SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME
PRIORITY 7
“Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge based Society”

Deliverable 8
“The Key Determinants of Community Conflict Escalation and De-escalation in Europe: a Systematic Comparative Analysis (QCA)”

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PEACE-COM
Peace Processes in Community Conflicts:
From Understanding the Roots of Conflicts to Conflict Resolution
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1. General Introduction

The purpose of this introduction is twofold: first, to briefly lay out the key goals and ambition of the “systematic comparative analysis” part of the PEACE-COM project; and second, to present the structure of this D8 report.

1.1. Systematic Comparative Analysis: an over-arching effort

A key goal of the PEACE-COM project is to systematically describe and explain the community conflicts and their historical dynamics in relation to the whole range of social, cultural, religious, political, economic etc. processes with which they interact. The important keyword here is «dynamics»: we are dealing with very complex, multilayered, multifaceted processes. The PEACE-COM project is particularly ambitious, in that it strives to achieve this description and explanation in a whole series of different situations, in different types of conflicts with different magnitudes – all of this over the whole post-WWII period.

As has been laid out elsewhere (e.g. D1 report), the cases have been selected so as to maximize geographical and cultural diversity (throughout parts of Europe: East-West-North-South, Latin v/s non-Latin cases, etc.) as well as diversity in terms of shapes and dimensions of conflicts (violent v/s less violent; relative importance or saliency of different dimensions: cultural, religious, economic, political, etc.). At the same time, we have made sure that the research teams engaged in this project have expertise of the different cases. Because PEACE-COM is both a case-oriented and a truly comparative research project, we have opted for a research design which avoids the mere juxtaposition of several case studies, by providing a common conceptual and empirical framework for all conflicts.

More precisely, in order to reach more authoritative comparative conclusions, the consortium has chosen to use a “systematic comparative case analysis” design and specific innovative comparative techniques, in order to systematically compare the cases, using both the qualitative and quantitative data which has been gathered in each case. More specifically, the csQCA (crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis) technique\(^1\) has been exploited in a rigorous manner. Because this technique (and other connected QCA techniques) is not yet so well-known, a basic introduction to this technique will also be provided in this report.

The systematic cross-case comparative analysis presented in this report constitutes an over-arching effort of the project, because – as shall be demonstrated below – it integrates all the main theoretical\(^2\) and empirical dimensions of the project: stages of conflict, conflict dimensions, «framing» of the conflicts, actors, repertoires of action, accommodation initiatives, etc. Only by integrating all these aspects can we hope to reach a better understanding (or even some ‘explanations’) of the dynamics of community conflicts.

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\(^1\) As well as another technique, for some analyses: mvQCA (multi-value QCA) for some specific tests. See Section 2.

\(^2\) Because this report subsumes findings and theoretical perspectives from all the other Deliverables of the project, the reader will find the theoretical and empirical bibliographical references in those respective Deliverables. An overview of some key theoretical references is provided in the D1 report.
1.2. Structure of this report

This report consists of seven core sections (Sections 2 to 8), which can be boiled down to four key steps.

In a first step (Section 2), we clarify the comparative research design and methodology which lies at the heart of the PEACE-COM project. Crucial issues such as case selection and the goals of systematic comparison are discussed as well. Further, we provide basic information on the “systematic cross-case analysis” approach which is adopted – this approach displays specific strengths for the purpose of our project. Finally, we also briefly present the set of data analysis techniques – called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – which will enable us to systematically compare all our cases over several decades.

In a second step (Section 3), we provide a step-by-step summary on how “synthetic case descriptions” (SCDs) have been constructed for each country or region analyzed. We explain how and why these SCDs, covering all the dimensions and relevant facets of each case, are a crucial intermediate step between ‘thick’ case descriptions and formal, systematic comparison of those cases with the QCA techniques. Two concrete examples (Northern Ireland and Belgium) are also provided as an illustration.

In a third step (Section 4), we very precisely describe the final model which shall be tested with QCA, and clearly define the ‘outcomes’ of interest (in terms of variation in the level of conflict) as well as the potential ‘conditions’ (explanatory factors) which are included in the model. Each condition is discussed in detail and translated into a specific hypothesis linking that condition to the outcome(s).

In a fourth and main step, which is presented in greater detail (Sections 5 to 8), we perform all the QCA analyses and, on that basis, are able to identify the key ‘causal paths’ leading to the outcomes of interest: respectively conflict escalation, non-escalation, de-escalation and non-de-escalation. Each one of these ‘causal paths’ is presented as a formal formula and its verbal translation, and is then interpreted by going ‘back to the cases’, relying on the ‘thick’ case expertise gathered in the course of the PEACE-COM project.

Finally, in the general conclusion (Section 9), we attempt to subsume the main findings, “revisit” the key research questions and hypotheses, and discuss further avenues for research, in particular in the view of enlarging the pool of empirical cases beyond the European context.

1.3. Acknowledgements

Naturally, this report relies on the case expertise of the PEACE-COM partner teams, through their writing up of country reports (WP1), and through their numerous feedbacks at various stages of the elaboration of this WP2. Four persons have played a more specifically important role in the elaboration of this D8 report. Régis Dandoy has collected and harmonized the synthetic case descriptions (SCDs) and has technically conducted the first series of exploratory QCA tests. Jeroen Joly has pursued further csQCA exploratory tests and has conducted the final csQCA and mvQCA tests that form the core of this D8 report (sections 5 to 8). Elise Féron has given her transversal substantive expertise in the project to provide ideas in many of the interpretations of the causal paths (section 5 to 8). Finally, Benoît Rihoux has elaborated the whole systematic comparative design, as well as the structure and guidelines for the SCDs. He has also overseen the various steps of the QCA analyses and has written down this final report.
2. Comparative research design and methodology

2.1. Comparative research design: Systematic Cross-Case Analysis (SCCA)

The PEACE-COM project comprises three types of comparisons, very different in terms of scope, data, and methods: specific (dimensional) comparisons, “soft” qualitative comparisons, and systematic cross-case comparisons (Systematic Cross-Case Analysis; SCCA). Only the third approach – the most ambitious one – is examined here\(^3\).

By “systematic”, we mean: a formalized procedure (coding data into numerical form and using a replicable\(^4\) data treatment procedure), covering all cases, and also covering all the major potential explanatory factors of the evolution of the level of conflict – i.e. encompassing as many hypotheses as possible (see Section 3 & 4) in the empirical test.

In spite of its formalized nature, this is largely a case-oriented approach which necessitates the input of each case specialist, at several stages of the process. Two practical points must be clarified. First, what do we mean by “explanation” or “explanatory factors”? In empirical social science research, “explanation” in the full sense is often an over-ambition goal. Do we really ambition to “explain” the evolution of community conflicts? This is a quite major claim, which requires a clarification of some assumptions (e.g. a specific conception of “causality”, etc.). For sure, in this project, we perform systematic descriptions of “thick” cases. What SCCA will allow us to do, at the very least, is to identify regularities (or co-occurrences, associations, etc.) in the data, across all the cases or clusters of cases. However moving from the observation of regularities – perhaps “relationships” – in the data to the interpretation of the regularities in terms of “explanations” is no easy task.

Second, generically speaking, what are our outcomes of interest? It is quite clearly the amplitude or degree of conflict; or, more precisely: the variations in the amplitude or degree of conflict, in terms of “stages of conflict”, as shall be defined in further section. In more concrete terms, we’ll have to define some more specific outcomes, so as to perform the empirical tests. In order to make progress towards the explanation of such an outcome across all the cases, quite clearly all the dimensions of the cases need to be injected in the analysis: accommodation policies, conflict dimensions, perceptions, actors, repertoires of action, etc.

2.2. Main steps of the SCCA: a bird’s eye view

There are four main steps in this SCCA effort, which we attempt to clarify in a visual way (Figure 1). The whole effort can be summarized in one sentence: in order to systematically compare quite a number of very complex cases, we need to reduce the complexity by concentrating only on some key features, some key evolutions of each case. In other words:

\(^3\) All details on SCCA and the specific techniques associated with it (QCA etc.), as well as numerous bibliographical references, can be found through http://www.compassss.org, and through a textbook: Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (eds) Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Thousand Oaks & London: Sage, 2008 (forthcoming as this D8 report is being finalized).

\(^4\) Such as in a statistical procedure – but NB: in this case, we will use a non-statistical formal data treatment procedure (based on Boolean algorithms: the “algebra of logics”).

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we need (only at some intermediate stages) to “sacrifice” some part of the great complexity of the cases. This is what makes systematic comparison (i.e. some form of “generalization” – see below) possible.

Figure 1 : main sequences of SCCA

SCCA sequences: a bird’s eye view

One key prior step, thus, once we have “thick” case narratives at our disposal (the case descriptions, plus all the background expertise of our PEACE-COM case specialists), is to elaborate some “synthetic case descriptions” (see below). This enables model-building, and then formal treatment with QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis; see below). Finally, the results of the QCA need to be interpreted, i.e. informed by “thick” case knowledge and by theoretical knowledge as well.

2.3. Using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) : how and why ?

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a method that was launched some 20 years ago by Charles Ragin. It is both an approach (and research design) and a set of specific techniques for the analysis of data.

As an approach, QCA develops a “synthetic strategy”, which ambitions to integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach. Indeed, on the one hand, QCA meets some key strengths of the qualitative approach. The first one is its holistic character: each individual case is considered as a complex entity (a «whole») which needs to be comprehended and which should not be forgotten in the course of

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5 See footnote 2 for further information.
the analysis. Thus it is a case-sensitive approach. Furthermore, it develops a conception of causality which leaves some room for complexity. This is a truly central feature of QCA: multiple conjunctural causation. This implies that: A/ most often, it is a combination of conditions that eventually produce a phenomenon (the « outcome »); B/ several different combinations of conditions may very well produce the same outcome; and C/ depending on the context, on the « conjuncture », a given condition may very well have a different impact on the outcome. This implies that different « causal paths » – each path being relevant, in a distinct way – may lead to the same outcome. Causality is viewed as context- and conjuncture-sensitive (as in policy evaluation indeed; see below). Hence, by using QCA, the researcher is urged not to specify a single causal model that fits the data best (which is often done with most conventional statistical techniques), but instead to determine the number and character of the different causal models that exist among comparable cases.

On the other hand, QCA also ambitions to meet some key strengths of the quantitative approach. Firstly, it allows one to analyze more than a few cases, and from there on to produce – to a certain extent – some generalizations. Secondly, it relies on formal tools (Boolean algebra) and is analytic in nature, in the sense that each case is reduced to a series of variables (a certain number of conditions and an outcome). The specific combination of conditions (for a given case) leading to a given outcome is called a configuration. Therefore QCA and its techniques are sometimes also referred to as “Configurational Comparative Methods”.

At the same time QCA is not radically analytic, as it leaves some room for the holistic dimension of phenomena (see above). Thirdly, it is a replicable analysis, in the sense that a researcher B who uses the same variables and makes the same choices as a researcher A will reach the same conclusions as the latter. This replicability also opens up the way for other researchers to verify or falsify the results obtained in the analysis. Finally, the Boolean technique allows one to identify « causal regularities» that are parsimonious, i.e. that combine only a few conditions, and not all the conditions that have been considered in the model.

Besides constituting a middle way between the holistic and analytic strategies, QCA is particularly well-suited for « small-N » or « intermediate N » situations and research design. Moreover, it allows one to consider both phenomena that vary qualitatively and phenomena that vary quantitatively. Both of these phenomena can be operationalized in the conditions and outcome variables used for software treatment. So, while cases do matter, and each case matters, in QCA (in this sense, it has a strong « qualitative » preoccupation), QCA really lies at the crossroads of qualitative and quantitative analysis.

As a set of techniques, QCA has been developed in the form of software treatment of data (two computer programs, FSQCA and TOSMANA). There are three main QCA techniques:

- the original Boolean version of QCA, where the conditions and the outcome have to be dichotomized. It is called csQCA⁶ (where “cs” stands for “crisp set”);
- the version that allows multiple-category conditions, called mvQCA (where “mv” stands for “multi-value”);
- the fuzzy set version which also links Fuzzy Sets to truth table analysis, called fsQCA (where “fs” stands for “fuzzy set”).

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⁶ Note that, in most publications so far, csQCA has simply been referred to as “QCA” – hopefully, the more precise and unambiguous “csQCA” label will be used from now on.
From now on, in this report, we will concentrate on csQCA, which shall be used for our analyses (mvQCA will also be used for some analyses, because one condition will also be operationalized in a more fine-grained way).

The key philosophy of csQCA as a technique is to start by assuming causal complexity and then mount an assault on that complexity. The tool which is used for this purpose of reducing complexity is Boolean algebra, the «algebra of logic». It would be impossible to give a clear idea of all the technical details and steps in this report.

In a nutshell, these are the main technical steps:

1. The researcher must first produce a raw data table, in which each case displays a specific combination of conditions (with «0» or «1» values) and an outcome (with the «0» or «1» value).

2. The software then produces a truth table which displays the data as a list of configurations – in a more synthetic way, as several different cases may very well display the same configuration.

3. Then the key step of the analysis is Boolean minimization: by using Boolean algorithms, the software reduces the long Boolean expression (which consists in the long description of the truth table) into a much shorter expression.

4. This shorter expression (called the minimal formula) that shows the causal regularities – the different causal paths, called prime implicants or terms – that were, in a way, «hidden» in the data.

5. Finally, it is then up to the researcher to interpret this minimal formula in the light of his/her case and theoretical knowledge.

Two more strengths of csQCA as a technique deserve to be mentioned. On the one hand, it can be used for at least five different purposes. The most basic use is simply to summarize data, i.e. to describe cases in a more synthetic way (by producing a table of configurations). Hence it can be a useful tool for data exploration, for instance to construct typologies in a more inductive way. It can also be used to check the coherence within the data: when the researcher discovers contradictions, this allows him/her to learn more about the individual cases. The third use is to test existing theories or assumptions, i.e. to eventually corroborate (validate) or refute (falsify) these theories or assumptions. csQCA is hence a particularly powerful tool for theory-testing (for example for testing the “causal theory” underlying a public policy). This will be the main use of the technique in this report. Fourthly, it can be used to test some new ideas or assumptions formulated by the researcher (i.e. not embodied in an existing theory); this can also be useful for data exploration. Last but not least, it allows one to elaborate new assumptions or theories: the minimal formula obtained at the end of the analysis can be exploited and interpreted – i.e. confronted with the cases examined – and eventually lead the researcher to put forward some new segments of theory, in a more inductive way.

On the other hand, in the course of the procedure, the researcher is confronted with choices. For instance, he/she must decide whether or not he/she wants to obtain the shortest solution possible (i.e. achieve a maximal level of parsimony). If this choice is made, this means that some logical remainders (i.e. cases that exist logically, but that have not been observed in the data) will be included in the «black box» for the Boolean minimization. The point is that the researcher may very well reject this option, and hence prefer more complexity over more parsimony. One also has to make clear choices on which variables to include and how to dichotomize them. The bottom line is that csQCA is a particularly transparent technique,
insofar as it forces the researcher not only to make choices on his/her own (he/she decides, not the computer), but also to justify these choices, from a theoretical and/or substantive perspective.

Hence csQCA really forces the user to always keep an eye on theory… and the other eye on the real-life, complex cases behind the coded data, not only on the tables and formulae produced by the software. Thus csQCA is both theory-driven and inductive: although induction does play an important role, there is quite a significant input of theory in csQCA. For instance, quite clearly, the selection of variables that will be used for the analysis – and the way each variable is operationalized – must be theoretically informed.
3. Synthetic Case Descriptions (SCDs)

3.1. The template: overall design

3.1.1. Goal and graphical presentation

In order to conduct a SCCA, we need to find a way to elaborate some « synthetic » versions of the thick, detailed case studies – we call these « synthetic case descriptions » (SCDs). There must be as many SCDs as there are cases. It is clear that only the case study experts are qualified enough to elaborate their own synthetic case description. Our task, as WP2 leaders for the SCCA part, has been is to provide a very clear canvas (with guidelines) explaining how to proceed. This canvas will be presented in detail in this section.

The best way to obtain a real synthetic case description is to make it so synthetic that the whole narrative of the case, in all of its dimensions and for the whole period under study, can be read at once, on one single page. The only way to achieve this is to make it visual, i.e. to elaborate a graph-like synthesis of the case. Of course, behind the graph lie a lot of details, comments, justifications, qualitative-historical statements, nuances, etc… All these elements should accompany the synthetic graph – the case experts have filled in an additional document with qualitative comments.

The most straightforward way to proceed is to take “time” (objective\(^7\), calendar time, i.e. months & years) as one axis of the graph. This is the time line. The second axis then constitutes a careful scrutiny (and graph-like summary) of all the evolutions monitored for the case, on all its “outcome” and “conditions” (i.e. potential explanatory or intervening factors, potentially linked to the outcome) dimensions.

3.1.2. Definition of a “case”

From a pragmatic perspective, and for the sake of providing a synthetic description, a “case” is defined as an area (a country or a specific region), observed over a certain period of time. This means that each PEACE-COM partner had to provide one synthetic case description, with one exception: former Yugoslavia with three distinct regional cases (Sandzak, Vojvodina, Kosovo), because these three cases differ very much in their narratives and evolution in terms of levels of conflict.

