be developed and incorporated into the construction of general theory. What has emerged then is the recognition of a need for what Lederach has called a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution which is attentive to how short term intervention which aims to halt violence is integrated with long term resolution processes. This long-term strategy will be sustainable if outsiders/experts support and nurture rather than displace resources which can form part of a peace constituency and if the strategy addresses all levels of an affected population.

Concluding this part we mention that while it does not claim to be universally effective, the field is more robust and self-questioning than many of its critics recognise. Further, there is a literature and a practice of conflict resolution and its cognate field of peace research spanning
over forty years. The literature on third party mediation is well developed. The emerging policy on the doctrinal and operational links between peacekeeping conflict resolution indicates a potential to deal with issues of the security of people in conflict zones. Finally, in applying a peacebuilding from below approach the way in which a conflict is viewed is transformed, thus engaging with concerns about inappropriate intervention raised by our critics. Devenport (1999) concludes that, although it is easy for outside critics to be dismissive of these small-scale and usually unpublicised initiatives, this is not how things look from the inside. Here it is the practical transformative work of all those who oppose the 'discourses of violence' that is cumulatively crucial: ‘for activists inside, it mattered too much not to try’. This represents what Fetherston (1994) calls anti-hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic peace-building projects, and what Caroline Nordstrom refers to as 'counter-lifeworld constructs' that challenge the cultures of violence (2000). In endorsing Large's conclusion, and applying it to the variety of indigenous peace-building enterprises that go on all over the world (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1998), Edmund Burke's dictum: 'it is only necessary for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph', comes to mind.

NEW TAXONOMY OF „ETHNIC WELFARE „

It seems to us that some of the less rewarding aspects of this hunt for demarcation will be avoided, if we attempt a categorisation - which begins from the wider notion of public intervention. We pose a typology of interventions. All of these categories involve government: government deciding that something should or should not be done about something and moving either to enforce, enable or encourage. Our aim will be to show the diversity of possibilities as much as to point to the existing range of current British services. But we will develop the typology initially with the field of ethnic welfare delivery an illustrative case. Social interventions could thus be ranged as follows (with no implicit hierarchy in the sequence). (Reddin, 2001)

1. Enforced Individualism: Government legally prohibits any 'collectivisation' of care provisions: each individual must look to her/himself, to meet needs, negotiating with such suppliers/providers or
agencies which agree to provide care. In short, by blocking any collaborative alternative it compels "standing on your own feet".

2. Protected Individualism: Government polices the 'environment' within which individualism may 'safely' be practiced: (making the world safe for individualism). This may involve no more than setting legal codes for consumer/provider behaviour; a framework for trade. Government could lay down minimum qualifications for the providers and might even begin to regulate the boundaries of their activities.

3. Enabled Individualism: in this model, recognition may be given to some of the problems and unpredictabilities of the economic world. With the emphasis still on individual solutions; government may however seek to assist or enable such responses. This might involve (in a 'weak' form) tax relief in support of private. More individuals would then have sufficient resources to journey 'individuality' into the market place. (Reddin, 2001)

4. Promoted Individualism: Still with the emphasis on individual solutions to care needs, government might encourage (on a non-statutory basis) 'individual' behaviour. It could even encourage the environments within which such individual welfare might best be practised. This variant could be progressively strengthened with increasing regulation and active promotion or incentive towards 'personal' well-being.

5. Endorsed 'Private Collectives': By 'private collectivism' is meant nothing more than individuals choosing to form themselves into groups to resolve 'private' problems; these might be Friendly Societies, Trade Unions, Neighbourhood or Community Associations, Church Congregations, or commercial Insurance offices. Again, government's role might be no more than to establish a legal framework within which they might operate, impose definitions of their liability, controls on their general behaviour, financial practices (funding, charging, etc.). Further 'endorsement' might be offered by conferment of special tax status or tax relief on contributions to such schemes.
6. Complemented 'Private Collectives': as a step beyond the former category government might agree to underwrite some of the severe risks of these 'private' agencies - enabling them, for instance, to include some 'high risk' clients who would otherwise be excluded. It might get involved in a 'temporary' expedient - in circumstances of acute economic distress; a long-stop in the insurance system. The temporary nature of the involvement might occur at the outset of a scheme, to enable it to 'blanket-in' older members: government would then step down as the new membership assumed their full actuarial liabilities.

7. State Collective (Residual): It is only in this model that we first see the State as direct provider of service or benefit. This could be for 'excluded groups' - people who would otherwise have to forego cover, bad risks, elderly, sick, chronic sick, unemployed, or economic dependents. The degree of cover within this residual health care programme is wide open to negotiation. In quantity and quality it could be comparable or distinctively inferior to the alternatives.

8. State Collective (Competitor): There are probably no extant examples of this model within Europe today. Arguably at no stage was there a serious risk of this approach finding legislative outlet, although the idea may (retrospectively) have had some romantic appeal.

9. State Collective (Partnership): In this variant government actively creates a setting within which alternative/private providers can comfortably work, at the same tasks as government has set itself. The 'supportive' framework noted earlier may be a part of this arrangement, whilst there will usually also be some regulation of behaviour on the private partner's behalf. Whilst the partnership itself can take many forms its central characteristic is that of an active 'working together', the avoidance of distinctively competitive behaviour (a market share agreement) and the avoidance of behaviour, by either partner, which will disturb the balance. The 'market share' of the partners can vary. (Reddin, 2001)
10. State Collective (with exemptions/contracting-out): Under such arrangements individuals, or groups would be allowed to depart from or avoid the otherwise comprehensive and universal State scheme in order to "take care of themselves".

11. State Collective (with Supplementation); The State is now dominant provider with several possible variants. In the second form, the State provides a common level, a universal benefit for all citizens, then offering - perhaps in return for higher contributions - supplementary State benefits. Some citizens then choose to supplement these provisions by additional private arrangements.

12. State Collective (Enforced Monopoly): All ethnic policy [identity care] would be provided through a State scheme: there would be no alternative forms of provision and indeed 'alternatives' would be legally precluded. (Reddin, 2001)

THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC POLICY SPACE

This review, in reviewing different theories of the public sphere, derived from them normative criteria which can then be used to analyze empirical differences in how the public sphere operates in different countries on different issues. In our analysis, we take on the difficult challenge of measuring them.

The traditional „European” discourse, in most respects, meets the criteria highlighted by representative liberal theory. The discourse is dominated by accountable state and party actors, supplemented by experts and representatives of the ethnic communities. Within a broad range, the sponsors of different policies are given free reign to offer the most persuasive arguments they can muster and do so.

The discourse provides extensive and detailed accounts and commentary on what the people's representatives are doing. Authoritative decisions provide a clear signal that this discussion is completed and, following them, public discourse moves on to other topics.
The Scandinavian discourse comes much closer than the previous discourse in meeting the criteria emphasized by participatory liberal theory. Civil society actors, including grassroots organizations and ordinary people, are given a lot of voice along with the people's representatives. There is a lot more discourse promoting citizens as active agents rather than as clients to be protected. Government decisions do not force an artificial end to efforts by mobilized citizen groups to achieve policies that they consider better.

The answer to which country best fits the criteria of discursive theory is more complicated. On the issue of deliberativeness, the evidence is ambiguous, with no clear cut advantage. On dialogue, in particular, different measures show slight advantages for one country or the other or no difference. If there is a difference in the amount of dialogue between countries, it is not robust enough to show up consistently.

In meeting the criteria emphasized by constructionist theories. The criteria which it shares with the participatory liberal tradition -- popular inclusion, empowerment, and the avoidance of premature closure -- are better met on the European margins. U.S. discourse is also notably stronger on overcoming the distinction between the public and private realm, and in legitimizing the language of the lifeworld and experiential knowledge through personal narratives. However, from the perspective of the other models, it veers dangerously close to the fragmentation of identity politics and the weight given to the social and the personal can appear to swamp the political in sensationalism.