Eventually, we were able to collect and process 9 SCDs – thus we have 9 cases for the SCCA: Austria (Carinthia), the Basque country, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Sandzak and Vojvodina. However, note (see below) that, due to the definition of the outcomes of interest, and due to the way the time dimension will be operationalized, we shall have much more “cases” (for the csQCA analyses).

\(^7\) Time can also be more subjectively defined (e.g. by some actors, when they construct their narratives), but in this graph we have chosen to stick to the objective time dimension.
3.1.3. Period to be covered

Because of the scope of the project, each case description has to cover the post-1945 period. In addition, for some cases it might make sense to refer to prior historical periods as well, before and/or during WWII. This choice is left to the case specialists. A specific area in the graph (left-hand side) is provided for this purpose. NB: for this period prior to 1945, the information must be more simplified, i.e. only the most dominant features for the whole period under consideration must be mentioned on the graph (see also specific instructions, section by section, here below).

Time is considered as objective, calendar time, i.e. months & years (see above), and represented as the horizontal axis of the graph.

3.1.4. Symbols

The case experts were given a template file (PowerPoint slide), in which they could easily copy/paste a series of symbols. Naturally, it is important that all SCD graphs use the same conventions. The symbols are as follows:

- The “arrow” symbols stands for particularly important developments (main events, evolutions, etc.) which can be placed at a particular point in time:
  - Arrow upwards: expected to have (or surely has) a conflict-increasing influence; tends to increase (or has the potential to increase) tensions;
  - Arrow downwards: expected to have (or surely has) a conflict-diminishing influence; tends to decrease (or has the potential to decrease) tensions;
  - Arrow both upwards and downwards: it is disputable whether this important development has a conflict-increasing or a conflict-diminishing influence; this event is perceived in contrasted ways, depending on the parties in conflict (the two main “camps”).

NB with regards to these arrows:

- For each dimension, the case experts only had to mention the most important events (rule of thumb: the 3 to 5 most important\(^8\) ones over the whole period). “Importance” is used as a generic term: it refers to events which may be expected to have (or have actually had) a strong influence on the developments of the conflict.

- If more than one important event (say: a sequence of 2 or more important events) occurred in a short period of time (say: during less than a year): the case experts had to summarize the information by one arrow, and provide the details in the “comments” file. Of course, if some of these events in that short period of time relate to different conflict dimensions (section B), or to different actors (section D), or too different repertoires of action (section E), the case experts had to insert some arrows as well on the relevant lines in the various sections.

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\(^8\) This was left to each case specialist. They could mention more events, provided that these events were really important ones. If a particular period (say: a few years) is characterized by the occurrence of a large number of relevant events, the “line” symbol had to be used instead (see right below).
3.1.5. Elaboration by the national teams

In the PEACE-COM partner teams where more than one researcher was involved in the project, we have advised that, as a first step, each researcher tries to fill in the graph him/herself separately. Then, in a second step, there could be a team discussion to cross the perspectives and reach an agreement – by “crossing” expert judgments and possibly subjective views. This was done by most of the teams. Thus the SCDs could be quite consolidated.

3.2. The template: detailed instructions

Here below, we replicate the detailed instructions which were given to the case specialists (see Figures in next sections for a graphical representation – the instructions follow the sequence of the graphs, from top to bottom).

3.2.1. A1: Stages of conflict

As a reminder, it is on the basis of this variable that we shall construct the outcome to be explained. This refers to the typology of conflicts as discussed in the D1 report, i.e.:

- Stage 1: peaceful stable situations, with a ‘high degree of political stability and regime legitimacy’, where a distinct minority coexists peacefully with a majority whose cultural background and heritage differs largely.

- Stage 2: political tension situations, with ‘growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines’. Sometimes these conflicts take a violent form, without causing human casualties, but sometimes the coexistence of several communities with distinct identities does not entail any specific form of physical violence.

- Stage 3: violent political conflict, where tension has escalated to ‘political crisis’ inasmuch as there has been an ‘erosion of political legitimacy of the national government’ and / or a ‘rising acceptance of violent factional politics’ with a number of people killed in any one calendar year up to 100.

- Stage 4: low intensity conflicts, where there is ‘open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups, regime repression and insurgency’ with 100-999 people killed in any one year.

- Stage 5: high intensity conflicts, where there is an ‘open warfare among rival groups and /or mass destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population’, with 1000 or more people killed in any one year.

In addition, for the pre-1945 period (left-hand area), we asked the case experts to:

- indicate with a line (if relevant) the predominant level of conflict during the whole period under consideration (i.e. the level of conflict which has most often been observed during the whole period);
- in the ‘comments’ Word file: provide the following 2 bits of complementary information (with qualitative comments/justifications, if needed):
  o the historical starting point (year) of the conflict, from their perspective;
  o the highest level of violence reached during that whole period.

3.2.2. A2: Accommodation initiatives

This refers to the occurrence of major accommodation initiatives (e.g. intervention of third parties, domestic or international, etc., and/or from some “camps” in the conflict). Some of these initiatives take a more structural form (longer process – to be represented as a line), whereas some other initiatives can be located at a precise point in time.

3.2.3. B : Conflict dimensions

This follows the sequence of the 12 conflict dimensions, as identified in the D1 report, grouped into 4 clusters:

A. “Cultural” dimensions :

1. **Religious dimension**: conflicting ideological views or religious faiths;

2. **Identity dimension**: struggle for basic needs such as recognition: communities put the stress on differences that exist between them and their neighbours, and on the animosity that has ‘always’ opposed them (an important process of “victimization” is at play, using medias, historical narratives, etc.);

3. **Cultural/Linguistic dimension**: linguistic and cultural differences that communities wish to preserve, as part of their basic identity and characteristics.

B. “Socio-economic and geographic” dimensions :

4. **Socio-economic dimension**: differences in socio-economic resources available for the concerned communities.

5. **Demography and population shifts dimension**: various processes leading to demographic changes, such as migrations, hazardous border drawing, differences in birth rates, etc. These changes often create discrepancies between political structures and communities’ demographic weights. They can also generate fears of extinction or of ‘minoritization’.

6. **Territorial dimension**: there is competition to occupy/own a given territory, as it is often seen as indivisible, and bears a romantic meaning.

C. “Political” dimensions :

7. **Centre-Periphery dimension**: opposition between a peripheral region or territory and the central state structures, which are accused of neglecting them, or of preventing them from preserving and developing their own culture, identity and interests.

8. **Security Dilemma and Access to Political Scene dimension**: a community feels distrust and estrangement towards state structures and apparatus, which seem to prevent it from participating in discussions and debates about its own conditions of life and future.
9. **Political leaders dimension:** propaganda and actions of a small group of political leaders (community leaders) whose position and power are legitimized and reinforced by the conflict.

10. **Citizenship denial dimension:** access to citizenship is difficult, or even denied to some communities (when citizenship is framed in terms of a national belonging which is itself strictly defined in terms of language, ascendency or religion).

D. **“External” dimensions (exogenous factors)**

11. **Decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension:** geopolitical transitions occur (e.g. resurgence of ancient hatreds kept under control by colonialism and / or the Cold War; erosion of the state’s autonomy following globalization, etc.)

12. **Neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension:** neighbouring countries, diasporas or bordering communities intervene in the conflict (e.g. to support one of the communities, against another community).

Operationalization:

We asked the case experts to consider each one of the 12 dimensions separately, and to apply strictly the same rules for each dimension:

- occurrence of particularly important events linked to one dimension: to be mentioned (with arrows). The importance of events can be objective (e.g. a major demographic shift, or an initiative of a charismatic community leader, etc.), or subjective (e.g. it plays a major role in the “framing” of the conflict by at least one community);

- saliency of dimension (over longer periods of time; continuous lines):
  - (if the dimension hasn’t been salient, neither in policy discourse nor in policies: no line)
  - (if the dimension has been salient, in terms of policy discourse and/or in terms of policies, but if this saliency has remained low or medium in the conflict: no line)
  - if the dimension has been salient in terms of policy discourse and/or in terms of policies, and if this saliency has, at least in some periods, been (very) high: identify the most highly salient period with a line.

NB: high saliency is defined as followed:

- for discourse: the dimension is a main stake in the conflict; it creates a deep division in society;
- for policy: the dimension is (one of) the main focus(es) of policy attention.

All other situations were to be considered as “low” or “medium” saliency.
3.2.4. C : Issues and framing

Even if the reality is sometimes more complex, each party in the conflict comes to see itself as opposed to one other “side” or “camp”.

Items C1 to C3 are three complementary ways to map the framing of the conflict by the two main “camps” involved. In community conflicts, obviously, the perception of the situation by the opposing parties is a very important factor to be taken into account: community conflicts develop not only around “objective” problems, but also (sometimes predominantly) on “constructed” problems. Indeed, no community conflict exists in pure “objective” form, but is mediated by subjective perceptions of conflicting parties (more on this topic: item C3, below).

NB: from C1 to C3: if more than two parties are involved in the conflict: the case experts were asked to select the two most important ones, i.e. the two parties which are directly opposing each other “on the battlefield” of the conflict (see Northern Ireland example, below).

3.2.5. C1 : Within-community differentiation (factional predominance)

The power relationships in a community conflict should not be over-simplified. This section provides one way to tap this complexity: by considering each community as a heterogeneous whole. Indeed, no community is entirely homogeneous. Within each community, there is a constellation of different sub-groups, which form advocacy coalitions. Most often it is possible to identify a few main “factions” (i.e. more or less organized and coherent large “tendencies”) – e.g. “radicals” versus “moderates”, etc. – within a given community.

For each one of the two main communities, we asked the case experts to provide (in the accompanying Word document) a list of the main factions, with a maximum of 3 factions per community (numbered from 1 to 3). They were thus asked to concentrate on the more important factions.

The issue is: through time, which one is the dominant faction in each one of the 2 main communities? Dominance can be assessed through different indicators: media access, electoral results, access to negotiations, access to resources (members, activists, funds, etc.).

For each community, the following numerical codes were given:

- code “1”: dominant faction is faction 1;
- code “2”: dominant faction is faction 2;
- code “3”: dominant faction is faction 3.

3.2.6. C2 : Main paradigms of conflict

The question is: within each camp, how is the conflict mainly framed through time, with regards to the 4 clusters of conflict dimensions (see section above)?

- code “A” stands for: main framing in terms of the “cultural” dimensions (first cluster of dimensions);
- code “B” stands for: main framing in terms of the “socio-economic and geographic” dimensions (second cluster of dimensions);

9 “Party” being defined as one large group in society, a “community”. E.g. the French-speaking Belgians, the Slovenes in Austria, the ethnic Russians in Estonia, etc.
- code “C” stands for: main framing in terms of the “political” dimensions (third cluster of dimensions);
- code “D” stands for: main framing in terms of the “external” dimensions (fourth cluster of dimensions).

The main indicator to be used to identify the main framing cluster of dimensions is the predominant discourse of “opinion leaders” of the community. The case experts did not have to collect specific primary data to make this assessment – instead the assessment was made qualitatively.

3.2.7. C3: Perception of self/other

If men perceive social situation as real, they are real in their consequences. In this sense, perceptions do not merely reflect but also create reality. This is what grounds a constructivist approach to complex social and political phenomena. This “reality-building” is accomplished differently by different actors (e.g. the opinion leaders in the different communities involved in the conflict). That is why there is no single “objective” reality in a community conflict, in which a single just solution can be grounded. There are, rather, multiple realities, multiple subjective worlds not reducible to any ‘objective’ mean.

Consequently, it makes sense to test, in addition to the ‘objective’ dimensions outlined in our project (see section B above), also the ‘perception’ dimension of the community conflicts. Since the ‘objective’ factors cannot be separated from the interpretive dimensions, research which focuses exclusively on the former will at best be partially successful. In our project the ‘perceptions’ constitute one dimension among the others. However, it is important to consider that it is different from the others as it co-exist also within ‘objective’ dimensions. For example, territorial conflicts can be analyzed along the ‘objective’ lines, but at the same time also along the lines of perceptions of the conflicting parties.

Thus we should not only determine around which ‘objective’ dimensions the concrete community conflict takes place, but also what is the semiotic meaning of the conflict for the conflicting parties.

In this section, we introduce a meaningful typology of the perceptions in community conflict. The question is: within each one of the 2 main “camps” (as defined above), how is the “other” community (the out-group) mainly perceived through time? We have elaborated a typology which consists of three ideal-types:

- code “1”: “non-existence” (separation): perception of symbolic non-existence of the ‘other’ community (out-group), in the sense that the in-group represents a kind of ‘higher’ form of existence (culturally, politically etc.), which really exists and ‘ought to be’, while the ‘other’ is ‘non-cultural’, ‘non-legal’ etc., which ‘ought not to be’ and that this is why it ‘does not exist’ (Hence there is no “conflict” perceived: separation does not include perception of open conflict - it does not make sense to conflict with a ‘non-existent’ other).

- code “2”: “alien other” (confrontation): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as an alien; domination of accusations, ethnocentrism and prejudices; perception of open conflict between the community groups and impossibility of compromises.

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10 This section is based on work by Raivo Vetik; see D10 report for more details and sources.
- code “3” : “different other” (integration): perception of the ‘other’ community (out-group) as a possible partner; possibility of compromises in case of conflicts; orientation towards cooperation and inclusion; perception of joint interests and multiple identities.

As for the C2 section, the main indicator to be used to identify the “main” perception of the “other camp” is the predominant discourse of “opinion leaders” of the community. The case experts did not have to collect specific primary data to make this assessment – instead the assessment was made qualitatively..

3.2.8. D : Organized actors

This section concentrates on “organized actors” in society (i.e. this does not include public opinion, which is more tapped through section C, above). The rationale for this section, in terms of operationalization, is exactly the same as for section B (conflict dimensions).

We asked the case experts to consider each one of the 10 actors separately, and to apply the same rules for each actor:

- occurrence of particularly important events or initiatives linked to one specific category of actors : mention them (arrows). The “importance” of events/initiatives can be “objective” (e.g. massive number of participants, or very high media visibility, etc.), or “subjective” (it plays a major role in the “framing” of the conflict by at least one community);

- importance of the role of the actor, in terms of influence (over longer periods of time; continuous lines):
  - (if the actor hasn’t been important in terms of influence, neither in policy discourse nor in policies: no line)
  - (if the actor has been important in terms of influence, in terms of policy discourse and/or in terms of policies, but if this importance in terms of influence has remained rather modest in the conflict: no line)
  - if the actor has been important in terms of influence, in terms of policy discourse and/or in terms of policies, and if this importance in terms of influence has, at least in some periods, been (very) high: identify the most influential period with a line.

For each category of actors, the case experts have also been asked to provide a list of the main concrete actors (e.g. labels of the main organizations, etc.).

NB: specific remarks on some of the 10 categories:

- category 1: includes national NGOs;

- category 4: “fringe political parties” are defined as parties which convey a more radical critique of the political-institutional system. They do not have access to government (they are not considered as “respectable” potential coalition partners). NB: it is not a matter of size – some of these parties may be large.

- Category 5: “mainstream political parties” are defined as parties which accept most of the formal and informal rules of the political-institutional system. They have potential access to government (they are considered as “respectable” potential coalition partners). NB: it is not a matter of size – some of these parties may be small.
3.2.9. E : Repertoires of action

This refers to the classical typology of collective actions developed by Barnes & Kaase, which has been fined-tuned to suit the needs of this project. The four types are defined in terms of: degree of “conventionality” and degree of violence. Naturally, the “conventional” nature of an action needs to be assessed within each specific (national) setting.

1. **Conventional institutional actions**: actions within the institutional setting, abiding by the institutional rules. These actions are, by definition, non violent. (selective list: voting, lobbying, interest group politics, formal negotiation, …).

2. **Conventional non-institutional actions**: actions outside the established institutions, but abiding by the legislation and generally accepted rules of the institutions. These actions are, by definition, non violent. (selective list: petitions, displaying slogans, authorized demonstrations\(^{11}\), …)

3. **Non-conventional actions with no violence against persons**: actions outside the established institutions, not abiding by the legislation and generally accepted rules. These actions do not involve violence against persons. These actions can be grouped into two main clusters:
   a. purely symbolic, with no violence whatsoever (selective list: refusal to pay taxes, boycott of products, peaceful unauthorized demonstrations, peaceful occupation of buildings, peaceful sit-ins, …)
   b. involving some violence, and damage to public or private property (selective list: tagging or destroying signposts, sabotage of infrastructure, bombing aiming at material damage, …)

4. **Non-conventional actions with violence against persons**: actions outside the established institutions, not abiding by the legislation and generally accepted rules, and which involve violence against persons (selective list: violent unauthorized demonstrations, violent occupation of buildings (e.g. clashing with police forces, taking “hostages”, …), hostage-taking, abduction, execution, bombings aiming at maiming or killing persons, warfare, guerrilla actions, violent direct action (e.g. militia action, vendetta, beatings, …), sexual abuse, …).

The case experts were asked to mention, on the graph:

- arrows: the major, most remarkable or notorious collective actions (if any) linked with the conflict.

\(^{11}\) I.e. demonstrations which are planned in advance and negotiated with the police forces or political authorities, etc.
lines: historical periods during which this category of actions has been often used.
The case experts were asked to mention only the most important collective actions, i.e. those
collective actions which have had (or are generally perceived\textsuperscript{12} as having had) some influence
on the evolution of the conflict.

3.3. Examples

In this section and the next one, we provide examples of two cases, for which we provide both
the graphical synthesis (the SCD itself) and the comments/details provided by the case
experts. We have purposefully selected two contrasted cases: one which has reached a high
level of violence (Northern Ireland), and one which is usually considered as a ‘pacified’
community conflict (Belgium).

Full information on the other cases (SCDs and comments/details) can be obtained through
Benoît Rihoux.

3.3.1. Example (1) : Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Of course it is very often a question of perception. Perceptions may of course vary, depending on which
“camp” one is in (see also section C). What is asked here is the expert judgement of the case specialists.

\textsuperscript{13} The information for this section has been provided by Elise Féron.
Here is the SCD (graph) for Northern Ireland (Figure 2):

A. OUTCOME DIMENSION
1. Stage of conflict
2. Accommodation initiatives

B. CONFLICT DIMENSIONS (evolutions/events)
1. Religion dimension
2. Identity dimension
3. Culture/language dimension
4. Socio-economic dimension
5. Demography/pop. shifts dimension
6. Territory dimension
7. Centre-periphery dimension
8. Security/pol. access dimension
9. Political leaders dimension
10. Citizenship denial dimension
11. Geopolitical transition dimension
12. Neighbours/diasporas dimension

C. ISSUES AND FRAMING
1. Within-camp fact. Dominance Protestants
   Within-camp fact. dominance Catholics
2. Main paradigm Protestants
   Main paradigm Catholics
3. Perception of self/other Protestants
   Perception of self/other Catholics

D. ORGANIZED ACTORS
1. National org. civil society/soc. movements
2. Churches
3. Established interest groups/lobbies
4. Fringe political parties
5. Mainstream political parties
6. Parliament and government
7. Mass media (if independent)
8. Other relevant domestic: paramilitary gps
9. European international actors
10. Non-European International actors (USA)

E. REPERTOIRES OF ACTION
1. Conventional institutional actions
2. Conventional non-institutional actions
3. Non-convent. – no violence v/s persons
4. Non-convent. – violence v/s persons

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And here is the sequence of comments by the case expert:

**Overall comments:**
- the 2 main opposing “camps”: Catholics/Nationalists v/s Protestants/ Unionists
- two other main actors: Britain and the Republic of Ireland
- one major external actor: the US and one whose importance is growing: the EU

**A1**
no comment

**A2**
Main conflict-increasing events:
- 1968 onwards: Civil Rights Campaign which led the British government to take the decision to deploy troops on the streets
- January 1972: Bloody Sunday
- 1981: Republican Hunger-Strikes

Main conflict-decreasing events:
- 1985: Anglo-Irish Agreement
- 1993: beginning of the on-going peace process (Talks Hume-Adams, then Downing Street Declaration on “the way forward”)
- April 1998: Good Friday Agreement

Events that can be perceived in contrasted ways:
- 1974: Sunningdale Agreement, first accommodation initiative which included a power-sharing structure, but which failed because of the opposition of unionists
- August 1998: Omagh bombing, which caused widespread revulsion

**B**

**B1**
The religious dimension is present since the beginning, and works as an ethnic marker, but the conflict is not about religion.

**B2**
Each community thinks its identity is at threat because of the existence of the other, and stresses its own specificities.

**B4**
The socio-economic dimension used to be a dominant dimension, as Catholics / Nationalists were discriminated against, but the issue has lost part of its saliency in the eighties, as the British government has been implementing several equality and anti-discrimination programmes which have been relatively effective.

**B6**
The territorial dimension is clearly at the core of the conflict, both at the level of the province (should it stay inside the UK or be re-united with the Irish Republic?) and at the local level,
with an increased segregation between communities, which also coincides with an East (mainly protestant)-West (mainly catholic) territorial division.

**B8**

Under the Stormont administration, and until the British Government decided in 1972 to rule the province directly, the Catholic / Nationalist community clearly did not trust and recognise itself in the unionist administration. The implementation of Direct Rule helped reducing this estrangement, though it did not succeed in fostering a genuine sense of belonging to Northern Ireland amongst Nationalists.

**B10**

Up till the end of the sixties, Catholics/ Nationalists’ access to citizenship was hampered by various legislations (e.g. allowing only those who owned their house or flat to vote for local elections, a rule which was clearly unfavourable to Catholics who were a lot poorer) and their political representation was undermined because of gerrymandering. In 1969, the British government forced the Northern Ireland government to introduce a number of reforms in this field.

**B12**

The Republic’s influence and involvement in Northern affairs has been quite constant since the partition of the island, even if during several decades (esp. from the forties till the end of the sixties) it has mainly exerted its influence through informal / unofficial channels. However, with the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985, the Republic gained an official say in Northern Ireland’s internal affairs, a concession which led to Protestant discontent.

**C**

**C1**

Factions on the Protestant side:

1: Radical unionists / loyalists. Would dream to return to a Stormont-like administration, are opposed to power-sharing and to any form of association with the Republic. Main representative: DUP

2: “Pragmatic” unionists. Accept the power-sharing principle but are opposed to an increased participation of the Republic in Northern Ireland’s affairs, and of course to reunification. Main representative: UUP

Factions on the Catholic side:

1: Republicans. Their first objective is the reunification of Ireland. Have long supported the recourse to violence to achieve this aim. Have developed in the nineties a more pragmatic approach, and now favour a completely peaceful and political approach. Believe the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement will be a first step towards the reunification of the island.

2: Constitutional Nationalists. Have always condemned violence, and favoured a power-sharing approach. Believe the protestants can be convinced of the benefits of reunification.

**C2**
It is difficult to map the main paradigms in each camp, because some explanations have been coexisting, without necessarily being in opposition (for instance, for Catholics, the socio-economic factors were very important until the eighties, but they were linked to political explanations and claims). However, generally speaking, we can say that Catholics have always depicted the conflict as mainly political (a consequence of decolonisation and partition of Ireland), whereas Protestants have first favoured a cultural framing (esp. a religious one), which has been replaced by a political one when the British government decided to implement direct rule, and to push forward accommodation initiatives including elements of power-sharing.

C3
On the Protestant side: for a long period, the “non-existence” of the Catholics was the predominant perception: their culture, religion and political claims were considered as totally illegitimate, while the Protestant cultural traditions were the only meaningful, decent and respectable ones. When forced at the beginning of the seventies to reconsider their attitudes towards the Catholic minority, most Protestants have begun to see them as political opponents, towards which they still hold a great number of prejudices.

Up until very recently, most Catholics used to consider Protestants as enemies with whom they were in conflict, and whose political aspirations had to be fought. Since the beginning of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, a majority of Catholics has come to accept that compromises were necessary, and that, should the reunification of Ireland ever happen, Protestants had also to be seen as partners – although not always reliable ones.

D
D2
Churches have been powerful actors since the beginning of the conflict. They have been active in peace initiatives, but as representatives of the culture of each community, they have also directly or indirectly fostered the conflict (e.g. Contested Orange parades on the Protestant side).

D4
Sinn Féin and the DUP have gained influence during the seventies, and this development has accompanied the radicalisation of the conflict. Event mentioned: Major unionist strike, which has led to the failure of the first power-sharing agreement: Sunningdale agreement (1974).

D5
The UUP, and the SDLP since the seventies, have been major actors of the conflict and in the various peace processes implemented since the seventies.

D6
The Parliament and the Government, both at the local (Stormont) and national (Westminster) levels have been both major actors and major stakes in the conflict since its beginning. Events mentioned: signing of the Hillsborough (1985) and Good Friday (1998) Agreements.

D9
Paramilitary groups on both sides have developed in the seventies. Their almost constant use of violence have kept them at the centre of the conflict ever since. Event mentioned: Omagh bombing (1998).
D10
The USA have been very active in the peace process which began in the nineties.

E
E1
Nationalist and unionist parties have begun to take conventional institutional actions during the seventies, with the return of direct rule from Westminster, and in the wake of the opening of the local political scene (cf. electoral reforms, see above). Event mentioned: GFA (1998).

E2
Demonstrations have been used a lot by Nationalists in the end of the sixties and by both communities in the seventies and eighties. Event mentioned: height of Civil Rights Campaign (1968).

E3
Violent and non-violent conventional actions have been widely used since the end of the sixties, incl. refusal to pay taxes, unauthorised demonstrations, as well as sabotage and bombing. Some of these actions were already used before the end of the sixties, but at a relatively low level. Events mentioned: Unionist strike against Sunningdale Agreement (1974), and Republican Hunger Strikes (1981).

E4
Since the end of the sixties violence against persons have been widespread. Some of them are the consequence of unorganised actions (e.g. deaths during riots), or were not intended, but most of them are the result of paramilitary or military activities. Events mentioned: Bloody Sunday (1972) and Omagh bombing (1998).

3.3.2. Example (2) : Belgium$^{14}$

$^{14}$ The information for this section has been provided by Benoît Rihoux. The SCD has been elaborated using the case report written by Régis Dandoy, Lieven De Winter and Benoît Rihoux.
Here is the SCD (graph) for Belgium (Figure 3):

<table>
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<th>A. OUTCOME DIMENSION</th>
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And here is the sequence of comments by the case expert:

**Overall comments:**

- the 2 main opposing “camps” : French-speaking v/s Flemish-speaking (the other ethnolinguistic communities, such as the German-speaking or immigrant communities, are marginal in this main conflict)

**A1**

- the two starting historical points of the conflict:

  o 1815 (Vienna Congress) : fusion of the Netherlands with most of current Belgium, against the will of the French-speaking elites (which were predominant in the whole of Belgium).

  o 1830 (Belgian revolution) : a bourgeois revolution, headed by the French-speaking elites. Creation of a state in which French is considered as the sole language (both Flemish and Walloon languages are considered as “dialects”).

- Reason why the pre-WWII period is classified as “stage 2” conflict: during the interwar period, there was a rise of a more radical (autonomist, anti-Belgian) Flemish movement.

- The post-WWII period (1945-1958) is some sort of “unusually quiet” period in terms of community conflict (in spite of 1950 – see below) – it was a period of “union nationale” to re-build the country after WWII (// Marshall plan, construction of the “Belgian model” of neo-corporatism, etc.).

**A2**

Main conflict-increasing events (the late 1960s and early 70s were the most “dense” periods in terms of events)

- 1966 onwards: “Leuven Vlaams” issue

- 1968 onwards: “Fourons Wallons” events

NB: from 1960 onwards: the “community” issue has been on agenda on a regular basis, every year (with further (verbal) escalation following the electoral cycle).

Main conflict-decreasing events:

- 1950: the “affaire royale” (short, but violent period; issue: return of king Leopold III from exile after WWII). While it was not defined in community terms, this issue also split the country along a North-South axis. The referendum, and the instalment of king Baudouin I, eventually lead to pacification.

- 1962-1963: settling of the “linguistic border”, which pacified things but which, on the other hand, also lead to the creation of the FDF, to the Fourons/Voeren issue, etc.;

- 1970: first institutional reforms;

- 1977: Egmont pact (which eventually was not signed – missed chance);


NB:
from late 1960s onwards: political negotiations (and compromises) between the
political elites of the 2 communities are more or less continuous (e.g. within a special
“concertation committee” from the early 1980s onwards)

no external intervention (whether direct or indirect). Possibly the single “external”
factor was the loss of Congo (the huge colony) in 1960. Congo was economically very
profitable for the whole country, including the French speakers and the Walloons –
possibly the Walloon economic decline became more visible after the Congolese
independence.

B

B2

The identity dimension is always there in the background (it was predominant in the 19th
century, with the Flemish struggle to be recognized in terms of identity/culture).

B3

The linguistic/cultural dimension is always present (in the discourses etc.), but it has become
less and less predominant from the 1980s onwards. The “Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde” (BHV)
issue, which is more salient again from 2000 onwards, makes this dimension more salient
again. In spite of successive institutional arrangements, the linguistic dimension regularly
comes back to the fore (it has never disappeared), more lately around the issue of BHV, with
radical demands on the Flemish side (in the short run, it is not about territory but about the
protection of linguistic minorities).

B4

The socio-economic dimension is becoming the clearly predominant dimension, from the
1980s onwards, with the very high differential between affluent Flanders and pauperized
Wallonia.

Before the 1980s, around 1960-1965 especially, this dimension was important in discourses
(on both sides), as the North-South disparity become visible (leaders become conscious of
those disparities). This is a key stimulus for the creation of regionalist political parties (the
Rassemblement Wallon, to start with), with more radical demands. These parties had a strong
influence on the agenda of the mainstream parties, and were also a key cause of the later
North-South split of all mainstream parties.

B6

Strictly territorial issues were highly salient only in the 1960s and 1970s. Afterwards, so-
called “territorial” problems (such as BHV, see above) are actually mainly linguistic
problems, at least in the short run. The issue of ”greater Brussels” is not posed anymore by
the French-speakers (apart from the more radical FDF). Only in discussion about possible
breakup of Belgium, Brussels is raised as crucial territorial issue.

B7

The centre-periphery dimension is very important, from a historical perspective, to understand
the discourse of Flemish nationalism (stemming from a period when the Flemish were
dominated by the French-speaking in all fields of public and institutional life).

In a sense, from the 1980s onwards, this dimension has been “inverted”: the Walloons,
especially, now feel as tough they are being dominated (economically, numerically, and in the
state apparatus) by the Flemish.
From the moment that the Belgian state has begun to federalize, it may be argued that much of the remaining conflicts do not correspond to top priorities of citizens (according to survey data, this is not a top priority since the early 80’s – it used to be a top priority in the 60’s and 70’s). NB: from the late 1970s onwards, there is virtually no collective mobilization around the community conflict

These conflicts are rather instrumentalized (i.e. regularly re-activated) by the political elites on both sides. This follows a more “political-institutional” self-logic:

- political decision-makers (at the Regional level, on both sides, but more strongly on the Flemish side because Flanders has “more to gain”) need to regularly re-activate these community issues in order to, eventually, obtain still more competencies and budgets etc.
- regional political leaders also instrumentalize the community conflict in their political communication (especially through the mass media) to reinforce their own legitimacy (“scapegoat” discourse: e.g. : “if the other guys weren’t in our way, we’d do much better”).

C

C1

Factions on the Flemish side:
- 1: Radical nationalists : strive for separation and independence of a full-fledged Flemish nation-state.
- 2: “pragmatic” nationalists/federalists (strive to obtain more prerogatives for Flanders, but still within a (con)federal setting)
- 3: unionists (pro-Belgium)

Factions on the French-speaking side:
- 1: Radical regionalists (Walloon or Francophone)
- 2: “pragmatic” unitarists (defend the unity of Belgium, also for more utilitarian purposes (e.g. socioeconomic aspects etc.). Some are also still attached to “la Belgique à papa” (the “good old times” when the French speakers were predominant).
- 3: “Rattachistes” (advocate the rattachement of Wallonia, and possibly also Brussels, to France if Flanders becomes an independent state).

In spite of the peak conflictual period of the 1960s and early 1970s, it may be argued that the “pragmatic” factions have always stayed predominant, on both sides. This being said:

- in the 1960s and 1970s, the more radical factions (on both sides) were quite strong (also electorally and in terms of impact on the agenda of mainstream parties), especially through the 3 regionalist parties;
- from the early 1990s onwards, on the Flemish side alone, the radical nationalists are gaining momentum, not only through the Vlaams Blok, but also increasingly through most of the mainstream parties.

C2

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15 The « Yser pilgrimage » and the « Gordel » (see below) cannot be considered as large collective mobilizations.
On both sides, in the framing of the conflict, the culture/language dimensions were first predominant; then they were gradually replaced by the socio-economic dimensions (“bread and butter politics”: North-South social security transfers, etc.). The key turning point is around 1980, for two key reasons:

- institutional reforms: launching of full-fledged regional institutions, with strong socio-economic prerogatives (⇒ 2 different agendas, in Flanders and in Wallonia)
- the French-speaking socialists (PS) are pushed back in opposition. Their main opposition discourse (against the Christian democrats and Liberals) centres around the Flemish domination of the economy (rationale: “Belgium is being instrumentalized for the economic interests of the Flemish”)

C3

On the French side: for a long period, the “non-existence” of the Flemish was the predominant perception: Flemish was not recognized as a “language” (rather like “dialects”), and a specific Flemish culture or “people” was not recognized either.

On both sides: in spite of the fact that many compromises have been reached (between the political elites of the 2 communities), the predominant perception (amplified via the mass media especially) still conveys many prejudices and stereotypes, on both sides (currently: Walloons are “lazy” and “profiteurs”, whereas Flemings are “rich and arrogant” and “extremist/racist”, “can’t do anything else but work” etc…). These prejudices have increased from the 1980s onwards, as the socio-economic dimensions have become more salient.