We suggest that the criteria we have derived from democratic theory are fruitful for comparing discourse in different societies on many other issues, using the ones that any particular theorist considers most important, to evaluate the quality of the democratic public sphere. [TABLE 1]

**POLICY PERFORMANCE - KEY INDICATORS**

In this section we review the key indicators of performance collected or proposed for collection. We have been somewhat selective, and have summarised among the hundreds of measures put forward. We compare these key indicators with those already being collected by the some international organizations [f.e. OECD].

*Outcome indicators*
The long search for unambiguous and reliable measures of ethnic peace outcome at a population level, using routine statistics, is proving difficult. By “ethnic welfare” outcome is meant ‘changes in status brought about by care - or system - activities’. That is because under ordinary conditions of care delivery, it is hard to isolate the impact of care from the impact of other determinants of status. Consequently, most, if not all, of the ‘outcome’ indicators, being proposed by countries, are, in fact, proxy indicators of outcomes. These proxy indicators are either:

status measures, where there are reasons to suppose that ethnic welfare should be amenable to appropriate and timely medical care or;

process of care measures, which measure utilisation which is believed to correlate highly with good outcomes.

Responsiveness indicators

Concepts of the responsiveness of ethnic welfare systems to consumers vary widely, embracing ideas of member satisfaction, member acceptability and member experience. The main distinction is between satisfaction and acceptability on the one hand and experience on the other hand. The former will depend on expectations. The latter seeks to describe objective characteristics of service delivery, such as whether member were (factually) given a choice of treatment. The distinction between the two can be illustrated from a recent Commonwealth Fund Survey of public discontent with ethnic rights care in five countries.

Equity indicators

The construction of a full set of equity indicators for a ethnic welfare system is very demanding of data. We have identified perhaps five different dimensions to equity: ethnic, equity outcome, access, responsiveness, and finance. In addition, there are many population groups, across which disparities might be monitored, including: age, gender, income and geography. Moreover, access to multiple data sets is often required. Similarly, the measurement of equity in finance requires knowledge of the distribution of disposable household income.

Efficiency indicators

In different ways, WHO and OECD conceptualise high level, general indicators of efficiency or ‘performance’. The WHO has actually made estimates of performance for all of its Member countries involving a
composite measure of performance, which weights achievements against equity and quality goals in relation to resources.

**What is controllable?** A key issue is how to discriminate between controllable and uncontrollable variations in performance. As we have seen, that arises particularly in the area of health outcome measures, when health status measures are used as proxies for health outcomes. There is likely to be less of a problem with process ‘measures’ of outcomes or with measures of responsiveness. However, even here it may be require investigation and analysis to identify what levers must be pulled to improve performance.

**Composite indicators**

Another issue, which faces all who devise sets of performance indicators, is whether or not to aggregate the indicators to provide composite or summary measures. The main argument in favour of aggregation is that without it, those trying to monitor performance may drown in a sea of detail. The main argument against aggregation is that to the extent indicators reflect performance against different goals, aggregation requires adding ‘apples’ and ‘pears’. Value judgements are required to weight different objectives, unless market prices or average unit costs can be used as weights. Moreover, if only summary indicators are published, the origin of variations in performance tends to be concealed. However, it is possible to publish both summary measures and their components.

A third issue is how to set standards or benchmarks for performance. One possibility - adopted recently by the UK - is to adopt certain ambitious but achievable targets for key areas of care, combined with a ‘traffic light’ system.

Another possibility, demonstrated recently by WHO for Member countries, is to use ‘frontier analysis’ to identify best performance among the performing units.

**Types of performance management**

Performance management in European ethnic welfare systems is a large, diverse and evolving subject, which is dealt with only selectively in this paper. By ‘performance management’ we mean the whole set of institutional and incentive arrangements by which performance information is (or is not) used to influence performance in health care systems. These institutional arrangements may be somewhat centralised,
as in the UK or they may be decentralised, as in the US. They may rely on one or more of a variety of incentives. The list of possibilities includes: professional motivation under an ‘agency relationship’; command and control; and self-interested behaviour in a market, or quasi-market, environment.

There are some important similarities in performance management arrangements across European health systems and there are some important differences.

The underlying reason for such arrangements is that there is asymmetry of knowledge between health professionals and “patients”. It is closely related to the difficulty of finding unambiguous and reliable measures of ethnic welfare already referred to above.