It should be stressed that, since the 1960’s, there are hardly any “national” mass-media. Only a small minority (decision makers and highly qualified professionals) regularly use both French and Flemish mass media.

D

D1

It is only in the 1960s and 1970s that large-scale demonstrations (marches etc.) took place, especially around the “Leuven Vlaams” and “Fourons/Voeren” issues (and again in 1977 against the “Egmont pact”).

There has never been a large-scale “Walloon” regionalist or cultural social movement. On the Flemish side, conversely, this movement is stronger. It still organizes symbolic events on a regular basis, such as the yearly (more activist) “IJzer pilgrimage”, the “Naatioan Zangfeest”, and also the yearly “Gordel” (literally: “belt”) around the Brussels region (foot- and – bicycle event, to reaffirm the Flemish nature of the Brussels periphery -- for about 90% this is just a sports-and-leisure happening, not like the IJzer).

D3

The most established interest groups are trade unions and employers’ organizations (both of which are very strong and influential organizations; neo-corporatist model), as well as the numerous and large “pillar” organizations (especially Christian and Socialist: cultural organizations, health and social sector, youth and sports organizations etc.). They have always been in the background, but NB: most often as pacifiers. They step in more strongly as moderators since the 1980s. E.g. the trade unions attempt to maintain a single “national” discourse, etc.

D4
From 1965 to the late 1970s: this was the “golden age” of ethnoregionalist parties (VolksUnie, FDF, RW).

From 1991 onwards, the Vlaams Blok has established itself as a key player, on the Flemish side, pushing more mainstream parties to adopt a more “Flemish” profile. But the real change comes from 2000 onwards, when the VU is split; the “democratic nationalists” form two different parties (SPIRIT and NV-A) which form cartels respectively with the SP.a (Socialists) and the CD&V (Christian democrats), with a strong impact in terms of party discourse and tactics on the community front.

D5

In the Belgian “partitocracy”, the main political parties are by definition key players in the whole process.

D7

From the 1960s onwards, the mass media have become partisan and selective in the way they portray the “other” community. It is however only during the 1960s and 1970s that the mass media (some newspapers especially) were more independent “political” player (some editorialists could dictate the political choices of decision-makers on the community issues).

From the 1980s onwards, the two media agendas are simply split (see above)

E

E1

In post-WWII Belgium, there has always been a profound “negotiation culture” (part of Belgian consociational democracy). In this context, institutional strategies (lobbying, negotiation, etc.) are predominant.

Important event: the 1950 referendum. Was an attempt to solve the “affaire royale” issue. Showed the dangers of a referendum (different results North v/s South) – hence no further national referendums were set up.

E2

Especially demonstrations have been used in the “historical” period on the 1960s and early 1970s (+ 1977 against the Egmont pact). In 1950 (“affaire royale” – almost a “short civil war”), there were also mass demonstrations.

NB some

E3

A very widespread activity of more radical groups (or isolated individuals as well) is to tag official signposts (typically: erase the names of localities in the “other’s” language). The starting point is 1963 especially (linguistic laws).

E4

Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s, extreme radical groups resorted to physical violence and violence against persons (such as the Vlaams Voorpost, a Flemish militia). However these groups always remained very small, and never engaged in systematic campaigns with violence against persons.

At a larger scale, only two particular events lead to some escalation of violence against persons:
- “Leuven Vlaams” demonstrations (late 60s: violent demonstrations, street fights, throwing cobblestones at police forces and activists of the other community)

- Voeren/Fourons (early 1980s): some gun shots and street fights).

NB: apart from these rare exceptions, the community conflict is not the conflict which produces the highest level of violence in the Belgian context. Socio-economic collective actions (miners, dockers, steel industry workers etc.) are often more violent than community-related demonstrations.
4. The final model: outcomes, conditions and hypotheses

4.1. Introduction: iterations towards the final model

Systematic cross-case comparative research calls, in a small-N situation especially, for a “dialogue” between the analyses and case knowledge – thus csQCA as a technique requires several iterations before one reaches a ‘final’ model whose results (the minimal formulae; see above) can be interpreted. These iterations enable not only a dialogue with the cases (and the deep, historical knowledge of the case experts), but also with the theories which are driving the PEACE-COM project (see D1 report).

In concrete terms, the goals of the iterations, following several exploratory models, were threefold: (a) fine-tune a series of testable hypotheses, to be included in the final model; (b) find the adequate operationalization of the time dimension for the different tests (more precisely: how to relate the outcome variable to the condition variables, i.e. how far back in time to look for relevant evolutions/changes etc. of the conditions, before the outcome is observed?); and (c) fine-tune the way each variable is dichotomized.

The various prior steps were discussed as papers in PEACE-COM project meetings as well as in some scientific conferences. In terms of sequence, we first performed exploratory tests considering cases (countries) as wholes over the whole historical period, building upon the ‘birds’ eye view’ comparison of the cases provided in the D1 report, thus without including the time dimension (without differentiating between historical period). Second, we implemented further exploratory tests using the SCDs, with more focused analyses involving different ways to tackle the time dimension. Third, we performed a first wave of operational tests, follow by a second and third wave -- at each one of the steps, we received feedback from the case specialists as well as some other colleagues (more from a methodological perspective), to further improve the operationalization and the model. Thus the final model we were able to reach through these iterations constitutes the “fourth wave” of operational tests.

4.2. The final model: outcome(s) and articulation between outcome and conditions

4.2.1. Definition of the outcome variables

Our exploratory tests showed that we had to identify at least 4 different types (and respective sub-types) of outcomes – also because we do not make the assumption that there are some sort “causal laws” at work here. For instance, if we find a solution for a test where the outcome is conflict escalation, we cannot assume that a test on conflict de-escalation will yield an opposite or symmetrical solution. Actually, we expect to have a quite different story.

Also, if we find a solution, say, for conflict escalation from level 2 to level 3, we cannot assume that this solution will also apply for conflict escalation from level 3 to level 4 – indeed escalation from level 2 to level 3, on the one hand, and escalation from level 3 to level 4, on the other hand, are qualitatively and substantively different evolutions, and thus most probably call for different ‘explanations’, in terms of combinations of conditions.

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Here below we lay out, in short, the operationalization of the different variants of the outcome variable.

**Conflict escalation** : increase of the intensity of the conflict, based on five different stages of conflict. More specifically, we chose to concentrate on two particularly crucial types of conflict escalation (also crucial from a EU policy perspective), between level 2 (political tension situation) and level 4 (low intensity conflict):

- Type 1 : increase from level 2 (political tension situation) to level 3 (violent political conflict) (coding : increase of conflict = 1; other situations = 0);

- Type 2 : increase from level 3 (violent political conflict) to level 4 (low intensity conflict) (coding : increase of conflict = 1; other situations = 0)

**Conflict “non-escalation”** (Type 3) : countries in which the community conflict never escalated above level 2 (political tension situation). It is indeed as interesting, also from a EU policy perspective, to understand why some conflict do not escalate, and in particular why some conflicts never reach a point at which there is violence against persons.

**Conflict de-escalation** : decrease of the intensity of the conflict, based on five different stages of conflict. Once again, we take as an assumption that the mechanisms of de-escalation will not be ‘symmetrical’ or opposite to those of escalation (see above). More specifically:

- Type 4 : decrease from level 4 (low intensity conflict) to level 3 (violent political conflict) (coding : decrease of conflict = 1; other situations = 0)

- Type 5 : decrease from level 3 (violent political conflict) to level 2 (political tension situation) (coding : decrease of conflict= 1; other situations = 0)

**Conflict non-de-escalation** : non-decrease of the intensity of the conflict when it has already reached a relatively high level of violence. Naturally, these are also particularly crucial evolutions (or non-evolutions) from a EU policy perspective:

- Type 6 : non-de-escalation in a situation where the conflict has already reached a level 4 (low intensity conflict); on the contrary, the conflict escalates further to open warfare and level 5 (high intensity conflict) (coding : non-decrease of conflict = 1; other situations = 0)

- Type 7 : non-de-escalation in a situation where the conflict has already reached a level 3 (violent political conflict) situation and stays protracted at that same level over a long period of time.

### 4.2.2. Common choices : articulation between outcomes and conditions

As for the period considered for the presence/absence of conditions having some impact on the outcome of interest, we have kept two core operationalizations: a historical period of 10 or 15 years before the outcome occurs. (idem for periods of non-increase or decrease). In the exploratory tests, we had tested many other ways to operationalize the time dimension in other ways, also making attempts with shorter periods of time (e.g. 5 years), and the 10- and 15-year spans turned out to deliver more interpretable results. Also a 10- to 15-year period enables us to “cover” both proximate stimuli & background, more long-term factors.

On the more technical side, in order to transform the SCD data into a binary data table (suitable for csQCA treatment), we also had to make some other concrete arbitrations (also in a more inductive way, through the exploratory tests), as follows:
- A condition is considered as “salient” (‘1’ score) if it is present during more than 50% of the considered period, except for the “accommodation policy”, “actors” and “action” variables, where the mere presence suffices;
- Temporally proximate increases (2-3 years of difference) are considered as the same case;
- Cases where data is missing are not included. This corresponds to two quite different situations. On the one hand, we have cases in which many conditions are simply not relevant (cannot be filled in by the case expert) due to some system constraints: the Basque case under Franco until 75, and also Estonia until 1990, under the Soviet rule, were two cases in which the political system was not ‘open’ for a conflict to develop. On the other hand, some cases could have been analyzed, but due to practical difficulties this could not be done (Corsica, and the Roma case).

Thus: in practical terms, by elaborating this temporal articulation between the outcome and the conditions, we have actually created much more “cases” (for csQCA treatment) than simply 9 countries (or regions, for the 3 former Yugoslav regions).

For instance, if our outcome of interest is the increase from level 2 (political tension situation) to level 3 (violent political conflict) (coding: increase of conflict = 1; other situations = 0) – i.e. the “Type 1” outcome, and if we consider the 10-year time span, we have:
- 4 ‘cases’ (i.e. country cases considered during a certain period of time before a given year) with a ‘1’ outcome (escalation): Cyprus 1947-1957, Ireland 1957-1967, Sandzak 1980-1990 and Vojvodina 1978-1988;

The same goes for all the other models, considering the different definitions of the outcome, and also considering the 10- or 15-year span. Consequently, we have created many more ‘cases’ (“temporal slices” of actual cases) than the 9 observed countries or regions. This has been made possible by bringing in the time dimension.

### 4.3. The final model: conditions

Here below, we lay out all the conditions in the final model. To each condition, at least one hypothesis is attached.

#### 4.3.1. Historical antecedents of violence

**[prewwii]:** historical antecedents of violence:

- score [1]: before WWII, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation (i.e. at least a level of 3 for an increase from level 2 to level 3, etc.).

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16 Actually the Basque case (after 1975) will only be analyzed in the «non-de-escalation» tests, because it always stayed at the level 3 of conflict (violent political conflict).
- score [0]: before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation (i.e. it stayed below a level of 3 for an increase from level 2 to level 3, etc.).

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H1]: if a conflict has, in previous historical periods, reached a high level of conflict, it could facilitate or legitimize escalation. For instance, armed factions could base their claims and mode of action (armed violence) on prior experiences of “mythical ancestors” and forefathers idealized as model combatants against the “enemy”.

4.3.2. Conflict dimensions

“Objective” saliency (through expert judgments) of 5 main conflict dimensions:

[dima]: saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions:
- Score [1]: high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions;
- Score [0]: low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H2]: highly salient “cultural” dimensions can potentially fuel conflict escalation (see D1 report for further justifications).

[dimb]: saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions.
- Score [1]: high saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions;
- Score [0]: low saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H3]: highly salient “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions can potentially fuel conflict escalation (see D1 report for further justifications).

[dimc]: saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions.
- Score [1]: high saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions;
- Score [0]: low saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H4]: highly salient “political” dimensions can potentially fuel conflict escalation (see D1 report for further justifications).

[dimd1]: saliency of the “global external”17 dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension.

17 Note that we have differentiated two ‘external’ dimensions: a « global » one and a « proximal » one. Our exploratory csQCA tests (and our empirical knowledge) indeed showed that these are two profoundly different phenomena.
- Score [1]: high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension;
- Score [0]: low saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H5]: a highly salient “global external” dimension can potentially fuel conflict escalation (see D1 report for further justifications).

[dimd2]: saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension.
- Score [1]: high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension;
- Score [0]: low saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H6]: a highly salient “proximate external” dimension can potentially fuel conflict escalation (see D1 report for further justifications).

### 4.3.3. Paradigm change / paradigm discordance

Our exploratory tests (and case knowledge) have lead us to operationalize the possible influence of paradigms from the two ‘camps’ in two different ways:

[parad_change]: change of main paradigm
- score [1]: a change of main paradigm occurred in at least one of the two “camps”
- score [0]: no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H7]: a change in the framing of the conflict, on either side of the conflicting parties, could de-stabilize the situation, and lead to conflict escalation.

[parad_disc]: discordance in paradigm between the two camps.
- score [1]: the two “camps” disagree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm discordance)
- score [0]: the two “camps” agree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm accordance)

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H8]: if the two “camps” disagree on the nature of the conflict itself, this limits possibilities for negotiations and “win-win” arrangements, and could lead to conflict escalation.

[NB: for the analysis of conflict de-escalation, this condition has, quite naturally been inverted: [parad_acc] – following hypothesis [H8’]: if the two “camps” agree on the nature of the conflict, this opens up possibilities for negotiations and “win-win” arrangements, and could lead to conflict de-escalation.]
4.3.4. Perception of self/other

Taking into consideration the typology elaborated by Raivo Vetik (see above): we combine the perceptions from both ‘camps’, thus obtaining the following typology of situations (Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP B</th>
<th>non-existing B1</th>
<th>alien B2</th>
<th>partner B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Two different conditions have been operationalized. On the one hand, we have defined a dichotomous condition, [perception(a)]: Variant “A”:

- score [1]: cell [5]: both “camps” perceive each other as alien;
- score [0]: any other self-other perception situation (both camps do not perceive each other as alien)

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H9]: the most explosive situations occur when both sides perceive each other as alien, because the opposite “camp” is viewed as an enemy which needs to be fought against.

On the other hand, we have defined a quadrichotomous condition\(^\text{18}\), [perception(c)]: Variant “C”:

- score [1] (most likely to lead to conflict escalation): cells [1][5]: both “camps” perceive each other as alien, or both “camps” perceive each other as non-existent
- score [2]: cells [2][4]: one “camp” perceives the other as alien, whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent
- score [3]: cells [6][8]: one “camp” perceives the other as alien, but the other “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner
- score [4] (least likely to lead to conflict escalation): cells [3][7][9]: both “camps” perceive each other as possible partner, or one “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H10]: the most explosive situations occur when both sides perceive each other as alien, or when both sides perceive each other as non-existent, or when at least one side perceives the other as alien.

The following table offers a synoptic view of the two main ‘camps’ and, within each one of them, of the main ‘factions’ (3 maximum per ‘camp’) (Table 2)

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\(^{18}\) Due to this quadrichotomous condition, we shall have to use mvQCA tests (TOSMANA software) instead of csQCA tests when we consider this operationalization.
### Table 2: two main ‘camps’ and their respective main ‘factions’, for all cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (A-Z)</th>
<th>Camp “A”</th>
<th>Factions (A)</th>
<th>Camp “B”</th>
<th>Factions (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Austria (Carinthia) | German-speaking nationalists | 1. Nationalists  
2. Ultra nationalists  
3. Moderates | Slovene-speaking Austrians | 1. RKS (more ethno-centrist)  
2. ZSO (more moderate)  
3. |
| Basque country | Basque nationalists | 1. Moderate nationalists  
2. Radical nationalists  
3. | Non-nationalists | 1. Moderate non-nationalists  
2. Radical non-nationalists  
3. |
| Belgium | Flemish-speaking community | 1. Radical nationalists  
2. “pragmatic” nationalists/federalists  
3. unionists (pro-Belgium) | French-speaking community | 1. Radical regionalists  
2. “pragmatic” unitarists  
3. “Rattachistes” |
| Cyprus | Turkish Cypriots | 1. separatists/nationalists  
2. integrationists/federalists  
3. | Greek Cypriots | 1. extreme nationalists  
2. centrist  
3. centralist federalists  
4. bicomunal-bizonal federalists |
| Estonia | Ethnic Estonians | 1. liberal and social democratic wing  
2. ethnonationalist and corporatist wing  
3. politically marginal non-ideological parties and coalitions | Soviet time settlers | 1. pro-Union Communist Party faction  
2. marginal parties and groupings (liberals, social-democrats)  
3. |
| Kosovo | Unionists (Serbs) | 1. Unionists [no significant factional differences]  
2. Serbian resistance movement  
3. | Separatists (Albanians) | 1. [no significant factional differences]  
2.  
3. |
| Northern Ireland | Protestants/ Unionists | 1. Radical unionists / loyalists  
2. “Pragmatic” unionists  
3. | Catholics/Nationalists | 1. Republicans  
2. Constitutional Nationalists  
3. |
| Sandzak | Serbian state authorities | 1. [no significant factional differences]  
2.  
3. | Bosniacs/Moslems of SandZak | 1. Radical wing  
2. Moderate wing  
3. |
| Vojvodina | Decentralists | 1. [pure decentralists]  
2. [more moderate decentralists]  
3. | Autonomists | 1. Hungarian ethnic parties  
2. Serbian regional parties  
3. |
4.3.5. Organized actors

**[pol_actors]**:
- score [1]: at least one major most polarizing actor is mobilized and influent
- score [0]: none of the most polarizing actors are mobilized or influent

This stems from the quite straightforward following underlying hypothesis [H11]: *if some most polarizing actors are mobilized and influent, this is likely to facilitate conflict escalation.*

Following the exploratory texts, the PEACE-COM partners were thus asked to divide actors in three categories: most polarizing, polarizing and pacifying actors.

[for the analysis of conflict *de-escalation*, this condition has been inverted : **[pac_actors]**, stemming from the other quite straightforward following underlying hypothesis [H11’]: *if some pacifying actors are mobilized and influent, this is likely to facilitate conflict de-escalation.*]

4.3.6. Action repertoires

**[actions]**
- score [1]: there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)
- score [0]: there is no frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)

This stems from the following underlying hypothesis [H12]: *frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action is likely to lead to further conflict escalation.*

NB: Following the exploratory tests, it was decided not to take into account non-conventional actions *with* violence against persons, because this type of action would be too proximate to the outcome (danger of tautology).

[**NB**: for the analysis of conflict *de-escalation*, this condition has been inverted : the scores have been inverted]

4.3.7. [Absence of] accommodation initiatives

**[no_accom]**:
- Score [1]: absence of significant accommodation initiatives
- Score [0]: presence of significant accommodation initiatives
This stems from the following, quite straightforward underlying hypothesis [H13]: the absence of significant accommodation initiatives is likely to lead to further conflict escalation.

[for the analysis of conflict de-escalation, this condition has been inverted : [accom] , stemming from the inverted, also quite straightforward hypothesis hypothesis [H13’]: the presence of significant accommodation initiatives is likely to facilitate conflict de-escalation. ]

4.4. **Summary of model (I): conditions and their scores (for escalation)**

Using the csQCA notation (uppercase stands for a [1] score and lowercase stands for a [0] score, for dichotomous variables), the following table presents the respective conditions and the verbal translation for each condition (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition label</th>
<th>Verbal statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREWWII</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prewwii</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMA</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dima</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMB</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dimb</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMC</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dimc</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMD1</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dimd1</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMD2</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>term</td>
<td>description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dimd2]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “proximate external” dimension : neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PARAD_CHANGE]</td>
<td>[a change of main paradigm occurred in at least one of the two “camps”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[parad_change]</td>
<td>[no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PARAD_DISC]</td>
<td>[the two “camps” disagree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm discordance)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[parad_disc]</td>
<td>[the two “camps” agree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm accordance)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PERCEPTION(A)]</td>
<td>[both “camps” perceive each other as alien]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[perception(a)]</td>
<td>[any other self-other perception situation (both camps do not perceive each other as alien)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[perception(c){1}]</td>
<td>[both “camps” perceive each other as alien, or both “camps” perceive each other as non-existent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[perception(c){2}]</td>
<td>[one “camp” perceives the other as alien, whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[perception(c){3}]</td>
<td>[one “camp” perceives the other as alien, but the other “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[perception(c){4}]</td>
<td>[both “camps” perceive each other as possible partner, or one “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[POL_ACTORS]</td>
<td>[at least one major most polarizing actors is mobilised and influential]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[pol_actors]</td>
<td>[none of the most polarizing actors are mobilised or influential]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ACTIONS]</td>
<td>[there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[actions]</td>
<td>[there is no frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[NO_ACCOM]</td>
<td>[absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[no_accom]</td>
<td>[presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each analysis, 4 tests have been conducted:
- test 1: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception condition
- test 2: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception condition
- test 3: with ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception condition
- test 4: with ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception condition

Only those tests and minimal formulae (or terms in the minimal formulae) which seem to make more sense will be laid out and discussed in the sections below.
### 4.5. Summary of model (II): conditions and their scores (for de-escalation)

For de-escalation, as mentioned above, some conditions had to be inverted. In the next table, in italics, we indicate conditions which have been inverted or re-operationaIized for the purpose of explaining de-escalation (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition label</th>
<th>Verbal statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[PREWII]</td>
<td>[before WW II, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[prewwii]</td>
<td>[before WW II, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DIMA]</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dima]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DIMB]</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dimb]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DIMC]</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dimec]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DIMD1]</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dimd1]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DIMD2]</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dimd2]</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PARAD_CHANGE]</td>
<td>[a change of main paradigm occurred in at least one of the two “camps”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[parad_change]</td>
<td>[no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”) ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PARAD_ACC]</td>
<td>[the two “camps” agree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm accordance)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6. Practical steps for interpretation (for next sections)

In the next sections, we present the results\(^\text{19}\) of these final models – indeed there are as many models as there are ways to operationalize the outcome. These results take the form of csQCA “minimal formulae” (see above). To make these readable for the non-specialist of csQCA, in the next sections we shall present these minimal formulae both in formal (Boolean) notation and in their more explicit verbal translation.

In practical terms, to interpret these minimal formulae, and also to only keep (for the purpose of this report) those minimal formulae which ‘make sense’ from a case-oriented perspective and which enable us to make progress in the understanding of the mechanisms of conflict escalation and de-escalation, we have asked the case experts to provide some case-based interpretations: for instance: do some “causal paths” seem to make more sense than others? What is the “narrative” (if any) behind the key conditions (or combinations of conditions) which come out in the minimal formula? In a second step, we\(^\text{20}\) have crossed these case

\(^{19}\) Technically, we have conducted csQCA and mvQCA analyses, allowing the software to include ‘logical remainders’ so as to obtain more parsimonious minimal formulae. All details can be obtained through Benoît Rihoux.

\(^{20}\) This work of ‘second-look interpretation’ has first been carried out by Elise Féron, and further developed by Benoît Rihoux.
experts’ feedbacks with some of our own, cross-case expertise gained in the course of the PEACE-COM project.
5. Final analysis: conflict escalation

5.1. From political tension situation to violent political conflict (stage 2 → stage 3), with 10-year\(^{21}\) time span

5.1.1. Test 1: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

For Cyprus (escalation to violent political conflict in 1957), we obtain as many as four useful causal paths. The first three paths are partly overlapping:

First causal path: (Cyprus47-57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMD1</td>
<td>* [high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parad_change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second causal path: (Cyprus47-57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMD1 * prewii</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third causal path: (Cyprus47-57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMD1 * NO ACCOM</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: What is interesting here is that the « decolonization » dimension comes to the fore in each one of those paths. Indeed, the last phase of British presence (late 40s and early 50s) and the departure of the British colonial power in the 1950s has lead to conflict escalation in different ways. First, the last phase of anti-colonialist struggle made Greek Cypriot political circles demand enosis or autonomy-self-government. Such aims, however, were regarded unacceptable by a political majority in Turkish Cypriot community, considering that as a minority they would lose their rights in a post-colonial regime. Thus this lead to massive politicization and radicalization of communal differences in both communities, within paradigms of a deeply rooted historical, mostly ‘cultural’ conflict which were already entrenched (path nr1). Second, up till the mid-1950s and also before WWII, the

\(^{21}\) For this outcome, no further useful empirical findings were made with a 15-year time span.
level of conflict (in terms of armed violence) could more or less be kept under control by the British occupier (path nr2), but the conflict always stayed there and consolidated, as a latent conflict with a high potential for violence. Third, the British attempts to find a ‘smooth’ way out by establishing a system of self-government created further tensions between the Greek & Turkish Cypriot elites: the Greek Cypriot nationalist leadership refused this option while the Turkish Cypriot leadership accepted it. Even worse: once it became clear that it would have to leave most of the island, in order to maintain its military existence there, Britain fostered intercommunal conflicts especially in late 1950s. This is a quite ‘classical’ scenario in which a decolonization process is not accompanied (even the contrary, in this case) by pacifying or accommodation policies (path nr3).

Here is the fourth causal path: (Cyprus47-57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTIONS * NO ACCOM</td>
<td>[there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)] AND [absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: this fourth path complements the first 3 ones, by identifying the strong *endogenous* nature of the conflict as well. Probably the de-colonization process provided the key spark for conflict escalation, but the ‘ingredients’ of a more violent conflict were already there, with a rise of increasingly violent modes of action on both sides, at the local level.

Thus we may conclude that, in the Cyprus case (1957), the main escalation factor was *decolonization, but not acting alone*: it was further exacerbated by the existence of a deep, entrenched cultural conflict and by the absence of accommodation initiatives.

For Vojvodina & Sandzak, we obtain a different picture:

Causal path: (Vojvodina78-88+Sandzak80-90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREWII * dima</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: in Sandzak, the year 1990 marks a turn to more violent conflict which was to last for a whole decade, with maximal level of violence in 1992-1995. In Vojvodina the conflict escalated earlier after Milosevic removed the autonomist Vojvodina leadership and installed his henchmen, and after the Serbian parliament scrapped Vojvodina autonomy granted by the 1974 Constitution. It is hard to find a relevant interpretation for the low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions – perhaps one explanation could be that those conflicts which could at first sight seem to be of cultural nature (e.g. religious as in the case of Sandjak) are in fact pretty much underpinned by economic and demographic rivalries. However the key factor here is *prior historical experience of extreme ‘ethnic’ violence* in those regions (involving the Serbs at least in some cases), especially easy to refer to by the leaders on all sides in the troubled times of former Yugoslavia after the death of Tito.
For the Irish case (1967), as for Cyprus, we also have a whole series of causal paths. In contrast to Cyprus (1957), these paths are more diverse.

First causal path : (Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMA NO_ACCOM</td>
<td>* [high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions : religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation : This is the most convincing of the causal paths: this conflict is mostly a deep identity conflict (with a religious marker), in which each community thinks its identity is at threat because of the sheer existence of the other community – thus a high potential for violent confrontation. At the same time, no party, neither from inside the conflict (Protestants and Catholics) nor from the outside (the British authorities), develops accommodation initiatives which could lessen the degree of radicality of the conflict – thus the mechanisms leading the two communities to view their differences and fundamentally different and incompatible are further reinforced. The absence of significant accommodation initiatives is the key factor here, but it only has a negative impact because the conflict is so deeply entrenched in the perceptions of both ‘camps’.

Second causal path : (Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMC NO_ACCOM</td>
<td>* [high saliency of the “political” dimensions : centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions] AND [absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation : This path is complementary to the previous one: with time, the deep cultural/identity cleavage between the two communities has been translated into two completely divergent political projects, especially since the Catholic / Nationalist community clearly did not trust and recognise itself in the Unionist administration, since Catholics/ Nationalists’ access to citizenship was hampered by various legislations (e.g. allowing only those who owned their house or flat to vote for local elections, a rule which was clearly unfavourable to Catholics who were a lot poorer), and since their political representation was undermined because of gerrymandering. This increasingly politicized conflict was not met with ex-ante accommodation initiatives from the British authorities – indeed the British government only intervened after the first casualties, i.e. after the conflict had escalated.

Third causal path : (Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMC parad_change</td>
<td>* [high saliency of the “political” dimensions : centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions] AND [no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation : This causal combination is less fundamental than the two previous ones, but it indicates once again how increasingly institutionalized and ‘fossilized’ the conflict became in the course of the late 50s and the 60s: the incompatible positions from the
2 sides are transformed, without any moderation of change in paradigm, into *incompatible political claims* strongly defended by leaders and activists on both sides, within strongly organized groups. Thus a high potential for escalation, in particular for more direct action (by the more radical activists) with violence against persons.

Fourth causal path: (Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMD2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parad_change</td>
<td>* high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension] AND [no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: On the one hand, this causal combination is plausible: it indicates that the two main external ‘players’, i.e. Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, have kept on reinforcing (in different ways: not only politically and ideologically, but also financially or militarily in some cases) the two conflicting parties. Thus the conflict gained in intensity, each ‘camp’ continued to reinforce its ‘framing’ of the conflict (no major change in paradigm) and to feel it was supported by a ‘motherland’. Thus each side felt strong enough to engage in more violent forms of action. On the other hand, however, such an explanation appears even more convincing for the prolongation of the conflict at a high level of violence (levels 3 and 4) than for the first escalation of the conflict in 1967.

Finally, the csQCA analysis yields an over-arching causal path for 3 cases:
(Cyprus47-57+Vojvodina78-88+Sandzak80-90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dima * dimb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perception(a)</td>
<td>* low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [low saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions: socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions] AND [any other self-other perception situation (both camps do not perceive each other as alien)] AND [at least one major most polarizing actor is mobilised and influential]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL_ACTORS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: Although this causal combination is quite ‘long’ (quite a lot of factors), it is actually quite a crucial for the interpretation. On the one hand, there are a list of conditions which are absent, i.e. some factors are there which should not lead to conflict escalation beyond political tension situation: (1) the conflict has a relatively low saliency on the ‘cultural’ dimensions (2) as well as on the socio-economic and demographic dimensions, and furthermore (3) the self-other perception does not feature the most negative scenario (alien-alien). But on the other hand there are ‘political entrepreneurs’ – in connection with community conflicts, we could use the label ‘identity entrepreneurs’. Those entrepreneurs politicize and instrumentalize cleavages and conflict dimensions which were *a priori* not so salient – or possible conflict dimensions which were not activated but which remained alive in a more latent way. For instance, in the late 80s, in the Sandzak case, the territorial dimension of the Bosniac – Serb conflict was not so salient in the region. It was rather in the context of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia that gave the local Bosniac (i.e. Muslim) political leaders an opportunity to try to obtain political autonomy for Sandžak. At the same time, together with local religious leaders, they framed the conflict again more explicitly in
religious terms – the religious dimension had always been there, but in a more latent way. Indeed it is often by re-activating latent cleavages that ‘identity entrepreneurs’ provoke the passage to violent conflict.

### 5.1.2. Test 2: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception

The other, more fine-grained operationalization of the ‘self-other perception’ condition yields further interesting causal paths.

First causal path: (Cyprus47-57+Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parad_change</td>
<td>[no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception(C){2}</td>
<td>AND [one “camp” perceives the other as alien, whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: this combinations points to a very strong mechanism of conflict escalation: the growing alienation at least in one of the ‘camps’, because it is not considered as relevant by the other ‘camp’. In other words, there is dissymmetry in the respective self-other perceptions, because one of the two ‘camps’ does not recognize the existence of the other camp – this further reinforces the radicalization of the latter camp. This mechanism operates even better when the conflict is deeply entrenched in history, with stable conflict paradigms (see above). Indeed this causal mechanism was observed in the Irish case: on the Protestant side, the “non-existence” of the Catholics was the predominant perception: their culture, religion and political claims were considered as totally illegitimate, while the Protestant cultural traditions were considered as the only meaningful, decent and respectable ones. The same was true in Cyprus, in which the Greek Cypriot leadership perceived the Turkish Cypriot side as an ‘unimportant minority’. Thus both the Northern Irish Catholics and the Turkish Cypriots felt increasingly alienated, and therefore their perception of the other ‘camp’ (respectively the Protestants and the Greek Cypriots) as a ‘tyrannical majority’ to be fought against was further reinforced. This legitimized more violent action in the ranks of the more radical activists in these alienated ‘camps’.

Second causal path: (Cyprus47-57+Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception(C){2}</td>
<td>[one “camp” perceives the other as alien, whereas the other “camp” perceives the other as non-existent] AND [at least one major most polarizing actors is mobilised and influential]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: this path is quite congruent with the previous one, with one additional escalating factor which was already discussed above (see previous section): the ‘opportunistic’ strategies of ‘identity entrepreneurs’ on both sides of the conflict. As demonstrated above, the effect of such entrepreneurs can be devastating (in terms of increase of level of violence) even if not so many key preconditions for conflict escalation are present. In Cyprus, a case in point is that of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot EOKA (encouraging more radical collective action); in Northern Ireland it was rather the increasingly radical campaigns for civil rights against the Unionist political leaders.
The third causal path is somewhat and applies solely to former Yugoslavia regions:

Third causal path: (Sandzak80-90+Vojvodina78-88)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no_accom</td>
<td>[presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: At first sight, this could look counterintuitive, as the presence of significant (and ex ante) accommodation initiatives should, in principle, not lead to conflict escalation, quite the contrary. The contradiction is however only apparent. The answer to the puzzle is that some policies which are perceived by one ‘camp’ as an accommodation initiative can be perceived by the other ‘camp’, on the contrary, as some form of aggression or provocation. For instance, the Yugoslav (and Serb) policy, through the adoption of the new communist constitution (1963, which remained valid till the late 1980s), granted Bosniacs (of Sandzak, in particular) an opportunity to declare themselves ethnically as ‘Muslims’. On the Serb side, this was viewed as a gesture of openness. On the Bosniac side, on the contrary, this policy was perceived as an attempt to neglect their cultural identity and to assimilate Bosniacs into Serbs (by using a religious label instead of an ‘ethnic’ label). Similarly, the adoption of the 1974 Constitution gave Vojvodina a substantial autonomy within both Serbia and Yugoslavia, all the way till the late 1980s. Autonomists saw this Constitution as a means to decrease conflicts, but local Serbs, on the contrary, were troubled by the high autonomy Vojvodina was given. In these two cases, these were rather ‘pacification’ policies decided in Belgrade, in some form of ‘peace-keeping’ effort, but which did not involve a genuine process of negotiation and reconciliation with the local stakeholders and community leaders at the ‘periphery’. This had a counterproductive effect: the radicalization of local actors ‘on the ground’ in those regions.