One of the big questions facing health policy makers is whether to strengthen self-regulation or whether to adopt a mix of self-regulation and external scrutiny. It is almost certainly quite unrealistic to contemplate displacing self-regulation altogether. In some countries, the search for improved outcomes and quality has focused mainly on strengthening the institutions and activities of peer review.

In other respects, there are wide differences between countries in performance management arrangements. These differences stem from the variety of institutional arrangements governing ethnic care across European countries. One dimension of variation is between private and public institutions. Another dimension of variation is between centralised and decentralised arrangements. Yet another dimension of variation is between management-based command and control and market based incentivisation of providers.

FIGURES AND TABLES

TABLE 1. NORMATIVE CRITERIA IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
### TABLE 2: CONFLICT-REGULATING PRACTICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory types</th>
<th>Criteria for a good democratic public discourse</th>
<th>( who ) participates</th>
<th>( how ) ideas should be presented</th>
<th>( outcome ) of relation between discourse and decision-making</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>( who ) participates</td>
<td>( how ) ideas should be presented</td>
<td>( outcome ) of relation between discourse and decision-making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representative Liberal</td>
<td>elite dominance</td>
<td>Free marketplace of ideas</td>
<td>detachment civility</td>
<td>closure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expertise</td>
<td>transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participatory Liberal</td>
<td>popular inclusion</td>
<td>empowerment</td>
<td>range of styles</td>
<td>avoidance of imposed closure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discursive</td>
<td>popular inclusion</td>
<td>deliberative</td>
<td>dialogue mutual respect civility</td>
<td>avoidance of premature, non-consensus-based closure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructionist</td>
<td>popular inclusion</td>
<td>empowerment recognition</td>
<td>narrative creativity</td>
<td>avoidance of exclusionary closure; expansion of the political community</td>
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<tr>
<th>Consociational Approach</th>
<th>Integrative Approach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Divisions of Power</td>
<td>Granting autonomy and creating confederal arrangements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Creating a polycommunal federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision-Making Rules</td>
<td>Adopting proportional representation and consensus rules in executive, legislative, and administrative decision making</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopting a highly proportional electoral system</td>
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<tr>
<td>State-Ethnic Relations</td>
<td>Acknowledging group rights or corporate federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopting ethnicity-blind public policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sisk, 1996, Table 1