5.1.3. Tests 3 & 4: with ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘A’, or ‘C’ of self-other perception

For these tests, we use a different operationalization to compare the predominant paradigms of the two main ‘camps’ in the conflict: paradigm discordance (or accordance), instead of paradigm change. This produces only one meaningful causal path:

Causal path: (Cyprus47-57+Ireland57-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARAD_DISC</td>
<td>[the two “camps” disagree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm discordance)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: At first sight, this explanation is quite straightforward: if the two ‘camps’ disagree on what the conflict is about, they are unable to agree on a common negotiation agenda, and thus the conflict deepens, with some danger of further escalation. However this explanation is probably a bit too “short”, as some other elements must intervene to lead to further escalation. In the Northern Irish and Cypriot cases, this additional factor is the refusal, on the side of the majority (the Protestants and the Greek Cypriots, respectively), to actually share political power with the minority community. These two cases are best contrasted with the Belgian case, in which there were some periods of paradigm discordance between the Flemish- and the French-speaking community leaders, but in which this disagreement was counterbalanced by willingness (on both sides) to share power with the other community.
5.2. From violent political conflict to low-intensity conflict (stage 3 → stage 4), with 10-year time span

In those tests, we strive to explain further escalation into a genuine armed conflict, still not as deadly as a stage 5 conflict (high-intensity conflict), but already a situation in which armed confrontation occurs on a regular basis, with a significant number of casualties.

5.2.1. Test 1: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

This test yields two distinct causal paths, each one with its own logic.

First causal path: (Ireland61-71+Kosovo81-88)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO_ACCOM</td>
<td>[absence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: This path seems particularly relevant for the Northern Irish case. Quite similarly to the previous step of escalation (the escalation to violent political conflict in 1967; see above), the absence of political accommodation initiative from the majority side (the Protestants/Unionists, supported by Great Britain) in order to solve the still partly latent conflict lead to further radicalization of the conflict. Indeed the Catholic demonstrations for civil rights in the late 60s were peaceful, and it was their repression as well as the refusal to proceed to reforms which lead to escalation (on the IRA side in particular, but also on a daily basis at the local level). In the case of Kosovo, the mechanism is quite similar: the mostly peaceful demonstrations by ethnic Albanians in the 80s, to claim more autonomy (but not independence), were met by outright refusal and repression by the Belgrade authorities. In both cases, such a complete closure of the political opportunity structure was a key catalyst for direct (violent) action from the part of the more radical groupings.

Second causal path: (Ireland61-71+Cyprus53-63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARAD_CHANGE</td>
<td>[a change of main paradigm occurred in at least one of the two “camps”]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: this path is probably less relevant in the Northern Irish case, where the change of paradigm (on the Unionist side, which quickly frames the conflict more as a ‘political’ one) is more the consequence than the source of the escalation. In the Cypriot case, however, the interpretation is more convincing. In the late 50s and early 60s, the change of paradigm occurred on the Greek Cypriot side, as they perceived an increasing autonomist demand on the Turkish Cypriot side. This could have provoked (or, at least, facilitated) further radicalization on the Greek Cypriot side.

5.2.2. Test 2: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception

In addition to the causal paths above, with a more fine-grained operationalization of the ‘self-other perception’ condition, we identify two new paths:

Causal path: (Ireland61-71) (also confirmed with 15-year time span: Ireland56-71)

| Term of formula | Verbal translation |
5.3. From violent political conflict to low-intensity conflict (stage 3 → stage 4), with 15-year time span

We now turn to a longer-term time span (15 years instead of 10 years), because it enables us to discover new potential causal paths.

5.3.1. Test 1: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

Two useful causal paths can be identified this way:

First causal path: (Ireland56-71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMC</td>
<td>high saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: The key explanation here is that prolonged tensions lead to the emergence of a new political issue which had previously never been at the core of the Catholics’ claims: the island’s reunification. In the late 1960s, those who demonstrated for the civil rights simply demanded equal rights for Catholics and Protestants. However, the refusal (on the side of the Unionist power holders and the British authorities) to take these demands into consideration, cumulated with the repression and the rigidity of the Protestant community, allowed for the more radical (Catholic) Nationalists to come back to the fore and to argue that the problem could not be solved unless Ireland was reunited. This was fuel for further conflict escalation, because it legitimized further radical actions on the Nationalist side, as well as increased repression and control on the British and Unionist side.
Second causal path: (Kosovo66-81+Cyprus48-63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMDI * no accom</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: At first sight, this causal path is puzzling. However, after due consideration, it does shed some light on the escalation. Remember (see above) that accommodation initiatives are not necessarily perceived as such by all parties in the conflict. In the Cyprus case, there were many accommodation initiatives (e.g. the London-Zürich and Nicosia agreements in 1959), but because they failed to bear fruit (as well as the 1960 independence), actually none of the pending issues were resolved between the two ‘camps’. All this also occurred in a context of British decolonization and geopolitical moves between Greece and Turkey, which did not contribute at all to pacification. In the case of Kosovo, the region was granted by the 1963 and 1974 Constitutions a status of province within Serbia (a federal unit’s sub-unit, as it were). Although it actually had all the prerogatives of a republic, the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo did not see this as a satisfactory arrangement, and so they sought a formal promotion of Kosovo into a federal unit, a claim which met utter rejection on the Serb side – thus creating further frustration both on the Serb and Albanian sides.

5.3.2. Test 2: with ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

A single meaningful causal path is identified this way:

Causal path: (Ireland56-71+Cyprus48-63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARAD_DISC</td>
<td>[the two “camps” disagree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm discordance)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: We meet again a causal factor which had been identified earlier for escalation to violent political conflict in those same countries (Northern Ireland, 1967, and Cyprus, 1957, see above): once again: if the two ‘camps’ disagree on what the conflict is about, they are unable to agree on a common negotiation agenda, and thus the conflict deepens, with some danger of further escalation. In the Northern Irish case, the incapacity of the Unionists to understand that it was the Northern Irish political regime itself (“a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people”) which was questioned by the Catholic demonstrators, led the latter to further radicalize in their goals and modes of action. The Cyprus case seems more difficult to interpret here.

In conclusion, we have been able to identify quite many meaningful ‘short’ causal paths accounting for conflict escalation, first to the level of “violent political conflict”, and then to the more violent level of “low-intensity conflict”. We shall now turn to completely different situations: those of cases (countries) which have never escalated beyond political tension situations.
6. Final analysis: conflict “non-escalation” beyond political tension situations

In this section, we concentrate on those PEACE-COM cases which have never gone beyond “political tension” situations (level 2) – these are the cases of Estonia, Carinthia (Austria) and Belgium. Actually those cases display an almost constant level of conflict (much less variation on the “level of conflict” scale). On methodological grounds, we have chosen to perform tests only with a 10-year span.

These are “success stories” of countries in which quite profound community conflicts do indeed exist, but which, for some reason(s) to be identified, have never become really violent, at least not in terms of violence against persons (the violence has mostly remained “symbolic”). Thus it is particularly interesting to try to identify the key (combinations of) conditions which enable those “success stories” to exist over the decades, in terms of conflict prevention – or more precisely in terms of prevention of further escalation in existing conflicts.

6.1. Test 1: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

We obtain two series of causal paths:

First causal path:  (Estonia90-00+Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMA * no accom</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: This should not be interpreted as a proof that ‘cultural’ community conflicts can more easily be ‘solved’ than ‘bread-and-butter’ community conflicts (with high economic, demographic etc. stakes). Rather, our interpretation is that in Europe, for a series of reasons (e.g. development of a State with rule of law, of pluralist democracy, including minority rights and definition of those rights by supranational texts, of Europeanization, etc.), it proves more feasible to at least keep under control (under a threshold of violence against persons) conflicts which deal with cultural/identify issues, as compared with conflicts which necessitate arbitrations in terms of territory (e.g. Cyprus) or of the political regime itself (e.g. Northern Ireland). Probably, also, more legal instruments are at the disposal of the minority communities when they want to push their ‘cultural’ claims. Naturally, in addition, the presence of accommodation mechanisms, through specific foundations (in Estonia), or through some more neo-corporatist arrangements (in Austria), combined with these legal possibilities (see above), enables the pragmatic solving of at least some of the ‘cultural’ issues at stake.

22 In short: because the level of conflict is a constant (or at least only seldom varies) over the whole period of study, we have no evident temporal cut-off points to create the ‘cases’ for csQCA treatment. Thus, we have to choose an informed rule of thumb in terms of historical ‘depth’ of each case. Choosing 15 years would erase much variation, because most of the possible stimuli would be present at least at some stage over 15 years). With 10 years, this problem is much less severe.
The second strand of causal paths (3 of them) concerns Belgium:

First causal path : (Belgium45-55+Belgium55-65+Belgium65-75+Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prewwii * dima dimd1</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [low saliency of the “cultural” dimensions : religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [low saliency of the “global external” dimension : decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second causal path : (Belgium45-55+Belgium55-65+Belgium65-75+Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prewwii * dimc dimd1</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [low saliency of the “political” dimensions : centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions] AND [low saliency of the “global external” dimension : decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third causal path : (Belgium45-55+Belgium55-65+Belgium65-75+Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prewwii * dimd1 dimd2</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [low saliency of the “global external” dimension : decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [low saliency of the “proximate external” dimension : neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation of these three causal paths : this is very consistent with the Belgian context : there is no tradition to solve conflicts in a violent way (politics of compromise), and the linguistic/cultural issues have actually been largely “digested” through some institutional reforms (although those issues remain symbolically important). Moreover, there is no particular outside pressure on the conflict, and it is thus completely an “endogenous” conflict. What the third causal paths add to the story is that no neighbouring country (e.g. France, the Netherlands) intervenes in any way, and that diasporas and bordering communities are “non-issue”. To cut a long story short: there is not crucial ingredient (or combination of ingredients) which would spark off more violent conflict.
6.2. Test 2: with ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception

This test yields quite a variety of causal paths, some of which are more straightforward to interpret than others, but all of which deliver useful insights.

First comes a pair of causal paths for the Austrian case:

First causal path: (Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMA * dimb</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions : religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [low saliency of the “socio-demographic and economic” dimensions : socio-economic, demographic/population shifts, territorial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second causal path: (Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMA * dmc</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions : religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [low saliency of the “political” dimensions : centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: these two causal paths are quite complementary. In both paths, we find a high saliency of the ‘cultural’ dimensions – in this case, mainly language and identity issues. However it is not because the conflict is more of cultural nature that it does not escalate (see also above). The reason is to be found in the articulation (the combination) with other factors. The first path shows that the cultural divisions (which are salient and do generate some level of conflict) do not really coincide with socio-economic or territorial divisions. Indeed, the Slovenes in Carinthia are quite spread out in the territory, and are not particularly economically disadvantaged. In these circumstances, the potential for escalation is much lower – this is the antithesis of what happened in Northern Ireland in the 60s, or in Cyprus up to this day. The second path shows that a further reason for non-escalation of this mostly ‘cultural’ conflict is that there are only few radical ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (at least on the minority, i.e. Slovene side) which would be able to instrumentalize this conflict and drive radical activists to more violent action.

Next comes yet another pair of causal paths, also pertaining to the Austrian case:

First causal path: (Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREWWII ACTIONS</td>
<td>* [before WWII, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second causal path: (Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMA * ACTIONS</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “cultural” dimensions: religious, identity, cultural/linguistic dimensions] AND [there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: at first sight, the first causal path seems very counter-intuitive, as there is a ‘historical’ potential for violence (because of prior experiences), and there is also a high density of non-conventional actions. Normally, this combination of conditions should lead to further escalation. However the answer to the puzzle (and also a meaningful interpretation of the second causal path) is that what is specific in the Carinthian case is that most non-conventional actions are conducted not by the minority group (the Slovene speakers), but rather by the majority group (the German nationalists around Haider etc., who tear down Slovene road signs. These majority activists are not really repressed by the authorities and thus cannot become “martyrs” for a potential reservoir of even more radical activists (who would engage in more violent means of action).

Finally, in the third series of causal paths, we always find a condition having to do with self-other perception, combined with various other conditions.

First causal path: (Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prewwii Perception(C){1}</td>
<td>* [before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [both “camps” perceive each other as alien, or both “camps” perceive each other as non-existent]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: the interpretation is quite straightforward. In contemporary Belgium, there would be a potential for more violence, in particular because of negative self-other perceptions on both sides (alien-alien). However but the lack of a tradition of violent action – in terms of violence against persons – is a key factor which prevents further escalation.

Second causal path: (Estonia90-00+Belgium55-65+Belgium65-75)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prewwii Perception(C){1}</td>
<td>* [before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [one “camp” perceives the other as alien, but the other “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: Once again, we find (as above) the lack of a tradition of violent action, in terms of violence against persons. But what is more crucial, at least in the Estonian case, is that it is mostly the minority (the Russian speakers) who is open and willing to negotiate, more so than the (ethnic) Estonian authorities. This could be an explanation of the lesser degree of radicalization.

Third causal path: (Estonia90-00+Austria45-55+Austria95-05)
6.3. Test 3: with ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

When we opt for the “paradigm discordance” operationalization of the conflict paradigm condition, we obtain two further causal paths.

First causal path: (Estonia90-00+Belgium45-55+Belgium55-65+Belgium65-75+Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prewwii * parad_disc</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had not reached a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation] AND [the two “camps” agree on the nature of the conflict (paradigm accordance)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: both in Estonia and in Belgium, because the 2 sides agree on the nature of the conflict, and because there is no ‘tradition’ of violent political action (see above), some form of accommodation or compromises can be reached. This largely prevents further conflict escalation.

Second causal path: (Belgium65-75+Belgium75-85+Belgium85-95,Belgium95-05+Austria45-55+Austria55-65,Austria65-75,Austria75-85,Austria85-95+Austria95-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTIONS * no accom</td>
<td>[there is frequent occurrence of non-conventional types of action (with no violence against persons)] AND [presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: in Carinthia (in Austria more broadly) and in Belgium alike, there is a long tradition of negotiation and accommodation (see above). When it is combined with the fact that the group which conducts most non-conventional actions is not the minority group, but rather by the majority group (see above – actually this is also true in Belgium), which does not consider itself as ‘oppressed’, this is not conducive to further escalation.

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23 The tests with the «C» variant for self-other perception did not yield any additional relevant minimal formulae.

24 In Belgium, most of the more radical actions on the ground are conducted by radical Flemish nationalist activists, such as the TAK.
7. Final analysis: conflict de-escalation

Remember that we do not expect to find opposite causal paths for de-escalation, as compared to those we had obtained for conflict escalation (see Section 5), simply because social-political phenomena are complex, one facet of that complexity being that there is no “causal symmetry” in the real world of community conflicts (see Section 2).

7.1. Test for strong de-escalation (from low-intensity conflict to political tension situation) (stage 4 → stage 2)

For this first series of text, we still use the first model (the one for conflict escalation, as used in Section 5; see also Table 3), with one key difference of course: we now analyze the minimal formulae for the cases with a ‘0’ outcome value on conflict escalation. Indeed de-escalation (and not status quo) is the logical opposite of escalation.

To contrast with the escalating cases in sections 5.2. and 5.3., i.e. cases which have escalated all the way to low-intensity conflict: in those same countries, we have 3 cases with strong de-escalation (from stage 4 (low-intensity conflict) to stage 2 (political tension situation)). Different tests have yielded useful terms of minimal formulae – but NB: much less so than for the previous analyses of conflict escalation (Section 5).

7.1.1. With ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception

We basically obtain one meaningful causal path:

Causal path: (Ireland73-83+Cyprus59-67+Kosovo76-86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1MD2 parad_change no_accom</td>
<td>* [high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension] AND [no change of main paradigm occurred (in none of the two “camps”) AND [presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: These three cases cannot be interpreted in the same way. The Northern Irish (1983) and Kosovo (1986) cases are relatively proximate in the sense that the so-called ‘accommodation initiatives’ are actually security and/or repression policies conducted by the central authorities (London and Belgrade). There is however a quite important nuances between the two cases. In Northern Ireland, the British administration also implements reforms that are in favour of the Catholic minority, by suspending the Stormont regime which was dominated by the Unionists. This is not the case in Kosovo, where the conflict is only “frozen” by military and police action. In other words: the conflict is not at all solved, but rather maintained in a state of latency. Through this ‘militarized peace’, the external de-stabilizing factors (e.g. the radical, guerrilla-like Albanian groupings with links in Albania) are temporarily neutralized – without the strong military presence of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army and police forces, the ‘Albanian connection’ would of course have constituted a strong re-escalating factor (this is exactly what happened a few years later with escalation to high-intensity conflict in Kosovo). In Northern Ireland, there is also a certain form of freezing of the conflict with the installation “peace keeping” British forces (which are not perceived this way by the Catholics, naturally), but at the same time there are genuine attempts to reform the system. These reforms are pushed both by the Irish (Eire) and British
governments – this illustrates the fact that external actors can have either an escalating or a de-escalating impact; it all depends how they exert their influence. These reform attempts, still, do not mean that the conflict is solved either; it is rather ‘contained’ and some solutions are sought for, even if those solutions do not address the root causes of the conflict.

The Cyprus case (1967) is different, in that it is the UN intervention – a much less ‘proximate’ actor – which freezes the conflict. In complete contrast with the Kosovo case (see right above), it is a ‘benevolent’ intervention. The similar feature is that, in Cyprus as well, the conflict is not solved at all. One will have to wait for the Annan plan (2004) as a first genuine and comprehensive conflict resolution ‘package’.

What is common to all three cases, thus, is that the conflict is only “frozen”, and that the paradigms of both ‘camps’ remain entrenched and are even reinforced by the military intervention.

### 7.1.2. With ‘paradigm discordance’ condition and variant ‘C’ of self-other perception

We obtain only one useful additional causal path, largely overlapping with the one discussed right above:

Causal path (Ireland73-83+Kosovo76-86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DlMD2 Perception(C) {3} * no_accom</td>
<td>[one “camp” perceives the other as alien, but the other “camp” perceives the other as a possible partner] AND [high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension] AND [presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: this complements the previous causal path, in that the ‘self-other’ perception factor add one further possibility of accommodation. In concrete terms: there is at least a potential ‘opening’ for a possible arrangement, as one side perceives the other as a possible partner. For instance, in the Northern Irish case (early 70s), when the Protestants were forced to reconsider their attitudes towards the Catholic minority, most of the Protestants have begun to see them as political opponents – with whom some arrangements could be envisaged, but towards which they still held a great number of prejudices.

### 7.1.3. With 15-year time span (various models)

We only obtain one further useful causal path:

Causal path: (Ireland68-83+Cyprus59-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dimd1 * dimc</td>
<td>[low saliency of the “global external” dimension: decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension] AND [low saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comments/interpretation: The low saliency of the global-external dimension is a bit puzzling. However the other factor is useful in terms of interpretation, at least for the Northern Irish case: in the 1970s, some quite significant political-institutional reforms were implemented, and thus at least some of the most hotly contested issues with regards to access to political power (for the Catholics) could be met. It were precisely those issues which had lead to the previous conflict escalation.

### 7.2. Test for de-escalation (from low-intensity conflict to violent political conflict) (stage 4 → stage 3)

From here onwards, we use the “inverted” model for some conditions, because of the inversion of the outcome variable (see Table 4 and Section 4.5).

It should be noted that, for all these de-escalation analyses, most of findings were less easy to interpret, as we obtained many less straightforward, or even counter-intuitive findings. Thus only few causal paths are discussed in this section and in the next one as well (de-escalation from level 3 to level 2). Even those who are discussed here below are quite disputable for some cases.

All 4 tests yield the same result, with 10-year and with 15-year time span, and enable us to single out two potentially exploitable causal paths.

**First causal path:** (Ireland73-83+Cyprus59-67+Kosovo76-86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DImc</td>
<td>low saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: This causal path actually overlaps with the one discussed in the section right above. It could be useful to interpret the Northern Irish case, once again, because some of the specifically political claims (citizenship rights and access to the political scene) could be partly met by some reforms. However, this causal path does not appear to be useful to interpret the Cyprus and Kosovar cases, because none of the major political claims of the contesting parties (to the exception of the Serbs of Kosovo, possibly) were actually met through the ‘pacifying’ interventions.

**Second causal path:** (Ireland73-83+Cyprus59-67+Kosovo76-86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DImD2</td>
<td>high saliency of the “proximate external” dimension: neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities dimension</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: Once again, only the Northern Irish case can be usefully interpreted by this causal path: from the early 70s onwards, the government of the Republic of Ireland made every effort to support peace initiatives and to co-operate with the British government so as to solve the conflict. Indeed this could probably be a meaningful de-escalating factor, as an arrangement which involved (directly or indirectly) the Irish (Eire) authorities had much more chance to be perceived as legitimate by the Catholics in Northern Ireland. In the two other cases however (Cyprus and Kosovo), this causal path is meaningless.
because, on the contrary, the ‘proximate external’ factors have always played an escalating role – i.e. respectively the ‘motherlands’ of Greece and Turkey, and the Albanians of Albania and Serbs of Serbia (outside of Kosovo).

7.3. Test for de-escalation (from violent political conflict to political tension situations) (stage 3 → stage 2)

None of the tests with a 10-year time span seemed to yield relevant minimal formulae. The only test which enabled us to obtain some interpretable results was the one with the ‘paradigm change’ condition and variant ‘A’ of self-other perception, over a 15-year time span. Even in this test, many potential causal paths also had to be dismissed, because they did not seem to make sense. In all, only three useful causal paths could eventually be kept.

First causal path : (Sandzak85-00+Vojvodina89-99)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREWWII</td>
<td>[before WWII, the conflict had already reached, at some point, a level of conflict which was at least as high as the highest level of conflict reached after the escalation]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: normally, a prior history of higher level of violence should not contribute to conflict de-escalation, quite the contrary, so at first sight this causal path seems counterintuitive. However we could suggest an interpretation, specifically for these two former Yugoslav cases. Probably the ‘hidden’ complementary factor here is: ‘accommodation’ policies (read: more or less repressive policies). In substance: if, in previous historical periods, the conflict had already degenerated into higher levels of violence, both conflicting parties (or at least the dominant party, in those two case the ethnic Serbs) might have learned, out of experience, ways to ‘solve’ the conflict, or at least ways to keep it at a latent level (see previous sections). In former Yugoslavia, these ‘solutions’ amounted to the imposition of a strong, centralized power by the Belgrade authorities.

Second causal path : (Cyprus45-59)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMDI1</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “global external” dimension : decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII dimension]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: Here, the core of the explanation of the ‘effectiveness’ of de-escalation is the intervention from an authoritative outside played: the British authorities. Indeed, it was London which oversaw the whole process leading the signing of agreements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1959. This is also in line with the escalation mechanisms which, in the Cyprus case, were always tightly linked with external factors – namely, in the 40s and 50s, the process of de-colonization by the British (see Section 5).

Third causal path : (Cyprus45-59)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>perception(a)</td>
<td>[any other self-other perception situation (both camps do not perceive each other as alien)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comments/interpretation: this finding is in line with previous ones (see previous sections): there was at least some potential ‘opening’ for some negotiations and arrangement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, because the self-other perception pattern was not of the “alien v/s alien” type. Note, however, that these arrangements could only have some (provisional) effectiveness in terms of conflict de-escalation because they were largely monitored and imposed by an external party, the British authorities (see previous causal path).
8. Final analysis: “non-de-escalation”

Finally, it is justified, both from an empirical and methodological perspective, to conduct specific tests for those situations of non-decrease of the intensity of the conflict when it has already reached a relatively high level of violence. This situation is indeed completely different from the cases of “non-escalation” in countries which have durably stayed at a low level of community conflict violence (see Section 6).

Once again, as for the tests of de-escalation, only very few meaningful minimal formulae could be obtained. In all, only two of them were deemed sufficiently convincing to be discussed here below.

8.1. Non-escalation at high level of conflict (further escalation to high-intensity conflict, level 5)

This corresponds to the case of Kosovo, which constitutes a noteworthy exception in our pool of examined cases: it is the only case which, after having escalated to ‘low-intensity conflict’, escalated further to ‘high-intensity conflict’, in 1997 and then again in 2002. Only the tests with a 10-year time span (various models) yielded one, single useful causal path.

Causal path: (Kosovo88-97+Kosovo97-05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMC</td>
<td>[high saliency of the “political” dimensions: centre-periphery, security dilemma and access to political scene, political leaders, citizenship denial dimensions]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments/interpretation: This causal path is very much in line with what we found out in the interpretation of the factors leading to the preceding stages of escalation (and especially de-escalation, see Section 7) for the Kosovo case. In substance, when the conflict was de-escalated, this was almost fully done by military imposition, without genuinely solving any of the ‘political’ root causes of the conflict. In those circumstances, there is fuel for the conflict to escalate again, even up to a higher level, because radical political leaders can more easily instrumentalize this non-solving of the ‘political’ aspects of the conflict and transform it in a high-intensity conflict.

8.2. Non-escalation at intermediate level of conflict (conflicts which remain durably at ‘violent political conflict’ stage, level 3)

Once again, only one single ‘meaningful’ causal path could be identified, with a 10-year time span; it concerns especially the Basque case, as well as the Northern Irish case for a more recent period:

Causal path: (Basque75-85+Basque85-95,Basque95-05+Ireland85-95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of formula</th>
<th>Verbal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCOM</td>
<td>[presence of significant accommodation initiatives]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comments/interpretation : At first sight, this causal path seems counterintuitive. However, if we also bear in mind the previous example of Kosovo, we remember that what is considered as an ‘accommodation’ policy can be perceived quite differently in the two opposite ‘camps’, and also that such a policy is sometimes not really a pacifying policy – rather a policy of containment. In the Northern Irish case, the accommodation policies jointly driven by the British government (in particular the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement) have remained subject to contestation (at least up till the 1998 Good Friday agreement) at least within factions in the more radical organizations on both sides. Thus the conflict could not escape a ‘certain’ level of violence, with some events with violence against persons. In the Basque case, in the whole post-Franco period, the accommodation policies – not least the creation of the Autonomous Regions (Autonomous) – did not lead to the suppression of violence against persons. The key reason is that, as in the Irish case, this institutional policy was still criticized as being way too limitative by the more radical nationalist Basque factions (not only by ETA itself). Therefore, the “abertzale” (the radical nationalist organisational milieu, mostly Left-wing) could keep some momentum in its more radical forms of action, and ETA armed actions (including murders and bombings) in particular could keep at least some legitimacy in those circles.
9. General conclusions

9.1. Overall results

One core goal of the PEACE-COM project was to analyze several ‘thick’, multilayered, dynamic and complex cases of community conflicts, in a comparative and systematic way, and also over a long period of time (the whole post-WWII period), in order identify the key determinants leading to community conflict escalation and de-escalation. This was a very ambitious goal indeed.

We dare say that this goal has been largely reached. In order to meet this challenge, we opted for a “systematic cross-case analysis” approach. Within this approach, we exploited a set of techniques – Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – which are both formal and case-oriented, and which enable one to systematically identify core regularities across cases, in the form of key combinations of conditions leading to an outcome of interest.

In more concrete terms, in the course of the PEACE-COM teamwork, we were first able to grasp the historical and narrative details and specificities of several ‘thick case studies’, and then to synthesize them into comparable ‘synthetic case descriptions’ SCDs. On this basis, we were able to then build a quite complex model (as many as 13 potential explanatory factors, or conditions), and to operationalize different types of outcomes in terms of conflict escalation, non-escalation, de-escalation and non-de-escalation. Thanks to the power of Boolean minimization algorithms in the QCA analyses, we were able to identify core regularities in the form of , we were able to identify core regularities in the form of key combinations of conditions linked with the outcome of interest in clusters of specific cases. Finally, to square the circle, we were able to make sense of those core regularities, by going back to the ‘thick’ cases with their specificities to unravel some key causal mechanisms leading to conflict escalation, non-escalation, de-escalation or non-de-escalation.

One key over-arching result of our analyses is that single explanatory factors seldom come out. Rather, in most cases (see sections 5 to 8), most factors operate in combination. This multiple conjunctural causation (to use QCA terminology), which has been empirically confirmed by our analyses, is in line with core theoretical expectations of the PEACE-COM project (see D1 and D9 reports), and also with other findings in the project when the ‘monitoring system’ was tested on the actual cases (see D4 and D13 reports). It not only implies that the key conditions operate in conjunction, but also that there are, for some operationalizations of the outcome at least, different combinations of conditions (different causal ‘paths’) leading to the outcome. In other words: there is not a single one-size-fits-all explanation, be it for conflict escalation, non-escalation, de-escalation or non-de-escalation, respectively. Note that, from a policy perspective, this also means that there is no single ‘best recipe’ strategy to avoid conflict escalation or to ensure conflict de-escalation, for instance (see below, however, for some indications of some key combinations which have proved more crucial in the actual conflict situations).

Altogether, there is not one single potential causal factor which never comes out in the key causal combinations – thus all the single hypotheses which were formulated can, to a limited extent at least, find some empirical confirmation. However we must make two crucial qualifications here : (a) very few of these hypotheses are confirmed in a separate way, as one

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25 Boolean algorithms for the more simple, dichotomous csQCA, and more complex set algorithms for the multi-value QCA (mvQCA) analyses.
must, most often, combine different conditions to account for the outcome; and (b) only some of the potential conditions come out much more frequently and can be considered more as ‘core’ factors (see next section).

9.2. **The theory revisited: what are the key combinations of factors for conflict escalation, non-escalation and de-escalation?**

Here below, we try to bring out some key mechanisms – most often dynamic combinations of factors – which seem to have played a more important role to explain variation in the intensity of community conflicts. Note that, because we have adopted a case-oriented approach (see Section 2), our assessment of the extent to which a given causal path is ‘important’ is not primarily based on frequency considerations. In other words: the ‘importance’ of a causal paths is rather assessed in terms of its relevance for a case or a cluster of cases with a similar outcome.

As shall clearly come out of the sections below, we identify qualitatively and substantively different ‘stories’, ‘narratives’ or ‘causal paths’ when we examine, respectively, escalation, non-escalation, de-escalation or non-de-escalation. In other words: for instance, the potential ‘good recipes’ which lead to conflict de-escalation are not the opposite of the recipes for conflict escalation (see causal asymmetry, here above).

9.2.1. **Escalation: key mechanisms**

A first key empirical finding is that ‘identity entrepreneurs’ play a key role in conflict escalation, especially in the passage to violent conflict. However this factor does not operate alone: those identity entrepreneurs – who are particular type of political entrepreneurs embedded in a specific community – are often more ‘efficient’ (so to speak) in their attempts to escalate the conflict when some latent cleavages (or conflict dimensions) can be re-activated (e.g. in Sandzak or Cyprus).

In another core combination of escalating factors, the crucial factor has to do with perceptions (see also the D9 report), in three ways: (a) the framing of the conflict (in particular paradigm change or paradigm discordance, i.e. a disagreement on the core issue at stake in the conflict); (b) the perception of one’s own community; and, linked with the previous point, (c) the perception of the other community or ‘camp’. The more explosive situations are, firstly, those in which the conflict is deeply entrenched, in the framing of the conflict – there is stability in how the conflict is framed (non-change of conflict paradigm), on who are the “culprits” and who are the “victims”. Secondly, some dynamic identity entrepreneurs (see above) must be there to instrumentalize those entrenched paradigms. Third, and last but not least, are those situations in which one community is (or, rather perceives it is) being durably alienated, not ‘recognized’ by the other community (e.g. Ireland, Cyprus). Note that these factors must operate in conjunction – thus, the mere presence of an “alien v/s alien” self-other perception is not a sufficient condition to witness conflict escalation. The Belgian case (in

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26 In two ways: being considered as menacing « aliens » (see next footnote) or, even worse, being considered as « non-existing » or not worth considering (see Section 3.2.7.).

27 Meaning: each community perceives the ‘other’ community (out-group) as an alien. In this context, there is a domination of accusations, ethnocentrism and prejudices; and there is the perception of an open conflict between the community groups, and of the impossibility of compromises (see Section 3.2.7.).
some periods) is a perfect case in counterpoint: there is an “alien v/s alien” self-other perception, but this country has never gone beyond ‘stage 2’ conflicts (political tension situations). This is a reminder that the factors discussed here very seldom operate in isolation (see previous section).

Third, an last, for the passage to open warfare specifically (‘stage 4’: low-intensity conflict), a crucial factor is the absence of significant ex ante accommodation initiatives. This factor must however be complemented by another factor: the claims at stake (which are not met by accommodation initiatives) must stem from minority communities. In particular, not responding to peacefully expressed grievances from minority communities (e.g. because some of these demands are considered as unacceptable, ‘non-discussable’ or irrelevant by the dominant community) is an almost certain path to further escalation, especially if some radical groups are ready to be mobilized on the ground. (e.g. Northern Ireland in 71, Kosovo in 88). In this respect, the worst way to respond to peacefully expressed grievances is to resort to armed repression (e.g. once again Northern Ireland in 71, and Kosovo in 88). This is a clear rejoinder to a conclusion of the D12 report, which demonstrates that conflict escalation is often the result of violent militarized response from the central State (against the peacefully expressed demands of the ‘periphery’, namely the minority community). Such militarized responses are sometimes framed by the central State as ‘accommodation’ policies, but in fact they can only be viewed as such by the allies on the ground (e.g. the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo), and thus cannot contribute to any form of ‘real’ pacification (quite the contrary, as demonstrated above).