FIGURE 1. STRUCTURE OF INTERVENTION
FIGURE 1. Analytical framework for the research endeavor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES</th>
<th>CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES</th>
<th>LIBERTY</th>
<th>EQUALITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>LIFE</td>
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<td>Protection from Harm</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Antidiscrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Privacy &amp; Confidentiality</td>
<td>Cultural Responsiveness</td>
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<td>Empowerment &amp; Part.</td>
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<td>Decision-making</td>
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<td>Liberty (physical)</td>
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<td>COMMUNITY</td>
<td>Integration</td>
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<td>Productivity</td>
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<td>FAMILY AS FOUNDATION</td>
<td>Protection from Harm</td>
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<td>Family Integrity</td>
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<td>Family Centeredness</td>
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<td>ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES</td>
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<td>CAPACITY</td>
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<td>- Coordination and Collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Empowerment &amp; Part. Decision-making</td>
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<td>- Family-Centeredness</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Professional &amp; System Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Classification</td>
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<td>INDIVIDUALIZATION</td>
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<td>- Individualized Appr. Service</td>
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<td>- Coordination and Collaboration</td>
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<td>- Capacity-based</td>
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<td>- Cultural Responsiveness</td>
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<td>- Coordination and Collaboration</td>
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<td>- Accountability</td>
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FIGURE 4. RISK POLICY APPROACH
FIGURE 5. POLICY STRUCTURES- PERCEPTION OF RISKS
Matrix 1. of Some Basic Causes, Symptoms and Preconditions of Ethno-Political Conflict Situation at Different Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>levels</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>Social Awareness</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Political-Ideological</td>
<td>Current events</td>
<td>Name calling rumours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. inter-personal</td>
<td>cultural differences</td>
<td>oral history</td>
<td>social stereotypes</td>
<td>job loss job discrimination</td>
<td>political preferences political identity</td>
<td>Graffiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>family, tradition</td>
<td>religion</td>
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<td>language customs</td>
<td>dichotomic thinking (friend/enemy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. small cultural</td>
<td>living history</td>
<td>social</td>
<td>access to job</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>graffiti</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Religious Customs</td>
<td>Family Memories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communal</td>
<td>Cultural Differences</td>
<td>Tradition Symbols, Myths Distinctive Religious Values</td>
<td>Living History Taught History</td>
<td>Social Stereotypes</td>
<td>Prejudices</td>
<td>Job Location Cultural Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regional</td>
<td>Social Perception</td>
<td>Tradition Cultural Differences</td>
<td>Common Historical Heritage Historical Determinants</td>
<td>Attitudes Towards Different Nations</td>
<td>Government Investment External Investment Lack of Investment</td>
<td>Centralization Level of Democratisation Factor of Territorial Differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. inter-state</td>
<td>lifestyle tradition distinctive religious values cultural differences</td>
<td>interpretation of the past white spots in history</td>
<td>social stereotypes public opinion</td>
<td>investment economic competition</td>
<td>constitutiona l provisions international agreements bilateral treaties external allies (kin state) bilateral relations</td>
<td>unusual military movement environment al disputes media international climate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Matrix 2. Suggested bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic response levels to ethnic early warning message**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Response Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inter-personal</td>
<td>informal groups, opinion-formers, eminent personalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small community</td>
<td>local-government, legitimate political representatives, church ecumeny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal</td>
<td>local-government, social-cultural organisations, NGOs, women organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Foundations, Institutions, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intra-state</td>
<td>ombudsman, United Nations High Commissioner on National Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-state</td>
<td>governments, The Hague International Court of Justice, OSCE Vienna Conflict Prevention Center, UN High Commissioner on National Minorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blénesi Eva, 1998. matrix 2

**Matrix 3. Suggested policy response levels to ethnic early warning messages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Response Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inter-personal</td>
<td>citizens’ diplomacy, mediation, civic education, police reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small community</td>
<td>citizens’ diplomacy, fair representation in local government's decision-making, police reform, human rights education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>citizens’ diplomacy, managing differences, distributive policies, problem-solving workshops, inter-communal trade, human rights education, power-sharing arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>transboundary-co-operation of local governments, transboundary economic and environmental co-operation, transnational mediation, targeted development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intra-state</td>
<td>media literacy, minority broadcast, multicultural education, legal reforms, human rights monitoring, mediation, leadership training, training on conflict management through mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-state</td>
<td>preventive diplomacy, track-two diplomacy, OSCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blénesi Eva, 1998. fig.1
Human Dimension mechanism, exchange programs, bilateral agreements, economic integration, non-official facilitation, joint training programs on environmental issues, natural resources management, good offices, unilateral good will gestures, open-sky agreements, non-official facilitation

Source: Blénesi Eva, 1998 matrix 3

EPOC (Effective Practice and Organisation of Care) taxonomy of interventions aimed at achieving practice change

PROFESSIONAL INTERVENTIONS

- Distribution of educational materials
- Educational meetings
- Local consensus processes
- Educational outreach visits
- Local opinion leaders
- Patient-mediated interventions
- Audit and feedback
- Reminders
- Marketing
- Mass media

FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS

- Provider interventions
- Patient interventions

ORGANISATION INTERVENTIONS

- Revision of professional roles
- Multidisciplinary teams
- Formal integration of services
- Skill mix changes
- Continuity of care
- Interventions to boost morale
  - Communication and case discussion

**PATIENT-ORIENTED INTERVENTIONS**

- Consumer participation in governance of healthcare organisation
- Mail order pharmacies
- Mechanisms for dealing with patient suggestions and complaints

**STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS**

- Changes to site/setting of service delivery
- Changes to physical structure
- Changes in medical records systems
- Changes in scope and nature of benefits of services
- Presence and organisation of quality monitoring
- Ownership of hospitals and other facilities
- Staff organisation

**REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS**

- Changes in medical liability
- Management of patient complaints
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