9.2.2. Non-escalation: key mechanisms

For the identification of core mechanisms of durable non-escalation (never beyond ‘stage 2’, i.e. political tension situation), we examined three countries or regions over a long period of time: Carinthia (Austria), Belgium and Estonia.

A first combination of factors accounting for non-escalation centres around the fact that the conflict is more of the ‘cultural’ kind (e.g. religious, identity, language) – but this it itself does not guarantee non-escalation, as the cases of Northern Ireland or Kosovo (see above) clearly remind us. The key narrative is twofold. On one hand, when the cultural dividing line does not strongly coincide with socio-economic or territorial dividing lines – thus the ‘cultural’ minority community is not, for instance, also socio-economically underprivileged than the ‘cultural’ majority community and, consequently, there is little reason to engage in more radical action (e.g. the Slovene speakers in Carinthia). Note that this a rejoinder to the famous Lipset & Rokkan theory of “cross-cutting cleavages”: when the main societal cleavages do not overlap, this produces a more pacified and compromise-seeking political interaction. On the other hand, even if there is some form of local contention (e.g. non-conventional actions on the ground, at the local level, which could radicalize the conflict), there is not a broad reservoir of radical ‘identity entrepreneurs’ to instrumentalize this mostly cultural conflict.

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28 Quite often because the minority community itself is perceived by the majority community as not relevant (see previous footnote), and/or as being a threat to the integrity of the majority community (e.g. the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, from the main Serb perspective; or the Northern Irish Catholics, from a Protestant perspective).

29 Note also that this is actually the exact opposite of the Northern Irish case in the 60s, for instance, where there was a perfect “match” between the religious, territorial and socio-economic cleavages, with as result a pretty explosive situation.
A second, specific path towards non-escalation, which mainly accounts for the Belgian case (and also, to a lesser extent, to the Estonian case) is the combination of no prior experience of ‘efficient’ use of violent means in the conflict, and of little or no intervention from ‘external’ players. The first factor is quite straightforward: neither of the two sides of the conflict can refer to past ‘glorious victories’ over the enemy on the battlefield, nor can they maintain the memory of a humiliating defeat and plead for revenge (for a perfect counter-example, see the Kosovo case). However this factor does not operate alone – after all, in theory, some leaders on either side could very well envisage to make a move away from the peaceful conflict-solving tradition, and go for more violent means of action. The second factors, thus, equates to the fact that no external player intervenes to further radicalize the conflict – when such players intervene, most often this has negative consequences (e.g. the role of the Albanians in Albania vis-à-vis the Kosovo context). In the Belgian case, neither ‘proximate’ external players (neighbouring countries, diasporas, etc), nor more ‘global’ external players (e.g. U.N., etc.) significantly mingle in the conflict. Thus, the conflict maintains its solely ‘domestic’ dynamic, and more routinized practices can be reproduced, generation after generation of political leaders – typically: pacts, compromise agreements, log-rolling and ‘package deals’ in the Belgian case.

The third and last causal narrative leading to non-escalation has to do with what we could define as an ‘inversion’ of the logic of contention. These are situations in which, paradoxically perhaps, the ‘non-conventional’ modes of action are more often used by the majority community (e.g. the German-Austrian nationalists in Carinthia), and not by the minority which seeks to obtain more rights. Because the activists of the majority group are not particularly criminalized by the judiciary system, this does not encourage further escalation. In the same line of argument, referring again to the ‘self-other’ perception theory (see above), those who are the dominated community and who feel they are being discriminated against are also those who are more open to discussion and negotiation (e.g. the Slovene speakers in Carinthia, and the Russian speakers in Estonia). Note that this interesting finding runs counter to some well-established theories and models (e.g. ‘relative deprivation’ and ‘political opportunity structure’) which predict that protest and violent or more radical means of action are most likely to be initiated by the more dominated or minority groups.

9.2.3. De-escalation: key mechanisms

As a note of caution, let us first concede that our analyses of the causal paths towards de-escalation were, on the whole, less convincing than those for escalation or non-escalation (see also below). Therefore, we had a more difficult time finding meaningful interpretation for the minimal formulae. Second, we have revealed, in the process of the analyses, that de-escalation does not necessarily equate with finding a ‘solution’ to the conflict (see also D12 report for a rejoinder). For instance, in Kosovo in the mid-1980s, the conflict was only “frozen” through military and police action, laying the foundation for even stronger escalation up to high-intensity conflict in the early 1990s. Actually when conflicts quickly and strongly de-escalate, it seldom corresponds to ‘real’ de-escalation. Such evolutions (e.g. from ‘stage 4’ to ‘stage 2’ conflicts) are rather imposed by force, without addressing the root causes the conflict. This leads us to consider the first explanatory factor: repressive and security policies which impose

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30 Indeed this can be nuanced somewhat – see the current difficulties in maintaining the «Belgian model» of compromise arrangements, as we finalize this report.
de-escalation through police or military action (or even less conventional armed action), thereby ‘freezing or ‘containing’ the conflict.

A second set of factors leading to conflict de-escalation is more linked with accommodation policies: the fact that such policies are able, more specifically, to address some political claims of the minority community (e.g. Northern Ireland in the 70s), also combined with the fact that ‘friendly neighbours’ on both sides are involved in the formulation and/or implementation of the pacification policies. For instance, in Northern Ireland in the 70s, the involvement of the Republic of Ireland (which was viewed by most Nationalists as a de facto ally, as a ‘motherland’), in co-operation with the British government (i.e. with the ‘motherland’ of the other conflicting party), was a crucial conflict de-escalating factor.

Finally, one different factor has to do (once again) with ‘self-other’ perceptions. The conflict-decreasing potential of these perceptions can only be activated when at least one ‘camp’ does not perceive the other as ‘alien’. Such a configuration opens up some possible space for negotiation and accommodation, with or without the intervention of external facilitators (e.g. the Cyprus case during the 50s). Conversely, in ‘alien v/s alien’ situations (see above), there is rather a potential for further escalation.

One last word should be said about non-de-escalation, especially for conflicts which remained stranded at a rather high level of conflict – ‘stage 3’, i.e. violent political conflict – namely the Basque case throughout the post-Franco period and the Irish case in the late 80s and early 90s. The key combination here is that (a) some form of accommodation policies have been initiated and implemented, but however (b) those accommodation policies have remained subject to contestation, at least within the ranks of more radical organizations on both sides. Therefore, a certain ‘reservoir’ of activists is kept mobilized for more violent means of action in the conflict.

**9.2.4. Confronting escalation and de-escalation: different mechanisms, different theories?**

Examining the main ‘causal narratives’ in the three sections here above, one notices that there is little symmetry in the findings – meaning, for instance: the explanation of conflict escalation is not opposite to that of conflict de-escalation. There are some small bits and pieces of symmetry here and there – e.g. the absence or presence of radical ‘identity entrepreneurs’, or the presence v/s absence of adequate and well thought-out accommodation initiatives. However, these symmetries are only partial, because they only cover one ‘ingredient’ in more complex ‘recipes’. This is actually a key empirical finding of our systematic comparative analysis: we can corroborate our over-arching hypothesis according to which there are no generic mechanisms which lead to conflict escalation and which, if inverted, would lead to conflict de-escalation.

We also note that our explanations are altogether more solid and empirically convincing for conflict escalation than for conflict de-escalation. Why is it so? A first tentative answer, more on the theoretical front, could be that the theories we mobilized, as well as the model we derived from those theories for the purpose of QCA analyses, is more geared towards escalation than de-escalation. It could mean that, for further analyses, we might have to consider more seriously the fundamentally asymmetric nature of the two phenomena (conflict escalation v/s conflict de-escalation). In practical terms, would this mean that we should look for (partly?) different theories (and consequently [partly?] different empirical models) to account for, respectively, escalation and de-escalation? At this stage, we leave this question open to debate.
A second, quite different tentative answer, more at the substantive and ‘real-life’ level, would be to contend that conflict de-escalation processes are, by nature, more complex, more ‘fuzzy’, more contradictory than escalation processes. For instance, one could contend that, in a given society consisting of well-identified communities, it is quite easy for one small group (e.g. dedicated radical activists around one charismatic ‘identity entrepreneur’) to cause conflict escalation; conversely, it is much more difficult for large groups (several of them, as the conflict has engulfed many components of society if it has escalated) to find some way towards conflict de-escalation. If these statements are altogether correct, it is quite logical that one would meet more difficulties in discovering the ‘recipes for de-escalation’ which work and to clearly link these recipes to clusters of cases.

9.3. Accommodation initiatives: mixed findings

It is useful to focus specifically on the impact of accommodation initiatives broadly defined (see D12 report), because naturally they are of direct interest from a EU policy and intervention perspective.

All things considered, our findings with regards to accommodation initiatives lead us to challenge some too simplistic and pre-conceived ideas, and also to differentiate between different types, modalities and ‘best practices’ (and ‘worst practices’, too) – in many ways, our systematic comparative findings empirically confirm or cross-validate some core statements in the D12 report.

First, our analyses demonstrate that some ex ante accommodation initiatives are actually counter-productive. Indeed they lead to conflict escalation, in the short term or in the longer term, because they are perceived by one ‘camp’ as single-sided. This was clearly the case in Sandzak and Vojvodina, for instance, where the domestic (i.e. mostly Serb-driven) accommodation initiatives were rather ‘peace-keeping’ measures which did not involve the local stakeholders, on the ground, and which sparked further escalation.

There is a clear link between this observation and another key finding of ours (which is also discussed at length in the D12 report): ‘soft’ (i.e. non-military) accommodation initiatives can only yield results under some very demanding conditions – only if: (a) they bring all the conflicting parties around the table, even the more radical groups which are labelled by some as ‘terrorists’; and (b) they are encompassing, i.e. dealing not only with outbursts of violence, but also with the root causes of the conflict, whether political, economical, social, cultural, etc. A ‘textbook example’ case – a rare case, actually – of such a process is the one which eventually led to the ‘Good Friday’ agreements in 1998 (Northern Ireland).

Another important point is that the ‘accommodation initiatives’ label is a very broad one. It corresponds to many different types of initiatives or policies: ‘domestic’ v/s ‘external’ ones, ‘benevolent’ v/s ‘repressive’ ones, ‘soft’ v/s ‘hard’ ones, etc. The point we want to make here is that our analyses have not produced empirical conclusions about the impact (jointly with other factors) of accommodation initiatives in general on community conflicts. Rather, we have established some causal links between some sub-types of accommodation initiatives which, together with other factors, have a conflict-increasing or conflict-decreasing effect. This is no small nuance – indeed, in the preceding sections, we have discussed at lengths some scenarios in which a particular type of accommodation initiative proves counterproductive. For instance, quite many ‘domestic’ accommodation initiatives are more tricky in their effects because they are often perceived by one ‘camp’ (often rightly so) as one-sided. In other examples (e.g. former Yugoslavia), we showed that, specifically, more ‘repressive’ accommodation policies initiated by the central authorities yielded catastrophic
results in the longer run. And so on. The bottom line is that, as is also discussed at length in
the D12 report, accommodation policies are very difficult tools to manipulate.

To broaden the picture a bit more, let us conclude on the possibilities for a given public
authority (e.g. national, European, etc.) to have a decisive impact on a community conflict,
more specifically in terms of de-escalation or, even better, in terms of non-escalation (conflict
prevention policies). Space does not allow us to develop this point at length (see also D12
report), but our systematic comparative findings enable us to identify a key difficulty. In
substance it is highly unlikely that a ‘recipe’ for community conflict de-escalation or non-
escalation which has proved effective in a given national setting can be simply ‘exported’ and
applied to another national setting and also yield fully satisfactory results. For one thing, there
are many ‘contextual’ factors (outside of our analytical models) which could intervene at
some stage in the causal process, and modify the eventual outcome in terms of level of
conflict. Second, one should not confuse an analytical model with the complexity of the real
world – any analytical model is vastly over-simplifying reality. For instance, in our models,
we give attributes to organizations, or states – but these attributes are always changing, and
some organizations (e.g. activist organizations) can quickly shift their goals and properties
depending on the ‘political opportunity structure’, etc. Third and not least, some core factors
of conflict non-escalation in some countries simply cannot quickly be implemented in other
countries, because of objective, factual differences. For instance, a deeply rooted political
accommodation culture (e.g. Belgium), which proves to be a key (and quite self-evident)
factor of non-escalation, cannot be imposed by decree in, say, regions in former Yugoslavia.
Other example : in objective terms, the socio-economic situation of the Slovene speakers in
Austria is much less problematic (as compared to that of the majority community Carinthia)\nthan, say, that of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo vis-à-vis the Serbs in that same region, or
that of the Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, and so on.

9.4. Paths for further research

Naturally, although the PEACE-COM project comes to an end, this systematic comparative
analysis effort opens up further paths for analyses and reflections. Here below, we discuss a
selective list of some key remaining topics, challenges and avenues for future research31.

First, although we have (rightfully) argued that our core goals of this whole comparative
enterprise are largely met, there is still some ample room for methodological refinements.
Probably the most challenging aspect is the time dimension, which we have operationalized in
a quite crude and ‘mechanistic’ way, for the purpose of model-testing. Some core issues in
this respect would be: more fine-grained operationalization of sequences, process-tracing,
better distinction between short-term and longer-term ‘causes’, etc. Another challenge is that
of cross-system diffusion, i.e. the influences from one case to another, which we have simply
disconsidered in our analyses.

Second, some specific aspects and variables of the models could be refined. For instance, we
could have a more nuanced look at dimensions of conflict, by not only considering salient v/s
not salient dimensions, but also “latent” dimensions – as such “latent” dimensions prove to be
a key resource for ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (see above).

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31 Some of the points raised here stem from discussions at a seminar which was held at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem (21 November 2007), at which Elise Feron and Benoît Rihoux made a joint presentation of some key
PEACE-COM results. We thank our Israeli colleagues for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Third, some aspects which were not included in our models could be added, if only for the sake of performing further ‘cross-validating’ tests. One possibility would be to also consider more ‘institutional’ conditions in the search for key causal factors: e.g. more or less “democratic” regimes, with more or less high “procedural quality” (e.g. independent judiciary etc.) and organized civil society organizations and networks, etc. Such a perspective could enrich the comparison – e.g. some former Yugoslav regions could be better contrasted with, say, some West European cases, etc. However such an institutionalist perspective would also have its limitations. Indeed a key richness of our PEACE-COM theoretical framework and empirical analyses is that they are more ‘actor-centred’ (see D1 report). Another specific aspect to be included could be the issue of the uncontrolled circulation of weapons ‘on the ground’, in the local communities, which can quickly lead to escalation as soon as the ‘containment’ strategies (military occupation, police presence etc) are a bit weaker. This also opens up the way for broader comparisons (PEACE-COM examples: former Yugoslavia cases, v/s other cases such as Israel-Palestine, or the Great Lakes region).

This last remark actually opens up a broad potential for further generalization of our findings, and for expanding further our “pool” of empirical cases. With some caution, it possible for us to extend some of the conclusions of our QCA analyses (“modest historical generalization”) to the whole European space in the post-WWII period, because our comparative research design (case selection) enabled us to cover a broad diversity of cases and situations (see Section 2, and D1 report). As to other useful empirical cases to confront with the current pool of PEACE-COM cases, there are many fruitful possibilities. One key possibility is the Israel-Palestine conflict, which could help us to fine-tune the interpretation of some core ‘causal paths’ we have identified – especially for escalation and non-de-escalation (e.g. non-inclusive accommodation initiatives and their perverse effects, limitations of ‘repressive’ policies, etc.). Another possibility is various countries in the Great Lakes region, and current-day Kenya (e.g. the role of ‘identity entrepreneurs’ who instrumentalize latent cleavages, etc.). Many other cases could also be envisaged in other regions of the globe, especially those which are of particular interest for the EU (e.g. Caucasus region, former Soviet Republics, etc.). Naturally, such a broader empirical scope would also necessitate some reflections on the applicability of some of our assumptions in a non-European (and non-liberal democratic) context, e.g. with regards to the presence of consolidated civil society and state institutions, etc. Bottom line: we would learn much more, also from a policy advocacy perspective (for the EU in particular), by enlarging the pool of empirical cases.

Naturally, we should not too quickly over-generalize our current findings. This warning was also issued in the D12 report on accommodation policies, and in the D9 report on the impact of Europeanization. For instance, the role of the EU with regards to intervention in community conflicts is fundamentally different within the EU and outside of the EU boundaries. And so on.

To conclude on a more methodological note: this D8 report demonstrates that we now have developed a consolidated comparative approach, and that we can count on a set of rigorous analytical techniques (QCA) which are well-suited to help us gain more understanding of the complex causal mechanisms of community conflict escalation and de-escalation. Whichever way we choose to expand the pool of comparisons in future studies, we will be able to fruitfully exploit this approach and set of techniques – also in the eye of improving the evaluation of accommodation policies in their various forms, be they ‘domestic’ or EU-driven.